


THE RADICAL TRADITION IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

By

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Thesis submitted to the University of Edinburgh in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in Political Science. August, 1980.





POLITICAL DIVISIONS-1950

(By courtesy of Dr. John Makakis)

TO ALL THOSE WHO SUFFERED BECAUSE OF MY GREED FOR KNOWLEDGE
AND MY STUBBORN DETERMINATION TO SATISFY MY THIRST FOR EDUCATION

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ABSTRACT

This thesis attempts to describe and analyse the radical tradition embodied in religious and other movements in Northern Nigeria from the Jihad in Hausaland to the period of party politics around independence. Islamic ideology, it is argued is the historical link between the various radical movements of Northern Nigeria. In particular, I argue that Islam was the main quarry from which were mined the ideas of the N.E.P.U., the last and main representative of this tradition with which I deal.

Chapter 1 briefly describes the nature of economic and social inequality in Hausa society, and the means whereby social order is maintained. Such inequality, and the abuse of both state power and of Islam itself (described in Chapters 3 and 4) have provided the target for a series of radical movements deriving their concepts and ideology from the long-standing radical interpretation of the Qur'an and the Hadith, described in Chapter 2.

The main such radical movements are the Jihads of the early nineteenth century (Chapter 2) and the Northern Element Progressive Union, a secular nationalist party inspired by radical Islamic thought, on the one hand and, on the other, the extensive abuse and oppression of the Native Authority system of colonial Northern Nigeria described in Chapter 3. N.E.P.U. is discussed at length in Chapter 5 which attempts to analyse its debt to Islamic ideas, its social composition and history, and the reasons for its ultimate failure to achieve either

power or major domestic reforms. The final chapter reviews the evidence for arguing that Northern Nigeria shares in the radical tradition in Islam and that N.E.P.U. forms part of that tradition.

*I declare that this thesis is
entirely my own work and thus
I assume full responsibility
for any errors and absurdities
(or stupidities)*

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This thesis was researched over a number of years. To mention all to whom I am indebted for advise, assistance and contribution would hardly be possible. Nevertheless, my gratitude to them all is very sincere. But among them there are some to whom special recognition is due.

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I came to Edinburgh purposely to work under Mr. C.H. Allen, on the recommendation of Dr. Owen Hartley and Mr. Hamza Alavi and I am glad I accepted their recommendation. Working under

Mr. C.H. Allen is a delight to a research student; he has a great capacity to invoke the best in one, and to make one reach out for more materials. His supervision is as intelligent as it is meticulous. Thus, I count myself as being lucky to have had him as my supervisor. Mr. C. Fyfe has gladly suffered my intrusions into his office. He readily answered my questions and generously lent books. Due to his patience and his charitable nature our friendship matured into AMANA and so it will remain. Miss Grace Hunter and Mrs. Anne Sutherland have been most helpful and very patient with me. Dr. Mark Bray and the future Dr. Yacub Adam loaned me many books as well as contributed ideas. I am particularly grateful to Miss Susan Joyce Burrill who has contributed in many and varied ways to the completion of this thesis. She voluntarily typed parts of this thesis and she contributed immensely to uplifting my spirit at some terrible moments when I felt like giving up. Miss Indo Tanko has generously assisted me in the task of reading proofs and manuscripts. To her eagle eye I owe the discovery of innumerable slips and inconsistencies which would otherwise have escaped me. No word can express my thanks to Mr. W.P. Gaskell who became my 'God father' during my stay in Britain. I was fortunate to meet Dr. M. Hiskett in London. He introduced me to the S.O.A.S. library and advised me on how and where to get materials relevant to this thesis. He presented me with copies of his "The Development of Sa'adu Zungur's Political Thought from MARABA DA SOJA, through AREEWA JUMHURIYAA KOO MULUUKIYAA to WAAKAR YANCI", and A History of Hausa Islamic

Verse, London, 1975. Mr. A.J. Spicer has kindly spared his very busy time for me in order to answer my questions on both Sa'adu Zungur and Aminu Kano as well as to enlighten me on British colonial policy on Education in Northern Nigeria. It was Miss Marjorie Nicholson who introduced me to the T.U.C. library in London. She also directed me to the colonial office library, and she presented me with relevant copies of Venture.

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In the course of eleven years between now and when I first arrived at Ruskin College, Oxford (in 1969), to begin my study in Britain, I have incurred a considerable number of further debts of warm gratitude to many people both in Britain and Nigeria. My work could not have been done nor I personally sustained without the help, support, moral encouragement and financial assistance of my friends and relatives. Special thanks and gratitude are due to Alhaji Maina Waziri, for having taken my most onerous family responsibility throughout the period of my study. In addition, his unflagging assistance and encouragement are instrumental to the little I have achieved so far. M. Balarabe A. Muṭumbiyu supervised all my domestic affairs at Jalingo. Mallams Umaru Alhaji Bashir and Musa Usman Mapindi took great interest in my education and encouraged me accordingly. Thanks are also due to Alhajis Ali Batan Yerima Balla, S.A. Tanko Yakasai, M.B. Yumusa, Inuwa Shehu Kafanchan, Baban Gida Sa'adu; Hajiya Gambo Sawaba, King Sharif Awaisu and FG. OFF. Muhktar Umar of the Nigerian Air Force.

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All those parties are, of course, absolved of any responsibility for the use to which I put their help in the form of this thesis.

It should be noted that my education from elementary school to the research of this thesis was financed by the Nigerian tax payers, firstly, through the defunct MURI N.A.; secondly, by the former North Eastern State Government of Nigeria; and thirdly, the Gongola State Government of Nigeria. Bayero University, Kano, gave me two years study leave to write my thesis.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A.B.U.	Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria
A.G.	Action Group
A.J.K.	<u>Arewa Jumhuriya Kawai</u>
A.J.M.	<u>Arewa Jumhuriya Ko Mulukiya</u>
B.P.U.	Birom Progressive Union
B.Y.I.A.	Borno Youth Improvement Association
B.Y.M.	Borno Youth Movement
C.P.P.	Convention Peoples Party (Ghana)
C.W.C.	Central Working Committee
D.D.E.	Deputy Director of Education
D.E.	Director of Education
E.O.	Education Officer
D.H.	District Head
I.L.P.	Independent Labour Party (U.K.)
J.A.A.	<u>Jam'iiyyar Arewa Ayau</u>
J.C.G.	<u>Jam'iiyyar Ci Gaban Arewa</u>
J.M.A.	<u>Jam'iiyyar Mutanen Arewa</u>
J.M.A.A.	<u>Jam'iiyyar Mutanen Arewa Ayau</u>
J.N.S.	<u>Jam'iiyyar Neman Sawaba</u>
J.S.K.	<u>Jam'iiyyar Samarin Kano</u>
K.P.P.	Kano Peoples Party
K.S.M.	Kano State Movement
L.U.F.	Labour Unity Front
M.B.Z.L.	Middle Belt Zone League
M.C.N.	Muslim Congress of Nigeria
M.S.	<u>Maraba da Soja</u>

N.A.	Native Administration (Native Authority)
N.A.K.	National Archives Kaduna
N.A.M.	Northern Askianist Movement
N.C.C.	Northern Central Congress
N.C.N.C.	National Council of Nigerian Citizens (formerly National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons)
N.E.C.	National Executive Council
N.E.C.P.P.	North East Convention Peoples Party
N.E.P.A.	Northern Elements Progressive Association
N.E.P.U.	Nigerian Elements Progressive Union (formerly Northern Elements Progressive Union)
N.F.L.	Northern Federation of Labour
N.M.C.	Northern Muslim Congress
N.N.T.W.A.	Northern Nigeria Teachers' Welfare Association
N.P.C.	Northern Peoples Congress
N.P.F.	Northern Progressive Front
N.T.U.C.	Nigerian Trade Union Congress
P.E.O.	Provincial Education Officer
P.F.A.	<u>Parti de Federation Africaine</u>
P.P.G.	<u>Parti Progressive de Guinea</u>
P.R.P.	Peoples Redemption Party
R.D.A.	<u>Ressemblement Democratique Africaine</u>
R.S.S.	<u>Rundunar Samarin Sawaba</u>
S.O.A.S.	School of Oriental and African Studies
S.W.W.	<u>A Yau Ba Maki NEPU Sai Wawa</u>
T.M.Z.	<u>Taron Masu Zumunta</u>
T.P.U.	Tiv Progressive Union

T.T.C.	Teachers Training College
T.U.C.	Trade Union Congress
U.A.C.	United Africa Company of Nigeria Limited
U.K.	United Kingdom
U.L.C.	United Labour Congress
U.M.B.C.	United Middle Belt Congress
U.N.M.	United Nationalist Movement
U.P.G.A.	United Progressives Grand Alliance
U.T.M.	United Tiv Movement
W.Y.	<u>Wakar Yanci</u>
W.Y.N.S.	<u>Wakar Yancin NEPU Sawaba</u>
W.Y.S.	<u>Wakar Yan Sawaba</u>

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

For the sake of simplicity I transliterate and translate Arabic and Hausa words according to general academic or written usage. For example, I am aware that the word ISLAM is used in three different meanings and misunderstanding can arise from the failure to distinguish them:

- 1) Islam means the religion taught by the Prophet Muhammad and embodied in the Muslim revelation known as the Qur'an (recitation).
- 2) Islam is also the subsequent development of the above religion through tradition and through the work of the leading Muslim jurists and theologians. This includes the Shari'ah (Muslim Canon Law) and the corpus of Islamic theology.
- 3) Furthermore, Islam is the counterpart of Christendom. In this sense it refers to what Muslims actually did, i.e. Islamic civilization as known in history.

In this thesis I use the word ISLAM to mean submission to the will of ALLAH which combines all the three meanings above.

Hausa readers will notice that I accepted the literary colonization in which Hausa words are spelt as English writers would spell them rather than the Hausa themselves would spell them. For instance, Zariya (a female name from which is derived that of the city of Zaria) is spelt as Zaria. This is deliberately done to avoid confusion and subsequent controversy which I can ill-afford at the moment. I prefer to use MUSLIM to the equally common MOSLEM and MUHAMMAD to MOHAMMED (or worse still, MOHAMMET)

mainly because there is no letter 'o' in the Arabic alphabet. I have omitted most of the diacritical marks such as accents and apostrophes which are used in Arabic transliteration. In general, I tried to keep very close to the method used in the Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam (edits.) GIBB, H.A.R., and KRAMERS, J.H., Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1953.

- ABD -(slave) from which common names like ABDULLAHI, etc., are derived.
- ALHAJI -(Female: HAJIYA). A title of respect for a Muslim who has performed pilgrimage at MAKKA.
- ALKALI -A Muslim court judge.
- ATTAJIRAI -(sing: ATTAJIRI) rich merchants.
- CALIPH -Deputy of the Holy Prophet Muhammad.
- The title was originally reserved for the four companions of the Prophet who also succeeded him in leading the original Muslim community. It was later adopted by Muslim rulers with the implication that they have also inherited the holiness of the four successor Caliphs.
- DAJJAL -(DUJJAL) false prophet or, simply, anti-Christ.
- DAR AL-HARB -Literally, the house of war (that of struggle for Islamization), i.e. the areas of the world still unsubdued by Islam.
- DAR AL-ISLAM -Literally, the house of Islam, i.e. the actual realm of the Muslim faith in which Islam is in full religious and political control.

DHIMMI	-A non-Muslim living under Muslim protection governed by the mutual obligation of peaceful coexistence.
ETSU	-King: the chief of Nupeland. This is the official title of the ruler of Bida Emirate.
FATWA	-Enlightenment on religious matters.
FIR'AUNA	-Pharoah
FITNA	-A rupture of public peace.
HABE	-(sing: KADO) non-Fulani as distinct from the Fulani.
HADITH	-Traditions concerning Prophet Muhammad's actions and utterances.
HAJJ	-(HAJ) The pilgrimage to MAKKA in the lunar month of ZUL-HADJ. This enjoined pilgrimage upon those who can afford it is one of the five pillars of Islam.
HIJIRA	-(HIDJRA; HEGIRA) exile (the breaking of relations by emigration). This tradition started with the flight of Prophet Muhammad from MAKKA to MADINA in A.D. 622, from which year the Muslim calendar dates. The term is also used to refer to the flight of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio from Degel to Gudu on 21/2/1804.
IBN	-Son of
IJMA	-The consensus of Muslim Scholars
IJTIHAD	-The right and the responsibility of every Muslim to interpret the Qur'an and the <u>Hadith</u> .

IMAM	-(LIMAN) a prayer leader. The temporal and spiritual leader in an Islamic community hence a title for the Caliph.
ISLAM	-Submission to the Will of Allah or, the act of surrendering oneself to Allah. In common everyday Arabic language ISLAM means to deliver in sound condition.
ISLAMIYYA	-(Of Islam or followers of Islam). In Northern Nigeria, the term is used to refer to a particular type of school which combined religious and secular teachings. The idea was hatched by M. Sa'adu Zungur but the schools were actually founded by Alhaji Aminu Kano.
ISMA'ILIS	-A group of Shi'ite Muslims who follow Isma'il Ibn Ja'afar al Sadiq, a descendant of the Holy Prophet Muhammad.
JAMA'A	-People: often refers to Muslim Community.
JIHAD	-Exertion. Any struggle against injustice; war in self-defense; or campaigns in defence of Islam.
KA'ABA	-The Muslim Holy Shrine situated in the grand mosque in MAKKA.
KADIRIYYA	-A Muslim sect ^{order (or brotherhood)} of the followers of Shayk Abdul Kadir to which most rulers of Northern Nigeria belong.
KANA'ANA	-Canaan
KARUNA	-Aaron

- LAMIDO -King; the chief among Fulani. This is the official title of the ruler of the Adamawa Emirate.
- MAHDI -The guided one (the Muslim's equivalent of the Messiah). The name is taken by Muslim leaders who claim divine enlightenment.
- MALAM -(pl: MALAMAI; Female: MALAMA) the possessor of knowledge. It is commonly used as a courtesy title for Hausa Muslims.
- MOQIBBO -Shayk among the Fulani. A learned man. This is the official title of the first Fulani ruler of Adamawa Emirate.
- MUSLIM -The submitter, i.e. one who submits oneself to the WILL of God. This is manifested by the simple declaration that, "I witness that there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is His Messenger".
- PAGAN -In Northern Nigeria this term is used to denote followers of any religion other than Islam, Christianity and Judaism.
- PURDAH -The traditional practice of confining wives to remain in houses, most of the time, unseen by men other than their husbands.
- RAMADAN -The ninth lunar month in the Muslim calendar in which the Qur'an was revealed to the Holy Prophet Muhammad. This month is observed by fasting and abstinence from sunrise to sunset.

- SALAF -Past scholars
- SALLA -(SALLAH) prayers. Muslim festival of either
ID AL FITR or ID AL KABIR.
- SARAUTA -Hereditary traditional status in Hausaland,
which grants a title or office, of a king or
lesser rank. The holders of such titles or
offices are the SARAKUNA, the ruling class.
- SARKI -King (or chief), as LAMIDO among Fulani; MAI
or MOI in Borno; or ETSU among Nupe.
- SARKIN MUSULMI -Commander (or leader) of the faithful. This
is the title reserved for the Sultans of Sokoto.
- SAWABA -Freedom. The N.E.P.U. slogan.
- SHARI'AH -(The known path) Muslim canon law
- SHI'A -(SHI'ITES) a partisan Muslim sect which holds
that Ali- the cousin, the son-in-law of the
Holy Prophet and the fourth of the successor
Caliphs, and his descendants are the rightful
heirs of the Prophet.
- SHEHU -(SHAYK) leader or teacher. When used alone
(as the Shehu) it refers to Shehu Usman Dan Fodio.
- SUDAN -That part of Africa stretching from the southern
part of the Sahara desert to the rain forest belt
along the equator. It is derived from the Arabic
term BILAD AL-SUDAN (the country of black men).
It is often called Western Sudan to differentiate
it from the Nilotic Sudan.
- SUFI -An Islamic system of contemplative life.

SUNNAH	-(SUNNA) the orthodox code of Islamic practice transmitted through Prophet Muhammad.
TAFSIR	-Qur'anic exegesis. The translation, explanation and interpretation of the Qur'an.
TALAKAWA	-(sing: TALAKA) peasants; common people as counterposed to the SARAUNA, ruling class.
TAQIYYA	-Roughly 'dissimulation'
TAQLID	-Passive acceptance of authority
TIJJANIYYA	-A Muslim ^{order (or brotherhood)} sect <u>TARIQA</u> of the followers of Shayk Ahmadu Tijjani
TUHDASU	-Living beyond one's income under Islamic Law.
ULAMA	-(ULEMA) Muslim theologians who rule on important religious and political matters.
UMMA	-Islamic community of believers.
WA'AZI	-Muslim religious sermon
WAZIRI	-(Vizier) Chief minister in Borno; Chief councillor in the Emirates of Northern Nigeria.
YAKI	-War. For example YAKIN BASASA (the civil war, notably, of Kano).
ZAKKA	-The equivalent of tithe
ZUHD	-Austerity

INTRODUCTION

The subject of this thesis is the nature and roots of the 'radical tradition in Northern Nigeria', the ideas, individuals and movements which inspired "Northerners" from the early nineteenth century into religious and political opposition, and to demands for political and social reform. We shall show that the roots of radicalism can be found in those teachings of Islam which emphasizes the rights of the common people against their rulers and thus obliges the commoners to resist the tyranny of their rulers. 'Tradition' refers to the historical continuity which sustains ~~M~~ muslim resistance against tyranny and their insistence on maintaining the purity of their religion. This tradition is derived from the Islamic conception of history as a continual and continuing conflict between the rulers and the ruled (or the oppressors and the oppressed). We hope to show that this same radical tradition was a major influence on the Northern (later Nigerian) Elements Progressive Union (N.E.P.U.), the main post war opposition party in Northern Nigeria.

LITERATURE SURVEY ON N.E.P.U.

The principal literature on NEPU tends to fall into three main categories; two of which bear on the role of Islam. The various

historical institutional studies¹ of which Whitaker's is the fullest, least inaccurate and most perceptive, all tend to neglect the role of religious inspiration, seeing NEPU simply as a secular nationalist party akin to the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (N.C.N.C.) of Dr. Azikwe. Indeed, some of them, notably Olusanya and Coleman, see it as an offshoot of that party. Further discussion of these studies is reserved for chapter 5 and will be limited, since this thesis does not attempt to provide a detailed history of NEPU itself. The remaining material consists of biographies of leading figures in NEPU, notably Aminu Kano and M. Sa'adu Zungur,² and studies of local

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1. These include Coleman, J.S., Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, Berkeley, 1963, pp.357 & 66, Olusanya, G.O., "Political Awakening in the North; a reinterpretation", In Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, vol.4, No.1, 1967, pp.125-134; Post, K.W.J., The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959, London, 1963; Sklar, R.L., Nigerian Political Parties, Princeton, 1963; Dudley, B.J., Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria, London, 1968, Whitaker, C.S. Jr., The Politics of tradition, Princeton, 1970; and "Three Perspectives on Hierarchy - Political Thought and Leadership in Northern Nigeria", In Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol. 3-4, 1965, pp.1-19. There is also an article by Whitaker and Sklar on, "Nigerian Parties and Politics", In Coleman, J.S. and Rosberg, C.G. (eds.), Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, Berkeley, 1964, pp.597-654. Last, M., "Aspects of Administration and Dissent in Hausaland, 1800-1960", In Africa, Vol. 40, No.4, 1970, pp.345-354.
 2. For Alhaji Aminu Kano see, Feinstein, A., African Revolutionary: The Life and Times of Nigeria's Aminu Kano, New York, 1973; Dambazan, L., Dan Arewa Na Ainihi: M. Aminu Kano, Kano, 1956 and Aminu Kano, Kano 1963. In the case of M. Sa'adu Zungur see, Abdulkadir, D., The Poetry, Life and Opinions of Sa'adu Zungur, Zaria (Gaskiya Press), 1974; and Kano, Aminu, Rayuwar Ahmad Mahmud Sa'adu Zungur, Zaria (Gaskiya Press) 1973.

politics in Kano and Zaria¹ in which NEPU figured prominently. Both of these categories are concerned with the influence of Islam on the ideology and activity of their subjects.

Feinstein's biography of Aminu Kano, the NEPU leader, is detailed and enthusiastic, and useful for its basis in interview material, but it remains the work of a friend rather than a critic; and must be supplemented by the comments in Paden's study of Kano. By contrast, Hiskett's discussion of Sa'adu Zungur attempts a critical assessment of his political thought and its relationship to Islam and nationalism, and thus touches on the main theme of this thesis. Thus, Hiskett argues:

"European-style nationalism.... helped to stimulate Sa'adu Zungur's intense awareness of his own Northern identity but this express itself much more in Islamic solidarity or pan-Islamism but not in nationalism." 2

However, Dr. Hiskett overlooks Sa'adu Zungur's practice of Taqiyya (dissimulation) which was necessary for the survival of any sensible anti-colonialist, Muslim nationalist of Sa'adu Zungur's time in Northern Nigeria. All Sa'adu Zungur's contemporaries in Northern Nigeria dissimulated their true beliefs to varying degrees and in different forms. Secondly, Dr. Hiskett, does not see that attacking the Native Authority (NA) system in Northern Nigeria (see chap.3) was the

1. Paden, J.N., Religion and Political Culture in Kano, Berkeley, 1973; Smith, M.G., "Historical and Cultural Conditions of Political Corruption among the Hausa", In Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol.6, No.2, 1964, pp.164-194; Tahir, A., Scholars, Sufis, Saints and Capitalists in Kano, 1904-1974: Pattern of Bourgeois Revolution in an Islamic Society, Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge, 1975.

2. This and the Quotation below are taken from Hiskett, M., "The Development of Sa'adu Zungur's Political Thought from Maraba Dasoja, through Areema Jumhuriyako Mulukiya, to Wakar Yanci", In African Language Studies, Vol.16, 1975, pp.1-23.

first prerogative of a perceptive nationalist because as colonial creation and agents, the NAs were local versions of colonialism. Hence, challenging the NAs was a form of nationalism. Following the above observation, Dr. Hiskett further concluded that:

"To speak of Sa'adu Zungur as a 'nationalist' may be to confuse his essentially Islamic philosophy with the very different ideas on African nationhood.... of other non-Muslim personalities of African independent movements."

Undoubtedly, Sa'adu Zungur used different methods of appeal and of mobilizing the masses, to non-Muslim African nationalists. However, taking different routes does not necessarily lead to different destinations. Sa'adu Zungur's understanding of the process of decolonization was very different to that of non-Muslim West African nationalists in the sense that it arose in part from Muslims' contempt for, and thus their total rejection of, the dehumanization effects of Western Christian material culture. Yet all nationalists, muslims and non-Muslims alike, have in common the desire to overthrow foreign domination of their countries and hence they all aim at the political independence of their respective countries. In this sense Sa'adu Zungur was a nationalist like any other nationalist in West Africa.

The accounts of Kano politics by Paden and Tahir are explicitly concerned with the role of Islam and of Islamic scholar-priests (Malamai) in Kano public affairs. Thus their discussions of NEPU do not characterize it as secular in inspiration. At the same time they are unable to comprehend NEPU institutionally, as a political party contesting elections, mobilizing support through its use of links with religious brotherhoods and other organizations, and through the

exploitation of local and national grievances. In his account, Paden used Alhaji Aminu Kano's interpretation (Tafsir) of the Qur'an extensively and, by so doing, he links NEPU supporters with the reformed Tijjaniyya. Nevertheless, the historical thread which ties such a radical ~~Muslim sect~~ ^{brotherhood} and the progressive political party of Northern Nigeria is clearly missing in his analysis. Perhaps he is not aware that Alhaji Aminu Kano is the deputy Khalifa of the Tijjaniyya in Northern Nigeria. He also makes a sweeping observation that NEPU appeared ready to support any deposed Emir without attempting to explain the implicit electoral strategy (which was successful in the case of Abdulummini in Katsina Province) in the party's support for only certain deposed chiefs. NEPU did oppose bad chiefs but, at the same time, it was equally vocal in defence of rulers who were victimized by the Regional Government or who themselves became victims of the abuse of the NA system by their "powerful" Councillors.¹ Neither Dr. Paden nor Dr. Tahir attempts to explain why NEPU won local elections in areas where Tijjaniyya was strong; and although Dr. Tahir touches on the socio-economic grievances and religious roots of NEPU, nonetheless, he sees the party as essentially a "mere" protest movement.

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1. For instance, Lamido Ahmadu of Adamawa (1946-1953) was deposed in 1953 mainly because of the intrigues of all-powerful councillors. See Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., Adamawa Past and Present, Oxford, 1958, pp.145-146; Smith, Sir Bryan Sharwood, But Always As Friends, London 1967. In the case of Muhammadu Sanusi in Kano, see, Paden, op.cit., pp. 182-183. Sanusi was deposed mainly because of his personal rivalry with the Premier of Northern Nigeria. My informants also include Alhaji Ibrahim (interviewed at Maiduguri in 1972). Alhaji Ibrahim Biu is now the Chairman, Public Service Commission, Borno-State of Nigeria, and he resides in Maiduguri.

All these works are useful in that they form a solid jumping-off point for research students of the future. Through them, it is possible to obtain from secondary sources alone an adequate outline of NEPU's electoral history, its organization and sociology. Their analysis of political (and in some cases ethnic) discontent which led to the emergence of NEPU will also remain a documentary source material for curious researchers. But, having said this, it is all the sadder to have to record that what is conspicuously absent in all of them is the examination of the ideological excitement which underlined NEPU's political philosophy. None of them attempts, by way of analysis, to link NEPU to past reform movements in Northern Nigeria - or in West Africa. Thus, we are yet to be informed of the roots and the nature of NEPU radicalism. These are some of the omissions which this thesis is set to correct.

ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT

Islamic political thought begins from the belief that Islamic government exists by virtue of a divine contract based on the Shari'ah (Muslim canon law). Therefore, political science is not an independent activity of Muslim social thinkers but a department of theology. It follows that there is no absolute distinction between state and society, or between mosque and state, and there is no separate doctrine of temporal power. Religion, morals and politics are one and the same thing. Similarly, what is legal is automatically moral and vice versa. Thus political disaffection amounts to religious dissent and, as such, the legality and illegality of a political rebellion (or any political action) is deeply rooted in

Shari'ah. With the expansion of Islam, there have of course developed a body of political ideas at the base of which lie different and pre-Islamic traditions and conceptions of state. Nonetheless and local variations notwithstanding, all ~~M~~uslims accept that the central functions of State are the maintenance of Islam, the application of Shari'ah and the defence of orthodoxy against heresy.¹

There are three established sources for the raw materials upon which Islamic political thought is built:

- 1) The scattered verses of the Qur'an which deals with political thought, the tradition of the Prophet, the practice of early Islamic Community (of the time of Muhammad and his four successor Caliphs). And the interpretations of these sources in the light of later political developments, reinforced by the dogma of the divine guidance of the community and the infallibility of IJMA (the consensus of ~~M~~uslim scholars).
- 2) The formulation put forward by the administrators and writers of manuals of conduct for rulers and governors the "mirrors of Princes". These formulations stipulate the duties of rulers as well as the rights and the obligations of citizens. They are concerned with the practice rather than the theory of governments. They seek to adapt Islamic norms to existing tradition of Kingship. The basis of these formulations is justice rather than right religion.²
- 3) The formulations of philosophers which owes much to Greek

1. For a concise and illuminating analysis of the functions of an Islamic state, see Rosenthal, E.I.J., "Some Aspects of Islamic Political Thought," In Islamic Culture, Vol.xxii, No.1, 1948.
2. Dr. M.T.A. Liman, a senior Lecturer, in the department of Arabic and Islamic Studies, Bayero University, Kano, drew my attention to various examples of these adaptations in Islamic history.

philosophy in the sense that it identifies the "Philosopher King" with the Imam (Caliph). Its basis is piety and knowledge rather than religion or justice.

The basis of Islamic political structure is the UMMA - an international/^Muslim community bound together by the ties of religion. Within the UMMA all are equal and there is no distinction of rank but only of function. God alone is the sovereign in the UMMA and His rule is both direct and immediate. Its international organization is defined and secured by the common acceptance of, and the common surrender to, the divine law and the vice regency of the IMAM (Caliph). But the Caliphate is justified on utilitarian grounds, i.e. it must exist on the maximum popular participation in the election of the Caliph and the right of the community to depose him for his errors especially for oppression and corruption. Among the essential qualities of a Caliph are: knowledge, piety, austerity in personal life and justice. Lineage is irrelevant in becoming a Caliph and thus every faithful can be elected. Obedience to Caliphs is conditional on the Caliphs' themselves being obedient to God and to His Prophet, i.e. a true believer should owe no obedience to the Caliph who disobeys God. The same obedience is due to subordinate officials to whom the Caliph delegated his religious, legal, military and administrative functions, as is due to the Caliph himself, but should they act contrary to the Shari'ah the Caliph must depose them. In this way Islam asserts the rights of ^Muslims to rebel against tyrants.¹

1. For a fuller exposition on this topic see, H.A.R., Gibb, "Al Mawardi's Theory of the Caliphate," In Studies on the Civilization of Islam, London, 1962, pp.151-165.

A more conservative and authoritarian conception of the Islamic State developed from the actual practice of government of Muslim communities, and is well presented by its earliest major formulator Al-Ghazali. Al-Ghazali states categorically that the jurists are forced to acknowledge any existing Muslim power since the alternative is anarchy and the stoppage of social life for lack of a properly constituted authority.¹ In Al-Ghazali's theory, the Caliphate stands for the whole Islamic government and it contains two main elements, viz: the Sultan; and the Ulema (Muslim Scholars), who by their approval of the Sultan's choice and by their Fatwa (enlightenment on religious matters) express the functional authority of the Shari'ah.² Al-Ghazali insists that the authority of the Sultan, even if vicious, must be upheld because it is a lesser evil than anarchy. He considers the authority of the Sultan to supervise the performance of canonical duties indispensable and thus calls him the shadow of God on earth. In view of this, disobedience is only permissible in the event of the Sultan's decisions being manifestly contrary to the Qur'an, the Sunnah (the code of Islamic practice transmitted through Prophet Muhammad) and the consensus of the Salaf (past scholars). He maintains that no Muslim ought to draw a sword against a brother Muslim because a rupture in public peace (Fitna) is one of the least forgivable sins. He recommends justice as the most effective means of preventing unrest, eliminating enemies and modifying existing evils.³

To Al-Ghazali, the purpose of the Sultan's government is the formal establishment of the religion of Islam and conditions in which his

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1. There is an instructive analysis on Al-Ghazali's statement in G.E. von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam, Chicago, 1946, p.168.
 2. A full discussion on Al-Ghazali's theory can be found in L. Binder, "Al-Ghazali's theory of Islamic Government," in The Muslim World, Vol.XLV, 1955, pp.229-241.
 3. For a more detailed discussion of Al-Ghazali's recommendations see, A.H. Dawood, A Comparative Study of Arabic and Persian Mirrors for Princes from the Second to the Sixth century A.H., Ph.D. Thesis, London University, 1965.

subjects can fulfil their destiny. The duty of the Sultan is to preserve equipoise by keeping each in his proper place. As the Sultan is seen to be divinely inspired, obedience to him as the choice of God is incumbent upon the people, but only he who practices justice is the true Sultan. For religion is made strong by Kingship, and Kingship by the army, and the army by wealth, but wealth is assured by making the country populous and flourishing, and this result can only be achieved by justice. In this way Al-Ghazali put great emphasis on the need for the Sultan to be strong. This view derived, at least in part, from the contemporary circumstances especially the violent nature of the ^Muslim rule of that time and the disorders created by the Isma'ilis¹ and the prevailing intrigues. In an attempt to resolve the tension between Islamic values and the threat of anarchy, Al-Ghazali divides the duties of the Sultan into two: his duty towards God and his duty towards the people. The former includes the performance of religious duties, the avoidance of innovation and the suppression of heresy. The latter includes the ruler's practice of justice which means the inherent moral quality derived from the perfection of the intellect and consisting in restraining dictatorial instincts, passion and anger.

1. A group of Shi'ites muslims who follow Ismail Ibn Ja'afar al-Sadiq, a descendant of the Holy Prophet. They are often associated with the Ashishin (the Assassins) mission, active in the Fatimid) Empire especially during the reign of Caliph al-Muntasir (1036-1094) See, B. Lewis, The Assassins, A radical Sect of Islam, London 1967, especially pp.20-37.

THE RADICAL INTERPRETATION

All conceptions of the Islamic State assume the ultimate source of power to be divine, that is to say, God delegates power to a temporal ruler on the condition that divine laws are rigidly adhered to and strictly enforced. This should be done because a *Muslim* is one who surrendered himself to God and thus obedience to His injunctions takes precedence over everything else. In the light of this, a *Muslim* society as most (if not all) *Muslims* conceive it, should be one ruled by God and not by man: the role of man is only to implement and, if necessary, to enforce the divine law. If Islam is not the governing principle of the state, the state is not an Islamic one; and if the citizens are true *Muslims* they must aspire to change it. *Muslims* believe that servitude to divine law will ultimately bring freedom - spiritual, material and political - to all mankind. This is the rationale of their total submission to the will of God.

The essence of this submission to God is that a *Muslim* should obey nobody else against the creator. In this lies the Islamic tradition which gives recognition to the principle of justifiable revolt. Islam simultaneously teaches submission to authority and revolt or rebellion when it lays down that the *Muslim's* duty of obedience lapses where the command is sinful. Since no procedure is laid down for testing the righteousness of a command, or for exercising the right to disobey one that is sinful, the only effective recourse for the conscientious *Muslim* is to rebel against the ruler and then try to overrule or depose him by force. A more expeditious procedure is to remove him by assassination. This is the process by which Caliphs Umar, Usman and Aliyu were physically eliminated by aggrieved citizens.

This process was elevated to the status of a principle (it was considered a virtue of orthodoxy by religious/political activists) and it was very often invoked, especially by sectarian rebels to justify their murderous acts.¹ Thus, total submission to the will of God and the justification of rebellion against sinful command by any earthly power are some of the unique political content of Islamic ideology.

The Islamic community of believers (Arabic: Umma; and Hausa: Jama'a),² as ideally conceived, is a religious polity, established and maintained under divine law. For example in a country like Nigeria (as in many parts of Africa) accepting the Muslim faith introduces a previously animist and pre-literate person living in a tribal community to a world religion, literacy and the rule of law. In addition, the obligation to perform the pilgrimage at Makka, mean that the faithful are, at least, ideologically linked to the whole/muslim world. In this sense Islam is truly universalistic. In the Jama'a the distinction between secular and religious is unknown. In the light of this, Islam is not only the official ideology and the legal system of the Islamic state but also the basis of popular culture: its spirit should saturate all aspects of life. In contrast to the political tradition of the West which separates church from State, in Islam there is no separation

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1. Ibid. especially pp.9-13 and 128, in which Lewis discusses murder as an instrument of policy and a religious duty.
 2. Even the Hausa Jama'a is derived from Arabic Jama'at (people); or Jama'at-I Islami (a group of believers in Islam). The Hausa concept of Jama'a can also mean a given local community whereas Umma stands for an essentially international community of believers to whom other units - like geographic, cultural, linguistic, etc., are irrelevant or even harmful. Many pious muslims are usually unconcerned with national boundaries and ethnic differences; for them the bond of Islam unites all believers as it distinguishes them from non-muslims.

of the mosque from the State but rather the two form a sort of "theocracy" under the Imam. A muslim theocracy is one ruled by all muslims including the rank and file and thus the entire muslim population should be mobilized to participate in politics.

Thus literacy is highly valued because it is necessary to read (or to be able to read) the Qur'an in order to interpretate its injunctions and the Shari'ah. This necessity for literacy gives a special position of respect to scholar-priests i.e. Malamai (the possessors of knowledge. Sing: Malam). The Malamai are present among all occupational groups and are necessary for a muslim community's life rituals, i.e. births, marriages, deaths, personal counselling and, at times, mediation between the rulers and the ruled. However, it should be noted that Islam is not hierarchical: it lacks such hierarchies as Pope - Bishop, Priest, and thus each Malam is economically and socially dependent on his community rather than on a bureaucratic organization. In a muslim community the Malamai have the prerogative of criticizing political authority. They form public opinion and thus become the leading political actors because Islamic law also regulates economic practices, like usury, inheritance, alms giving, etc.¹

When we look at the origins of Islam in Arabia we shall see that the first Islamic community, under the Prophet and the early Caliphate,² made sustained efforts to create an egalitarian society by its

1. See, J.J. Spengler, "Economic Thought of Islam: Ibn Khaldun", In Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol.VI, No.4, 1963-1964, pp.

2. Among others see, Watt, W.M., Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman, Oxford, 1977; and Brockelmann, C., History of the Islamic Peoples, London, 1952, pp.45-70.

*A rule by divinely revealed law: SHARI'AH

distributive principles through which spoils of conquest were shared. In addition, every member of that community had a right to some of the wealth of the State. The State was fully responsible for providing support to its members irrespective of their status, ages, tribe, sex or religion. The poor, the old and the sick had to be tended and cared for by the State. There were a combination of factors (social and religious) which gave rise to the "socialist" principles of Islam which insists that there should be a reasonable minimum standard of living for each individual as well as a maximum level of affluence. For one thing, the faith was revealed at a time when the mass of the people were suffering both materially and spiritually from the incursions of the newly rich Makkan commercial class which offended the Prophet's own sense of humanity.¹ And for another, the Qur'an enjoined wealthy Muslims to give part of their wealth to the poor:

"Who so gives and shows piety, and professes the truth of the most excellent (reward), We shall smooth (his way) to ultimate happiness.
Who so is mean and bumptious on account of wealth, who denies the most excellent (reward), We shall smooth (his way) to ultimate misery.
His fortune shall not profit him when he falls into the abyss." (92: 5-11)

This Islamic socialism (the application of the teachings of Islam to socio-economic justice) and the disapproval of bumptiousness (ostentation,

1. There is an insightful discussion of this in Zubaida, S., "Economic and Political Activism in Islam", In Economy and Society, Vol.1, No.3, August, 1972, pp.308-338; and Watt, W.M., Islam and the Integration of Society, London, 1961, p.7, in which he explains how those in a socially weak position notably, widows and orphans, were shamelessly cheated and oppressed by the rich merchants.

lack of compassion and selfishness) produced the principle of moral austerity which includes the refusal to use political office for personal gain especially on the part of the leadership.

The foregoing attempts to show that the ideal Islamic society should consist of people who, by having put their faith in Islam, have become liberated from all other allegiances except that which they have undertaken towards God; that society which lives by applying Islam would be free and democratic, and that its citizens would be, as the Prophet of Islam put it, "as equal as the teeth of a comb."¹ Subsequently, Muslims believe that they belong to Ummatan Wasata (a just and balanced community) and members of this community are told:

"You have a pivotal role to play in the service of mankind - you must act as a model to others as the Prophet was a model to you." (2: 143)

And another injunction explains:

"God changes not the condition of people who will not change it themselves." (13:11)

Such teachings exercise a powerful hold on Muslim minds who use them to justify religious and political activism. They inspired many Muslim reformers in the past as they do today.

1. Prophet Muhammad in Hadith, cited by Sa'id, A.M., Arab Socialism, London, 1974, p.46.

RADICAL TRADITION IN PRACTICE:¹ MORAL AND POLITICAL CONCEPTS

We indicated above that Islam is essentially a system of values, a body^{of} imperatives, a view of how the faithful should live and order their relations with one another as well as with society. Islam includes a complex of beliefs about the Muslim's relations with nature, the cosmos, etc., and his purpose and destiny in life. These values, imperatives and views, are expressed in rituals, behaviour, practices, rules, institutions and scholarship, and embodied in all aspects of Islamic civilization. The application of the Islamic value system to non-Muslim society has been always a radical act. Indeed, at the time of its founder (Muhammad), Islam was a revolutionary movement. Later, Islamic ideas have been taken over by ruling classes and transformed into State religions, hence it has been associated with conservative, traditionalist, authoritarian, hierarchical ideologies whose functions have been the justification and the maintenance of the existing social and political order and the ascendancy of the ruling classes. Simultaneously, there have been puritan Muslims dedicated to maintain the purity of their religion, who thus adhered to its revolutionary (or radical) spirit. Thus the history of Islam is a continuing struggle between the radical - democratic and the conservative authoritarian interpretations of the Qur'an. Against the radical interpretations some Caliphs, Sultans, Emirs and Ulama, have constantly restated the conservative authoritarian interpretations and persecuted the radicals.²

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1. This section relies heavily on the work of Thomas Hodgkin, notably his recent "The Revolutionary Tradition in Islam" in Race & Class, volume XXI, No.3, 1980, pp.221-237, which is the best and most concise account available.
 2. See a more detailed discussion of this point in Hodgkin, T.L., "Mahdism,, Messianism and Marxism in the African setting", In Yusuf Fadl Hassan, Sudan In Africa, Khartoun, 1972.

The Islamic principle which says that "Judgment belongs to God alone," manifests a tendency which is characteristic of radical movements throughout history, in their inclination to reject governments and to move towards an anarchist standpoint. The Caliphate is seen only as a necessary evil: if the faithful were sufficiently mature and virtuous to ensure the application of the Shari'ah there would be no need for a Caliph. But if there have to be a Caliph then there must be the maximum popular participation in his election and they should reserve the right to depose him for his errors, more especially for his oppression and corruption. Among the essential qualifications for a Caliph are knowledge, moral and material austerity, adl (justice) etc. Anyone of the faithful, if he or she is qualified, can elect and/or be elected. Lineage is irrelevant hence succession to office based on heredity is illegitimate. Muslim radicals insist on the attainment of high standards of education, not only to minimise apathy in public affairs, but also as a precondition for understanding and thus for acting in accordance with the Shari'ah. Muslim radicals everywhere share the ascetic and egalitarian attitudes inseparable from their distaste for people in authority. Similarly, they share common rejection of all forms of ethnic and social privileges as strongly as they are attracted to poor and oppressed people. This is because all ^Mmuslim radicals invariably agree on the undermentioned main points of theory which underlined the motives and causation that inspire Islamic political activism.

1. The principle of individual responsibility tends to detach radical ^Mmuslims from the habit of obedience and deference to established authority (of Sultans, Emirs, Colonial governments etc.) because it is

associated with the principle of Ijtihad (the idea of inquiry) discussed below. This principle emphasizes the right and the responsibility of every Muslim to interpret the Qur'an and Sunnah for himself (or herself). This principle is always referred to in the Muslim world against the principle of submission to bureaucratic authority.

2. The idea of activism which insists that "people make their own history". This idea runs through the radical tradition of Islam: that believers have the responsibility to command the good and forbid the evil; that religious beliefs must be expressed in social practice; and that believers must struggle (and make sacrifices) to bring into being a just society.

3. The egalitarian democracy which developed during the formative years of Islam¹ remains an essential element of the radical tradition in Islam. Firstly, this example insists on the equality of all before the creator, irrespective of ethnic origin, lineage, social status, or sex. Secondly, it stresses the rights of the people against their rulers; and the right of all Muslims to maximum participation in decision making at all levels; and finally, it emphasizes the special rights of the most oppressed and the poorest people. This argues that to treat unequals equally is a form of injustice and thus it justifies preferential treatment for the weakest and the most deprived categories.

4. Austerity (Zuhd) is very much related to the idea of religious puritanism which, among other things, insists on simplicity of life and the avoidance of conspicuous consumption and ostentatious style of life.

1. See Watt, M.W. The Formative Period of Islamic Thought, Edinburgh, 1973.

References are always made to the golden past in Islamic history and, especially, to the exemplary leadership of ^Muslim reformers.

5. Islam seeks to establish a world wide (Universal) Islamic community.

Hence, in the Islamic views the world is divided between Dar al Islam (the abode of Islam) and Dar al Harb (the abode of war or the area of struggle). The effort to create this universal Islamic community by asserting their autonomy or their rule over non-^Muslims provided the continuing vitality of Islam. Whenever and wherever this world wide revolutionary drive is halted a ^Muslim community finds itself confronted with tension between the wider perspectives of world revolution and the limited objectives to create and maintain a just society within itself.

6. It is believed by ^Muslims that their conception of history as a continuing struggle will generate a situation of profound crisis and thus lead to the emergence of a revolutionary movement that will, in turn, bring about the overthrow of the existing corrupt and oppressive social order and substitute it with a just and egalitarian (classless) society. For this historical process of the struggle between the oppressors and the oppressed will ultimately lead to the victory of the oppressed. The expectation of the Mahdi arises from this conception of history.

7. 'Mahdism' stems from the belief that if the present belongs to the oppressors, the future belongs to the revolutionary community outside of which there is no salvation and no future. There are three essentials of Mahdism 1) the conception of a period of profound crisis immediately before the Mahdi appears, 2) that the Mahdi would exercise a special revolutionary initiative and conduct a Jihad (holy war) against nominal and backsliding muslims, 3) the association of the Mahdi with the

approaching of the end of the world and the brief intervening golden period during which he would fill the earth with justice and equity as it was filled with tyranny and oppression.¹

Among other things the above shows that in Islam divine guidance is not only a matter of individual faith, it also provides a blueprint for the human community on earth. Islam defines both the relationship of the individual to God and the role of the proper, divinely guided community on earth. This explains the much repeated generalization in this thesis that Islam is not only a creed but a total way of life. The attempt to create a community in accordance with the revelation of God is a key theme in the history of Islam. Thus, it is partly the determination to apply the Islamic principles of social and political organization which lead to the rise of Islamic radicalism in West Africa.

RADICAL TRADITION: MOVEMENTS AND STATES IN WEST AFRICA

Islamic history abounds with accounts of social movements led by militant preachers who spread the good tidings of escape from the pains and evils of their times to a better future. Their tasks had been to find out and articulate latent grievances, to challenge the authority of the dominant class and to organize the oppressed for a contest with the dominant forces. This "authentic, ancient, but also living revolutionary tradition in Islam"² can be seen as arising first in Kharijism in the 7th century, though asserting itself somewhat later on the periphery of the Islamic area, as in West Africa with the Almoravids.³

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1. The basic text for the theory of Mahdism is in Ibn Khaldun's Muquaddimah (Rosenthal, F. trans.), vol.II, 1958, p.156, also see Holt, P.M., Mahdist State in the Sudan 1881-1898: A study of its Origins, Development and overthrow, Oxford, 1977, pp.22-31.
 2. Hodgkin, "Revolutionary tradition..." op.cit., p.235.
 3. T.L. Hodgkin "The Revolutionary tradition in muslim West Africa", in D.P. Little (ed.), Essays on Islamic Civilisation (London 1976) pp.103-117.

In West Africa the activities of such militant preachers culminated in the late eighteenth century and nineteenth century Jihads which overran Hausa land and Borno, Masina and some parts of Guinea.¹

The Muslim intellectuals who led the Jihads were inspired by the teachings of Islam which discourage Taqlid (passive acceptance of authority in matters of faith) and encourage Ijtihad (personal interpretations). The reforming Jihadists were determined to replace the old regimes by new administrations to be based on classical Islamic models described by Muslim theorists such as al Mawardi - discussed above. Thus, Islam provided the Jihad movements with ideology as well as an attractive alternative social system which appealed to the masses battered by the existing institutions. All through the Jihads the crucial factors which united the peasants with their intellectual leaders was the ideology of Islam. This is not to play down economic and social causes of the revolt or to under-estimate the feeling of patriotism (or nationalism) but rather to explain that the problem of organizing resistance was resolved in Islamic terms.²

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1. Efforts to bring about Islamic reforms in West Africa are well documented. Among many others, see, Last, M., "Reform in West Africa: the Jihad movements of the nineteenth century" In Ajayi, J.F.A., and Crowder, M. (edits) History of West Africa, London, 1974, Vol.11, pp.1-29, and Hiskett, M., "The nineteenth Century Jihads in West Africa" In Flint, J.E. (edit.) The Cambridge History of Africa, Cambridge, 1976, Vol.5, from C.1790 to C.1870, pp.125-169.
 2. On the socio-economic causes of the Jihads see, Smith, H.F.C., "A neglected theme of West African History: The Islamic Revolutions of the nineteenth century" In Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, Vol.II, No.2, 1961, PP.277-285. But on how the feelings of patriotism (or nationalism) were induced in mobilizing the peasants see, Abdullahi Ibn Muhammad Tazyin al Waraqat (Hiskett, M., trans.) Ibadan, 1963.

Some of the consequences of the Jihads include the emergence of new ruling classes (e.g. in Hausa land and Borno). But in Senegal where the Tariga (Muslim brotherhoods) leaders acquired power in the nineteenth century in the face of the disintegration of Wolof society. The muslim Marabus (religious but not formal political leaders) succeeded the Wolof chiefs and aristocracy in authority, forming cohesive and powerful orders in which they enjoyed enormous religious - political and economic authority over their followers and Ta'alibe (disciples). There are now three large and important Tarigas in Senegal - The Tijjaniyya, of which there are several groups, the Muridiyya, second in number of adherents but the most influential, are the Kadiriyya.¹ The Jihads led to a wider dissemination of Arabic literacy which created a mood of Islamic perfectionism and thus to increased criticism and revolts within the Muslim communities. Furthermore, the Jihads strengthened Islamic culture and hence put the whole sub-Saharan Africa culturally within the orbit of the Muslim world.² Consequently, Islamic education and literacy are partly responsible to the Muslim's resistance to secular Western education until recently.³ However, even in Hausaland where the greatest policy impact of Islam is manifested in the conservative and hierarchical

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1. The Impact of Islam in the Senegalese Society is discussed in detail by Lucy Behrman, Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal, Cambridge, Mass. 1970, chapters 4-6.
 2. For a brief but useful discussion on this see, Kraus, J., "Islamic Affinities and International Politics in sub-Saharan Africa", In Current History, Vol.73, No.456, April 1980, pp.154-158 and 182.
 3. After the creation of twelve new States out of the former three regions of Nigeria in 1967, the six States in the North embarked on rapid educational development to bridge the gap between the North and the South. Prior to that children of the common people were actively discouraged from attending Western Schools and those who attended were laughed at as: Yan Makarantan Bokoko
Babu Karatu Sai Sata

which means:

"The pupils of Book Schools
/They/ learn nothing but thievery."

emirate system of governments (discussed in chapter II), compromises were made by the successors to the Jihadists in which the old Habe social and political institutions were adapted to the need of the new rulers.

From the earliest days of Islam, some Muslims insisted on a rigorous adherence to the rules of the faith. These Muslim fundamentalists opposed the compromises made by reformist leaders and conservative ulama. They actively condemned fellow Muslims who did not adhere strictly to the Qur'an and Sunnah. The careful study of the life of the Holy Prophet provided a focus for those who insisted that life in the Islamic community should be based strictly on the teachings of the Qur'an and Sunnah. A key figure in this development was Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (780-855),¹ whose vigorous opposition to political compromise and philosophical innovation set the tone for the later fundamentalist spirit in Islam. Thus the fundamentalists were the strongest leaders who maintained the vision of the early ideal community of Muslims and they frequently advocated programs of Islamic purification and revival. This spirit has inspired militant Islamic movement from the early days down to the present. In West Africa, as in the rest of the Muslim world, this militancy developed into the popular belief in the future coming of a Muslim Messiah figure, the Mahdi, whose divinely guided rule would supplant existing institutions. Expectations of the Mahdi resulted in revolts against colonial authorities in West Africa.²

1. For his birth, early life and subsequent activities see Gibb, H.H.R. and Kramers, J.H. (eds) Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, Leiden & London, 1961, pp.20-21.

2. Mahdism in Northern Nigeria is discussed in chapter III, and for the rest of West Africa see the references therein.

Muslim fundamentalists have not changed their position till today. Whenever and wherever compromises by Muslims appear to threaten the basic Islamic identity of society, they call for a reaffirmation of the unchanging truth of Islam. This has taken many forms. In relative isolated areas fundamentalist movements have existed in different forms. But nowhere have they been as successful as in the Arabian Peninsula, where under the leadership of Muhammad Ibn Adb al-Wahhab¹ (an Islamic scholar in the tradition of Hanbal above) they established and still control the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Elsewhere in the Islamic world Wahhabism² remains active only in using the Qur'an and Sunnah to condemn current practices of rulers and the general population.

But in West Africa, Wahhabism³ (or Subbanu al Musilmin: as they are locally known) is a radical and largely urban Islamic movement most active, like the earlier Hamaliyya,⁴ in Mali and Guinea, and arising towards the end of 1944 at a time of general radicalization of West African Politics. Their main religious aims were to establish schools, or entire mosques, independent of the control of the existing Imams whom they saw both as disseminating a false version of Islam, and as

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1. For the origins and the doctrine of Wahhabism as well as a short biography of its founder Adb - al - Wahhab see, Gibb, H.A.R., and Kramers, J.H. (edits) op.cit., pp.618-621.
 2. On how Wahhabism spread to other parts of the world, see, Voll, J.O., "The Islamic Past and the Present Resurgence", In Current History, Vol.78, No.456, April 1980, pp.145-148 and 180-181; and on the reaction of Western Europe to the movement see, Daniel, M., Islam Europe and Empire, Edinburgh, 1966, pp.113-116.
 3. See Kaba, L., "The Wahhabi movement and its contribution to political development in West Africa, 1945-1958", Ph.D. Thesis, North Western University, 1972.
 4. See Alexandre, P., "A West African Islamic Movement: Hamallism in French West Africa", In Rotberg R.I. and Mazrui, A.A. (edits) Protest and Power in Black Africa, New York, 1970, pp.497-512.

compromised by the mutual support existing between them and the French administration.¹ Since they attributed the corruption of Islam to the combination of French colonial interference and the venality and incompetence of the Imams, they "thought that political independence and national unity were indispensable to the triumph of a 'clean Islam'".² From this, and from their interpretations of Islamic injunctions against injustice and exploitation, the Wahhabi movement became clearly involved with the radical local sections of the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (R.D.A.), in Mali and Guinea.³ Traders and Transporters disseminated both Wahhabist ideas and the RDA message, and the urban social base of both organizations were similar in the 1954-1957 period when Wahhabism was most influential: traders, drivers, transporters, clerks (but not graduates) and younger members of leading families. The parties themselves drew heavily on Islamic or Wahhabi symbols and concepts; though not to the extent of ceasing to be secular organizations.⁴

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1. Kaba, L., op.cit., p.246. A more extreme version of this mutual support was found in Senegal / See, O'Brien, D.C., The Mourides of Senegal, Oxford, 1971 and, of course, in Northern Nigeria.
 2. Kaba, L., op.cit., p.325.
 3. Ibid., pp.238-239, 322-337.
 4. Ibid., pp.286-289, 329-333.

ISLAMIC RADICAL MOVEMENTS: SOME COMMON CHARACTERISTICS¹

1. Although Islamic radicalism takes different forms in different locations (because they often emerge from different historical and cultural context) and can best be understood by studying them from the circumstances in which they arose, it seems generally recognized that they have certain common characteristics. For instance, they all aim at "perfection" in the sense that they strive to establish a "just and egalitarian" society in which all citizens would be able to participate fully in the political process. Their concept of justice entails equality before the law and life more abundant for all. Their egalitarian ideas stem from their rejection of all forms of ethnic and social privilege which attempt to legitimise the relative deprivation of the masses.
2. Either because of their critical understanding of the existing system or because of their puritanical adherence to the orthodox teachings of the Qur'an (or both) they reject established authorities, both secular and religious, as corrupt, oppressive and illegitimate. Hence they seek to establish an alternative system, which is an advance on the existing one. Whether or not their envisioned new order is based on the ideal of the Shari'ah they tend to use the teachings of the Qur'an and Sunnah to justify their refusal to submit themselves to established bureaucracies.

1. These are only a few of the common characteristics of Islamic radical movements. This list is compared with Thomas Hodgkin's common characteristics of Mahdist and Messianic movements in his "Mahdism, Messianism and Marxism", op.cit., as well as his definition of "Radical Tradition" in his "The Radical Tradition in Muslim West Africa", In D.P. Little (edit) Essays on Islamic Civilization, Leiden, 1976, pp.103-117.

3. As a result they are forward looking and thus progressive movements. Their strict adherence to the unchanging teachings of the Qur'an and Sunnah as well as their references to the golden past of Islam are by no means simply backward looking and conservative. On the contrary, they manifest their determination to return to the ideal and on that basis establish a perfect society.
4. They are universalistic in the sense that the new societies they want to create would accommodate and provide for non-~~M~~uslims and ~~M~~uslims alike, of course, with the hope that non-~~M~~uslims would see the justice of the Shari'ah and thus be converted to Islam.
5. They all challenge the social functions and hence the social basis of established authorities. Thus, the authorities regard them as subversive and often they are treated accordingly.
6. In most cases they are led by militant preachers and teachers who spread among the masses, the good tidings of how to escape from the corruption, oppression and tyranny of the existing order.
7. They all become involved in attempts to create movements and states based on their conception of Islam, either directly or with the major Mahdist movements and the Jihads . or through their close integration with more secular political parties, with the Hamalliya and Wahhabis in post war francophone Africa, or as with Tijjaniyya in Northern Nigeria, which had close ties with NEPU. Both NEPU and the RDA capitilized on the puritan Islamic ideas and stances of the movements though at the same time maintaining their secular position as modern nationalist parties which appealed for the support of ~~M~~uslims and non-~~M~~uslim alike.

The desire to apply the radical principles of Islam enumerated above, in current terms, partly manifested itself in the struggle of the radical nationalist parties to liberate their respective communities from Western Imperial domination. Hence their alliance with the radical religious movements. But in the case of NEPU in Northern Nigeria, two major factors led to a relative subordinate role for Islam in the party's national and to a lesser degree regional politics. Firstly, it was necessary to be (or to appear to be secular) in order to win the support of Christian and animist electorates, as it was obvious that no one sectarian party would win enough votes (or seats in the legislature) to form a government. Secondly, not only national stability but also national unity would have been greatly endangered if sectarian parties were to exist. Thirdly, Northern solidarity would not be maintained against the South, as non-~~M~~uslims in the North would reject any party with ~~M~~uslim connotations as they had always rejected Islam. As is now well known, these religious and cultural factors are some of the reasons which led to the adoption and retention of a federal system for Nigeria. However, secular politics notwithstanding, NEPU shares the forgoing characteristics of Islamic radical movements as the examination of the party's ideas and method of appeal shows in Chapter V.

STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

The first three chapters attempt to serve two purposes: on the one hand to explain the social context within which modern radicalism sprang up in Northern Nigeria and, on the other hand, to describe sources of dissent in Northern Nigeria, namely social inequality, religious belief and the colonial local government system. Chapter one concentrates on

economic and social inequality (which tend to threaten order), and on the maintenance of that order through religion, patronage and coercion. Since NEPU was itself seen as threatening the social order, these resources were used to contain or undermine its activities, as described in Chapter five. Chapter two discusses Islam as a quarry from which Muslims mine their radical political ideas mainly by their arguments and disputes (or disagreements) over the interpretations of the Qur'an and the Hadith. This tradition of dialogue (and often conflict) between Muslim intellectuals centers on the desire to maintain the integrity of a particular Muslim State at one level and, the purity of religious faith on another level. In the case of Northern Nigeria, this conflict is illustrated by reference to the nineteenth century Jihad and the subsequent establishment of Muslim governments. I argue that the piety and the principles of austerity of the early jihadists were abandoned by their successors and hence paved the way for the emergence of an oppressive political system and a conservative interpretation of Islam in support of that system.

Chapter III is concerned with how the nineteenth century Emirate governments became the local version of colonialism officially christened "Native Authorities," and the way in which the British policy of Indirect Rule actively supported that formal structure. Consequently, the British support for the Emirs in particular and the Sarakuna (the ruling nobles) as a whole, led to widespread abuse of power by all N.A. officials. This abuse, like the earlier and similar abuses of Habe rule in the eighteenth century, was the main (but not the only) source of opposition which started moderately but later became more articulate as the role of the N.As became all pervasive. The N.A. system fostered

an atmosphere which poisoned the region's society from the top to the bottom. After Nigerian independence (in 1960) no one dared speak openly in the rural areas. From 1961 - 1965, there was an outcry against mass imprisonment of the opponents of the N.A. system in the urban centres, but lost in their own dreams neither the Emirs nor the Northern Regional Government seemed to have heard any protest.

Chapter IV examines the origins of modern radicalism which challenged the N.As and, by so doing, the whole colonial apparatus. It concentrates on radical activities from the 1930s to the formation of NEPU in 1950.

The history and sociology of NEPU, the first organized radical opposition party in Northern Nigeria is the subject of chapter five, which also examines NEPU policies, political strategies and radical ideas, linking these with earlier expressions of modern radicalism and more especially with Islamic radical ideas. This theme is carried over to the final chapter. In chapter six we attempt to trace and draw together the threads of both motive and causation which spur Muslims to religious and political activism. This concluding chapter summarises some of the political teachings of Islam and thus shows the raw materials from which the political ideals of the Jihadists were drawn and developed; and by identifying this same source as the mainspring of modern and organized radicalism in Northern Nigeria, we assert a continuing radical Islamic tradition in Northern Nigeria, at least up to 1966.

CHAPTER IINEQUALITY AND SOCIAL ORDERBamu Yarda Ba Tanderu Na Ingila Kullu Na Nigeria

"We do not accept that the bakery should be in England when the dough is in Nigeria." NEPU

INTRODUCTION

At the time the British assumed responsibility for Northern Nigeria, the society was roughly divided into three strata: free Muslims, their slaves, and 'pagans' (or animists) who were potential slaves.¹ These social divisions remained important up to the 1940s and 1950s. However, social differentiation in Northern Nigeria (especially in Hausaland) is by no means as simple as this. The society is still both horizontally and vertically differentiated because social distinctions are still deeply cut by ethnic cleavages and religious beliefs. To some extent, historical circumstance has also elevated some groups over others as we show below. In addition, the colonially inherited federal structure of Nigeria reinforced social inequalities and economic imbalances. These imbalances sharpened perceptions of unequal relations as well as of political domination.

1. My own observation is also confirmed by Lugard, F.D., "Northern Nigeria", In The Geographical Journal, Vol.XXIII, No.1, 1904, pp.1-29; and Perham, M., Native Administration in Nigeria, Oxford, 1962, p.49. In the Northern Nigerian context, a 'pagan' is one who is neither Muslim nor Christian or Jewish, i.e. it denotes one who practices indigenous religion.

In contemporary jargon, Northern Nigerian society can be classified and described as "pre-industrial." The largest proportion of its people are engaged in agriculture, and the number occupied in handicrafts and trade, or modern industry, form a relatively small proportion of the total; and even those occupied in other trades often combined their commercial or industrial occupations with agricultural pursuits. This does not mean that commercial and industrial activities are insignificant or that they play little part in shaping the economy of the region or in directing the course of its economic development. On the contrary, cottage industries and trade are important and integral to the economic life of the society. Similarly, those engaged in trade and industry have increasing influence on the politics of the region.

This chapter aims to provide background information on the social context within which NEPU sprang up and operated as well as to outline the sources of dissent in Northern Nigeria. Hence it focusses on social relations through which people both produce and exchange the material conditions of their existence. The chapter is divided into two parts. Part one attempts to identify poverty and the elements of poverty, in order to show how the ruling class keep the common men in their places. It starts with an account of the pattern of settlement so as to bring to light the rural - urban dichotomy. The second part of this chapter discusses social inequality and political order by attempting to analyse social division in Hausa society in historical, religious and ethnic terms. I shall try to explain forms of economic and social differences in order to show how social order is maintained by means of patronage and coercion: both methods are underlined and supported by the system of education and religious belief.

PATTERNS OF SETTLEMENT

The pattern of settlement in Northern Nigeria centres around Birane (cities) and Garuruwa (towns). But the largest proportion of the population live in Kauyuka (villages) and Unguwowi (hamlets).¹ Some of the typical features of these villages and hamlets are inherent in the essential needs of agriculture and social life. Thus, the most obvious characteristic of the hamlet or the village is its topography. It is collective i.e. a grouped settlement and, the form of grouping most characteristic of the countryside, is that of a "nuclear" village (or hamlet) consisting of a cluster of households around a centre, topographical or economic - a well, a lake, a pond, a stream, a river, or a hill. Most of the hamlets (and to some extent villages as well) are not permanent settlements; their inhabitants are liable to migrate to new settlements whenever circumstances warrant it. But the cities and the towns are more permanent settlements. Some of the cities, like Kano, Katsina and Zaria, are very old, being first settled hundreds of years ago. Some of the towns were first settled in the nineteenth century, having sprung up during or after the ~~M~~uslim uprisings (Jihad). Both the cities and the towns were originally chosen for settlement because of economic and military reasons but today they are essentially metropolitan areas (Kano) or urban centres (Jos).

At the turn of the century, most hamlets and some villages were inhabited by slaves (on Gandu farms), nomads (mostly Fulani or Tuareg)

1. In her description of Kano and its environs (especially Dorayi village), Polly Hill contrasted the differences between the city and its surrounding villages. See Hill, P., Population, Prosperity and Poverty: Rural Kano, 1900-1970, Cambridge, 1977, pp.1-20.

or animist tribes, who lived very near or on the top of hills, to escape from slave raiders. Towns and cities were inhabited by free Muslims, their house slaves and trading strangers (or visiting traders).¹ But today, most villages and hamlets are inhabited by Talakawa (independent commoners)² of different religious beliefs scattered over their respective farmlands, hunting grounds or fishing lakes and rivers. The cities and the towns are characterised not only by their demographic densities but also in terms of the heterogeneity of the population in their division of labour and differentiation of functions. Nevertheless, Northern Nigerian society still remains a collection of tribal units ruled by native chiefs and aristocrats and continuing in the main to conform to their pre-colonial customs in all matters legal, social and agrarian.

RURAL POVERTY

As an overwhelming majority of the population live in the rural areas at subsistence level, by peasant farming land tenure is most

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1. There are various accounts of village setting in Northern Nigeria and the Western Sudan. Among others see, Barth, H., Travels and Discoveries in North and central Africa, 1849-1855, London, 1890; Shaw, Flora, L. (Lady Lugard) A Tropical dependency - An outline of the Western Sudan with an account of the modern Settlement of Northern Nigeria, London, 1905, Smith, F.M., Baba of Karo, A Woman of the Muslim Hausa, London, 1954.
 2. Talakawa (sing. Talaka) is loaned and naturalized into Hausa from the Arabic word Talaaq which means an independent (or free) person. In the pidgin Arabic of the Southern Sudan, the word stands for an independent person as opposed to a slave. In Hausa language Talaka is often synonymous with a 'poor person'. It also denotes one who does not hold an official title. Perhaps it is equivalent to a yeoman as opposed to a serf in medieval England. But in political terminology, Talakawa stands for commoners (the 'have nots') as opposed to the aristocrats, the rich or the privileged (the 'haves').

important to them. In Northern Nigeria, the land tenure system has a double ancestry: the traditional African concepts of communal ownership of land; and the Islamic law which recognizes individual tenure.¹ But the basis of the present system of land tenure is communal in that it is generally recognized by all communities that members resident within a village area have the right to use as much of the land around their area as they require.² Although little is known of the land tenure system in the pre-Jihad period, in the post-Jihad era the Muslim rulers arrogated to themselves ownership of all lands in their respective areas of jurisdiction. This derived from the Muslim belief that Ardhul Anwati (the conquered land) belongs to the ruler.³ However, the customary rights of the individual farmer to occupy and use a patch of the land of his community survived. Although the farmers' legal right to the land is usufructual, according to custom the farmers have effective security of tenure both for themselves and for their heirs.

The vast majority of rural dwellers are engaged in farming during the rainy seasons.⁴ But in the dry seasons some of them engage in trades other than farming in order to supplement the little incomes they

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1. P. Hill's, Studies in Rural Capitalism in West Africa, Cambridge, 1970, is rather general but the system of land tenure she discusses applies to many parts of Northern Nigeria.
 2. There is an insightful analysis of this in Hill, P., Rural Hausa: a Village and a setting, Cambridge, 1972. Although this is a particular study of Batagarawa village in Kaduna state, the same principles are generally recognized by most communities in Hausa land.
 3. Interview with Alhaji I.K. Alkali, Edinburgh, 4/2/76. However, according to Alhaji Aminu Kano, Shehu Usman Dan Fodio ruled that land, like sunshine and air, belongs to God and that it was wrong (in Islamic law) for any one to claim its ownership.
 4. The rainy season is from May to October whereas the dry season is from Nov. to April.

make in farming. The types of trades which the farmers undertake are determined by their respective wealth and, to some extent, by social consideration (for example Fulani dislike such jobs as butchering). The relatively well-to-do villagers tend to be long distance traders, Qur'anic teachers etc. The middle income farmers are generally craftsmen: dyers, weavers, blacksmiths etc. and local traders. Poor farmers are usually non-landowning, e.g. servants, labourers etc. (who do not own even the patches of land on which they farm).¹ Villagers produce not only food crops but also cash crops to provide money for their household expenditure. In fact, the average middle income farmer has to supplement his income with hand craft productions, such as leather crafts, woodwork, etc. Almost every sizeable village has its own hucksters, fullers, spinners, etc. In addition to farming, poor farmers can find employment as communal employees i.e. herdsmen, or labourers, just to eke out additional income by other non-agricultural pursuits.²

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1. Hill, P., Rural Hausa, op.cit., pp.105-106 discusses this and the wage rates of farm labouring.
 2. Smith, M.G., The Economy of Hausa Communities of Zaria, A report to the colonial social science research Council, Colonial Research Studies, No.16 (HMSO) London, 1955, p.138, contains data on production for subsistence and exchange.

TABLE¹ 1:1 ANNUAL BUDGET OF A FARMING HOUSEHOLD, MISAU, BAUCHI PROVINCE, 1939¹

	Production			Consumption			Sales		
	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Farm Produce:									
Grain	3	17	9	3	15	9		2	0
Other food crops ²	2	11	9		10	7	2	1	2
Corn stalks		8	8		1	4		7	4
Cotton	1	0	0		—		1	0	0
Total	£7	18	2	£4	7	8	£3	10	6
Other Production: ³									
Donkey transport		15	0		—			15	0
Spun cotton		5	0		—			5	0
Mats		5	8		—			5	8
(Collected foods		5	0		5	0)		—	
(Homestead maintenance		5	0		5	0)		—	
(Firewood		5	0		5	0)		—	
Total	£9	18	10	£5	2	8	£4	16	2
Recorded Purchases for consumption: ⁴									
Meat & milk at 4d per week					17	4			
Salt & other condiments at 6d per week					1	6	0		
Clothing					15	6			
TOTALS	£9	18	10	£8	1	6	£4	16	2
TAX						7s. 3d.			

- 1 From data reported by the agricultural officer, Bauchi province, Feb. 1940
- 2 Including a small crop of ground-nuts.
- 3 There are no data for the value of household maintenance and collected produce, a probable value has been assumed for some of these and placed in square brackets.
- 4 These are certainly incomplete but the minor items need not have amounted to more than two or three shillings.

1. This table along with the explanatory notes are taken from Perham, M. (ed.) Native Economies of Nigeria, London, 1946, p.130. It is based on a study at Misau in Bauchi emirate. It should be noted that Misau has more fertile land and thus its people are much richer than those in some emirates e.g. some parts of Adamawa and Sokoto.

NATURE OF MATERIAL POVERTY

The whole of Nigeria is a poor country by the standards of the Western Industrial countries. But the levels of living for the masses in Northern Nigeria towards the end of the colonial period was the lowest in the country as table 1:2 below indicates.¹

TABLE 1:2² REGIONAL DIVISION OF NATIONAL INCOME (1952)

	West	North	East
Total N.I.	£200m.	£246m.	£150m.
Population	7m.	15m.	8m.
N.I. per head	£29	£16	£19

However, the cost of basic foodstuffs, etc., differs from Region to Region, and when 'adjusted' for such price levels the figures become:

West - £26 North - £16 East - £23

Most people then and still live very simply and their needs are basic. They still own very little property and, even their household goods, are most inadequate and dilapidated.³ In the rural areas, incomes are not only very low by Nigerian national standard, but are also irregular.⁴ There, the

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1. For example Perham, M. (edit) Native Economies of Nigeria, op.cit., contain a comparison on levels of consumption and money incomes between the North and the Southern Regions in pp.58-64 and 155-179. Also as a trade unionist I know that when labourers wages were 5/- in the West and Lagos; about 4/- in the East; it was about 3/- on the North Region. Wages in the Northern Region remained lower than in the rest of the country up to 1969.
 2. This regional division of national income is from Stapleton, G.B., The Wealth of Nigeria, London, 1958, p.95. A further discussion on the relative poverty of Northern Region can be found in Nigeria, the political and economic background (Prepared by the Royal Institute of International Affairs), Oxford, 1964.
 3. I first came face to face with stark poverty in rural houses in Fika emirate of Borno province (now Borno state) and I observed similar situations during my visit to Sokoto in 1976.
 4. A few villagers drift into the townships to take to all sorts of labouring jobs in the dry season but the overwhelming majority remain in the villages unemployed until the return of the rainy season. There are also natural causes of irregular income. For example, drought or quila birds or locusts can often damage crops and thus bring great hardship on farmers.

people live from hand to mouth and they have scant security for the future. In the Sahel areas of the far North, food is, at times, a great problem because of shortage of rainfall and the spreading of the Sahara desert. Although the food intake is above starvation level in the Savannah zone, it is generally inadequate in nutritional content to provide minimum safeguards to health.

Large numbers of Northerners have only one set of clothing which is seldom washed. Typically, the same clothes are worn day and night since pyjamas are unheard of and, even Gwado (a blanket of ^{coarse}~~course~~ cotton cloth) is beyond the means of those who are very poor. I trust that even without medical evidence, it is easy to imagine the hygienic consequences of this poor clothing. Few people in the rural areas have shoes on. Children up the age of seven roam about practically naked and beyond that age, some boys wear Bante (a piece of cloth tied around the waist which covers only the private parts). Women generally have more and better clothes than men except for the poorest of women who often have to be content with one Zani (a cloth wrapper measuring about two square yards covering the body from the waist to the knees).¹

Poor housing is another obvious evidence of poverty in Northern Nigeria. The majority of the people live in poorly built, overcrowded, insanitary and very scantily furnished homes (if at all they are furnished) which lack nearly all basic amenities. The houses are often

1. Households survey data are hard to come by but those who are familiar with Northern Nigeria do not need it anyway. However, NEPU political songs are full eloquent exposition of the poverty of the Northern masses and M. Gambo Hawaja's "A Yau Ba Maki NEPU Sai Wawa," is the most elegant versification of this.

no more than shacks or hovels, round huts with thatched roofs dotted in the savannah grasslands under the intense heat of the tropical sunshine.¹ Nevertheless, housing is one of the aspects of which one can say that rural inhabitants are in some cases better off than the poorest in the urban areas who do not have even the miserable shelters of the rural people. It is common to see beggars and truck pushers sleeping day and night in front of public buildings (if they are allowed) and under bridges or on the open fields and streets.² In the rainy season such poor fellows suffer from the heavy downpour of the tropical rains and, in the dry season, strong, dusty winds (harmattan) fill the air hence eyes are constantly sore and smarting throats irritated and lungs afflicted. Potters, soap-makers, smiths, bakers and farmers carry out their menial trades in and about their houses. Although these appalling conditions constitute health hazards to the communities concerned, the risks seem to be the greatest for infants who innocently play in the rubbish while their parents looked rather unconcerned as they feel relieved by anything that attracts the children away from their shoulders and laps. The effects of all this on the health of the people and subsequently on productivity are too obvious to be argued here.

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1. The problem of housing and lack of even a decent shelter seem to me to be more acute in Borno and Sokoto provinces where a good many of the houses are made of corn stalks and there are few trees to give comfortable shelter.
 2. It seems to me that the worst areas are Gangaren Jos; Maciyan Dan Auta, Zaria; and Bompai, Kano. Up to 1970s successive Nigerian governments made unsuccessful efforts to return beggar and destitutes back to their respective villages. Blind centres were built in Kaduna, Yola and other provincial capitals but not enough to make any impact.

THE INSANITARY CONDITIONS OF THE POOR¹

It seems the greatest of all the sanitary problems is the disposal of human waste and this affects the urban slums as much as the rural districts. In the rural districts, throughout Northern Nigeria, it is the common practice to defecate in the fields, bushes or jungle areas very near human habitation, consequently, villagers who normally walk bare-footed are exposed to hook worms and all sorts of foot diseases; the wind-blown fecal dust makes the eyes very sore, and when it rains the parasites which thrive in human waste are washed into the rivers, streams, lakes, ponds and wells from which water is obtained for drinking and cooking purposes. Where latrine pits exist, they are usually poorly constructed, shallow and surrounded by cesspools in which the cockroaches that roam the houses at night reside in day-time; water from them may also drain into wells, increasing the risk of cholera and other diseases. In the urban slums the sanitary provisions are hardly better than in the rural areas and may be worse. Some latrines are dry and as such scavenging has to be done manually. The scavengers, who are usually the poorest, tend to perform their jobs indifferently and their carelessness accentuates health hazards. Most urban areas have open drainage which both spreads germs and gives off obnoxious odours. Little effort is made to improve sanitation as constructed latrines are rarely used or, at best, misused and, due to public indifference, the authorities are unconcerned about sanitary conditions. Consequently, insanitary conditions result in the spread of many diseases which lead to ill-health and physical weakness and this, in turn, minimises economic productivity. If one agrees that poverty created the above

1. This account is based on my personal experience all over the North but I first noticed it at Fika in Borno State. Manual night-soil-men operate in all the urban centres. The writer attempted to organize them into trade unions in Kaduna in 1965 but some of them were so ashamed of their work that they did not want to expose themselves by joining a Union.

condition in the first place then the obvious conclusion is that the poor are caught in a vicious circle which perpetuates their poverty.

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RULING CLASS

The underlying causes of the foregoing appalling conditions of the poor people are partly economic, as social inequality and cultural poverty are reflections of material poverty; and partly political, because the administrations are not designed to benefit the people but to subdue them and thereby facilitate their easy exploitation by the ruling classes (see Chapter III). For the attitude of the ruling classes in North towards the Talakawa is more like that of a hyena towards a goat than that of a shepherd towards his flock, and has been so since at least the mid-nineteenth century. For instance, Henry Barth (who accompanied a Borno Commander on an expedition in 1850) observed the senseless destruction of human life, prosperous villages, which followed the capture of few thousand slaves, asked the Commander:

"Why not let these people cultivate in tranquility and levy tribute on them?"

The Commander replied:

"That only by most violent means were they able to crush these pagans, who cherished their independence and liberty above everything and that, that was the reason why he had to burn all their granaries, in order to subdue them with famine; and that even with famine they were less sensible than he could wish, as the water of the area provided them with unlimited supply of fish." 1

1. H. Barth, op.cit., p.594, cited in Perham M., Native Administration in Nigeria, Oxford 1962, p.45.

Similarly, in 1904, F.D. Lugard observed that:

"Inherent in the system of administration was the ceaseless raiding for slaves, both for use by the rulers and for payment of the Sokoto caliphate. The country was thus rapidly depopulated, since the numbers captured, vast as they were, were but a small proportion to those killed or left to die of starvation. These raids were made against independent pagan tribes... Raids were also made upon the subject peoples muslims on the excuse of rebellion, or no excuse at all. Where a Fulani army passed it left a depopulated desert." 1

Destruction of life and property by the ruling class continued well into the 1960s especially in Mumuye and Wurkun Districts of Gongola State.² However it must be admitted that their prevalence and intensity was minimised under the moderating influence of British colonial administrators. The rationale for those atrocities was the ruling class belief that the more prosperous their subjects became the less coercible they would be. So, the strategy was to make the Talakawa economically dependent so as to make their political control effective. This shows how the emirate system of government rested, in part, on the poverty of the subjects.

1. Lugard, F.D., op.cit., p.7.

2. Unquotable sources informed the writer that two District Heads were deposed in Muri, on the insistence of British District officers, for ordering their servants to destroy pagan villages. Many villagers were killed in Wurkun in similar circumstances. In 1943, Abubakar Imam complained to Lord Lugard on the atrocities of District rulers in the North: See New Nigerian (Special Supplement) Wednesday, 17 January 1979, p.11. After independence, N.P.C. government kept a blind eye on what happened to villagers in the rural districts (see chapter III).

TAXATION AS A MEANS OF POLITICAL CONTROL

In pre-Jihad Hausaland (as in the post-Jihad administration) slave-raids were meant to supplement the income of the rulers, which mainly derived from levies, which tended to impoverish their subjects. The Muslim rulers inherited from their Habe predecessors an onerous system of taxation. In addition to Kudin-Kasa or Kudin-Gona (land tax) every handicraft (weavers, dyers, blacksmiths, etc.) was taxed. Also caravans, canoe-owners, sellers in the market, all alike paid tax, while a sort of death duty was enforced.¹ When the British colonial superstructure was imposed upon Northern Nigeria in 1902, the aim of the British administration was to regulate this incidence of taxation by, on the one hand, freeing the peasantry from oppressive impacts and, on the other hand, enforcing uniform payment of "a fair and just" tribute of which the new colonial government claimed a share.² This assured a fair revenue to the Emirs, in lieu of their former sources of wealth which consisted in slaves, booty from raids and in taxes. In this way taxes paid by peasants continued to support large numbers of idle Princes, office-holders and armed retainers. Thus in Northern Nigeria, as in most developing countries, peasant farmers generate most of the economic surplus that support the ruling strata while the methods of extracting this surplus remains the core of their social and political problems.³

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1. Fika, A.M., "The political and Economic Reorientation of Kano Emirate, Northern Nigeria 1882-1940", Ph.D. thesis, London University, 1973, pp.74-75.
 2. Lugard, F.D., The Political Memoranda, London, 1919, pp.165-215.
 3. There is a general but insightful discussion by Williams, G. and Turner, T., "Nigeria: politics and political economy", in Dunn, J., (ed.) West African States: Failure and Promise, Cambridge, 1978, pp.132-172; Also see Williams, G., (ed.) Nigeria: Economy and Society, London, 1976. The parasitic nature of the ruling class is better exposed in Williams, G., "Inequalities and class in Rural Nigeria", unpublished paper 1979, p.11.

Although the British tried hard to rationalize the system of tax collection in order to minimise appropriations by intermediaries and to increase the State's share of revenue, taxation remained at a high level in Northern Nigeria throughout the colonial period. Taxes were not reduced to match any fall in agricultural prices; and often they amounted to half or even most of a farmer's cash income.¹ One of the effects of this has been the continued destitution of the Talakawa which results in the poor nutrition and the material poverty enumerated above as most of their cash incomes (at times most of their belongings) went to pay taxes. For example Nadel² attributed the poverty of the NUPE Talakawa in part to the appropriation of a substantial share of farm output in the form of tithes, rents, official salaries, etc., and the share of taxes which accrued to the privy purse of the royal house. In the Bida emirate, as in the emirates of Hausaland, the ruling classes had a great capacity to exact rents from the fiefs to which they lay claim. On the Banchi Plateau, Gwoza and Adamawa Hills areas which are lacking in export crop and thus in lucrative markets for food crops, the Talakawa suffered particularly from lack of money necessary to pay

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1. See Perham, M., Native Administration in Nigeria, op.cit., pp.51-54. There is a more detailed discussion on the relation of taxation to income including income data in Forde, D. and Scott, R. in Perham (edit) The Native Economies of Nigeria, op.cit., pp.164-187.
 2. This account is drawn from Nadel, S.F., A Black Byzantium, The Kingdom of Nupe in Nigeria, Oxford, 1942, pp.162-165 in which he discusses taxation.

even for taxes, clothing and supplementary food.¹ Thus, Forde² perceptively observed that in general Northern Nigerian farming households in the early 1940s were unable to obtain an adequate supply of items necessary to their diet, and were usually unable to find the £3 or so they needed to meet the "customary standards of consumption in supplementary foodstuffs, clothing... and personal services", because the annual tax-payment constituted a very heavy reduction in the real cash income available for such expenditure.

From the foregoing we can see that neither production for the market nor the subordination of peasant farmers to political authorities outside their respective communities were colonial innovations in the emirates of Northern Nigeria. Although the British administrative reorganization (1910-1925) made the emirates' control over outlying districts more effective, the ruling class have always maintained a patrimonial form of administration over the rural populations. They also provided for their own consumption through

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1. Having come from Jalingo town in Muri Division, Adamawa province, I am familiar with some of the causes of poverty in Adamawa and Gwoza area and having worked for the U.A.C. in Jos (1961-1964) I know Bauchi and Jos Plateau fairly well. The problem of tax collection and poverty is also documented. See, among others Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., "Tax and travel among the hill tribes of Northern Adamawa", in Africa, Vol.XXVI, No.1, 1956, pp.369-378; Koko, A., "Northern Nigerian District Officer, past, present and future," In The Nigerian Journal of Public Affairs, Vol.11, No.1, 1971, pp.29-38; Smith, M.G., "Kagoro Political Development", In Human Organization, Vol.19, No.3, 1950, pp.137-149.
 2. Forde, D., in Perham, M. (edit), op.cit., pp.163-164. The quotation below is taken from p.164 thereof.

taxing their subjects, appropriating slaves and tributes from conquered tribes; exactions on trade and commerce; and by maintaining estates worked by a form of slave labour. Hence in contrast to the poverty of the peasant producers, the ruling class, rich merchants and members of the State bureaucracy (most of whom resided in the cities, urban centres and district headquarters) were comparatively better off. The British organization of the Native Administrations (N.A.; discussed in Chapter III) reduced the incidence of abuses but it also stabilized the sources of income of the ruling classes and thus provided them with the regular income necessary to maintain the pattern of expenditure needed to preserve their privileges and statuses. In addition to what Fulani call Barka Lamu (the fruits of office), the ruling class, their attendants and N.A. functionaries received regular salaries and had gratuity and pension entitlements on their retirements. This clearly differentiated the Masu-Sarauta (the office holding aristocracy) from the rural populations by their wealth, landholdings and political power.

SOCIAL INEQUALITY

A comprehensive analysis of the class relations of Northern Nigerian society and its political implications is not only beyond the scope of this chapter, but would present grave difficulties at present. Apart from the familiar problems of applying class concepts and class analysis to largely 'peasant societies',¹ in the Northern Nigerian case

1. See the introductory chapter in Shanin, T., The Awkward class, Oxford, 1972 also see his peasant & peasant society, Penguin 1971; and Berger, J., Pig Earth, Writers & Readers Cooperative, 1979.

the data for such analysis are scarce and hard to come by.¹ Further the attempt would raise numerous problems. For example, Northern Nigerian producers derive their incomes from various productive, distributive and other activities. Farmers are also commonly traders or labourers or tailors and, in some respects their farm incomes may depend on their non-farming earnings. In a life time people can shift from, say, wage labour to farming, to trading; or combine all and retain farming as their main source of income. This is why we do not intent to classify people into classes in the aggregate. Instead, our focus is on the simple divisions of Hausa society arising from historical religious and ethnic factors as well as gender, status and wealth.

The concept of social inequality is very much associated with two interlocking but conceptually different, social processes. One is the "appropriate" allocation of material rewards attached to different positions in the social hierarchy and, the other, is the process of recruitment to these positions.² Modern Nigeria exhibits forms of inequality arising from both economic and political power. For example the new "breed of intermediaries", who act as middlemen between foreign firms and government departments, have acquired great political influence because of their wealth. They are also buying titles from the traditional elites and thus achieving for themselves high social status.

1. G. Williams, unpublished paper, op.cit.

2. This concept is ably analysed by Westergaard, J., "Class, Inequality and Corporation", In Hunt, A. (edit) Class and Class Structure, London, 1978, pp.165-185.

DIVISIONS IN HAUSA SOCIETY: ETHNICITY AND RELIGION

Northern Nigerian Society is divided on ethnic and historical lines as, for instance the distinction between Fulani and Habe (non-Fulani). The word Habe denotes ^Muslims of non-Fulani origin, both of slave and of free descent, so Hausa are Habe.¹ Among the Northern Nigerian ethnic groups an individual derives his ethnic status from his father. Thus a child of a Fulani father by a Munmye slave woman is Fulani. Following their conquest of the Hausa States during the Jihad period, the new Fulani rulers established harems of non-Fulani women, in part symbolising their dominant position. This extensive opportunity for recruiting concubines from their own slaves and other non-Fulani tribes helped to create social stability in the sense that it served as a form of political alliance between powerful clients, non-^Muslim chiefs and the Emirs.

In this way the children² of Habe mothers were assimilated into the Fulani ruling aristocracy. However, Habe may also be assimilated to Fulani affiliation through their Fulani mothers. This does not mean that all Fulani have high status, on the contrary, most of them are among the ruled, thereby giving the word Fulani, a differing political and ethnic reference. In Northern Nigeria, the rule of

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1. The Hausa themselves refer to the animists as Arna (a derogatory Hausa word for pagans (sing: Arne) while the Kanuri of Borno call them Kirdi (equally derogatory as Arna). But in the Fulfulde speaking areas of Adamawa, Gombe, Muri, the word Habe refers to animists or any native of non-Fulani descent. See F. Salamone, "Becoming Hausa: Ethnic identity, change and its implications for the study of ethnic Pluralism and Stratification" In Africa 45, 4 (1975) 410-24. "The Serkawa of Yauri: Class, Status or Party?" In African Studies Res. 18, 1 (1975) 88-101.
 2. Under ^Muslim law the child of a slave concubine by her master is a free member of the master's family having equal rights of inheritance with other issues on its father's death. In this way, most, if not all Emirs, in Northern Nigeria had (or still have pagan cousins).

succession is observed by both Fulani and Habe alike. With few exceptions only the sons of the past rulers are eligible to succeed to the throne. This principle applies to the lesser offices of the State with hereditary nature.

Compared to the Hausa and the Fulani of the far North, the animist tribes of the Middle Belt, had inferior technology; lived in smaller settlements; and had their own peculiar mode of social organization. All these combined to leave them relatively defenceless against slave raiders to whom they formed the legitimate target of slave raids and tribute exactions. Traditionally, the nearest they came to independence was by recognizing the suzerainty of the Fulani rulers and by payments of tribute. This is why they are generally regarded by all muslims, and especially by the Fulani, as the lowest social group. In the Emirates, the animists are looked upon with extreme contempt. In the eyes of the Fulani ruling aristocracy all pagans are uncouth and unreliable. That these animists groups put together form about 30%¹ of the population of Northern Nigeria is not of great significance to the Fulani aristocracy.

The religious division of Northern Nigerian society is due to the fact that the far North (Emirates) is predominantly muslim and, as such, it received its culture over 500 years ago across the Sahara from Middle Eastern sources. Thus in addition to an obscure myth of common origin 'in the East', and a common religion, there are certain common social and political ideas and purposes which link the muslim parts of Northern Nigeria with North Africa.² The Middle Belt remains

1. This percentage (30%) is quoted from the Nigerian Year Book, Lagos, 1970.

2. There ^{are} many literature which analysed the factors linking Nigeria and North Africa. For example see Hodgkins, T.L. educative analysis in "The Battle for the Maghred", In Political Quarterly, Vol.29, No.4, 1958, pp.348-355.

largely animist and therefore indigenous in religion and culture, though during this century, both Christian and latterly muslim proselytization has occurred, without apparently creating marked religious tension.¹ These contrasting influences have led to two distinct patterns of social political settings. Although the peoples of Northern Nigerian origin are commonly referred to as "Northerners" (indicating Northern solidarity), especially in Southern Nigeria, and despite the fact that the North is apparently more homogenous than the South, these internal distinctions within the Northern communities are there for all to see.

WEALTH AND STATUS

Because "classes" in the sense of distinct and selfconscious socio-economic groups having autogenistic economic and political relations with other socio-economic groups are not the predominant social categories in Northern Nigeria, we focus this section on the notion of status based on birth and social placement.² What militates against the 'contradictions of the capitalist mode of production becoming increasingly social in nature'³ is the family bond linking the rich and

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1. The recent controversy in the Constituent Assembly (1978) and the tension it generated, over the Shari'ah issue, did not go beyond the debating chamber.
 2. According to Smith, M.G., "The Hausa system of social status", In Africa, Vol.29, No.3, 1959, pp.239-251, 'Social placement' refers to a position an individual occupies and belongs to in the society; whereas 'social status' implies that such placements have a common basis and hierarchical form (p.239).
 3. On the 'capitalist mode of production', See Marx, K. Capital, A Critique of political economy, Vol.1, (S. Moore and E. Aveling, trans. and edited by F. Engels), London 1977, pp.173-180. Also see Marx's Pre-capitalist Economic Formations (edited and with introduction by Hobsbawm, E.) London, 1978, especially pp.1-65.



the poor, literate and the illiterate, the influential and the insignificant. The Emir, the chief, the title-holder, or the rich, may have a brother, a sister, a relation or a friend who might be very poor - labourer, peasant farmer, destitute etc. - but to their credit it would never occur to them to hide their lowly relatives as might be the case in Britain or in all Western Europe and North America. The extended family system, good neighbourliness and Amana (a combination of trust and loyalty) bridge the divisions between the strata. As family boundaries overlap those of strata, perception of elite status does not necessarily imply hostility or class antagonism.

The poor look up to the rich with admiration rather than with envy or jealousy. Wealth is seen as something bestowed upon the rich by God:¹ it is rarely perceived as having been amassed by Zamba (cheating or exploitation) or Riba (profiteering).² The Hausa saying Arziki Kyautan Allah (wealth is the gift of God) supports this. Enterprising young men aspiring for success in business normally identify themselves with the already established businessmen hence the adoption of such names " Ubale Na Alhaji Abdulnadir" or "Alhaji Abdul-Kadir Na Alhaji Ma~~n~~sur". Ubale identifies himself with Alhaji Abdul Kadir (as Alhaji Abdul Kadir did to Alhaji Ma~~n~~sur before he became well

1. This attitude towards the rich is not peculiar to Hausa; Lloyd, P.C., Power and Independence: Urban Africans' Perception of Social Inequality, London, 1974, pp.174-178, observed a similar attitude among the Yoruba.
2. The Hausa word Zamba also means fraud and swindling; Riba which ordinarily means profit also means profiteering which makes it immoral in Islam and thus illegal in Islamic law. Again the Yoruba also have similar words Kalabule (commercial cheating) and Gwinabu (adroit trade malpractice), according to A. Omotosho.

established) in anticipation of patronage and help from his 'Master' to enable him establish his own independent business later in life.

Thus instead of class hostility we find in Northern Nigerian society relations of Biyavya (deference) and Daraja (prestige). Daraja does not necessarily carry with it the assumption of wealth and political or economic power but it is simply of high social status based on birth, education and the holding of an official title. Some people are also evaluated on the age they have reached. For instance, depending on individual merit and moral qualities, distinction is made between Tsoho (old man) and Dattijo (a respectable gentleman or a mature man). In this way social superiority can be achieved without acquiring wealth or power or both. Since this status system is all embracing class antagonism is not yet manifest. However, this does not mean that no lines of distinction are to be drawn in the social structure.¹

GENDER

Generally speaking, the female is socially inferior to the male in all parts of Nigeria.² Within the various social categories, women are lower in status than men. In the Middle Belt, women do take part in many economic and social activities. Among the Jukuns and the Igbirra women even hold high political offices,³ but that does not

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1. For more details on the various social gradations see Smith, M.G., "The Hausa system of Social Status", op.cit. and Greenberg, J.H., "Islam and Clan Organization Among the Hausa", In South Western Journal of Anthropology, Vol.3, 1947, pp.193-211.
 2. It seems that this is not peculiar to Nigeria or to African countries. See Mitchell, J., Woman's Estate, Penguin, 1971, pp.41-54.
 3. This point was discussed in greater detail elsewhere. See my "Nigerian Politics: The causes and the effects of the Civil War," unpublished seminar paper, Dept. of Sociology, Leeds University, 1976, pp.4-8.

enhance their social status to equal that of men.¹ But among some tribes, as with the Munmye, married women are regarded as the property of their husbands and are often inherited by sons (except for their own mothers). This does not, of course, include the new Christian converts who as Christians have accepted Western European culture to varying degrees. Among the ^Muslim community women are legal minors and both legally and economically are the wards of men.² In Islam women have a religious duty to marry, and so, in most parts of the far North, some unmarried women are considered prostitutes. But the general Hausa word for prostitutes Karuwai (sing: Karuwa), applies to women who live independently and who are known to serve male clients for financial reward. Unmarried women who live with their parents or relations are called Bazawarai (sing: Bazawara).

Marriages may be polygamous because the Qur'an says:

"If you are afraid that you will treat the orphans unjustly, then marry what women seem good to you, twos, threes and fours; if you are afraid you will not deal equitably, then one; or what your right hands possess (i.e. slave concubines); then you are more likely not to be unfair"

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1. For a detailed discussion on the political status of women, see Sanday, P.R., "Female Status on the Public Domain", in Rosaldo, M.Z. and Lamphere, L., (edits) Woman, Culture and Society, Standford, 1974, pp.189-206.
 2. The legal obligation of the male ^Muslim towards his family and, especially, the rights and obligation of women is ably discussed by Hinchcliffe, D., "The Status of Women in Islamic Law", in Brown, G.N. and Hiskett, M., Conflict and Harmony in Education in Tropical Africa, London, 1974, pp.455-466.

(The Qur'an verse 4:3). Thus Islam permits male ^Muslims to marry up to four wives at the same time, on the condition that all the wives will be treated EQUALLY. Within the polygamous households, in ^Muslim areas, co-wives are ranked in seniority by reference to marriage order to the common husband.¹ Divorce is allowed under Maliki law (^Muslim law) by the simple repudiation of the wife by the husband or by the wife's desertion and refusal to return to the husband's house. Common law wives (concubines) are also allowed as some schools of thought hold that a male ^Muslim is permitted to take as many concubines as he can afford to maintain.² All common law wives share the same status, below that of married women.

Wives, as well as concubines, can be kept in purdah. While purdah is still the ideal and is widely practised, poverty or education (among other factors) may lead to its abandonment by individual husbands. Prestige is in relation to the degree of purdah imposed and it is more

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1. Baba of Karo's personal experience is an educative inside story of this. See Smith, M.F., Baba of Karo, London, 1954.
 2. Nevertheless, polygamy is a very controversial topic among the Ulema. Some ^Muslims hold that it is allowed only on the condition that all the wives are treated equally (the key word and, hence the emphasis, is Equality) and, since this condition is impossible to meet in practice, they maintain that it amounts to prohibition. On the problems of reform of marriage and inheritance in Islam, see Watt, W.M., Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman, Oxford, 1977, pp.151-166. For a scathing attack on the practice of polygamy in Northern Nigeria, see Isa Wali, "The True position of Women in Islam," In Nigerian Citizen, 18 July, 1956, p.6. Although the Jones' account is a manual with special reference to conditions of women in India, it is a remarkable elaboration of Isa Wali's views. See Bevan-Jones, V.L. and L., Woman in Islam, Lucknow, 1941, especially pp.177-193. There is a study of the status of women in the muslim world in general, with particular stress on legal and socioeconomic fields in Beck, L., and Keddie, M. (edits) Women in the Muslim World, Cambridge, Mass. 1978.

significant to the prestige of the husband than for that of the wives. So, full purdah is practiced by the aristocratic families of the far North whose wives and concubines work within the confine of their respective compounds, whereas their servants and maids do what has to be done outside the compounds. Commoners, especially in the rural areas, practice partial purdah as their wives and children often help them with farm work and draw water for domestic use.¹ Non-Muslims imposed no such restrictions on their wives. Thus, in this traditional setting the male takes priority over the female. This ascribed superiority of the male over the female partly derived from the men's ability to excludethe women from socially productive work and thus restrict them to private housework; and partly it stems from women's economic dependence on men which leads to their being physically determined as inferior to men. Ethnic and religious differences notwithstanding the overall inferiorization of women is total in the whole of Nigeria.

ELITE STATUS AND OFFICE-HOLDING

Another general differentiation in Hausa society is the distinction between the rulers and the ruled.² In this rough division there is, on the one hand, the Sarakuna (rulers) and Masu Sarauta (political office holders) and, on the other hand, the Talakawa

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1. For the account of the economic activities of Hausa women in purdah, see Hill, P., "Hidden Trade in Hausaland", In Man, Vol.4, No.3, 1969, pp.392-409.
 2. Among some of the non-muslim communities being a chief does not entail exemption from work and thus the degree of the exploitation of the common people is very much lesser than what is obtained in the muslim areas.

(Commoners). In Hausaland, the rulers exercise considerable authority over the ruled and, therefore, have high status. Their authority is partly derived from the misinterpretations of the Qur'an by venal Malams (See Chapter II) who claim that Islam invested the rulers with the religious sanctions of Allah's will and thus provides religious and moral support for their rule; and partly by their domination of all the institutions of command and control. Following this their status comes from their effective control of all administrative appointments and through the enormous wealth¹ they accumulated from the exploitation of the peasantry. Thus, the complete monopoly of power and patronage by the rulers marks the greatest social distinction in Hausaland. The distinction between the rulers and the ruled accordingly divides the society into two clearly defined strata: the one subordinate to the other. As we have seen above the same basic idea is expressed in ethnic terms, because the official systems are co-extensive with the society. Office holders include persons drawn from all significant status levels and in so far as the society is highly differentiated, offices and their holders are also status differentiated. Hence only Princes can seek the throne and only 'slaves' (see below) are eligible for slave offices.² But, on the whole, the status of the Fulani ruling lineage, in particular and the entire aristocracy in general,

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1. Russell has compared and contrasted the enormous wealth of Fulani Emirs as opposed to the abject poverty of their subjects, based on her observations at Jalingo, Yola, Kafanchan and Katsina. See Russell, E., Bush life in Nigeria (Privately published) by Sir Kenneth Maddocks, Abbey House, Sutton Moutis, Yeovil, Somerset, 1978.
 2. The distinction between slave offices and royal offices are discussed below. Smith's didactic analysis on the statuses of slaves is based on his observation in Zaria but the same principle applies in varying degree to all Hausaland. See Smith, M.G., op.cit.

is higher than that of other Fulani. Their male members are each Yerima or Jauro (a Prince); and their females are each a Gimbiya or Mairam (a Princess). According to convention, their privileges included their exemption from the payment of taxes.¹

The Fadawa (sing: Bafade 'courtiers and royal attendants')² occupy a high status in Hausa society because of their proximity to the Sarakuna. The majority of Fadawa are commoners but their status varies with the rank of the official they serve. In this way it sometimes happens that the client of a man who has never held office may outrank the agents of some officials. The official system reflects the status differentiation current in the Emirates but it can neither relate one status to another consistently nor supply an invariable principle of social classification. Indeed, the official system is quite marginal to status placement and it is neither as uniform nor as consistent as it may seem. In this case, it seems the only consistent principle which holds is the convention that only the aristocracy are eligible to compete for those offices which come to be theirs, as only members of the learned families, Malamai (clerics) are eligible for legal and religious positions, to which individuals are appointed on the basis of their Islamic learning and particularly their knowledge of jurisprudence (FIQH) and the Maliki law.

The Malamai (sing: Malam) form a group which is so heterogeneous as

1. This confirmed that taxation (or the payment of taxes) was an admission of subjection and thus taxes were seen by both the rulers and the ruled as a substitute to the payment of tributes.
2. This group include a large number of spies, intriguers and wire-pullers. In some respects they resemble the large number of "retainers" around Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia as described by Markakis, J., Ethiopia, Anatomy of traditional Polity, Adis Ababa, 1974, pp.229-259.

to defy any general ranking status. Although senior judicial offices, like Alkalai (sing: Alkali) and religious offices like Imams, etc. are held by this group, the group itself has no definite general status. However, they may be considered part of the establishment not only because they dominate the judicial and religious institutions but also because of their manifold relationship with the aristocracy. Each Malam has definite religious duties allotted to him for which he is appropriately remunerated. These duties include naming babies, marriages, burial of different classes, etc. Furthermore, the Malamai as a whole, are the principal recipients of public alms and Zakkat (the equivalent of tithes). To the extent that they enjoy these benefits, some Malamai holding office as Imam etc. are partially independent of official support. Despite the religious nature of their social functions, some official Malamai often act very much like the Sarakuna. This is because their official recognition and hence their access to the (political) court inject a political ingredient in their activities.

On the whole, the Malamai are highly respected because as religious leaders they are seen as the moral guardians of their communities. Hence the Hausa epithet: Malamai Magada Annabawa (the Malamai are the successors of Prophets). As pious men and diviners, they pray for the safety and success of the rulers and of the commoners. In this way they are taken into confidence by both the rulers and the ruled alike. Through the process of private consultations with their clients, they get to know the commoners' views on public issues: what the commoners want and expect of their rulers. Since the same Malamai are also advisers to the rulers on Islamic affairs they tend to suggest popular public policies while justifying their opinions by using Islamic religious

tenets. In this intermediary role between the rulers and their subjects, the Malamai directly and indirectly participate in the attempt to solve public issues and conflicts. They participate in the deliberations, in the decision-making and in the coordination of action in matters of policy.¹

The aforementioned social and political order in the Emirates seems to have a high absorptive capacity, but in reality those absorbed are not treated exactly as the members of the ruling classes, or even as those who might have inherited their offices. Hence the difference between Karda and Shigegge and other official title-holders comes to light.² Karda refers to ascribed status which to Hausa is very important and, as such, is held in very high regard. It is applied even to occupational groups. The son of a hunter is socially expected to become a hunter when he grows up but if, for instance, he chooses to become a fisherman, he will be looked upon as a Nouveaux Riche and treated as a Shigegge (see below) in the trade. The usual Hausa blessings for children which reflect the depth of this belief is: Allah Yasa Kagaji Baba or Yaro Magajin Baba (may you inherit your father's occupation). Hausa sayings like: Dan Na Gada Yafi Dan Na Kova (ascribed familiarity is better than acquired skill; or such songs as: Yaro Nemi Magani Ga Ubanka, (Boy, learn a skill from your father)

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1. Mr. A. Cohen's work is a study of Hausa Malamai among the Hausa settlers in Ibadan, Western Nigeria but it is indicative of the general practice in Hausaland itself. See Cohen, A., Custom and Politics in Urban Africa, London, 1969, pp.205-207. For a detailed analysis of the social functions of muslim scholars in Hausaland, see Last, M.D., The Sokoto Caliphate, London, 1967, pp.lxxvi-lxxx; and his "Aspects of Administration and Dissent in Hausaland, 1800-1968", In Africa, Vol.XL, No.4, 1970, pp.345-354.
 2. A very useful analysis of the distinction between Karda and Shigegge is made by Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., in his "The merit principle in an African Bureaucracy: Northern Nigeria", in Rivkin, A., (ed.) Nations by Design, 1968, pp.205-258.

Uban Wani Bayi Baka Saidai Naka, (somebody else's father won't teach you, only yours will); all confirm the Hausa's deep belief in inheritance and admiration for ascribed status. The Shigegge are those who are freely appointed or recruited and thus have achieved status. While the Karda can go wrong and ~~this~~ excused as Kuskure (a mistake) the Shigegge's mistake is regarded as a reflection of the lack of the Karda's ascribed familiarity (Ba Saban Ba). The existence of this type of attitude towards those who achieved status suggests that there might be some dormant resentment by the new recruits against the system but since the expression of dissent is not accepted and can be ruthlessly treated when it occurs, such frictions do not come to light. Nevertheless, the possibility of its existence cannot be completely ruled out.¹

The Emirates traditional system of taxation subjected traders, craftsmen, farmers and other producers to special taxes which were collected by officials separately for each category. Thus, there were chiefs of blacksmiths (Sarkin-Makera), of weavers (Sarkin-Masaka) etc. In Fulani ruled Emirates, these occupational offices were mainly filled by Habe and, in all the Emirates, they were clearly subordinate to those filled by Fulani, being charged only with tax collection and the organization of supplies required by the Emir. When taxation was reorganized (after the British conquest) and the special rates abolished, the formal hierarchies of occupational offices simply lapsed, but the

1. There are interesting accounts of how verbal and active dissent are dealt with within Northern Nigerian palace politics in Whitaker, Jr. C.S., The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria, 1946-1966, Princeton, 1970; Smith, M.G. Government in Zazzau, London, 1960; Smith, Sir Bryan Sharwood, But Always as Friends, London, 1970; Paden, J.N., Religion and Political Culture in Kano, California, 1973.

occupational groups upon which they were based remained unaffected and thus the titles still exist. This shows the error of defining social units in purely political terms.

STATUS IN NON-MUSLIM SOCIETIES

Amongst the less complex animist communities of the Middle Belt, the pattern of social status is very different, except among the Jukuns and the Igbirras where the system is, to some extent, similar to that of the Emirates. For example, among the egalitarian TIV and Munmye, social status is attributed to two things: age (the principle of gerontocracy) or the acquisition of high spiritual powers. The eldest man in the village is often the most respected but the man with high Akombo (spiritual powers among the TIV)¹ or the Pantigiriri (the rain-maker among the Munmye tribe) is both respected and feared because of his magical powers (Tsafi). The holders of these offices of power which are achieved and not ascribed, enjoy high status socially but have no political power. Similarly, heads of large extended families, who usually live together in compounds, are also very much respected. In tribes who have no centralized political organization, old men who happen to be the keepers (or the caretakers) of the shrines, arbitrate in disputes and as such enjoy high social status. In many areas of the Middle Belt, chieftaincy institutions are of recent creation and so they do not carry the same influence as is the case in the Emirates.

1. This information on the TIV is drawn from Mead, M., Cultural Pattern and Technical Change, Paris, 1965, p.96. Also see Bohannan, L., "Political Aspects of TIV social organization", In Middleton, J., and Tait, D., (eds.) Tribes Without Rulers, London, 1958, pp.33-36. My information on the Munmye is the result of my interview with M. Muhammadu Bello Kassa, M.H.A., Wakilin Kassa, at Kano, 1978.

However, many are adopting the political organization of the Emirate although their chiefs do not enjoy the same social status or exercise the same political power as their counterparts in the Emirates. The animist tribes, more especially their youth, who are educated and thus are Christians, are as aware as they are equally resentful of the contempt with which they are held in the Emirates. This in part led to what came to be known as "The Middle Belt Controversy", and became (in 1963) an explosive political issue in Nigeria.¹

SOCIAL MOBILITY OF SLAVES

The appointment of slaves or persons of slave origin to high offices of the state shows one of the patterns of upwards social mobility in the Hausa system of social status (discussed above). That they were the law enforcing agents in the pre-colonial period shows that they were a factor in the maintenance of social order (discussed below). The legacy of slavery and the slave mentality of uncritical obedience to the State exist in Northern Nigeria today, in that slaves were the precursors of the Fadawa group discussed above as well as in the sense that the Native Authority Police (see Chapter III) took over the functions previously performed by janissaries (slaves). On the other side of the same coin, the 'modernised' Native Authority staff also performed the functions discharged by slaves in the pre-colonial

1. For an official view on the origin of the Middle Belt disturbances of 1960-66, read the memoirs of a former colonial governor of Northern Nigeria during whose tenure of office the crisis began to surface, see Smith, Sir Bryan Sharwood, *op.cit.* Martin Dent whose account differs from the official view and, for which he left the Northern Nigerian Civil Service, was a District Officer in TIV Division. See Dent, M., "A minority party - The United Middle Belt Congress", In Mackintosh, J.P., Nigerian Government and Politics, London, 1966, pp.461-507.

bureaucracy. This explains in part the deferential attitudes and self-effacing behaviour of N.A. workers. In addition the power of the Emirs to promote without creating envy or to destroy without creating danger any employee of the N.A. was reminiscent of the way slaves were treated before the advent of the British.

That slavery existed in Nigeria from time immemorial up to the early twentieth century needs no emphasis here.¹ Although one of the noble objectives of British colonialism was to stop the slave trade, they did not find it desirable to eradicate domestic slavery in Northern Nigeria. However, the British stopped slave raids and made slavery illegal. In practice, this meant that slaves were given 'permissive freedom', i.e. they could run away from their masters and the courts would not support the masters in getting back the slaves. This gradual policy of abolishing slavery over a long period of time is, partly responsible for the existence of voluntary 'slaves' in some parts of Northern Nigeria today.² When "the legal status" of slaves was abolished (on 31st March 1901) many slaves remained with their masters and the British subtly supported this by not taking steps to make the law effective or even to indicate its purpose.³

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1. Literature on Slavery in Nigeria abounds. To mention only a few, see Lugard, F.D., Political Memoranda: Revision of Instructions to Political Officers on Subjects Chiefly Political and Administrative, 1913-1918, London, 1919, pp.217-248. Miers, S. and Kopytoff, I. (eds.) Slavery in Africa, Madison, Wis., 1977, especially, pp.85-102, 121-154; Mason, M., "Captive and Client Labour, the Economy of the Bida Emirate, 1857-1901," in Journal of African History, Vol.14, No.3, 1973, pp.453-471. For a useful discussion in Islam and Slavery in Senegal which bears a remarkable resemblance with Northern Nigeria, see Klein, M.A., Islam and Imperialism in Senegal, 1847-194, Edinburgh, 1968. A general discussion on Slavery in West Africa can be found in Grace, J., Domestic Slavery in West Africa, London, 1975.
 2. In traditional Northern Nigerian Society the distinction between a 'slave' and a 'servant' is a highly academic one. For one thing voluntary slaves exist and, for another, most of the servants in Emirs' palaces insist on being slaves for reasons discussed below.
 3. See Lugard, F.D. Political Memoranda, op.cit., and Perham, M. Native Administration in Nigeria, op.cit., pp.49-50.

In societies based on slave labour, slavery is "justified" by legal sanctions hence slaves form the social stratum which suffered great economic exploitation and the worst form of dehumanization, because most slaves were prisoners of war and/or they were of foreign origin [i.e. of different tribes] in the enslaving community.¹

Although the house slaves lived with the family group of their masters and were better treated than the field slaves, nevertheless, all slaves were socially defined as objects or things of property. Those slaves who were regarded as a purely economic commodity were clearly marked for sale or for export. During the Jahiliyya (the period of ignorance which simply means pre-Jihad era) period slaves who were marked for sale (and export) were totally dehumanized that they were no more part of the social system than any item of trade.²

After the Jihad, the position of slaves in the Emirates became legally ambiguous because it defied the main purpose of enslavement in Islam which is to convert the captives to the religion of Islam. Under no circumstances can a Muslim be enslaved by another Muslim. Islam makes it clear that enslavement must follow a True Jihad, meaning one captured in a strictly Muslims' reaction to defend themselves in war. In this sense the victim is seen to be a threat to the Islamic community. Even at that, further conditions were set: one must either convert the victim to Islam; ask him to pay a ransom for himself;

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1. A very general but radical analysis of the dehumanizing effects of slavery is made by Patterson, O., "Slavery in Human History", In New Left Review, No.117, 1979, pp.31-67. Patterson's discussion of general theory of slavery and his example of plantation slavery is distinguished from African domestic slavery in Grace, J., Domestic Slavery in West Africa, London, 1975.
 2. For a comparative study of slavery and emancipation in Nigeria (Zaria) and West Indies (Jamaica), see Smith, M.G., "Slavery and emancipation in two cities", In Social and Economic Studies, Vol.3, No.4, 1954, pp.239-290.

or free but bind him over to be of good behaviour and make peace with Muslims. Otherwise he is essentially a prisoner of war and ought to be treated accordingly.¹

But, as is well known, not all Muslims follow the teachings of their religion or the examples set by their religious leaders, and Northern Nigeria was no exception. Perham tells us how, after Jihad, slavery had received "the most respectable" confirmation in that after Muhammadu Bello (the Sultan of Sokoto) had laid down three categories of people: pure Muslims, nominal Muslims and heathens; he then asserted that on consensus of the Malamai the third category should be enslaved and their property divided among Muslims.² In the Emirates three categories of slaves existed: 1) the field slaves who lived and work on Gandu (farm settlements) 2) house slaves who did all the domestic work and attended to the general needs of the nobility 3) slave titled office holders (and other courtiers). The general problem of slavery itself is beyond the scope of this thesis because, with the legal abolishing of slavery, it ceased to be of central importance. In addition, we are only interested in how slaves were recruited into the Sarakuna class. Hence the third category is the focal point of our discussion.

1. Commentaries in the Hadith support this because when Prophet Muhammed conquered Makka, after a period of Hijira at Madina, he set all the city dwellers free. Shehu Usman Dan Fodio was also opposed to illegal 'enslavement'. In his book, Masa'il Muhimma, he complained of illegal sale of Fulani as slaves because they were Muslims. Also in a poem, "Tabbata Hakika" (Be sure of that) he explained that whoever enslaved a free man shall suffer torment: "The Hell-fire shall enslave him." Shehu Abdullahi Ibn Fodio rebuked some of his kinsmen for consorting with the Gobir enemy and he contemptuously referred to them as "the sellers of freemen in the market." For a useful account on the Hadith and slavery see Liman, M.T.A., "The Influence of the Poetry of Al-Kumait Ibn Zayd Al-Asadi on the downfall of the Umayyad Dynasty," Ph.D. thesis, London University, 1974, p.50; and for the detailed account of both Usman Dan Fodio and his brother Abdullahi see Hiskett, M., The Sword of Truth, The Life and the Times of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, New York, 1973, pp.77-78.

2. Perham, M., op.cit., pp.49-50.

In many Emirates, if not in all Emirates, slaves had considerable economic freedom. They often emerged as major political figures and in some States (e.g. in Gongola, Bauchi and Borno, to mention only a few) certain slave statuses are far more materially rewarding and thus more powerful than those of free men.¹ In most cases slaves were drawn into the network of political offices and, as such, the social distinctions between slaves and free men were so blurred that one could hardly speak of a well-defined slave stratum. Nevertheless, it is imperative to identify the faint line of distinction between slave officials and other nobles because in their case the word 'slave' was an exclusion mechanism which debarred them from aspiring to the throne.

Among the Sarakuna, the cultural distinctions between slaves and free men were minimal, if any. All title-holders, slaves and free men alike share, on the one hand, bland self-assertion in dealing with their inferiors and, on the other hand, courteous behaviour towards their equal. They also have (as they always had) a particular characteristic in which even when angered and intriguing against each other, they did so in restrained fashion, contained by invisible rules of "tolerance", "good sense" and "fair play." The habit of compromise was (is) part of their culture. They all taught their sons to be self-confident, courageous and to develop initiative. Conversely they discouraged, or even ruthlessly suppressed, the same qualities in the Talakawa. In

1. For example, there is a detailed account of influential slave officials in Borno in Brenner, L., The Shehus of Kukawa, Oxford, 1973, especially pp.89-103. There is also a well researched account by Cohen, R., "The Dynamics of Feudalism in Borno", In Butler, J. (ed.) Boston University Papers on Africa, Vol.11, Boston, Mass., 1966, pp.85-105.

fact slave title-holders, like their free counterparts, owned their own slaves as well as employing free servants. Smith tells us that Turaki Ba'idu, a slave official of Malam Musa (the first Fulani Emir of Zaria) had over 1,200 slaves and that he was one of the wealthiest men in Zaria at that time.¹ This shows that the relationship between slave and master was of utmost significance, because in its most effective form it was considered to be the ideal relationship between any two individuals of superior and subordinate rank, be they free or slave. In that case to be a slave was like being a client, it did not in itself entail dishonour. On the contrary, it provided, an opportunity to demonstrate mutual trust, inner courage and integrity, not to mention the promotion of mutual interests.

Apparently, the word 'slave' was not humiliating to slave officials because it was used metaphorically as in the Islamic belief that all men are the "slaves of God", which emphasized the extent of their submission to Almighty Allah. Thus a God-fearing man is admirably called Abdullahi (in Arabic) or Bawan Allah (in Hausa). Hence, being called 'slaves' denoted the loyalty of the slave officials to the Emirates' political system. This is why in Hausaland, holders of slave offices were called Bayin Sarki (the Emir's slaves). Slaves could (and did) rise to high offices of the State as District Heads or even become members of the category of the "Traditional King Makers",² i.e., Kachalla (Commander), Kaigama (War Lord or leader), Ajiya (the caretaker of captives), etc. Slaves of such status were so influential

1. Malam Musa ruled Zazzau in 1804-1821. See Smith, M.G., Government in Zazzau 1800-1951, Oxford, 1960, p.82.

2. The council of electors who selected and appointed a new Emir. They also advised the Emir on the recruitment and the appointment of all title-holders.

that their importance, in some cases, was second only to the Emir himself. Their own 'slavery' was a verbal idiophone which marked their loyalty and obedience to the Emir at whose pleasure they held office. In addition, it forbade them, socially from usurping offices reserved for royal nobles and, more especially, the Emir's throne. This shows clearly that no matter how powerful a slave official became, his office and thus his social status was lower than that of the royal noble. They were part of the Sarakuna but they remained in status ranking, the sub structure of the Masu Sarauta.

PRESERVATION OF SOCIAL ORDER

A society so divided by both status and wealth requires means for ensuring the reproduction of social order, regulating the relations between different strata, whatever their basis. A common culture alone is insufficient, not least because the non-^Muslim areas of Northern Nigeria share a common culture with the muslim areas only to a limited degree (see Chapter II). Apart from its monopoly of wealth and force, the ruling stratum in Northern Nigeria is able to rely on a variety of interpersonal relationships (deference, joking relationships), religion, and patronage as a means of social control.

The ethnic divisions of Northern Nigerian society have led to "joking relationships" which, politically, serve as a social basis of

peaceful coexistence. Joking relationships are widely practised in Northern Nigeria between both blood relations and ethnic groups. For instance, cross cousins joke with and tease each other. Similarly, NUPE people joke with Katsina people (Nupawa Da Katsinawa), Kano people with Zaria people (Kanawa Da Zazzagawa), TIV with Fulani (Munci Da Fulani), Bolewa with Bura (Bolawa Da Burawa), to mention only a few. These joking relationships are certainly one of the factors in the social system which holds Northern Nigeria together and, thereby gives it its sense of "Northernness."¹ More formal institutions may be created for the same end. After lengthy warfare in the sixteenth century between Borno and Kwararafa (Jukun), the two Kingdoms made peace, exchanged Ambassadors and gifts between them. The gift exchange between the two tribes continues till today. The holder of the title 'Ajifinge' represented the Jukuns in Borno whereas the 'Zanuwa' represented Borno at Wukari (the capital of Jukun Kingdom) when the sovereignty of the two Kingdoms was ended by the British conquest of Nigeria, the Zanuwa was appointed the District Head of Katsina Ala in 1912.² Such demonstration of solidarity and unity of the North also featured in the First Republic of Nigeria (1960-1966) when a Kanuri school teacher represented one of Bauchi constituencies in the Northern House of Assembly at Kaduna whereas a man from Kazaune and a man from Daura were among the Kano members of the same Assembly. Joking relations which are one of the bases of tribal understanding and tolerance in

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1. There is an insightful analysis of inter ethnic relations among the Hausa by Salamone, F.A., "Becoming Hausa: Ethnic identity, change and its implications for the study of ethnic pluralism and stratification", In Africa, Vol.45, No.2, 1975, pp.410-423.
 2. Interview with Mr. Abama and Alhaji Maina Waziri at Kano in 1978.

Northern Nigeria exist even among (and between) the animist communities.¹
This partly explains why the ethnic hierarchy is tolerated.

RELIGION AND ELITE STATUS

But the elite status of the Fulani as with such status in all muslim societies, is derived also from Islamic scholarships. The pursuance of knowledge is obligatory on every muslim; the Hadith enjoined all muslims to "search for knowledge even in China".² This injunction reflects the importance of learning in the minds of the early muslims and the Prophet himself. In pre-Jihad Hausaland, Fulani had the virtual monopoly of literacy and as such they were the sole religious leaders in muslim communities. In the post-Jihad period, political leadership was added to Fulani religious leadership and thus combined in them spiritual and temporal leadership in the Emirates. The habit of behaving in the way people praise was also attributed to the Fulani aristocracy. This attribute might have originated from the modest and the austere way of life of some of the leaders of the Jihad. Their exemplary life styles came to earn for the Fulani the epithet: Fulani Yayan Kunya (Fulani the modest ones). The piety of the Fulani leaders of Sokoto, in particular, gave them the name: Torobe, popularly known as the Toronkawa (the God-fearing ones). Similarly, their warm and generous characteristics endeared them to all

1. Among the Hausa, the joking relationship is known as Abokan-Wasa (play-mates); and the traditional exchange of gifts or presents is called Biyan-Shara (the traditional payments to play-mates). See Smith, M.F., Baba of Kano, op.cit., p.45.

2. Cited in Liman, M.T.A., op.cit., p.96.

who came in contact with them.¹ In the aristocratic families, efforts designed to uphold the qualities of the Fulani elders, as well as to develop initiative, are continuously inculcated in their progeny; whereas the society as a whole systematically disciplined and repressed other children. Thus, tradition, Islamic learning, apparent devotion to God and the simplicity of their style of life combine to make the Fulani Ardo'en (clan leaders) the accepted leaders of the ~~M~~uslim communities of the early nineteenth century Hausaland. Since Islam emphasizes that one of the constitutional principles of the State is the unity of the political and the religious community, the leadership in the Emirates have adopted Islamic teachings to support the political order. Thus, as religious leaders, Fulani are automatically seen as the defenders of the Islamic faith. In fact, to some orthodox ~~M~~uslims, the concept of an individual leader is implicit in the religion.

The combination of spiritual and temporal power in a ruler is not peculiar to the ~~M~~uslims of the far North. In the case of some tribes of the Middle Belt (e.g. Jukun, Bachama, Igala, etc.) it is part of their political culture that there should be one person who is the living symbol of their corporate existence, who will be their leader in battle, their law-giver, and the trusted intermediary between them and the Supreme: in times of peril and who protects them from pestilence or famine. Thus, like the Emir in a muslim Emirate, that person is their chief executive. In addition, both the animist and muslim communities share common high respect for elders. In this way Islam and custom between them imposed on the rulers of Northern

1. For differing habits between the Fulani and the Hausa see, Hiskett, M., *The Sword of Truth*, op.cit., pp.25-26.

Nigeria certain obligations, i.e. the maintenance of the apparatus of authority, the protection of the poor against the devices of evil doers, etc. In return, the rank and file of the society are expected to demonstrate their allegiance to their superiors by periodical offerings in cash and in kind.¹

PRESERVATION OF ORDER WITHIN THE RULING GROUP

As discussed above, while the characteristics of the ruling group include kindness, generosity, sympathy, restraint and tolerance towards each other, they do not extend the same towards their inferiors. The whole group can be pictured as members of a large extended family who prefer to intermarry among themselves and thus strengthen political ties and economic interdependence.

Competition for succession to the throne (of Emirship) is limited to the male members of the ruling dynasties who are in most cases brothers, cousins or other very close blood relations. In this competition, a loser is "down" but not "out", because it is not a game of 'winner takes all.' The successful candidate for Emirship redistributes posts and titled offices among his family and hence keeps them reasonably contented.² Even those who hold no offices at all are

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1. Literature abounds on the social and political organizations in Northern Nigeria. To mention only a very few see, Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., "Bureaucratic Cadres in a Traditional Milieu", In Coleman, J. (edit) Education and Political Development, Princeton, 1968, pp. 372-406; "The Muslim Areas of Northern Nigeria under British Rule", In Nigeria, a quarterly magazine of general interest, No. 22, 1944, pp. 30-41; Bohannon, L., "Political Aspects of Tiv Social Organization" In Middleton, J., and David, T., (edits) Tribes Without Rulers, London, 1958, pp. 33-36.
 2. On how this system worked in Zaria Emirate see Smith, M.G., Government in Zazzau, op. cit., p. 84.

well supported by their more fortunate relatives. Group cohesion is tightly maintained and underlined by their relative self-consciousness as a group, and their desire not to rock the boat by criticism, exposure of abuses, etc. In this way they maintain their superiority and hence a corresponding measure of influence over the fate of the community.

In addition, most senior titled officials are of slave origin and thus not entitled to compete for the Emirship. This group are however equally interested in preserving the goose which lays the golden egg and so are ready, at all times, to deal ruthlessly with any more action which threatens the social order. For this reason, the discontented are well aware that the Emir has the monopoly of the means and, indeed, the use of violence which will not be spared on anyone who threatens the social order. Their coercive means also regulate the relations between Emirs and the merchants (i.e. the wealthy). In most cases the Emirs are the richest persons around but where there is an exception the Emirs have a range of means from social and religious preserves through manipulation of the courts, to crude force, in order to ensure that no one else acquires or uses an economic base to challenge their powers. Thus, the merchants tend to secure the Emirs protection through gifts and by defraying their expenditures on important occasions. Where the merchants are dominant (as in

Kano)¹ some of them do tend to support opposition elements, if not themselves active in opposition to the Emiracy; yet even this is tempered by gifts to the Emir and his family, or to important Imams.

RELATIONS BETWEEN STRATA: POVERTY AND PATRONAGE

In part one of this chapter I tried to show how the Talakawa were kept down by the tyranny of poverty and hunger. Poverty and its attendant hardships are related to a very strong Kingship system which gives the head of the family an authoritative hold on all members of the extended family. The economic interdependency of small scale peasant production, which is wholly by human labour with the aid of primitive tools, is such that defiance of the authority of Maigida (Head of the family) is seen as economic suicide, and risking being made a social outcast. As is the case in most peasant societies where the majority of the people have been accustomed to the caprices of seasonal cycles and habituated to the hazards of subsistence farming,² the Talakawa attach considerable importance to the trait of generosity and, to its opposite, the social sin of miserliness. A Hausa proverb elegantly

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1. The opposition tendency of Kano merchants is discussed in detail by Tahir, I., "Scholars, Saints and Capitalists in Kano 1904-1974: The Pattern of bourgeois revolution in an Islamic Society", Ph.D. Thesis, Cambridge University, 1975. But what should be noted is that the Habe versus Fulani conflict is more pronounced in Kano than anywhere else in the Emirates. This makes Kano the exception rather than the rule. Being an ancient trading city, Kano has the largest indigenous merchant class most of whom are Habe of Hausa origin whereas the ruling class are almost exclusively Fulani. But even in Kano, the merchant class were incorporated into the ruling group through marriage at the local level and by virtue of the NPCs control of patronage at the regional and central levels. However, some of them continued to support NEPU secretly, as I explain in Chapter V.
 2. For a comparative study of the predicaments of peasant life see, Shanin, T., (ed.) Peasant and Peasant Societies, Penguin, 1971.

expresses this belief when it says: Da Hannu Akan San Girma (true greatness is identified by generosity); whereas the miserly are anathemised in the somewhat more elliptical maxim: Lafin Babba Rowa (the sin of an important person is stinginess). This partial redistribution of wealth extracted through taxation or other means from the peasantry forms the basis of patron-client relationships in peasant societies¹ and can regulate both relationships within a ruling hierarchy, and between that hierarchy and subordinate strata, though the nature of the 'client' status differs in the two cases. Whitaker has described the significance of patronage in Northern Nigerian politics with admirable brevity:

"Clientage is a key traditional political institution, indeed, a major social adhesive of the emirate system. The crux of the clientage relationship in all the emirates is that patronage, economic security and protection can be exchanged for personal loyalty and obedience. For the Habe Talakawa, clientage represented the principal channel of upward mobility, toward and within the ruling circle. For those outside that sphere, lesser forms of clientage relationships provided virtually the only defense against such eventualities as arbitrary tax levies, injurious treatment in judicial proceedings, discrimination in allocation of farming land or in administration of public services, to mention the most common perils.

The efficacy of traditional clientage within an emirate lies in the ability to exercise influence in proportion to the rank and position in the socio-political hierarchy. Typically an influential official enjoys the allegiance to a more influential person above. 2

†. For a general but instructive study of patron and client relations See, Schmidt, S.W. et al.: (eds.) Friends, Followers and Factions, California, 1977.

2. This and the quotation below are taken from Whitaker, C.S. Jr., op.cit., pp.373-375.

The NPC by virtue of its close relationship with the ruling hierarchy and its control of public spending, was able to turn patronage to its advantage. Whitaker again explains:

".... the party was the principal agency of patronage offices, loans, scholarships, contracts and other opportunities sought by the upwardly mobile. This could be accomplished either directly and formally or indirectly and informally through the medium of the party or ex-party men who dominated the public boards, corporations and commissions. Second (and of the greater consequence in terms of winning mass support), the interlocking directorate of local administrative and party personnel inescapably bound humble persons to traditionally august figures in their capacity as party men. The dependency that derived from the vast network of clientage relationships inherent in traditional society were transferred to the party. Loyalty to the NPC became a way of defraying traditional political obligations."

Among other factors, it was this traditional institution of clientage which effectively competed with the functions (or the potential functions) of NEPU as a radical opposition. Along with coercion, patronage snatched from NEPU's grasp the opportunities for exercise of power and thus for implementing its programmes which it claimed would have freed the Talakawa from the grip of socio-economic and political traditional hold.

DEFERENCE AND OBEDIENCE

It was previously stated that life was terrible for the "little people" and that the Talakawa were conscious of that. They were fully aware that their only general protection against overzealous tax collectors, judicial bias and administrative arbitrariness was deference

and obedience to the ruling group and their clients.

The subservient habits of the Hausa society stemmed from the heritage of slavery. In the precolonial period, slaves had to obey their masters and if any of them rebelled (or defied their master) all the free men would combine to crush such a rebellion. Other subject people showed their obedience and apparent loyalty by the payment of tribute and by accepting a client status to a local noble . Those were the only means of protection and security open to the Talakawa, and through those means the slave mentality of fear, dependence and servitude was inculcated in the rank and file of the society.

The socialization processes through which children, youths and women passed emphasized over and over again the importance of obedience, dependence and servitude to one's superior in exchange for protection, status security and, in some respects, upward social mobility. Beneath the deference and obedience of the subordinate classes to their social superiors, lies the fear of the coercive instruments controlled by the ruling group, who do not hesitate to use them to enforce obedience as and when the occasion arises.

The entire socialization processes reinforce the subordination of women and children to men and elders as well as that of the Talakawa towards the Sarakuna. Long before children begin to perceive this social differentiation (or understand it) they begin to react to it as they are controlled by it. The society has innumerable ways of making social categories known, felt and feared. Initiative is discouraged among the children of the Talakawa as much as severe discipline is enforced against "disobedience"; and loyalty is often

rewarded. Muslim Hausa take Islam to be synonymous with loyalty and obedience to the extent that a loyal or an obedient person is not expected to "cry when he is hurt." It is metaphorically explained that the more quiet, loyal and obedient a sheep the more benefits she gets from the shepherd. Thus it is considered meritorious not to press to the limit one's claim for compensation when one has been injured, which again tends to undermine the potential for opposition movements.

RADICAL THOUGHT AND SOCIAL ORDER

The foregoing situation produced in the Talakawa a people who by sheer force of circumstances have learned to survive amidst severe psychological and physical onslaughts, acquiring in the process the toughness such experience entails. Radical ideas are slow to grow or spread in such a milieu, but certain categories have tended to adopt them: the western educated elite (Ma'aikata); artisans, traders and others whose incomes and occupations freed them from dependence on patrons; and a few enlightened and more independent peasant producers (especially those influenced by the more radical Islamic brotherhoods or movement). This pull of radicalism which brought together the enlightened poor and the radical Ma'aikata culminated in the emergence of the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) discussed in Chapter V.

But this unity of "radicals" did not bring electoral success to NEPU because the majority of the peasants remained conservative; and as is well known the conservatism of the peasants centre on the defense

of what is known against what is not known. This makes the Talakawa stratum a granary of meanings preserved from lines and generations threatened by continual and relentless external change. Whereas the Ma'aikata wanted changes which would transform oppressive institutions and ascribed statuses, the peasants refused to accept that proposition because they envisaged in it the disappearance of their culture. Their conditions of living, their exploitation and suffering were bad, but the prevailing social hierarchy did provide them some protection, as clients to their social superiors, and thus meaning for their survival. Consequently, they could not contemplate the abolishing of what was known in the mere hope of replacing it with what was claimed to be ideally a better one. Moreover, many older peasants were already adult when the British conquered Hausaland and thus they could compare and contrast the situation in the pre-colonial period and what obtained during colonial rule. Hence, some of them knew that it was one thing to overthrow an oppressor and quite another thing to establish a just rule.

In a nutshell, the main reason for the failure of modern radicals and, indeed, of radical reforms in twentieth century Northern Nigeria lies, in the nature of the alliance between the Talakawa and the Ma'aikata. This was based and maintained on the specific issue of ridding Nigeria of colonial domination and of minimizing the abuses of the native rulers, to which both of them agreed. Apart from that, the other ideals of the Ma'aikata were far beyond the comprehension or desires of the Talakawa. Thus no total alliance was possible between the two components of the NEPU and hence NEPU was unable to sustain effective electoral competition with the ruling party in Northern Nigeria.

CHAPTER II

ISLAMIC INJUNCTIONS AND MUSLIM GOVERNMENTS¹

BABU WANDA YAFI WANI SAI WANDA YAFI WANITSORON ALLAH

"No one is superior to the other except he who is most God-fearing"

N.E.P.U.

This chapter is a brief outline on how the Qur'an and Hadith authorize the process by which Muslim affairs and activities should be organized and conducted. Thus, it shows the Qur'anic basis of the character of Muslim government and the specific versions of these concepts derived by the Jihad leadership. The erosion of the original ideals in the actual practice of post-Jihadic government led to a series of crises and chaos until the advent of the British.

Prologue

Islam is an Arabic word which denotes submission: a complete surrender and obedience to Allah. As a religion, Islam similarly stands for complete submission and obedience to God. Literally, the word means "peace" and this signifies that one can achieve real peace of body and mind through submission and obedience to Allah.² Such a life of obedience brings peace of the heart and it establishes real

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1. The following account on Muslim Governments is partly drawn from: Rosenthal, E.I.J., Political Thought in Medieval Islam (Cambridge, 1958); Watt, W.M., Islamic Surveys 6: Islamic Political Thought: The Basic Concepts (Edinburgh, 1968).
 2. See Abdul, M.O.A., Islam as a Religion: Faith and Duties (Lagos, 1976), pp. 15-18.

peace in society at large. The religion of Islam teaches mankind to be in peace with the Creator as well as with one another. Whereas to be in peace with God one has to give absolute submission to His will, recognize His oneness, obey His commands and worship Him as the only one who deserves to be worshipped, to make peace with man, one has to do good and behave well always and to do unto others as one would want them to do unto one. Whoever believes in Islam and practices its teachings is a Muslim. The Qur'an confirms this when it says:

Whoever submits himself entirely to God and he is
the doer of Good to others is a Muslim. (2:112)

This verse shows that faith alone is not enough to make a good Muslim; it has to be accompanied by good deeds. What makes a good Muslim includes, among other things, the way one behaves towards others, what one worships, what one says and what one does to others.¹

Islam is not a religion which confines its scope to the private life of man. It is a complete way of life which caters for all the fields of human existence. It provides guidance for all walks of life, individual and social, moral and material, economic and political, legal and cultural, national and international. The Qur'an enjoins man to enter the fold of Islam without any reservation and follows God's guidance in all fields of life.² Islam clearly states that its objectives are: the purification of the soul and the reformation and the reconstruction of society. The Qur'an says:

We sent our messengers and revealed to them the
Scriptures and the authority to establish justice
amongst mankind ... (57:25)

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1. See Abdul, A'la, Maududi, Towards Understanding Islam (Gary, Indiana, 1970), pp. 2-10.
 2. For an instructive discussion on this see: Ahmad, Khurshid, Islam: Its Meaning and Message (London, 1975), p. 28.

The Holy Prophet explained to his followers that,

Every one of you is a shepherd and will be questioned about the well-being of his flock. So the Head of the State will be questioned about the well-being of the people of the state. Every man is a shepherd to his family and will be answerable about every member of it. Every woman is a shepherd to the family of her husband and will be accountable for every member of it. And every servant is a shepherd to his master and will be questionable about the property of his master. 1

This shows that the teachings of Islam are so all-embracing that it does not leave out any field of human existence to become a playground of worldly forces alone.

Another feature of Islam is that it establishes a balance between the individual and society. It believes in the individual personality of man and holds that everyone is personally accountable to God. It guarantees the fundamental rights of the individual and does not permit anyone to tamper with them. It makes the proper development of the personality of man one of the prime objectives of its educational policy. Hence it holds that a man should not lose his individuality in society or in the state.²

According to the Qur'an:

Man shall have nothing but what he strives for. (53:29)

And whatever hardship you suffer, it is what your hands have wrought. (42:30)

God does not change the condition of people unless they first change that which is in their hearts. (13:11)

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1. Cited in Ahmad, K., op. cit., p. 38. For a more thorough study of Prophet Muhammad as a statesman, see Watt, W.M., Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman (Oxford, 1977). Also see Rodinson, M., Muhammad (Penguin, 1977); and Rodinson, C.H., Muhammedanism: Has It Any Future? (London, 1897).
 2. Sayyid, Qutb, The Religion of Islam (Gary, Indiana, 1970), pp. 1-13, contains a more detailed discussion on Islamic education, policy and society (or state).

For each is that which he has earned and against
each is only that which he has earned and against
each is only that which he has deserved. (2:286)

For us are our deeds and for you are yours. (28:55)

Similarly, Islam awakens the sense of social responsibility in man, in that it enjoins Muslims to organize themselves in societies and states and it commands the individual to subscribe to the common good. For example, prayer is offered in congregation to inculcate social discipline and social cohesion among the Muslims. Everyone who has the means is enjoined to pay Zakka (the equivalent of tithes)¹ and the Qur'an says:

The alms-seeker and the destitute have their due
rights in their wealth. (51:19)

Furthermore, Jihad (the duty to defend oneself and the Muslim community against aggression)² is made obligatory, which means that the individual

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1. Zakka is usually translated as the "poor tax", in order to distinguish it from Sadaga which is "properly voluntary alms-giving." One wonders whether the distinction really holds in practice because the two overlap.
 2. Jihad is translated as the "Holy War" in everyday language but, strictly, it means "Exertion". It is the obligation laid on Muslims to struggle (or to strive) against any form of socio-economic and political injustice. It also means the purification of the faith because Muslims believe that faith will inevitably deteriorate if it is not regularly purified. There are numerous works on the Jihad. In the case of Northern Nigeria, these include the following: Bivar, A.D.H., "A Manifesto of the Fulani Jihad", Journal of African History, XI (No. 2, 1961), pp. 235-243; Last, M., "A Note on the Attitudes to the Supernatural in the Sokoto Jihad", Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria IV (No. 1, 1967), pp. 3-13, The Sokoto Caliphate (London, 1967), and "The Jihad Movements of the Nineteenth Century", in Ajayi and Crowder (eds.), History of West Africa, vol. II (London, 1974), pp. 1-29; Smith, H.F.C., "The Islamic Revolutions of the Nineteenth Century", Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, II (No. 2, 1961), pp. 169-185; Smith, M.G., "The Jihad of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio", in Lewis, I.M. (ed.), Islam in Tropical Africa (Oxford, 1966), pp. 408-419; and Willis, J.R., "Jihad fi Sabil Allah", Journal of African History, VIII (No. 3, 1967), pp. 395-415. Also see Hiskett, M., "The Nineteenth Century Jihads in West Africa", in Flint, J.E. (ed.), Cambridge History of Africa, vol. V, From c. 1790 to c. 1870 (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 125-169.

will, when the occasion arises, offer his life for the defence and the protection of the true Islamic state. To this end the Holy Prophet said:

All mankind is a fold every member of which shall be a keeper or shepherd unto every other and be accountable for the entire fold.

Live together do not turn against each other, make things easy for others and do not put obstacles in each other's way.

The believer in God is he who is not a danger to the life and property of any other. 1

In this way Islam establishes harmony between the individual and the society and assigns to each its proper due.² This shows that Islam is not altogether satisfied with the mere performance of worship, hence, it does not distinguish the sacred from the secular. For instance, in the management of public affairs, both the temporal and spiritual authority is vested in the Umma (community of Muslims) to be exercised by their elected leader and there are enormous scriptural literature which provide the basic background to the Islamic political thought and processes.³

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1. Cited in Ahmad, K., op. cit., p. 39. For a more thorough study of the Islamic way of life see: Mawdudi, Abul Ala, Islamic Law and Constitution (Lahore, 1960), and Islamic Way of Life (Lahore, 1967); also Ahmad, K. (ed.), Studies in the Family Law of Islam (Karachi, 1960) and Family Life in Islam (Leicester, 1974).
 2. For the appreciation of this unique feature of Islam by a Western scholar, see Gibb, H.A.R., Whither Islam (London, 1932), p. 379.
 3. To mention just a few, see: Gibb, H.A.R., Studies on the Civilization of Islam (London, 1962); Rosenthal, E.I.J., Islam in the Modern National State (Cambridge, 1965); Schacht, J. and Bosworth, C.E. (eds.), The Legacy of Islam (Oxford, 1979), especially pp. 392-424; and Watt, W.M., Islam and the Integration of Society (London, 1961), especially pp. 143-180.

Islamic Theory of Government

One of the basic principles of Islam is that human beings must, individually and collectively, surrender all rights of overlordship, legislation and exercising of authority over others. No one should be allowed to pass orders or make commands in his own right and no one ought to accept the obligations to carry out such commands and obey such orders. None is entitled to make laws on his own authority and none is obliged to obey them. This right is vested in Allah alone. The Qur'an enjoins:

... The authority rests with none but Allah. He commands you not to surrender to anyone save Him. This is the right way (of life). (12:40)

(If) They asked, "Have we also got some authority" say: All authority belongs to God alone. (3:154)

Do not say wrongly with your tongues that this is lawful and that is unlawful. (16:116)

Who so does not establish and decide by that which Allah has revealed, such are disbelievers. (5:44)

Following these injunctions sovereignty belongs to Allah. He alone is the Law-giver. No man, not even the Holy Prophet, has the right to order others in his own right to do, or not to do, certain things, because even the Holy Prophet is subject to God's Commands. The Qur'an said,

We sent no messenger save that he should obey Allah's Command. (4:64)

And the Holy Prophet explained,

I do not follow anything except what is revealed to me. 1

1. Cited in Ahmad, K., op. cit., p. 158.

Muslims are obliged to obey the Prophet and to imitate his ways because he enunciated not his own commands but God's commands. This is clearly explained in the Qur'an:

They are the people to whom We gave the Scripture and Command and Prophethood. (6:90)

It is not (possible) for any human being to whom Allah has given the Scripture and the Wisdom and the Prophethood that he should say to people: "Obey me instead of Allah". Such one (could only say): "Be solely devoted to the Lord." (3:79)

Thus, the fundamental character of an Islamic state can be summarised as follows:

- 1) Neither a person, group of persons nor the populace of a given state can claim sovereignty. God alone is sovereign; the people are His subjects.
- 2) Following 1) above, absolute authority is vested in God. The believers can neither legislate nor modify God-given Laws — the Shari'ah.
- 3) The Islamic state must be founded on the Shari'ah and the Hadith (Prophetic Traditions). The government of an Islamic state will be entitled to obedience in its capacity as a political agent (of God) and only in so far as it acts in that capacity. If a Muslim government disregards the Laws of God, it automatically forfeits the obligation of the believers to obey it. In this lies the implied injunction upon the faithful to rebel against unlawful and oppressive regimes.¹

1. For the classical foundations of an Islamic state, see: Rosenthal, E.I.J., Islam in the Modern National State (Cambridge, 1965), pp. 12-27. Rabi, Muhammad Mahmoud, The Political Theory of Ibn Khaldun (Leiden, 1967), shows the distinction between Khilafa (the state based on the Shari'ah of Islam) and the Mulk (the state with a mixed constitution, based on the Shari'ah and the political laws of the ruler). Also see Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, An Introduction to History (Rosenthal translation) (London, 1967), Chapter III, pp. 311-472.

Islam bases its ideal polity on the sovereignty of God and ^{viceregency} Viceregency of man. Hence, it is a "theocracy".* But an Islamic theocracy* is ruled by the whole of the Muslims, including the rank and file. The entire Muslim population should be mobilized to participate fully in politics. In this "divine democracy", the Executive arm of the Government is supposed to reflect the general will of all Muslims who also have the right to depose their rulers. But the Qur'an should remain their Constitution and the Shari'ah their Law. Similarly, Islamic process of Government should be based on the Hadith (i.e. on how Prophet Muhammad administered the first Muslim community).¹ All administrative matters and all questions about which no explicit injunction is found in the Qur'an or the Hadith, are settled by Ijma (the concensus of the Islamic community); and, in the final analysis, only the sacred texts remain as the proper legitimising basis of the Ijma.² On the other hand, Islamic democracy is a limited popular sovereignty under the suzerainty of God: as no Muslim leader or Legislature, no religious scholar, or even the entire Muslim world put together, can either form an independent judgement, or have any right to make the least alteration on explicit command of God, or where the known Hadith of His Prophet already exist. Although the Qur'an and Sunnah (customs and practices, i.e. the exemplary life of Prophet

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1. Among others, see Watt, W.M., Islamic Political Thought: The Basic Concepts (Edinburgh, 1968), especially pp. 3-30; Gibb, H.A.R., Islam, a Historical Survey (Oxford, 1975), especially pp. 16-23; and Rodinson, M., Muhammad (Carter, A., translator) (Penguin, 1977), pp. 215-292; and Guillaume, A., Islam (Penguin, 1978), pp. 20-54.
 2. For a didactic analysis of Ijma, see Weiss, Bernard, "Al Amidi on the Basis of Authority of Consensus", in Little, Donald (ed.), Essays on Islamic Civilization (Leiden, 1976), pp. 342-356.

* Thomas Hodgkin rightly drew my attention to the fact that it is a government based on divinely revealed law (SHARI'AH)

Muhammad)¹ form the basis of an Islamic Government, the propagation of the Islamic religious faith is not the "be-all" and the "end-all" of the Islamic state.

One of the many purposes of the state is to create conditions in which the mass of the people will be assured of social justice in accordance with the standards laid down in the Qur'an which gave explicit instructions for a disciplined mode of life.

(Muslims are) those who, if we give them power in the land, establish a system of Salah (worship) and Zakka and enjoin virtue and forbid evil and iniquity. (22:41)

You are the best community sent forth to mankind; you enjoin the Right conduct and forbid the Wrong; and you believe in Allah. (3:110)

Thus the Islamic state aims to establish a system of social justice in accordance with the teachings of the Qur'an. It is meant to prevent exploitation, to safeguard liberty, and to protect its citizens from foreign invasion. The objectives of an Islamic state are to eradicate all forms of evils and to encourage all types of virtues and excellence, especially those expressly mentioned in the Qur'an. Political power should be used for these purposes as and when the occasion demands. The state should employ all means of propaganda and peaceful persuasion, as well as undertake both moral and physical education of all the peoples so as to harness social influence and public opinion, in order to achieve the set objectives. The Islamic state is supposed to be

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1. The idea of Sunnah is derived from pre-Islamic Arabia and, literally, it means "the beaten track". In the desert of Arabia, it is an act of common sense to follow "the beaten track", otherwise one may lose one's way and die in the desert. For a more detailed explanation of Sunnah, see Watt, W.M., "Islamic Political Concepts", in Political Theory and Ideology in African Society (Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, 1970), pp. 1-6.

universal and all-embracing in the sense that its sphere of activity should be co-extensive with all aspects of human life. It should seek to mould every aspect of life and activity in consonance with its moral norms and its ideals of social justice; simultaneously individual liberty should be upheld and all traces of oppression eliminated. As in most known states, this is an attempt to take a middle course between the two extremes of anarchy (chaos) and dictatorship (totalitarian).

The Islamic state is an ideological state in which theology, not politics, provides the basis of argument and the form of expression¹; and only those who are knowledgeable in Islam are permitted to be members of the state's Executive Council. Conversely, non-Muslims are not entitled to have a say in the shaping of the state's fundamental policies. This is because they lack knowledge in Islamic theology and philosophy² which are also the ideological basis of the state. But they are free to live within the Islamic state as Dhimmis (non-Muslim citizens)³ and enjoy specific rights and privileges in accordance with the Shari'ah: the state protects them as any Muslim; their persons are honoured; their lives and properties are protected; and if they are capable of service, their services will be used. In this way the rights

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1. See Lewis, B., "The Study of Islam", in Encounter, XXXVIII (No. 1, 1972), pp. 31-41.
 2. For a brief but useful study in the historical development of philosophical and religious thought in the Muslim world, see Watt, W.M., Islamic Survey I, Islamic Philosophy and Theology (Edinburgh, 1979).
 3. For an illuminating analysis of Christianity in the Middle East and then the relation between Islam and Christianity, see Browne, Laurence E., The Eclipse of Christianity in Asia (Cambridge, 1931); Watt, W.M., Islamic Revelation in the Modern World (Edinburgh, 1969), especially pp. 94-98 and 114-117; and Franck, Dorothea S. (ed.), Islam in the Modern World (Washington, 1950). Also see W.H.C. Frend, "Christian Period in Mediterranean Africa, c. AD 200 to 700", in J.D. Fage (ed.), The Cambridge History of Africa, vol. II, From c. 500 BC to AD 1050 (London, 1978), pp. 410-489.

of minorities are protected; their freedom guaranteed and they are given the right to live according to their own culture. This is the rationale of the Islamic policy of peaceful coexistence, expressed in the Muslim axiom: Lakum ma lana wa alaikum ma alaina (You have what we have and you share in our responsibilities).¹

Islam has also defined means of selecting those who are to act in the vicariate of God on earth. The Qur'an says:

Allah has promised those among you who believe and do righteous deeds that He will assuredly make them to succeed (the present rulers) and grant them viceregency in the land just as He made those before them to succeed (others). (24:55)

The use of the word "vicegerency" (Caliph) means that the Caliph is bound by the concept of delegation and, therefore, his authority is not sovereign, in that the power to rule has been delegated to the whole community of believers and not to the Caliph alone; nor to any particular group of persons within the community. Thus, the delegated authority is a popular one, not a limited one, hence the Caliph, is, in fact, a primus inter pares in the Muslim community. According to the Islamic political theory, every Muslim is a Caliph of God, in his own individual capacity and, by virtue of this position, he is individually responsible to God.² This theme led to the development of an Islamic version of Protestantism (see Tijjaniyya in Chapter VI).

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1. I owe this explanation to Alhaji Aminu Kano, interviewed in London on 12 May 1974. He also suggested further readings on the topic for me. For a more detailed exposition on the relations between Muslim rulers and their non-Muslim subjects, see Tritton, A.S., The Caliphs and their Non-Muslim Subjects (Oxford, 1950).
 2. For a detailed discourse on this proposition, see Lambton, A.K.S., "Islamic Political Thought" in Schacht, J., and Bosworth, C.E., (eds.), The Legacy of Islam (Oxford, 1979), pp. 404-423.

The concept of popular vicegerency is the real foundation of democracy in Islam because it made every Muslim a Caliph of God and thus an equal participant in the Caliphate. Furthermore, Islam enjoined its believers not to tolerate any class divisions based on distinctions of birth and social position. Islam teaches the equality of man as well as his nothingness before God. This means that, in theory, all men enjoy equal status and position. The only criterion for superiority, in an Islamic social order, is personal ability and character. The point which was repeatedly taught and explicitly asserted by the Holy Prophet and leading Muslims is that:

No one is superior to another except in point of faith and piety. All men are descended from Adam and Adam was made of clay. An Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab nor non-Arab over Arab; neither does a White man possess any superiority over a Black man nor a Black man over a White one, except in point of piety. 1

This shows that Islamic religious tradition is overwhelmingly hostile to social as well as racial discrimination. For example, after the conquest of Makkah when the whole of Arabia came under the domination of the Islamic state, the Holy Prophet, in an address to his tribesmen, who were regarded as superior to other Arabs, said:

O people of Quraish! Allah has rooted out your haughtiness of the days of ignorance and the pride of ancestry ... You are descended from Adam and Adam was (born) of earth. The noblest of you all in the sight of Allah is the most devout. An Arab is superior to a non-Arab in nothing but devotion. 2

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1. Nasr, Seyyed Hossein, "Ideals and Realities of Islam", cited by Ahmad, K., op. cit., p. 169. This point was also dealt with, at length, by Lewis, Bernard, "The African Diaspora and the Civilization of Islam", in Kilson, Martin and Rotberg, R. (eds.), The African Diaspora: Interpretive Essays (Cambridge, Mass., 1976).
 2. Jahiz, "Kitab al-Bayan wa-t-Tabyin", cited in Rodinson, Maxine, Mohammed (Anne Carter trans.) (Penguin, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1977), p. 286; also see Ahmad, K., op. cit., p. 169.

This insistence on the equality of all men and of all races before God is meant to ensure that no individual or group of individuals will suffer any disability on account of birth, social position or profession that may in any way impede the growth of his faculties or hamper the development of his personality. In an Islamic society everyone is supposed to enjoy equal opportunities for progress. The door will be left open to all to make as much progress as possible according to their inborn capacities and personal merits without prejudice to similar rights of other people. In this way even slaves and persons of slave descent can move up the social ladder to the highest positions, yet other citizens can never feel ashamed to serve under them. This argument was forcibly made by Ibn Hazm (994-1064), when he said:

God has decreed that the most devout is the noblest, even if he be a negress's bastard, and that sinner and unbeliever is at the lowest level, even if he be the son of the Prophet. 1

This type of unrestricted scope for personal achievement has always been a hallmark of the ideal Islamic society.

Islam seeks, on the one hand, to set up democracy and, on the other hand, to put an end to that individualism which militates against the health of its body politic. The relations between the individual and society have been regulated in such manner that the personality of the individual does not suffer any diminution. Islam makes the purpose of an individual's life the same as that of the community, namely the acquisition of the good things in life through the enforcement of

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1. Ibn Hazm, "Jamharat Ansab al-'Arab" (ed. Levi, Cairo, 1948), cited by Lewis, Bernard, in Kilson, M. and Rotberg, R., op. cit., p. 47. Also see Lewis, B., Race and Color in Islam (New York, 1971), which is a useful reading on this topic; an abridged version of this book under the same title can be found in Encounter, XXXV (No. 2, August, 1970), pp. 18-34.

Divine Laws (Shari'ah). This is why after safeguarding the rights of the individual, it imposed upon him certain duties towards the community. In this way the requirements of both the individual and the society have been so well harmonized that the individual is afforded the fullest opportunities to develop his own potentials and is also enabled to employ his developed facilities in the service of the community.

In the Islamic society, every sane, adult Muslim is entitled to express his opinion because every Muslim is a repository of the Caliphate. God made the Caliphate conditional not upon birth or wealth but upon faith, good conduct and competence. Therefore, all Muslims have equal freedom to express their opinions. Consequently, there is no room for dictatorship in the Islamic society. No person (or group of persons) is entitled to become an absolute ruler by depriving the rank and file of their inherent right to the Caliphate. The position of men who are elected to conduct public affairs is simply this: all Muslims (or, as it is technically stated, all Caliphs of God) delegate their Caliphate to them for administrative purposes. Thus, the Caliph is in a position of dual responsibility: on the one hand, he is answerable to God, and on the other hand, he is answerable to his fellow Muslims (Caliphs) who have delegated their authority to him. If he raises himself to the position of an absolute ruler, i.e. a dictator, he assumes the character of a usurper rather than a legitimate caliph because dictatorship is a negation of popular viceregency and, therefore, un-Islamic. These safeguards against dictatorship are meant to give the individual the full liberty to choose whichever path he likes to take to develop his faculties in any direction which suits his natural gifts. If the Caliph obstructs

anyone by physical means, or if he obstructs the growth of anyone's personality by institutional means, he will be punished by God for his tyranny.

Political tyranny, economic exploitation, social repression, and any form of injustice, are vices which Muslims are enjoined to fight against. Any Muslim ruler who practices such vices is deviating from the teachings of the Qur'an and thus has forfeited the right to demand obedience and support from his fellow Muslims. This message is clearly stated in the Qur'an, which says:

No obedience is due to any creature against the Creator. 1 This injunction also instructs Muslims to obey only what is lawful and to disassociate themselves from, indeed to disobey and even correct, if they can, what is unlawful. In fact, according to Caliph Umar (the second of the "Rightly Guided Caliphs"), Muslims are commanded to rebel in the sense of "struggling" or "striving" against any form of social, economic and political injustice.² It is regarded as Fardh ain (compulsory) upon Muslims to resist injustice. Any positive action directed against injustice and against any object of disapprobation by "exertion", is regarded as Jihad. Muslims believe that faith will inevitably deteriorate if it is not regularly purified, hence, the obligation of the Jihad which is taken to mean the purification of the

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1. The Qur'an, chapter 66, verse 9, cited in Liman, M.T.A., The Influence of the Poetry of Al'Kumait Ibn Zayd Al'Asadi on the Downfall of the Ummayyad Dynasty (unpublished PhD thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, 1974), p. 55.
 2. Islamic political literature abounds with stories of Caliph Umar (634-644). Among many others see Arnold, Thomas, The Caliphate (Oxford, 1924); Hitti, Philip K., The Arabs: A Short History (Chicago, 1956); Lewis, Bernard (ed.), The Arabs in History (London, 1956); and Watt, W.M., Islam and the Integration of Society (London, 1961), especially pp. 163-180. But for a specific discussion on Umar's Caliphate, see Brockelmann, Carl, History of the Islamic Peoples (London, 1952), pp. 45-70.

faith. This instills in the minds of Muslims, the puritanical and the activist conception of Islam. Similarly, it serves both as the point of reference and the justification of positive actions for the purposes of reforms in the Islamic society and the extension of the frontiers of Dar al-Islam.

Islamic Reforms in Northern Nigeria

The idea of the Jihad and the expansion of Dar al-Islam at the expense of Dar al-Kufr, through the establishment of empires, transcending ethnic loyalty and geographical area, and held together by the common belief in Islam and under the jurisdiction of a Muslim Caliph, existed in Africa south of the Sahara centuries before the Muslim uprising in Northern Nigeria in the early nineteenth century. For instance, although the ascendancy of the Almoravids in the Western Sudan in the eleventh century was short-lived, it affected subsequent reform movements in the area in many ways. For example, it transmitted its "radical" interpretations of the Qur'an to the Muslims in the Western Sudan; it established a channel of communication between Western Sudan and North Africa; and it created a precedent for later reform movements which sought to transform their respective societies in accordance with the prescriptions of the Shari'ah.¹

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1. There are many accounts of the impact of the Almoravids in North Africa and the Western Sudan. Among many others, see Le Tourneau, Roger, The Almohad Movement in North Africa in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries (Princeton, New Jersey, 1969); Brelvi, Mahmoud, Islam in Africa (Lahore, 1964) especially pp. 344-564; Lewis, I.M. (ed.), Islam in Tropical Africa (Oxford, 1966); Levzion, N., "The Sahara and the Sudan from the Arab Conquest of the Maghrib to the Rise of the Almoravids", in J.D. Fage (ed.), The Cambridge History of Africa, vol. II (London, 1978), pp. 637-718. Also see Mohammedan History (published by HMSO, London, 1920), and Little, Donald P. (ed.), Essays on Islamic Civilizations (Leiden, 1976). Among many articles/

The usurpation of power by Askia Al Hajj Muhamed Ture¹, in the fifteenth century Songhay Empire (1464-1591), was not unconnected with the desire to purify the Muslim faith and to modify indigenous, pre-Islamic, political institutions. During the one century rule of the Askias over the Songhay Empire certain developments in favour of Islam took place: (i) the creation of a centralized government and complex bureaucracy very much like those of the Islamic states in the Maghrib and the Middle East; (ii) the establishment of centres of higher learning and research in Islamic sciences (e.g. in Timbuktu); (iii) the growth of the number and the political influence of the Muslim clerics; (iv) the application of a more positive policy of Islamization in the whole Empire.² The evidence of Askia Muhammad's concern with the purification of Islam, partly lies in his question to Shayk Al-Maghili (to whom Western Sudan owes several aspects of its reform traditions)³, on the status of Muslims who combined Islam with pagan practices. Al-Maghili replied:

articles there are Hunwick, J.O., "Ahmad Baba and the Moroccan Invasion of the Sudan (1591)", in Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, II (No. 3, 1962), pp. 311-326; Sanneh, Lamin, "The Origins of Clericalism in West African Islam", Journal of African History, XVII (No. 1, 1976), pp. 49-72.

1. For a detailed account of how Askia Muhammad took over power in the fifteenth century Songhay Empire, see Lewis, I.M., op. cit., pp. 296-315. A comparative study of the rule of Askia Muhammad and Sonni Ali before him, is made by Pardo, A., "The Songhay Empire under Sonni Ali and Askia Muhammad: A study in comparisons and contrasts", in Daniel F. McCall and N.R. Bennett (eds.), Boston University Papers on Africa, V (1971), pp. 41-58.
2. Lewis, I.M., op. cit., contains various aspects of reforms undertaken by the Askia administration in the Songhay Empire.
3. For an assessment of Shayk Al-Maghili's activities in West Africa, see Bedri, Kamal and Starratt, Priscilla E., "The Crown of Religion concerning the Obligation of Princes", Kano Studies, New Series, I (No. 2, 1974-1977), pp. 15-27; Gwarzo, Hassan Ibrahim, The Life and Teachings of Al-Maghili with Particular Reference to the Saharan Jewish Community (unpublished PhD thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, 1972); and Baldwin, T.H., The Obligation of Princes (Beirut, 1932).

As for those people whose characteristic you described, they are polytheists without doubt, because anathematizing, according to manifest Law, is for less than that, and there is no doubt that Holy war against them is better and more meritorious than Holy war against unbelievers who do not say, "There is no God but God, Muhammad is His Apostle" ... 1

Obviously, the Askias in their century long reign did not cure the socio-economic problems of the society and the political oppression of the rulers; nor did they end the syncretism of Islam and paganism in their area of jurisdiction; because three hundred years after both Al-Maghili and Askia Muhammad, the protest against illegality, tyranny and mixing of Islam with paganism was re-echoed by Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, his brother Abdullahi b. Fodio and his son and successor Muhammadu Bello.

The interpretations of the above Sokoto triumvirate comprise the main primary sources on the state of affairs in Hausaland before the nineteenth century Jihad.² In his book Kitabul Farq³, Shehu Usman Dan Fodio made sharp and destructive criticisms of the Habe rulers of Hausa states. Having condemned their excesses and corruption he quoted the Holy Prophet as having said:

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1. Quoted in Hiskett, M., "An Islamic Tradition of Reform in the Western Sudan from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century", Bulletin of S.O.A.S., XXV (No. 3, 1962), pp. 577-596.
 2. Their main texts which focus on the society, political and religious situation are: Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, Bayan Wujubul Hijira (1807), Kitabul Farq (1810-1811); Abdullahi b. Fodio, Diya'l Hukku (1807-1908), Diya'ul Wilayat (1815); Muhammadu Bello, Usulus Siya'asat (1806), Infakul Maisuri. Other sources include T. Hodgkin's comprehensive historical anthology, Nigerian Perspectives (Oxford, 1975), especially section seven, 1800-1850, pp. 244-292, and Smith, M., Baba of Karo (London, 1954), especially pp. 66-82.
 3. This information is drawn from Hiskett, M., "Kitab Al-Farq: a Work on the Habe Kingdoms attributed to Usman Dan Fodio", Bulletin of S.O.A.S., XXIII (No. 3, 1960), pp. 558-579.

If we appoint an Emir or assign to him a certain stipend, then anything which he receives other than that is fraud. 1

Shehu Usman Dan Fodio went on to say that for the unbelievers, the purpose of government was only the fulfilment of their lusts, because they were like beasts. He described the ways of their (Habe) governments as follows:

- 1) Succession to the throne was by hereditary right or by force to the exclusion of consultation.
- 2) Their sovereignty rested upon three things: the people's persons, their honour and their possessions. Whoever they wish to kill, violate his honour, exile, confiscate his wealth, they do so without any regard to Shari'ah.
- 3) They imposed uncanonical taxes on all subjects (Muslims and non-Muslims alike). They also imposed fiscal exactions on merchants and travellers.
- 4) Without any religious observance, they ate and drank what they wanted; wore what clothes they wished; took any woman they wanted into their houses (many times numbering thousands) as concubines, without marriage; and they lived in grandeur in their decorated palaces.
- 5) Their rulers practiced Kamuwa (confiscation of property) in market places, etc. Also, when their prosperous subjects died, their properties were forcibly taken without consultation or the consent of the dependents of the deceased.
- 6) They compelled people to serve in their armies.
- 7) All subject peoples gave presents called Gaisuwa (bribes) to their superiors and those bribes (money) determined truth and falsehood in

1. Cited in Ibid., p. 567.

legal disputes. People had to pay money (bribes)¹ to be conducted before the rulers. Thus, the rulers shut their door in the face of the needy (poor).

8) They delayed in the payments of debts and that was considered as injustice by the Muslim reformers.

9) Freedom of worship was denied to Muslims by beating those who were seen praying to God in the open.

10) The subject peoples practiced the long standing Hausa tradition of greeting their rulers by throwing dust over their heads, which was evidence of the excess of the rulers, and thus an evil. They also did different kinds of vainglorious things, such as beating drums and blowing flutes, etc., for their rulers.

11) Habe rulers were said to be liars, treacherous and proud; that one could not see any of them who did not give airs; and whoever was disrespectful to them was severely punished. The reforming Ulema held that whoever practiced any (and worst still all) of the points enumerated above was on the way to hell-fire.² The Shehu then instructed his Muslim followers not to imitate the unbelievers' way of government and not to use the titles of their officials such as Galadima³, Uban Dawaki (Master of horses), etc.

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1. The Kanuri equivalent of this type of bribery, which is still being practiced in Borno, is known as Kufelo. For an analysis of institutionalized corruption in Borno, see Cohen, Ronald, "Some Aspects of Institutionalized Exchange: A Kanuri Example", in Cahiers d'études africaines, V (Nos. 17-20, 1975), pp. 353-369.
 2. Points 1-11 are the paraphrased summary of the criticisms levelled against the Habe kingdoms by Usman Dan Fodio, "Kitab Al-Farq", in Hiskett, M., op. cit., pp. 556-569.
 3. Among the Kanuri of Borno, the title of Galadima is known as Galtima, meaning the Governor of the West. This suggests that it is originally a Borno title which is adopted by Hausa and then by their Fulani successors. It is one of the senior hereditary titles conferred on clients (Barori) as well as on Princes under Fulani. See Aliyu, Abubakar Yaya, "Report on the Sokoto Sub-Project", in Nigerian Administration.

In his book, Infakul Maisuri¹, Muhammadu Bello, elucidated the contempt which the reforming Ulema felt towards both Hausa rulers and the venal Muslim clerics who supported them. He cited the tradition in which Sahabi Aliyu² classified people into three categories: (i) scholars of high standing; (ii) those who seek knowledge and the way of salvation; (iii) the untutored rank and file who would follow anyone who called them.³ Subsequently, Muhammadu Bello drew a line between those who deserved to be honoured by virtue of their merit and those who are to be the followers by gradation. He said:

Any man whose exact knowledge is proved and whose conduct is good and follows not worldliness, it is right to follow him. He who displays good deeds, it is right to honour him according to his worth. (But) He who casts aside the veil of shame from his face, it is right to revile him. If evil is made plain and the Malam (cleric) keeps silent and does not prevent it, God will punish him and drive him away, without doubt, from those who keep His word. 4

In a way, the above quotation reveals the Platonic legacy in the Islamic political thought, in the sense that the highest honour should be

Administration Research Project, First Interim Report (Institute of Administration, A.B.U., Zaria, 1972), pp. 4-10, and Alkali, Muhammad Nur, "The Concept of Islamic Government in Borno under the Saifawa Dynasty", in Kano Studies, New Series, I (No. 2, 1974-1977), pp. 29-36.

1. This information is drawn from Arnett, E.J., The Rise of the Sokoto Fulani (Kano, 1922), being a paraphrase and in some parts a translation of the Infakul Maisuri by Muhammadu Bello. Also see Hodgkin, T.L., op. cit., pp. 256-258, 264-267, 283-285, 287-290.
2. The Arabic word Sahabi means a friend or a companion of the Holy Prophet. In addition to being friend and companion of the Holy Prophet Muhammad, Aliyu was the fourth of the Rightly Guided Caliphs (656-661), the cousin, and the son-in-law of the Holy Prophet. On how and why Aliyu was assassinated, see Brockelmann, Carl, op. cit., p. 70. Also see Watt, W.M., Islamic Philosophy and Theology (Edinburgh, 1979), especially pp. 1-5.
3. Paraphrased from Arnett, E.J., op. cit., p. 27.
4. Quoted from Ibid.

accorded to the learned on the basis of their knowledge as similar honour was reserved for the "guardians" in Plato's Republic on the basis of their intellectual capacities.¹ But more than in Greek philosophy, Islamic philosophy makes it obligatory on the "philosophers" to do good and forbid evil. It appears from Muhammadu Bello's assertion above that the Muslim Ulema is ordained to be the shepherd of his people; and his failure to carry out this command amounts to a dereliction of his religious duty. This act, we are made to understand, would be appropriately punished by God.

According to Muhammadu Bello, the Muslim crusade was a reaction to acts of provocation against the Muslims by Habe chiefs. For example, they blockaded roads to stop Muslims from paying courtesy calls on the Shehu, and they confiscated Muslim properties. Thus, the Jihad was declared firstly for the purpose of self-defence, i.e. to repel attacks on the Muslims; and secondly, in order to reform Islam, i.e. to extirpate heathenism, destroy its thicket, to convert more people to the Muslim faith and thereby to replace nominal Islam with the true Islam.

On his own part, Abdullahi b. Fodio was said to be more worried with the mercenary tendencies of some undisciplined Muslims and venal Malams who shifted their allegiance to suit their material interests. At first, they cooperated with Habe chiefs against the Muslims but later, when the Muslims gained the upper hand in the wars, they joined the ranks of the Jihadists in order to share in the booty of the wars. The fact is that, in pre-Jihad Northern Nigeria, religious syncretism

1. Rosenthal, E.I.J., in Political Thought in Medieval Islam (Cambridge, 1958), pp. 113-114, suggests that it was the study of Platonic political philosophy which gave Islamic political philosophy its character and its form.

was so common that even Shayk Muhammad Al-Amin El-Kanemi¹, the famous Borno scholar, who questioned the legitimacy of the Jihad, admitted that Islam in the country (Hausaland and Borno) was tinged with heathen practices: that women went without the veil and that the administrations were corrupt. In keeping with Al-Maghili's dictum, the prevailing un-Islamic practices justified the Jihad in the whole area. Above all, a good number of the Habe chiefs were outright animists, whereas Islamic traditions hold that:

It is well known that the prevailing belief in the country is the belief of the chief. If the chief becomes heathen, the country becomes heathen too. 2

This shows that of all the factors which led to the Jihad, Islam, as the ideology of the movement, was predominant. Through the teachings of Islam, Hausa subjects became aware of the injustices of their rulers. Islamic awareness, political and social discontent created a crisis of confidence: one in which the Muslims felt so frightened and insecure under Habe rule, that the Shehu had to make a Hijira.³

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1. Among the Kanuris of Borno, he is simply referred to as Shehu Laminu. He emerged as the leader of Muslims in Borno in 1800-1814. For a brief, but useful, analysis of his leadership, see Brenner, Louis, The Shehus of Kukawa (Oxford, 1973), pp. 26-47. And, for his case against the Jihad, see Hodgkin, T.L., Nigerian Perspectives (Oxford, 1975), pp. 261-264; and Lavers, John E., "Islam in the Borno Caliphate: A Survey", in ODU, New Series, No. 5 (1971), pp. 27-48, which contains a detailed analysis of the state of Islam in Borno from 1500-1800. Also see Cohen, R., "The Bornu King Lists", in Boston University Papers on Africa, vol. II (1966), pp. 39-83.
 2. Muhammadu Bello, "Infakul Maisuri", cited in Arnett, E.J., op. cit., Literature abounds on the background of the Jihad. To mention a few, see Hodgkin, T.L., op. cit., especially pp. 244-267, and Hiskett, M., The Sword of Truth (Oxford, 1973), and the list in footnote no. 2, p. 84.
 3. The act of fleeing from the land of unbelievers by Muslims, first started by the Holy Prophet Muhammad when, in A.D. 622, he migrated from Mecca to Medina. Shehu Usman Dan Fodio's migration from Degel to Gudu took place on 21 February 1804. Among many works on this topic, see Boyd, Jean, The Flame of Islam (NNPC, Zaria, 1972), pp. 27-28.

As the Muslim community travelled to Gudu to join their leaders, the authorities in Gobir became desperate and moved swiftly to stop that mass exodus of people from their area of jurisdiction. This brought the two sides face to face for the final show-down.

Although the Hijira appears to be the last straw which broke the camel's back, the nineteenth century Muslim uprising in Northern Nigeria jointly derived from many, and far more deep-rooted factors, which include the following: the desire to return to the Qur'an and the Sunnah, the determination to establish an Islamic state in its pure form, the struggle against the payment of uncanonical taxes, frustrations due to the decadence of Habe regimes, the emphasis on moral and material austerity, the campaign against paganism and the striving against the excesses, the abuses and the worldliness of the Habe ruling dynasty. Indeed, it was a protest against the arbitrariness, the political oppression and the social injustice of the Habe rulers. Further causes of the tension which led to the uprisings included the contempt with which Muslim scholars held their non-Muslim overlords, the Muslims' consciousness of their cultural superiority over pagans, their virtual monopoly of literacy and their awareness that they knew much more about the wider world than their pagan neighbours and rulers. All these combined, made the Muslims "mighty subjects".¹

In addition to their literary skills, and their knowledge of the Muslim world, the scholars were also diviners and physicians and so the Habe rulers needed their superior magic (Ronga) as much as they needed their services as scribes and teachers. Hence many Muslim

1. This phrase was first used by Smith, H.F.C., in "The Islamic Revolution of the Nineteenth Century", in Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, II (No. 2, 1961), p. 172.

scholars were employed as functionaries in the Habe courts. Being employees in the Habe courts gave the Muslims an inside view of the extent of the deterioration of the Hausa system of government. The knowledge and the experience acquired by the Muslims in the Habe courts made the scholars even more determined in their efforts to replace the Hausa states by an Islamic state, based on the Shari'ah and to establish a bureaucracy manned by God-fearing Muslim leaders. Since all subject peoples suffered from an extreme sense of frustration and helplessness under Habe rule, the Muslim rebellion provided the much needed rallying point for the Talakawa to turn against their rulers. On the one hand, the rebellion offered a genuine popular basis for resistance and, on the other hand, the Muslim leaders skillfully exploited the grievances of all subject peoples (Muslims and non-Muslims alike) to their advantage and for their final victory.¹

That victory was also due to increased conversion to Islam. As an alternative value system to the animist beliefs, Islam articulated latent grievances to challenge the dominant pagan mythology and thus organize the people for a contest with the dominant forces around them. Whereas the teachings of Islam produced a critical mass of potentially discontented people in Hausaland, the working out of the large-scale institutional forces of the same society set the stage for the appearance of militant Muslims preachers who spread the good tidings of escape from the evils and the pains of the Habe rule. Most of those militant teachers belonged to the Fulani ethnic group. This is one of the reasons

1. For detailed accounts of the various causes of the Jihad see the following: Smith, H.F.C., ibid.; Hodgkin, T.L., Nigerian Perspectives (Oxford, 1975); Bivar, A.D.H., "A Manifesto of the Fulani Jihad", in Journal of African History, XI (No. 2, 1961), pp. 235-243; Al-Hajj, M., "The Fulani Concept of Jihad -- Shehu Usman Dan Fodio", in ODU, I (No. 1, 1964), pp. 45-58.

why the nineteenth century Muslim Revolution which ended Habe rule in most of Hausaland is commonly called the "Fulani Jihad". Even though the Fulani Ulema were small in number, they constituted an influential cultural group in a society which was overwhelmingly pre-literate and where the standard of learning was very low indeed. For several years before the Jihad, the Fulani were religious teachers and, by virtue of their religious knowledge, they were also the leaders of Muslim communities and hence, they commanded considerable authority. This point is important in the study of the Jihad as a political force because it underlines both the causes and the motives of the movement. Although the Fulani were numerically in the minority, they were able to lead and to carry out the Jihad to a successful end because of their sense of cohesion and their intellectual superiority over the rest of the population. Their knowledge of the Muslim world and, especially, that of the rise and fall of the Muslim Empires in the Middle East gave them some degree of organizing ability and political acumen over and above that of the Habe aristocracy. This also explains why the "Fulani Jihad" was only checked, in the northeastern part of Nigeria, by Borno Muslims, whose cultural development and social organization equalled that of the Fulani. Even the scholar leaders of the Jihad themselves had acknowledged the equality, if not the superiority, of the then Borno society.¹

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1. According to Hiskett, M., "Materials Relating to the State of Learning Among the Fulani Before their Jihad", Bulletin of S.O.A.S., XIX (No. 3, 1957), pp. 550-578, Muhammadmu Bello said, "Before Jihad no country surpassed Borno in prosperity and there are not found in our towns students and writers of the Koran equal to theirs" (Ibid., p. 572). This remark also proves that Islam had been prevalent in Northern Nigeria centuries before the Jihad. Similarly, there were many devout and learned Muslim clerics amongst both the peoples of Borno and Hausa as among the Fulani. Because Borno, like Hausaland, was inhabited by many and different ethnic groups.
For/

It should be noted that, although the Jihad was Fulani led, the actual war attracted the interests of all the underlying population of the Hausa society: good Muslims and nominal Muslims, non-Muslims and Muslims, Fulani and Habe, alike, all participated in the crusade for the emancipation of their society. In fact, for many participants, the main, if not the sole incentive, for fighting in the Jihad was to share in the booty of the wars. It provided opportunities for people to distinguish themselves in the wars and, subsequently, to acquire for themselves wealth, political office and prestige. Nevertheless, there were other people who fought in the Jihad in the expectations of their reward from God thereafter. Thus, the appeal of the Jihad was neither limited to the Fulani scholars, nor even to the wider body of nomads belonging to the Fulani tribe.

In view of the fact that Fulani have always been, and are still, in the minority, and in view of the fact that they were then, and are still, thinly scattered all over Northern Nigeria: firstly as nomads, secondly as peasant farmers, and thirdly as the settled aristocracy¹, there is no reason to believe that all Fulani had (or have) common interests and thus had unanimously supported the Jihad.

For the spread of Islam in the south-eastern part of the then Sokoto Empire, see Sa'ad, A., "Islam in Fombina Before c. 1847", in Northern History Research Scheme, Third Interim Report (1967-1971, Zaria, 1975), pp. 45-54, and "The Foundation of an Islamic Scholastic Community in Yola", in Kano Studies, New Series, I (No. 3, 1978), pp. 27-38. But for a general discussion on the spread of Islam in West Africa see, McCall, T.F., "Islamization of the Western Sudan in the Eleventh Century", and Levzion, M., "Patterns of Islamization in West Africa", in Boston University Papers on Africa, V (1971), pp. 1-30 and 31-39, respectively.

1. This occupational classification is in numerical order. Only a small minority of Fulani are settled in towns and even a smaller minority of the settled Fulani form part of the ruling elites.

Conversely, all available evidence suggests that many persons of Fulani origin refused to lend their support to the cause of the Jihad. For example, Abdullahi b. Fodio complained that his own tribesmen were slow in coming forward to assist the Shehu.¹ This shows that a very large number of the Shehu's supporters were Hausa or from other tribes. Muhammadu Bello confirmed Abdullahi's complaint when he explained in his own account of the Jihad:

As for us who had helped each other for the Muhammadan faith, we take no glory in anything except in our faith ... Now the different races among us Muhammadans were first the Toronkawa: they are our kindred; then our Fulani and our Hausas. There were also some of other races who assembled and aided us in the service of God. 2

The fact that in all of his accounts of the various wars fought during the Jihad period, Bello always emphasized the collective actions of Muslims rather than of Fulani shows that the other ethnic groups were as crucial to the successful prosecution of the "Holy War" as they were of significant importance to the whole of the Reform Movement.

The above shows that the nineteenth century Jihad was partly a Muslim affair and partly a protest of the Talakawa against the oppression of the Habe ruling dynasties.³ While the objectives of the Jihad were always presented in Islamic terms, in practice, the actions of the

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1. Arnett, E.J., op. cit., p. 47. Almost all the known literature on the Jihad agrees that the movement reflected a religious rather than a tribal unity. This is because Islam was the ideology of the movement and Muslim leaders commanded the campaigns. Similarly, all available evidence indicates that all aggrieved parties joined in the struggle to overthrow the existing rulers.
 2. Quoted from ibid., p. 58.
 3. This point comes even more clearly in Hodgkin, T.L., Nigerian Perspectives, especially in pp. 50-71. A similar conclusion was made by Last, M., "The Jihad Movements of the Nineteenth Century", in Ajayi, J.F.A. and Crowder, M. (eds.), History of West Africa, vol. II (London, 1974), pp. 1-29.

Jihadists were due to a combination of various interests. What was common to both the ideology and the practice was the aim of overthrowing the common tyranny (Habe rule) and the subsequent expectations of the realization of individual liberty, freedom of worship and social justice.

The Jihad was officially declared at Gobir in 1804 and a few years later (1810) it had overrun most of Hausaland.¹ Outside the Hausa States, especially in the riverine and the plateau areas, the military campaign continued until the advent of the British in 1903. Whether or not all the civil wars which took place in the nineteenth century Northern Nigeria were Jihad, is debatable and the debate is beyond the scope of this study.²

The Caliphate in Northern Nigeria

Soon after the defeat of the Hausa rulers on the battle-fields, the warrior-scholars who led the Jihad, learned the sad lesson that the great communalist ideals prescribed by Islam do not yield easily to practical implementation. Thus, like their predecessors³ in the

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1. See Sa'ad, Abubakar, "The Establishment of Fulbe Administration in Adamawa", a seminar paper, Dept. of History, A.B.U., Zaria, 1971.
 2. Islam teaches that "True Jihad" is essentially in self-defence. The Qur'an says: "Propagate the faith of your creator with diplomacy and good counsel" because, "No force in religion light can be distinguished from darkness." In this verse, "diplomacy" means the application of tact and intelligence. I am grateful to M.T.A. Liman to whom I owe the above quote and the explanation of the true meaning of Jihad.
 3. On the process of government, scholars like Al-Mawardi, Al-Ghazali, Ibn Jama'a and Ibn Taymiya, hold utilitarian moral views which, each in its own way, expresses the "greatest good of the greatest number". Their principles of public administration are so flexible that they advocate what is possible rather than what is ordained. See Al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkam As-Sultaniyya (also in French translation). Whereas Gibb, H.A.R., Studies on the Civilization of Islam, op. cit., pp. 151-165, carries a brief, but very useful summary of Al-Mawardi's Theory of the Caliphate. Rosenthal, E.I.J., Political Thought in Medieval Islam, op. cit., pp. 21-83, contains an instructive analysis of the Muslim version of government as the "art of the possible".

history of Muslim Empires, they formulated and put forward manuals of conduct for rulers, governors and bureaucrats.¹ These formulations were to serve as the mirrors for Princes. They were more concerned with the practice rather than the theory of government as enjoined by the Qur'an. On the whole, the manuals emphasized justice rather than religion, spelling out the responsibilities of rulers, as well as the rights and duties of subjects, and to some extent, seeking to assimilate the Islamic norms of traditional kingship. Again, like Muslim constitutionalists² before them, they upheld the Islamic elitism³ which identifies the Philosopher King with the Imam: on the basis of righteousness and knowledge. Therefore they specified the qualities for leadership and laid down the principles of and the institutions for public administration.

Regarding leadership qualities the Shehu held that these should include being just, knowledgeable and courageous. The leader should be elected:

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1. The list in footnote 2, p.98 , are the standard texts on administration by the Sokoto Triumvirate commonly referred to by researchers. But, for a full list of Usman Dan Fodio's works, see Balogun, Isma'il, A.B., The Life and Works of Usman Dan Fodio (Lagos, 1975), especially pp. 40-48; Al-Hajj, M.A., "The Writings of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio: A Plea for Dating and Chronology", in Kano Studies, New Series, I (No. 2, 1974-1977), pp. 5-13.
 2. Al-Ghazali towers above them all. See his book Kitab Al-Iqtisad (Cairo, A.H. 1320). Also see Arnold, Thomas and Guillaume, Alfred (eds.), The Legacy of Islam (Oxford, 1934), and Watt, W.M., Islamic Philosophy and Theology, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-123 and Muslim Intellectual: the Struggle and Achievement of Al-Ghazali (Edinburgh, 1963). This list is by no means exhaustive.
 3. The teachings of Islam hold that an elite, based on knowledge and skills, useful to the society, is perfectly justified up to the point where the accrued distinctions serve as spurs on others to strive to acquire the same.

By the best Muslims from among their scholars and their virtuous men. A man they are pleased to have as the Commander of the Faithful by virtue of his being the best of them and the most suitable for the office. 1

Perhaps the Shehu's most prized quality is Adl, "Justice", in his Bayan Wujub al-Hijira², he emphasized that a leader should be a man of sound judgement and diplomacy in handling public affairs, capable of being strict when necessary and lenient when leniency is required. It is the duty of the leader to order people to uphold justice and goodness. According to the Shehu:

The essence of it (justice) is that the Sultan should draw the scholars near to him since they are the custodians of religious knowledge. They are its guardians, propagators, who know it thoroughly and show the way to God. He (the Sultan) should do nothing without their order. The other aspect of justice is conventional. It is the practices the Kings followed before Islam came, by which they managed their worldly affairs. The King who ignored them was unsuccessful. 3

The Shehu further insists that leadership should go to those who least want it: "The Emirate is not given to one who aspires to it."⁴ The ideal Emir is constantly reminded that his leadership is meant to be used to secure benefits and well-being for the community and not for his personal advantage or pleasure. For the Shehu, the proper thing for the Commander of the Faithful to do is to fear God and follow the

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1. Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, in Bayan Wujub al-Hijira, cited by Tukur, M., "The Philosophy, Goals and Institutions of the Sokoto Caliphal Administration", in Nigerian Administration Research Project, First Interim Report (Zaria, 1972), p. 22.
 2. Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, Bayan Wujub al-Hijira Ala Al-Ibad, 1807, El-Masri's translation for his PhD thesis (Ibadan, 1967). My subsequent account on Bayan Wujub al-Hijira is heavily drawn from his translation.
 3. Quoted from ibid., p. 44. In the conclusion of this quote the Shehu warned with the maxim that "A Kingdom can endure with unbelief but it cannot endure with injustice."
 4. Cited in Tukur, M., op. cit., p. 24.

habits of Muslims in their system of government: these habits have their foundation in piety and righteousness. Integrity and incorruptibility are the twin ideals which go hand in hand with piety. No Emir of high standing can accept gifts from officials before appointing them to public office. To do so is to weaken religion, open the door to bribery and oppress the people. The legality of a gift, Gaisuwa, notwithstanding, the Shehu holds that no governor is justified in accepting it. Obviously he suspects that the person giving the present will expect some kind of favour at a future date.

In enumerating what is incumbent upon the Emir, Abdullahi b. Fodio said that he should realize that he is no better than any of the creatures of God. He has to love goodness for his people. He must not embezzle wealth from the public treasury. He should ensure that orders are obeyed; and that he should utter no word without following it by action. On the criteria and the qualifications for appointment to the offices of the state, Abdullahi advised that appointment to any office through mutual love is unlawful. He asserted that the appointees should be men of religion, virtue, piety and knowledge. Abdullahi b. Fodio believed that the Emir must make himself available to his subjects at all times and that only by so doing would he protect them from the injustices of his deputies. His position is that:

It is necessary for the grand Amir to sit everyday for the people where women and children can reach him. It is not enough that he has appointed judges and other helpers. Complaints of the subjects could be against them. 1

In fact, this position is supported by Al-Maghili's advice to Muslims in the Western Sudan when he said:

1. Abdullahi b. Fodio, cited by Tukur, M., op. cit., p. 25.

The veiling of the King from his subjects is the source of all mischief. 1

The idea of the accessibility of Muslim leaders is buttressed by the life story of the "Rightly Guided Caliphs" who succeeded the Holy Prophet. It is said that they lived simply and made themselves available to their people.² This is why Muslims regard the ideal Caliph as Rudd al-Mazalim, "Reliever of the Oppressed".

In his Usul al-Siyasat³, 1807, Muhammadu Bello was emphatic on the subject of justice:

The justice of a Sultan for one single day is better than the devotion of an ordinary man for seventy days. On the day of Judgement, when no shade exists but the shadow of God and there is no refuge but His shadow, seven men will be granted shelter: the Sultan who is just towards his subjects. The just Sultan will be raised to Heaven. If you govern do it with justice. All administrators will be in Hell-fire except those who have followed the path of piety and discharge their duties honestly. The oppressive ruler will not obtain any intercession. The Amir who draws his sustenance from the people but does not bother to treat them justly or relieve their oppression, the chief who fails to strike a balance between the strong and the weak and judges vengefully or by caprice have incurred the wrath of God. 4

Apparently, paraphrasing his father, the Shehu, Bello shunned those who struggle for power:

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1. Al-Maghili, Obligation of Princes (Baldwin translation), op. cit., p. 8.
 2. Muslim tradition holds that rulers are leaders who are also expected to be with their people; and it holds that criticism of rulers by subjects, within the conventionally accepted terms are tolerated. This is the precedent set by the Khulafa'u Al-Rashidun, who were available to their subjects at all times. For example, see the story of Caliph Al-Mansur in Hiskett, M., A History of Hausa Islamic Verse (London, 1975), pp. 92-93.
 3. Prof. Abdullahi Smith has an unpublished translation which is slightly different from Shehu Yamusa's text, in his M.A. thesis, The Political Ideas of the Jihad Leaders, (Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 1975). I relied more on B.G. Martin's translation in Boston University Papers on Africa, V (1971), pp. 63-86.
 4. Muhammadu Bello, Usul Al-Siyasat, B.G. Martin's translation, op. cit., pp. 79-80.

The person who we see striving hard for leadership causes us to think that he does not deserve to have it. 1

Thus, for the Sokoto leaders of the Jihad, the foundations of government are: that it should not be given to those who seek it; it must be by consultation; it should ensure justice, enjoin good works and forbid harshness. The Shehu, in particular, sees the crown of a king in his integrity; his stronghold in his impartiality and his capital in his subjects. He observes that there can be no triumph with transgression, no rule without learning, and no chieftancy with vengeance. He instructs that a ruler has to accustom himself to patience and to swallow the bitterness of his subjects' aversion.²

They conceive administration as an organ for the implementation of decisions arrived at by consultation. In keeping with Islamic political theory, they see the primary purpose of their governments to "enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong and to render worship possible." This particularly means being just, avoiding oppression and corruption. Muslim governments should strip evils from religious and temporal affairs and introduce reforms in both. The objectives of the post-Jihad governments include: to protect the Faithful against unbelievers and to wage war against oppressors and exploiters; to combat every cause of corruption in the country; to reform the markets and set to right the affairs of the poor and the needy; to teach knowledge, Ilm, and to encourage people to study.³ These objectives show very clearly that the new government intended to renovate and to

1. Ibid., p. 81.

2. See Bayan Wujub, op. cit., p. 210.

3. Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, Kitab Al-Farq, M. Hiskett's translation, op. cit., pp. 569-570.

improve all aspects of the pre-Jihad society. The social/economic policies of the new government include the provision of social services and the expansion of trade and commerce. These objectives are so comprehensive that they would not have been undertaken by a minimal government which was to concern itself with the maintenance of law and order only. Muhammadu Bello even went further to say that the function of the administration is to guarantee the interests of the religion and the entire harmony of the world:

The Imam or the Amir or the Wali is the one who lays down for the people of his state their worldly and religious duties. And he is the one who fosters the artisans and is concerned that people have a trade which is dispensable to the population, such as cultivators and smiths, dyers and physicians, grocers and butchers and carpenters and all the trades which contribute to the harmony of this world. He must allocate them to every village and every town according to the needs of the people, likewise foodstuffs and supplies as they are needed, and as the towns and country places become filled with population. He must see to the construction of walls around the towns and bridges and the maintenance of markets and roads and the realization of the general public welfare, so that the harmony of this world may be maintained. 1

In fact, Bello's exposition is supported by a familiar tradition of Umar ibn al-Khattab, who said:

A lamb might go to the bank of the Euphrates and fall in, and 'Umar would be asked about it on the day of Judgement, for there is no mercy for the Wali who lets the rights of Muslims perish. 2

Similarly, the idea of a welfare system and that of the equitable distribution of wealth and amenities are also rooted in the origins of

1. Usul Al-Siyasat, op. cit., p. 81.

2. Umar Ibn al-Khattab is the well known Caliph Umar. This quote is related by Ali Ibn Abi Talib. Also to be found in Jawhara and quoted by Bello himself in ibid., p. 84. Islamic history presents Caliph Umar as a legendary figure not only because he was the second Caliph (AD 634-644) but because as one of the earliest converts to Islam he was a close companion and the father-in-law of the Holy Prophet: he was the father of one of the Prophet's wives, Hafsat.

Islam in Arabia, especially under the early Caliphate. In the formative years of Islam, all the Khulafa'u Al-Rashidun, more especially Umar Ibn Khattab, were rigorously distributive in their attitudes towards the resources of the state. For example, tradition has it that Caliph Umar walked about the streets in his simple clothes, wearing sandals and refusing to ride, because he saw himself as the embodiment of the state and thus he wanted to see that little was spent on the state. During his reign (AD 634-644) there developed a sort of "socialism" based on the principle of social equality and the equal sharing of war booty. For instance, it was related that Caliph Umar was accused, by one of his own subjects, of having taken more than his share of blankets, distributed as the spoils of conquest. He considered it a matter of fundamental importance to prove the man wrong. Indeed, he proved there and then, that the extra blanket he had on was lent to him by his son.¹ This distributive aspect of Islam is closely related to the egalitarian concept in the sense that the Islamic ideal of a "classless" society is genuinely fraternal one in which every man should see every other man as a brother so that there would be no conceit or constraint of "class" to limit fraternity.²

The institution of the new Caliphate is to be headed by the Commander of the Faithful, Sarkin Musulmi, at the centre (Sokoto) while

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1. Although this is a well known story among the students of Islamic history, I was actually tutored on its political implication by M.T.A. Liman. A. Mazrui's Political Values and the Educated Class in Africa (London, 1978), pp. 141-142, contains an extended version of the same story.
 2. See Muhammad Umar Chapra, "Objectives of the Islamic Economic Order", in Khurshid, A., op. cit., pp. 173-195; M.M. Sherif (ed.), A History of Muslim Philosophy, Vol. I (Wiesbaden, 1963), pp. 178-190; and Mirza Muhammed Hussain, Islam Versus Socialism (Lahore, 1970).

administrative authority in the provinces lies with the Emirs, Amirul Jaish. Since the Emir who is the shepherd of his people cannot conduct all the affairs of the community personally, it is inevitable that he should delegate certain powers to his deputies. These deputies should include the vizier, Waziri¹, who should take charge of the central administration. Abdullahi b. Fodio advised that the Waziri should fear no one but God and that:

He should be truthful and just in his religion; trustworthy in his character; perspicacious in the affairs of the subjects; able to have mercy on them and console those wounded by the Sultan. He should not withhold good advice even when it is unpalatable. 2

Other senior ministers of the state should include: the Chief of Police, the tax collector and the Qadi-Alkali (Muslim judge). Regarding the qualities and the qualifications of the Alkali, Abdullahi b. Fodio sees no judicial role for a corrupt or ignorant person. He also recommended that the state bureaucracy should be manned by impartial civil servants: revenue collectors, clerks and accountants, market supervisors, health inspectors, etc. There should also be neutral law enforcing agents. But the Waziri should remain the over-all deputy of the grand Amir.

1. According to Ibn Khaldun, Waziri means "help". He explains: The Wazirate is the mother of governmental functions and royal ranks. The name itself means "help". Wazirah (Wazirate) is derived either from Mu'azarah "Help" or from Wizr "load" as if the Wazir were helping the person whom he supports to carry his burden and charges. Thus, the meaning comes down to no more than "help". See The Muqaddimah (London, 1967), vol. II, p. 6 (translated from Arabic to English by Franz Rosenthal).
2. Quoted from Diyaul Hukkam (Yamusa's translation) cited by Tukur, M., op. cit., p. 36. It should be remembered that Abdullahi b. Fodio was the Waziri of his brother Shehu Usman Dan Fodio. See Last, M., The Sokoto Caliphate (London, 1967), especially pp. 145-226.

The Emirates

It is evident that the justification of the Caliphate administration is essentially religious (not secular) but its implementation is such that even other-worldly objectives have temporal underpinnings. Their aim was to establish essentially Islamic Governments. The Jihad was a revolutionary movement and its leaders intended to keep that revolutionary spirit permanent by establishing governments which catered for the interests of all citizens. Were the ideals of the Jihadists carried on by their successors?

In the late 1840's, most of the "First Eleven" of the team which led the Jihad had passed away and thereby gave way to their "Second Eleven". Those successor Emirs were preoccupied with issues and problems different from those of their predecessors. Whereas the first category of leaders were essentially Muslim scholars concerned mainly with the propagation of the faith, their successors were essentially military administrators concerned with the consolidation of their respective positions of authority and with the expansion of their respective empires. They assumed such secular titles as Etsu, Lamido, Sarki, etc.¹, whereas their predecessors were modestly called by their achieved religious titles, such as Shehu, Modibbo, Malam.² In view of their militaristic policies, they relied heavily on the warrior class,

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1. Etsu is the traditional title for the ruler (Emir) of Nupeland; and Lamido is the Fulfude word for the Fulbe rulers (Emirs) of Adamawa; whereas Sarki is the Hausa word for King (or chief).
 2. Shehu is derived from the Arabic word Shaykh, a title implying both religious and tribal leadership. The title was adopted by the rulers of Borno in the nineteenth century. When used alone (The Shehu) it refers to Usman Dan Fodio. Modibbo is a Fulfulde word meaning the learned; its shortened version, Modi means a graduate. Mallam (Mallama, female) is a title of respect for a Muslim religious, or secular, teacher or scholar.

Bayin-Sarki, for advice and support. The leading and, indeed, most powerful war chiefs, such as Wambai, Magajin-Gari, Ubandoma, etc.¹, replaced the scholars as the Emirs' friends and confidants and, indeed, as their power base. Thus, the scholars were out of power though they remained associated with the palaces as religious advisers: Imams and Al-kalai. Some of the scholars were horrified by their change of fortune. But, more important, this change in the power structure brought a deep division among the scholars; between the puritan scholars who adhered rigidly to Islamic orthodoxy and the less puritan who accepted their new role as "official" interpreters of the Qur'an and the Hadith, in order to support the new political set-up. The former came to be known as Bawan-Allah (the God-fearing) and the latter were contemptuously referred to as Malum-Fada (the Venal Malam).² Their statuses and public standing differed greatly in the eyes of the public. The one was admired and respected, the other was inwardly resented and merely tolerated.

A good number of the scholars depended on the Emirs for gifts of food, slaves and land to farm.³ Such scholars composed poems and songs in praise of the Emirs and in commemoration of their successful campaigns. But the relations between the Emirs and the puritan scholars became frosty. Since Islamic traditions enjoin Muslims to vote with their feet when they found themselves in a situation beyond their

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1. These are hereditary, senior chieftancy titles usually conferred on clients, Barori. See Abubakar, Y. Aliyu, op. cit., p. 6.
 2. Literally, this means the palace Malam, i.e. the greedy one.
 3. For the case of what happened to the Malams at Yola in Gongola State, see Sa'ad, A., "The Foundation of an Islamic Scholastic Community in Yola", in Kano Studies, New Series, I (No. 3, 1978), pp. 27-38.

control, many puritan scholars began to migrate from the Emirates. But some went from the frying-pan into the fire, as Modibbo Raji and Modibbo Hassan discovered to their dismay. They migrated from Gwandu and Malle respectively, to Yola, where they found in existence the evils of deviation from Sunnah and a return to Habe customs, from which they were trying to escape.¹ Many puritan scholars led independent lives either by withdrawing from their communities and living as hermits in isolated areas or by remaining in their respective communities but refusing to accompany the Emirs on their "unreligious" wars.² This type of opposition to authority continues till today in Northern Nigeria and such puritan opponents of authority are highly respected, in Muslim areas, as much as they are feared by the erring members of the establishment. When in opposition the Malams work on their farms by themselves assisted by their relatives and by their students. They also receive Sadaqa (alms) and Zakka³ from their former students, parents of their pupils and from many Muslims who appreciate their predicament. As a rule, most puritan scholars did not then (and do not now) accept public offices, such as the Alkalai nor do they agree to identify themselves, in any way, with Emirs or any member of the establishment.

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1. Sa'ad, ibid., p. 6, gave a detailed account of their predicament.
 2. Last, M., made a useful study of the traditional method of opposition in Hausaland, in his "Aspects of Administration and Dissent in Hausaland, 1800-1868", Africa, XL (No. 4, 1970), pp. 345-354.
 3. Sadaqa and Zakka form the basis of the Islamic system of social security, i.e. the means by which the poor and the destitute are taken care of in Muslim communities. It is believed that God will reward such charitable persons thereafter, hence it is not demeaning for Muslims, of any standing, to receive either Sadaqa or Zakka or both. But, in most cases, it is preferably given to the poor, the destitute or scholars engaged in fulltime teaching and writing and thus they have no alternative trade or occupation.

But (very rarely) some of them agree to serve as Imams (prayer leaders) or to undertake Tafsir (Qur'anic exegesis) during the lunar month of Ramadan, when all Muslims fast from sunrise to sunset.

One of the immediate effects of the Emirs' apparent deviation from the path of the Shari'ah and the Sunnah after the Jihad, was that the states lost the services of the most religiously respected and therefore the most authoritative scholars. Thus, the venal Malams became the companions of rulers. This in turn led to a general decline in standards of conduct and, more especially, to moral weakness: open corruption brought about by worldly success and the loss of the early ideals.¹

Consequently, some influential groups, more especially those who were rivals to the thrones, began to question the authority of the leaderships by refusing to recognize them. This necessitated more militaristic policies by the Emirs, in order to maintain their positions, to crush any act of rebellion, and to extend the boundaries of their areas of jurisdictions. Hence, the rise and the increased influence of the Bayin-Sarki as the most important sub-structure of the Emirates' governments. In addition to their being the law enforcing agents in the Emirates, they became the effective "King-makers" until the British conquest. It was unthinkable to ignore their candidate or their choice for Emirship; and even very difficult, if not impossible, for the candidate of their choice not to succeed to the throne. Thus, princes aspiring to an Emirship, or for any titled office, rivaled

1. A. Sa'ad, op. cit., suggests that this led to greater use of force in Yola, whereas Johnston, H.A.S., The Fulani Empire of Sokoto (Oxford, 1967), pp. 177-187, described it as "cracks in the edifice" of the entire Fulbe Administration.

each other in trying to buy their support and their loyalty. The Bayin-Sarki were influenced by gifts of clothes, horses, slaves, livestock, as well as by marrying their daughters or their female relations. As "generosity" became one of the accepted qualities for leadership, bribery and corruption also became institutionalised in the political system of the Emirates. Competition among the Princes to outbid each other in trying to win the support of the Bayin-Sarki, led to increased warfare, so as to capture more slaves for such distribution; to increased exploitation and extortion of all subject peoples (Muslim and non-Muslims, Fulani and non-Fulani alike), and to increased political oppression.

The combination of the foregoing factors changed the climate of public affairs throughout the Emirates. Various un-Islamic institutions, ceremonies and precedents developed to enhance the status of the Sarakuna. Subsequently, there emerged courtiers, palace drummers and praise singers, ceremonial horses, larger harems, and all sorts of hangers-on. All the pomp and pageant of the condemned Habe system was readopted by the Muslim rulers. In this way, ostentation and public display of wealth and power replaced the moral and the material austerity for which the Jihadists were renowned. The rulers also adopted, applied and obviously enjoyed all the privileges, the rights and the abuses of the Habe rulers, against which the Muslims had fought but a few years before. To the consternation of the puritan Malams, in particular, and the Muslim community as a whole, they also adopted and indeed upheld inheritance as a legitimate way of succession to leadership. Members of the Sarakuna class enjoyed high social status, endless privileges and rights over and above the Talakawa.

All these were obviously un-Islamic. Islam always emphasized achieved over ascribed leadership as it condemned social differentiation based on birth or on wealth. Between man and man Islam recognizes only one criteria for superiority, and that is due to more righteous conduct. Qur'anic injunctions are explicit on this subject:

The most honourable among you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous among you ... (49:13)

And thus, "The noblest among you ... is the most pious." 1

By the same token, Islam stresses individual merit as the main, if not the only, criterion for leadership in public affairs. All distinctions based on parentage and tribal relations are irrelevant. Hence, the Arabic saying: Inna akramakum indallahi atqakum, "The best among you is your leader." The teachings of the Qur'an and the Hadith on equality and leadership are also supplemented by the practices of some early Muslim leaders. Neither the Holy Prophet, nor any of the four "Rightly Guided Caliphs", was succeeded by his son or relative. Islamic tradition is overwhelmingly hostile to leadership by ascription, as it is to social discrimination. Islam teaches that individual merit is determined by piety and good works only, thus discounting both pedigree and race. Some of the Jihadists tried to uphold the Islamic tradition of learning, especially among their offspring. Muhammadu Bello said:

The people of Hausaland corrupt our children when they tell them that their family is a family of saints and turn them from the path of learning. That is but a lie, an illusion, an error and a fallacy; for science can only be preserved by learning and the Malams are nearer to science than anyone else. 2

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1. The Qur'an (3:102) cited in Lewis, B., op. cit., pp. 41-42.
 2. Quoted from Arnett, E.J., op. cit., p. 31.

During his (Bello's) last illness and on his deathbed, Bello was said to have called in his eldest son Aliyu and warned him against attempting to succeed Bello as the Commander of the Faithful. When urged by his Waziri (Gidado) to name his successor, Bello refused to do so and said that he left the succession in the hands of God and advised the Waziri to be the first to swear allegiance to whomever the Provincial Governors¹ elected to succeed him as the Sarkin Musulmi.²

Thus, it is a well established Islamic tradition that succession to leadership is not by ascription. Emirs are to be elected either by the whole community of Muslims or by a council of learned scholars. But the fact of conquest created new relationships; and the range of conquest evoked new attitudes which flouted the teaching of the Qur'an and shelved the ideals of the founding fathers of the Jihad. No sooner than the Jihad ended, than the struggle for leadership ensued, between the descendants of the leading Jihadists. Emirs came to be selected by Sarakunan-Karaga (the council of traditional king-makers), a body dominated by the Bayin-Sarki, usually with two representatives of the learned scholars: the Imam and the chief alkali. Similarly, the relationship between Muslim rulers and their non-Muslim neighbours also changed. During and immediately after the Jihad, that relation was based on the policy of peaceful co-existence by which Muslims and non-Muslims shared the benefits as well as the responsibilities of being members of the same community.³ But these noble teachings were

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1. The Provincial-Governors were the Amirul Jaish, also known as the flag-bearers because their insignia of office included flags given to them by Shehu Usman Dan Fodio. After the British occupation of the Muslim North, their descendants were restyled: Emirs.
 2. Arnett, E.J., op. cit., pp. 31-32, contains a full account of Muhammadu Bello's admonition to his son Aliyu.
 3. For the origin of the Islamic policy of peaceful co-existence, see Wolf, E. R., "The Social Organization of Mecca and the Origins of Islam", in South Western Journal of Anthropology, VII (No. 4, 1951), p. 15.

indefinitely deferred, the ideals of the Reformists were betrayed and the expectations and the hopes of the Talakawa, who supported the Jihad, were shattered. What also disappeared were the self-restraint and the simple style of life which the led admired in their leaders.

At this juncture, it is important to remember that the experience in Northern Nigeria was not the only instance when a Muslim community found itself in a crisis of confidence resulting from deviation from the set Islamic tenets. This seems to be a permanent feature in the political history of Islamic Empires. For example, during the reign of the Ummayyad Caliphs (41 A.H. to 126 A.H.), the entire Muslim world was bedevilled by a crisis of confidence in the Caliphate, which led to civil wars and to the subsequent fall of that Islamic empire.¹ Wherever and whenever autocratic rulership became firmly established in the Muslim dominion, the situation arose when Muslims had to choose either to follow the orthodox teachings of their religion or to devise their own secular arrangements for the management of public affairs. Naturally, as the size and administrative complexity of the state expanded, a number of questions which had not been originally anticipated, but which had to be answered within the broad principles of Islam, also arose. Islamic constitutionalists, who were usually connected with the ruling establishments, were called upon to provide answers to the issues of statecraft, such as the question of political legitimacy, the nature of law and rulership, the nature of the organization of

1. The thesis of M.T.A. Liman, op. cit., examines some of the factors which led to the downfall of the Ummayyad Dynasty. Brett, M., "The Arab conquest and the rise of Islam in North Africa," in J.D. Fage, op. cit., pp. 490-555, discusses the general problems of state expansion in North Africa under the Ummayyads; pp. 513-522, examines the factors which led to "the fall of the Ummayyads".

the state, the extent and the limit of governmental powers, the nature of rights and obligation of citizenship. The traditional theories and concepts which had been of great help in ruling a small state (a Muslim community) were no longer of much help in consolidating and ruling empires (Emirates) composed of heterogeneous peoples and of different elites.¹

What was required was the development of rational concepts to meet the requirements of the new situations. Rational principles (within the broad principles of Islam) had to be developed, enlarged and, at times, bent to satisfy the desires of authority. Since chaos and disorder were a reality, legal doctrines current in Muslim states insisted on practically unquestioning obedience even to autocratic rulers. Those aspects of Islamic traditions which called upon Muslims to resist actively and to rebel against tyrannical rulers were either suppressed or manipulated to provide support for the ruling elites. Religious rationalization was also brought forth to warn against anarchy and called for obedience to the powers that be. In order to achieve cohesion within the Empire, religion was manipulated as the ideology of the state. Thus, the religious quest for perfection and universality was made the handmaid of the politically ambitious rulers. Al-Ghazali (1064-1111), a leading Muslim Jurist of his time, explained:

The concessions made by us are not spontaneous, but necessity makes lawful what is forbidden. We know it is not allowed to feed on a dead animal: still it would be worse to die of hunger. Of those that content that the Caliphate is dead forever and irreplaceable, we should like to ask: what is to be preferred, anarchy and stoppage of social life for

1. These problems have been variously analysed in Arnold, Sir T.W., The Caliphate (London, 1965); Asad, M., The Principles of State and Government in Islam (Los Angeles, 1961); and Muir, Sir William, The Caliphate, Its Rise, Decline and Fall (London, 1924).

lack of properly constituted authority, or acknowledgement of the existing order, whatever it be? Of these two alternatives, the Jurists cannot but choose the latter. 1

Let us remember that the Muslim Jurists of Al-Ghazali's time were part of the Ulema which, as a group, had neither an institutional basis of power nor independent means of decent living other than that secured for them by state patronage and by state power. In order to keep themselves in business, they maintained close association with government officials, merchants and craftsmen. Thus, like the Malamai group in Northern Nigeria, they acted as the community leaders of the rank and file and as the intermediaries between the subjects and the rulers. As one would expect of those in dependent positions, the Ulema were essentially a conservative force, acquiescent in the power of the state. So, they continued to give tacit support to a constituted authority "whatever it be", provided the rulers were Muslims. Apparently, the theological justification for their continued support of the authority rested on the principle that any government was better than one headed by a non-Muslim ruler, or worse still, than a state of anarchy. After all, a Muslim government would provide the conditions under which Muslims could lead a religious life and fulfill their ritual obligations. In view of that, the only alternative to a Muslim-led government was seen by them as either anarchy or irreligion. This doctrine was affirmed by Al-Ghazali when he urged Muslims to support any Caliph who was in command of the armed forces.

Government in these days is a consequence solely of military power, and whosoever he may be to whom the holder of military power gives his allegiance, that person is the Caliph. And whoever exercises independent

1. Quoted from Arnold, T. and Guillaume, A. (eds.), The Legacy of Islam (Oxford, 1934), p. 302.

authority, so long as he shows allegiance to the Caliph in the matter of his prerogatives of the prayers and the coinage, the same is Sultan, whose commands and judgements are valid in the several parts of the earth. 1

This passage attempts to rationalize the capitulation of those Ulema who acquiesced in the power of the state. In so doing they ignored the Qur'an; they flung aside the Hadith; and they flouted the Shari'ah. The Islamic history of that period abounds in the examples of political and military upheavals of all kinds: religious wars, dynastic conflicts, tribal battles, revolts and rebellions. Most of those tribulations were between the various sections of the ruling military classes, and the ruling elites and the intransigent groups or tribes.

The Emirates of Northern Nigeria experienced similar predicaments but in different circumstances. The problems which confronted Muslim communities in nineteenth century Northern Nigeria were neither the clear choice between anarchy or the acceptance of the existing order, nor the overwhelming military power of any single Emir. The real problems were, on the one hand, the change in the political structure: the dependence of the Emirate governments on the military powers of the Bayin-Sarki and, on the other hand, the consequent deviation by the ruling elites from the path of the Shari'ah and the abandonment of the exclusively religious duties (e.g. the conversion of pagans to Islam, etc.) by the states. There was neither visible threat to the Muslim communities nor strong internal dissension likely to undermine peace and tranquillity. Obviously, the rulers flouted the ideals of the Jihadists because of avarice. For instance, they stopped conversions to Islam because the inhabitants of the pagan enclaves, near the Muslim settlements, were regarded as their reserves of wealth to be captured

1. Quoted from ibid., p. 329.

and enslaved for domestic purposes or exported to external slavery in exchange for foreign goods, as and when the need arose. And in the capital cities (the seats of the Emirs), religious teaching was neglected, hence many people lived in ignorance and sin. In fact, the religion of the masses became not Islam, but a combination of idolatry and magic, more suited to their own superstitious needs. That deliberate neglect of religious teaching to the masses by the Muslim authorities provided an excuse for the rulers to enslave nominal and poor Muslims at will, on the grounds that they were Habe and therefore were liable to be enslaved. That practice was so widespread in the cities of the far North that it came to be known in Hausa as Murugu. The fear and insecurity was such that when Hausa people heard of the anti-slavery activities of some white Christians along the sea-coast (the South), they composed songs to welcome the Christians to Hausaland. Part of the song runs as follows: "Christians, you are taking long to arrive, Are your horses chameleons?"¹

Those unhappy situations dwindled away the confidence of the Muslims in their rulers. Having lost all credibility, the governments also lost the support of the governed. Thus, the Jihad which started

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1. "Chameleon" here refers to the slowness of the animal and not its adaptability to the environment. Also see Alhaji Umaru, "The Arrival of the Christians: A Hausa poem on the Colonial Conquest of West Africa", in Africana Bulletin, No. 22 (1975), pp. 55-129. I am grateful to Alhaji Aminu Kano for drawing my attention to this song. The Hausa translation runs as follows:

Nasara Kun Dade Baku Zo Ba,
Ko Dokin Hawainiya Kuka Hau Ne?

I am also indebted to my student, Aliyu Abdullahi Jibia, at Bayero University, Kano (1978) who presented me with a copy of Gandoki, in which the full text of this song is reproduced. See Alhaji Muhammadu Bello, Gandoki (Zaria, 1977), p. 4. In Skinner, N. (ed. and trans.), Alhaji Mahmudu Koki, Kano Malam (A.B.U., Zaria, 1977), pp. 17-20, gave his childhood recollections on how slaves were captured, sold and treated in Kano.

as a popular revolutionary movement deteriorated into inefficient tyrannies of ruling elites supported, mainly, if not only, by force of arms, the military power of the Bayin-Sarki.¹

In spite of its deviation from the defined tenets of Islam and despite all its abuses the "Emirates' system of Governments" was an advance on the Habe system which was overthrown by Muslims about a century previously. Whatever backsliding there had been on the part of the Muslim rulers, the Emirate governments had some advantages over their predecessor Habe governments which can be summarized as follows: (1) at least, for about two decades after the Jihad, the new governments reduced the worrying inter-tribal strife and warfare which prevailed during the Habe rule. (2) They provided a central government with authority over most of the North where independent Habe kingdoms existed before. The mark of Sokoto authority over its vassals was the fact that it had to approve all appointments of new Emirs by sending the Waziri of Sokoto² to present letters of appointments, from the Sultan of Sokoto, to the new Emirs. In return, the Emirs paid allegiance to the Sultan of Sokoto either by annual visits or/and annual dispatch of tribute (slaves, etc.). There were numerous other ways by which the

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1. These trends were already clear to the earlier Jihadists, notably Shehu Usman Dan Fodio and his brother Abdullahi b. Fodio (who was one of those Malams who migrated from his community in disgust at the undermining of Islam). For the Shehu's criticisms, see his poem, Wallahi Wallahi, cited in Hisket, M., The Sword of Truth (London, 1961), p. 107, and for Abdullahi b. Fodio, see his Risalat Al-Mulk, Diya'al-Hukum, Diya'al-Siyasat and Sabil Al-Salama, summarised in ibid., pp. 97-98 and p. 105, and Paden, J.N., Religion and Political Culture in Kano (Berkeley, 1973), pp. 214-219.
 2. The Waziri of Sokoto is equal in his status to a first class Emir. Sending him to deliver a letter of appointment to a new Emir denotes the Sultan's approval of the appointment of the new ruler, and, conversely, the new ruler's subordination to the Sultan of Sokoto.

Emirs manifested their loyalty to Sokoto but it is unnecessary to enumerate them here. (3) The Emirates' government attempted to create (or created, in comparison to what existed in the Habe system which was overthrown), an independent judiciary in a bid to ensure impartiality of the law and to avoid molestations.¹ This list is by no means exhaustive.

Conclusion

From the foregoing we can conclude that the Jihad was a revivalist movement employed by Muslims to establish an Islam^{ic} State (or states) 210 and these states were ideally to be based on the unalterable Law of Allah and the unchanging Sunnah of the Holy Prophet Muhammad. Its ideology was Islamic: derived from the teachings of the Qur'an and the Hadith. Thus, the new governments, established after the Jihad, were held together because of the understanding that all the Emirs were merely to enforce the Islamic policy. In spite of their deviation from the teaching of the Qur'an and their misinterpretation of the Hadith, a fragile unity was maintained among the Ulema for the fear of the consequences of an alternative system which might be a return to Habe rule and hence, the subjugation of the Ulema by non-Muslims and a possible annihilation of the Faithful Muslims. That apparent unity enabled the ruling elites to continue to claim that the legitimacy of their regimes was derived from Islam. Another factor which maintained

1. I am indebted to Alhaji Aminu Kano who drew my attention to some of the advantages of the Emirate system of government, interview in London, 12 May 1974. A very able analysis of the impact of the Jihad is made by Hull, R., "Impact of the Fulani Jihad on Interstate Relations in the Central Sudan Katsina Emirate: A Case Study", in Boston University Papers on Africa, V (1971), pp. 87-136.

the Emirate governments until the advent of the British was the great absorbtive capacity of the system. For instance, the re-emergence of the Habe warriors in Muslim courts gave them (Habe) both power and privilege within the very system which had defeated them, on the battlefields, a few decades previously. Having their stake in the system and thus their interests to protect, the Bayin-Sarki defended it with intense loyalty. In that way the coercive power of the warriors became a great supporting pillar of the expressed religious (Muslim) brotherhood which cemented the system together. Finally, as the system had been in existence for about a century (1804-1903) before the British came, most, if not all, people knew no other system. They accepted what they knew as natural: meaning they knew nothing else and would not conceive an alternative political system.

On the other hand, to the extent that the Emirate system was, or claimed to be, rooted in Islamic orthodoxy, prompted not merely criticism from the less "venal" Malams, but more active opposition stemming from this criticism. The radical opponents of the system discussed in later chapters can be seen (in part) as the modern inheritors of this tendency and tradition.

CHAPTER III

ADMINISTRATIVE EXTORTIONS

GIRMAN UBANGIJI GAMA KAI DA TAIMAKON JUNA

"To the Glory of God and People's Solidarity"

N.E.P.U.

Introduction

The previous chapter attempts to show that the successor Emirs to the Jihadists established over much of Northern Nigeria a system similar to that of Oriental despotism.¹ The Shari'ah was imperfectly applied and its adoption was merely a cover beneath which the ruling class pursued their selfish interests. In doing so, the Sarakuna paid lip-service to Islam when it suited them to do so, and each Emir was surrounded by a group of Muslim literati whose function was to give the administration some elements of legitimacy by attempting to create the impression that rules, orders and actions of the governments were in keeping with the Shari'ah and therefore proper. The populace were urged to recognize the rights of the governments to be obeyed and conversely the governments were encouraged to make their will effective against those who defied them. Thus, both constitutionally and in terms of religious observance, Islam became drawn into the accommodation of un-Islamic practices in support of the selfish interests of the Emirs and the entire traditional bureaucracy. The established bureaucracy

1. For a brief but useful analysis of Oriental despotism, see Barrington Moore Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Penguin, 1966), pp. 314-315.

in the upper North had many of the characteristics of medieval "feudalism" where clients owed nearly total obedience and allegiance to patrons who were members of a hierarchical, deeply entrenched ruling class. With effective institutions of command and control to preserve their interests, the ruling class also enjoyed unlimited privileges in that they had rights to which no corresponding duty was attached.

This chapter attempts to show that administrative institutions were instruments for extracting surplus from the masses, and that the local government bureaucracy was entirely a self-serving, not a public serving instrument, which saw the country and its populations largely as a ripe farm to be eaten and exploited. For example, the imposition of community tax (Haraji) and cattle tax (Jangali) were, more than anything else, means by which the traditional authorities kept their hold on their subjects. We also aim to show that as the local governments became synonymous with colonial rule, the privileges of the ruling class were maintained and increased under British colonial administration. In fact indirect rule did not change fundamentally in Northern Nigeria until the end of 1976.

The traditional political system obliged the Emir to delegate power to certain deputies with defined responsibilities including the Waziri, Alkalai and Hakimai (District Heads)¹. This formed the basis

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1. Tukur, M., makes a brief analysis of the traditional political institutions in Sokoto Emirate in "The Philosophy, Goals and Institutions of the Sokoto Caliphal Administration", Nigerian Administration Research Project Interim Report (Zaria, 1972), pp. 15-42. Paden, J.N., Religion and Political Culture in Kano (Berkeley, 1973), p. 216, discusses the role of the District Heads in Kano Emirate.

of the structure of the "Native Administrations"¹ in Northern Nigeria because it was the Muslim system of government which was preserved under Lord Lugard's policy of "Indirect Rule". The central concept of Indirect Rule was that all communities possessed indigenous leaders who commanded respect and obedience and, therefore, wielded authority. Thus, such leaders could be co-opted into the Native Authority system. The main tenet of Indirect Rule was that traditional authorities in the colonies should be recognized whenever possible and the colonial power should coopt them as the sub-structure of colonial administration and rule through them. That framework survived all through the colonial period to provide the administrative infra-structure of the post-colonial governments in the former Northern Region of Nigeria. Local government reforms made by the military administration in 1967 modified the structure but did not transform it. The recent local government reforms (which came into effect on 1st January 1977)² decentralized the former N.A. areas of jurisdictions. It also attempts to democratize local government in Nigeria. But in the North, the Emirs still remain as

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1. Also called Native Authority as interchangeable with Native Administration (N.A.). See Perham, M., Lugard: The years of Authority 1898-1945 (London, 1961), especially pp. 138-173. There is a critical analysis of Indirect Rule by Nicolson, I.F., The Administration of Nigeria, 1900-1960 (Oxford, 1969), pp. 124-179 and 216-250. Whitaker, C.S., Jr., The Politics of Tradition, Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria, 1946-1966 (Princeton, 1970), pp. 259-309, discusses the enhanced position of the Emirs under British colonial rule and the problems which arose thereon for the post-colonial N.P.C. government.
 2. See Federal Republic of Nigeria (F.R.N.), Suggested Framework for a National System of Local Government (Federal Ministry of Information, Printing Division, Lagos, 1976); Guidelines for Local Government Reform (Government Printer, Kaduna, 1976).

the chairmen of their respective Emirate Councils¹ (the unelective traditional councils) and their influence remains great.²

Indirect Rule was developed in response to the particular circumstances found in Northern Nigeria. That being the case, let us digress into history in order to trace some of the reasons which made Northern Nigeria the classic example of the British policy of Indirect Rule and how, in turn, that policy gave the Emirs more power than they enjoyed even under the late nineteenth century Caliphate system and thereby produced and maintained a political system unfavourable for democracy and for rapid economic development.

Historical Background

Towards the end of the nineteenth century the Emirate Governments in Northern Nigeria were on the verge of collapse.³ That shaky situation was the result of a combination of factors which included the following:

- (1) Many people abhorred and condemned the enslavement of Muslims and the existence of markets in which such slaves were sold in all the capital cities.

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1. Except in Kano and Kaduna States, where the state governments abolished the Emirate Councils in October 1979. See People's Redemption Party (PRP of Nigeria) Manifesto for the July/August 1979 Election (Government Printer, Kano, 1979), p. 22; and speech by Kaduna State Governor on Tuesday, 2nd October 1979; and a note from an observer: "The New Order in Kano and Kaduna States", in New Nigerian, Tuesday, 9 October 1979, pp. 7 and 9.
 2. The local government reform in 1976 was discussed by three Nigerian scholars: Gboyega, A.E. and Oyediran, O., "A view from Ibadan"; and Aliyu, A.Y., "As seen in Kaduna", in Panter-Brick, K. (ed.), Soldiers and Oil, the Political Transformation of Nigeria (London, 1978), pp. 253-287.
 3. There are several accounts of the crises in the various Emirates, but Murray Last's analysis stands out above them all. In his concluding remarks, Last, M., The Sokoto Caliphate (London, 1967), pp. 227-235, analyses the problems in Sokoto and its neighbouring provinces.

(2) Indiscriminate slave raids and official gangsterism (the use of violence by palace officials to prey on rural populations)¹ which made life very insecure in the countryside and left the inhabitants easy victims of slave raiders and bandits. The Emirate system of government became so inadequate for maintaining peace and security of the rural dwellers that villagers had to bargain with bandits in order to be left in peace. Professional and hereditary bandits existed and, in some cases, they lived in cordial relations with the Emirs. In that way gangsterism became part of the society and it acquired respectability through the notion of "chivalry".² All these show that the governments and the ruling classes performed no function that was useful to the life of the Talakawa. On the contrary, they lived on the commoners like ticks on cattle. As the relation between the rulers and the ruled became increasingly that of extortion, it was obvious that the link between them was liable to snap under any severe strain. It did when the British struck.

(3) Internal conflicts, such as the civil war in Kano (1893-1895)³ and dynastic conflict in Zazzau.⁴ The Muslim hold in Adamawa had always

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1. The case for Zaria Province was discussed in detail by Smith, M.G., Government in Zazzan (Oxford, 1960), p. 190.
 2. Interview with Bobbo Samki at Jalingo in 1976; see Smith, M., Baba of Karo (London, 1954), especially part one, pp. 38-73 and 107; Hodgkin, T.L., Nigerian Perspectives (Oxford, 1975), pp. 384-286.
 3. There are accounts of the Kano civil war (Yakin-Basasa) in Hogben, S.J. and Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., The Emirates of Northern Nigeria (London, 1966), pp. 202-204; Paden, J.N., op. cit., pp. 251-254; but Fika's, A.M., The Kano Civil War and British Over-Rule 1882-1940 (Ibadan, 1978), especially parts II and III, pp. 29-83, contains much more detail and it is up to date.
 4. See Smith, M.G., op. cit., pp. 178-188; Hogben, S.J. and Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., op. cit., pp. 227-230.

been nominal¹, while in the Middle Belt and the Banchi Plateau, pagans continued to resist slave raiders and to counterattack.² At about the same time Rabeh raided Borno and, indeed, shattered the Al-Kanemi ruling dynasty, until his death in action on the battlefield of Kusseri against the French on 22 April 1900.³

The result of that unrest was the influx of run-away slaves and other aggrieved commoners into Lokoja where the Niger Company (a British company) had a trading post under Sir George Goldie.⁴ Those aggrieved natives were first recruited into the company's Royal Niger Constabulary Force and later joined the British army⁵ and thus comprised

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1. Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., Adamawa Past and Present (London, 1958), pp. 125-151 and 152-165, contains an illuminating analysis of the relation between the Fulani and their pagan neighbours in Muri and Adamawa Divisions. Also see Hogben, S.J. and Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., op. cit., pp. 428-453; Sa'ad, A., "The Establishment of Fulbe Administration in Adamawa", seminar paper (a copy in the possession of the writer), (A.B.U., Zaria, 1971).
 2. See Hogben and Kirk-Greene, op. cit., pp. 454-471; Aliyu, A.Y., "The Foundation of Banchi Emirate", Nigerian Administration Research Project, First Interim Report (A.B.U., Zaria), pp. 44-61; Gonyok, C.K., "Colonial Administration in Ngas", seminar paper (a copy in the possession of the writer) (A.B.U., Zaria).
 3. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, op. cit., pp. 333-337; Adeleye, R.A., Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria, 1804-1906 (London, 1971), pp. 110-111; and "Rabih Fadlallah 1879-1893: Exploits and Impact on Political Relations in Central Sudan", Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, V (No. 2, June 1970), pp. 223-241; "Rabih b. Fadlallah and the Diplomacy of European Imperial Invasion in the Central Sudan, 1893-1902", in ibid., V (No. 3, December 1970), pp. 399-418; Horowitz, M.M., "Ba Karim: An Account of Rabih's Wars", African Historical Studies, III (No. 2, 1970), pp. 391-402.
 4. See, among others, Flint, J.E., Sir George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria (London, 1960); Muffett, J.D.M., Concerning Brave Captains (London, 1964); Burns, Sir Alan, The History of Nigeria (London, 1972).
 5. According to Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., "A Preliminary Note on New Sources for Nigerian Military History", Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, III (No. 1, March 1965), pp. 129-147, the pedigree of the Royal Niger Constabulary (1893) is traced from the Hausa Militia (1864) and develops to the West African Frontier Force (1897), the Northern and Southern Nigeria Regiments (1900), the Nigerian Regiment (1914), the Royal West African Frontier Force (1928), the Queen's Own Nigeria Regiment and the Nigerian Military Forces (1956), the Royal Nigerian Military Forces (1959) and Army (1960). After Nigerian independence it became the Nigerian Army (1963). Also see Ukpabi, S.C., "The origins of West African Frontier Force", Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, III (No. 3, 1966), pp. 485-501.

the bulk of the troops which under Lord Lugard conquered Northern Nigeria.¹

Between 1897 and 1903 British troops overran the whole of Northern Nigeria. It then effectively became "the protectorate of Northern Nigeria". But the British discovered that it was one thing to conquer a country and another thing to administer that country efficiently. The Talakawa welcomed the British conquest of the Emirates because they mistakenly thought that under British rule they would not pay taxes and tributes to the Emirs. To the pagans, British rule meant an end to slave raids by the Emirs and their agents. Indeed, the British tried to reduce some of the abuses of the Muslim governments. But one of the major problems which confronted the British, as Christians ruling over predominantly Muslim populations, was general popular hostility and suspicion.² They also lacked the men and the materials with which to govern the vast territory.³ All they had were the small officer corps of the invading army and the skeleton of the civilian staff which they inherited from the Royal Niger Company. In view of that dearth

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1. Lord Lugard's own account of the conquest of Kano and Sokoto can be seen in his "Northern Nigeria", The Geographical Journal, XXIII (No. 1, January 1904), pp. 1-29.
 2. Ibrahim Tahir made a detailed analysis of anti-Nasara (Christian) feelings among the merchant classes in Kano. Unfortunately, Dr. Tahir limited his observations to the commercial rather than to the general economic resentment and, far more importantly, he said little, if anything, on the extent to which that feeling against Nasara affected the relations between the Fulani ruling class and their Christian overlords. See Tahir, I., Scholars, Sufis, Saints and Capitalists in Kano 1904-1974 (PhD thesis, Cambridge, 1975), pp. 360-361.
 3. Michael Crowder observed that of all colonial administrations, "The British in Nigeria were the most thinly spread", as by comparison "The Portuguese employed a relatively much larger number of civil servants." See Crowder, M., "The White Chiefs of Tropical Africa", in Gann, L.H. and Duigman, P. (eds.), Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960 (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 320-350, especially p. 329.

of manpower, the complete lack of a communication system and the poor transport system, it was impossible for the British to establish an effective direct government.

These problems reinforced the British view that direct rule was not possible in a region as vast as the Emirates of Northern Nigeria. In 1899, Sir George Taubman Goldie had observed that:

[Direct Rule] is quite inapplicable to densely populated regions where the whiteman must always be in absolute considerable minority, where he can never hope to rule by force alone, and where his ideas, if they could be enforced upon native population, would create endless discomfort and misery. In such regions the only true policy of government is to adopt the local native Governments already existing and to be content with controlling their excesses and with maintaining peace among themselves ... (for) it is certain that the population of Nigeria ... would rather be misgoverned by their own people than be governed by the very best of our officials. 1

The administrative problems found in the Northern Emirates, after their conquest, confirmed the preconceived ideas of the leading British personality in the region. Indeed, those problems (along with many others) became the rational justification for the British reliance on the traditional rulers: Emirs, chiefs and elders of communities. Hence, the British declared that their aim was not to disrupt the pre-existing government but to modify it and to bring to it the British idea of justice. Thus, they made it clear that their policy was to support the Emirs and chiefs and all the traditional hierarchies. With that policy a system of colonial government through native chiefs and their institutions was established. To the dismay of the Talakawa, the British colonialists, like their Muslim predecessors who absorbed the Habe warriors into their governments, turned around to support the very

1. Quoted from Muffett, J.D.M., "Sir George Goldie", West Africa, No. 3034, 18 August 1975, p. 961.

Emirs who they defeated on the battlefield. The despotic rule by the Emirs was hailed as the bastion of stability¹ and their institutions of government as the cherished heritage of Northern Nigeria. Indeed, the British defended the Emirate system of government with all their might. Thereby it became for the British a good model of local government best suited for "the less educated and the less well advanced communities."² Consequently, the system was adopted and unsuccessful attempts were made to extend it to other parts of Nigeria. For example, Tiv people in the former Benue Province (now Benue State) resisted the Emirate type of government with vigour. The unsuccessful attempt to impose this pattern of native rule in the former Eastern Region of Nigeria (now Eastern States) produced the "Aba Riots". And above all, the Nigerian press of that time were most vocal in their opposition to Indirect Rule.³

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1. See Russell, E., Bush Life in Nigeria (privately published by Sir Kenneth Maddocks, Abbey House, Sutton Montis Yeovil, Somerset, 1978), p. 45.
 2. See Ballard, J.A., "Administrative Origins of Nigerian Federalism", African Affairs, LXX (No. 281, October 1971), pp. 333-348, quotation from p. 342 thereof.
 3. There is an enormous literature on the opposition to indirect rule in Nigeria. They include: Ballard, J.A., "Pagan Administration and Political Development in Northern Nigeria", Savannah, I (No. 1, 1972), pp. 1-14; Doward, D.C., "The Development of British Colonial Administration Among the Tiv, 1900-1949", African Affairs, LXVIII (No. 273, 1969), pp. 316-333, and "Ethnography and Administration: A Study of Anglo-Tiv 'Working Misunderstanding'", Journal of African History, XV (No. 3, 1974), pp. 457-477. On the press opposition see Duffield, I., "John Eldred Taylor and West African Opposition to Indirect Rule in Nigeria", African Affairs, LXX (No. 281), pp. 252-268. But Isichei, E., A History of the Igbo People (London, 1976), pp. 119-139, contains an instructive analysis of the Igbo resistance to colonial domination. Also see Ikime, O., "The British Pacification of the Tiv, 1900-1908", Research Note, Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, VII (No. 1, 1973), pp. 103-109; "Reconsidering Indirect Rule: The Nigerian Example", Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, IV (No. 3, 1968), pp. 421-438; "Colonial Conquest and resistance in Southern Nigeria", Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, VI (No. 3, 1972), pp. 251-270; "Chief Dogho: The Lugardian system in Warri 1917-1932", Journal/

The military defeat of the Emirates also brought disrepute to all the chieftaincy institutions in the region. It seriously affected the powers of the Emirs and thereby weakened the forces of law and order, especially during the First World War, which was the period of general weakening in the whole country.¹ Many Emirs, who resisted the British occupation of Northern Nigeria, were deposed and replaced by those who were more "loyal" to the colonizers. After all, the British had won by the right of conquest what the Muslim rulers had enjoyed previously by the same right. Similarly, they had inherited the right to rule. Henceforth, the former "semi-autonomous" Emirs under the Sultan of Sokoto, became the vassals of the victorious colonial power.

As the spell of their powers were broken the Emirs became increasingly dependant on their new colonial master.² All the new Emirs installed by the British had to swear the oath of allegiance to

Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, III (No. 2, 1965), pp. 313-333; "The anti-tax riots in Warri Province 1927-1928", Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, III (No. 3, 1966), pp. 559-573; and "Native Administration in Kwale-Aboh, 1928-1950: A Case Study", Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, III (No. 4, 1967), pp. 663-682. Others are: Afigbo, A.E., "Revolution and Reaction in Eastern Nigeria 1900-1929 — Background to Women Riot of 1929", Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, III (No. 3, 1966), pp. 539-557; "The Warrant chief system in Eastern Nigeria: Direct or Indirect Rule?", Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, III (No. 4, 1967), pp. 683-700; Igbafe, P., "British Rule in Benin 1897-1920: Direct or Indirect Rule?", Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, III (No. 4, 1967), pp. 701-717; Tamuno, T.N., "Some Aspects of Nigerian reaction to the imposition of British rule", Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, III (No. 2, 1965), pp. 271-294; Afigbo, A.E., "Herbert Richmond Palmer and Indirect rule in Eastern Nigeria 1915-1928", Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, III (No. 2, 1965), pp. 295-312; Akpala, A., "The Background of the Colliery Shooting Incident in 1949", Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, III (No. 2, 1965), pp. 335-363.

1. See Crowder, M., Revolt in Bussa (London, 1973); Osuntokun, A., "The Response of the British Colonial Government in Nigeria to the Islamic Insurgency in the French Sudan and the Sahara during the First World War", Bulletin of Ife, XXXVI (No. 1, 1974), pp. 14-24, and "Disaffection and Revolts in Nigeria during the First World War, 1914-1918", Canadian Journal of African Studies, V (No. 2, 1971), pp. 171-192. Both these articles are now elaborated upon in Dr. Osuntokun's new book: Nigeria in the First World War (London, 1979).
2. Crowder, M. and Ikime, O., West African Chiefs (Ife, 1970).

the British Crown through the High Commissioner of the Northern Provinces. The Protectorate was divided into twelve provinces with a British Resident as the head of each province. Each province had police and army detachments at its provincial headquarters to give teeth to the Provincial Administration. Each Province was divided into administrative divisions and each division was headed by a British District Officer (D.O.) responsible to the Resident, responsible in turn to the High Commissioner at the regional headquarters. Most of the former Emirates became divisions. For example, Kano Local Authority Area (formerly Kano Emirate) had become Kano Division whereas Kano Province included other Divisions (also former Emirates), i.e. Gumel, Kazaure, Hadejia.¹ Emirs were ranked into "first class" and "second class" categories.² There were also "third class" chiefs.³ Some District Officers ran their divisions like private estates and bullied everybody from the Emir down.⁴ Neither the Emir nor any official had any right to his position unless he rendered "proper" services to the Colonial Administration.

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1. Local governments in the North were organized into two: the former Muslim controlled emirates and the independent pagan areas.
 2. The most powerful Muslim rulers became first class Emirs and were given a staff of office (with a silver top) by the British. The less powerful Emirs became second class and they were given a staff of office with a brass top. Similarly, rituals of appointing Emirs (and chiefs) to office varied from one local tradition to another. But for the installation of the Lamido of Adamawa (At Yola) see "Over the Hill to Yola", in Duckworth, E.H. (ed.), Nigeria (No. 29, 1948), pp. 189-193.
 3. There were some pagans, who though might had been harried, were not actually defeated in war by Muslims. Such independent pagan areas were organized under their respective chiefs who became third class chiefs and were given a short staff of office with silver top. For the general organization of the Native Administration in the Northern Provinces, see Perham, M., Native Administration in Nigeria (Oxford, 1962), especially pp. 81-159; also see Russell, E., op. cit. But the administrative peculiarity of the Muslim North was clearly spelt out in "The Muslim Areas of Northern Nigeria under British Rule", in Duckworth, E.H. (ed.), Nigeria (No. 22, 1944), pp. 30-41.
 4. They were so powerful that some of them were nicknamed Zaki (lion), Giwa (elephant) and Babbandodo (the big monster). See Russell, E., op. cit.

Factors Strengthening Native Authority Rule

The newly established colonial government faced a series of crises in Northern Nigeria. Some of the reasons for those troubles stemmed from the long internal civil wars which preceded British conquest and were, of course, followed by the British campaign itself. Others came from the apparent weakness of the administrations (both colonial and native), and still others from the perception of colonial rule as a threat to Muslim hegemony. Many pagans also believed that the British were helping the Emirs to bring them into subjection. Thus, the reasons for the troubles were different but their effects were the same: they tended to undermine the established authorities, they threatened the administrations and, consequently, they led to a closer and stronger alliance between the British and the native rulers. In turn, that new relationship reinforced the Emirs by giving them more power and, thereby, it created the Nigerian version of "royal absolutism".¹

There were also problems specific to particular parts of the region. The Gwari and the Dakarkari peoples had always resisted Muslim domination, so that their rebellion in 1903 can be seen, at least in part, as a continuation of that resistance. In that resistance, they attacked and killed a British political officer. They repeated their resistance in 1908 when they attacked a joint military and police patrol, killing Captain Briggs, the officer in charge. Continuing with his people's resistance to Muslim rule from Zaria, the Yerima of Kuta seized power in 1905 and declared his independence not only of Zaria but also of the British. Consequently, the town of Kuta was attacked by the British and the Yerima was arrested and imprisoned.

1. For a general discussion on Royal Absolutism, see Barrinton Moore, Jr., op. cit., pp. 230-242 and 415-417.

There were also protests and riots in Borgu (1915) and at Montol (1916). In Borgu the British decided to depose the Emir, Kitaro Gani, in favour of a "loyal" agent, who was sufficiently subdued in his attitude towards the British and, therefore, more amenable to the British than Emir Kitaro Gani. Wideranging administrative reforms were also proposed which meant the disappearance of Borgu as a province and as such a reduction in the status of the Emir. The people of Borgu resented these measures and they refused to pay taxes. Following that, a military patrol was moved into Borgu at the request of the District Officer. A group of armed men attacked Borgu town, killing several members of the newly imposed local administration. Rebellion, characterised by the refusal to pay taxes, highway robbery and various threats against N.A. officials, continued until 1924, when a member of Kitaro Gani's family was restored to the Borgu throne.¹ Following the administrative reforms of 1906, the Montol people of central plateau, were subordinated to the Ankwe chief. The people rebelled killing the chief of Ankwe and the D.O., Mr. F. E. Maltby. That incident was followed by a devastating punitive expedition against the Montols by the British.² Such rebellions occurred all over the Northern Provinces. Most of the unrest occurred during the tours for the assessment and/or collection of taxes when in most cases British officials were accompanied by Yaran-Sarki (Emirs' representatives), the native officials connected with the collection of tribute before the advent of the British. The presence of Yaran-Sarki was seen as indicative of the white man's support of tribute collection

1. See Crowder, M., Revolt in Bussa (London, 1973), p. 13.

2. This rebellion is variously analysed in Gonyok, C.K., op. cit.; Hobgen, S.J. and Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., op. cit.; Burns, Sir Alan, op. cit. Also see Sa'ad, A., "The Northern Provinces under Colonial Rule", unpublished seminar paper (a copy in possession of the writer) (A.B.U., Zaria).

for the Emirs hence the extension of the Emirs' control over often previously unconquered pagans. Thus, some of those pagans resented the British as much as they resented the Emirs as there seemed to be no difference between the two. In Muslim areas the Emirs were seen to be cooperating with infidels (British) to bring about the subjugation of Muslims by Nasara (Christians).¹

Another reason for the unrest in Gwari areas was the recruitment of labour for the construction of the railway.² During that period, lands were acquired in most cases without compensation and, worse still, the people whose lands were confiscated were also required as navvies for the construction of the railines. The Emirs, through whose areas of jurisdiction the railway lines passed, were required to organize the supply of labour for the construction work, and food for the workers. Thus, some subjects were compelled to participate in the building of the railway lines whereas others were forced to contribute food for the upkeep of the labourers. Such demands by the colonial administration led to the increased extortions of the subjects by the Emirs. Consequently, both the British and the Emirs became the targets of attack. One of the effects of that was the stoppage of the construction of the railway line in Gwariland for some time.³

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1. Both Tahir, I., op. cit., and Paden, J.N., op. cit., observe that the anti-Nasara feelings were strongest among Muslim scholars in Kano.
 2. For a general study of the colonial governments' attitude towards labour, see Mason, M., "Working on the Railway: Forced labour in Northern Nigeria, 1907-1912", in Gutkind, P.C.W., Cohen, R., and Copans, J. (eds.), African Labour History (California, 1978), pp. 56-79. Also see Oyemakinde, W., "Railway Construction and operation in Nigeria 1895-1911: Labour Problems and Socio-economic Impact", in Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, VII (No. 2, 1974), pp. 303-323.
 3. See Sa'ad, A., op. cit.

Mahdism

In the upper North, resistance to British rule often took the form of Mahdism. In the minds of the ordinary people, the idea of the imminence of the Mahdi is equated with the time of trouble: trouble caused by the presence of Nasara or by the generality of infidels. According to popular beliefs, the Mahdi will appear to end the troubles confronting Muslims. He will cleanse the society and then make arrangements for the second advent of the Messiah.¹ Even among the Ulema there is no unanimity on the idea of the Mahdi: whereas for some the idea of the Mahdi is an article of faith, for others it is a popular notion. To some schools of thought, the Mahdi is equated with the "Hidden Imam"² who is absolute and infallible and whose return (raj'a) is awaited to restore the leadership of the Muslim community to the Ahl al-Bayt (the Prophet's house). To the other school of thought, the Mahdi is simply a reformer who will restore the Faith to its original purity of the early days as it had been during the times of Al-Khulafa'ul Rashidun (the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs).³ But in Northern Nigeria the Mahdist uprising was clearly also a protest against accumulated grievances: hardship and insecurity which had been accumulating long before the British occupation of the region. Firstly, the predicament of the masses derived from internal civil wars and slave

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1. For an illuminating analysis of Mahdism, see Hodgkin, T.L., "Mahdism, Messianism and Marxism in the African Setting", in Gutkind, P.C.W., and Waterman, P., African Social Studies, A Radical Reader (London, 1977), pp. 306-323, original source: Sudan in Africa, ed. Y.F. Hasan (Khartoum, 1971). Wilson, E.T., Russia and Black Africa before World War II (New York, 1974), pp. 222-223, illustrates the hysterical response to 1920's Mahdism by the British.
 2. For instance, see Lewis, B., The Assassins, A Radical Sect in Islam (London, 1967), p. 30.
 3. See Biobaku, S., and Al-Hajj, M., "The Sudanese Mahdiyya and the Niger-Chad Region", in Lewis, I.M. (ed.), Islam in Tropical Africa (Oxford, 1966), pp. 425-437.

raids which disrupted economic activity and normal life. Secondly, there was the British invasion of the region which lasted for about ten years. Thirdly, the economic recession resulting from the impact of the First World War (1914-1918) further disrupted Northern Nigeria's traditional trade routes, especially with Ghana and generally, across the Sahara, with North Africa and the Mediterranean World.¹ Furthermore, it was a protest against what was seen to be the undermining of Muslim hegemony in the region. So, in the Emirates of Northern Nigeria Mahdist revolts were the result of accumulated grievances and the British occupation of the region was the last straw.²

The earliest recorded instances in which the British came into major conflict with Mahdism were at Bulmi in 1903 when Sultan Attahiru and his supporters were killed, and then at Satiru in 1906.³ The latter is the most documented of the British experience of the Mahdist rebellion in the Northern Emirates.⁴ Some Emirs who were sympathetic with these rebellions were accordingly punished by the British: at Katsina Emir

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1. See Johnson, M., "Calico caravans: The Tripoli-Kano Trade after 1880", in Journal of African History, XVII (No. 1, 1976), pp. 95-117.
 2. The seriousness of the "Mahdist threat" to the British rule and the very drastic action taken by the British against the Mahdists and the subsequent measures against the Mahdist sympathisers can best be understood in terms of the vast area it might have enveloped if left unchecked. There were about fifteen Muslim Emirates controlling a total area of some 18,000 square miles and all owing allegiance to the Amir al-Muminin (the leader of the faithful), the Sultan of Sokoto. However, there is some doubt about the nature of the "Mahdist threat", as some have argued that the British exaggerated it as a means of disciplining certain Emirs. It was also linked with British fear of "Bolshevism" and Arab nationalism. See Wilson, E., op. cit.; Holt, P.M., The Mahdist State in the Sudan, 1881-1898, A Study of its Origins, Development and Overthrow (Oxford, 1977) is a useful background to the study of Mahdism in Africa south of the Sahara.
 3. See Adeleye, R.A., "Mahdist Triumph and British Revenge in Northern Nigeria: Satiru 1906", Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, VI (No. 2, 1972), pp. 193-214; Njeuma, M.Z., "Adamawa and Mahdism: The Career of Hayatu Ibn Sa'id in Adamawa, 1878-1898", Journal of African History, XII (No. 2, 1971), pp. 61-77.
 4. In addition to footnote 3 on the previous page, and footnote 3 above, see Perham, M., op. cit., pp. 46-7.

Yero¹ supported the Mahdist uprising openly and was deposed for that in 1906, thus bringing to an end the Dallazawa dynasty in Katsina Emirate. In Gwandu, Emir Muhammadu² was deposed in 1906 for his complicity with the Satiru rebellion. At Hadejia, the Emir Muhammadu³ was so delighted with the outbreak of the rebellion and so optimistic for its success that he defied British authority. Consequently, a British military expedition was sent against Hadejia and the Emir was killed in action. In 1907, three Ilorin officials (Balogun Ajikobi, Magajin Gari and Ajaji Ogidiolu) supported the Mahdist rebellion. They defied their Emir, who was on the side of the British, led their men in the attack on the Residency. But they were later crushed by a British military expedition.⁴ During the course of the First World War there were further upsurges of Mahdism in Northern Nigeria. But with the support of the Sultan of Sokoto and many other Emirs, the situation did not get out of hand.

It should be noted that at that time most Emirs (if not all of them) had acceded to office as the nominees and the proteges of the British conquerors. In this way the fortunes of the Emirs were directly bound up with the advent of the British. Similarly, the minor officials and the title holders, some of whom were royal princes and warriors, owed their loyalty to the new Emirs (the British appointees) to whom they owed their appointments and/or continuance in office (or both). As a result of the changes in Emirship, the political relations in the Emirates also changed, because the stability of the position of

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1. Muhammadu Yero, the eighth Fulani Emir of Katsina, 1904-1906.
 2. Muhammadu Bashar was the thirteenth Fulani Emir of Gwandu, 1903-1906.
 3. Muhammadu the tenth Fulani Emir of Hadejia, 1885-1906.
 4. Sa'ad, A., op. cit., p. 16.

of the British-made Emirs could not be separated from the stability and the survival of their colonial master. Through the policy of punishing "enemies" and rewarding "loyalists" the British made sure that most of the ruling elites in Northern Nigeria had vested interests both in the stability and the continuity of the colonial rule.

Again in the 1920's the Mahdist movement created panic as it appeared to threaten the whole Imperial structure. For instance, Sir Bryan Sharwood Smith said that in Sokoto there had been something approaching a breakdown of authority.¹ Although in the 1930's the political climate was relatively calm, some Mahdist groups continued with passive resistance of the British up to the 1940's. Thus, for the first three decades of their rule in Northern Nigeria, the British faced one crisis after another. The net result of those crises was a more stringent colonial control by the effective application of the policy of Indirect Rule. From what followed it seemed the British appreciated the Hausa adage, Sai Da Dangari Akan Ci Gari (a town is never subjugated except with the aid of some of its children). For the British introduced the "Sole Native Authority" system, among other reasons in order to give the Emirs the full powers to deal with recalcitrant elements.

The Structure of Native Administration²

In 1925, H.R. Palmer was appointed the Lieutenant Governor of Northern Provinces. Being most concerned with the maintenance of law

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1. See Smith, Sir Bryan Sharwood, But Always as Friends (London, 1968), p. 66.
 2. This account of the N.A. structure was as it stood up to 1976. The current system of local government came into existence from 1st January 1977. For simplicity, the present tense is nonetheless used to describe the N.A. system.

and order necessary for smooth operation of government, the colonial system of the "Sole Native Authority" was introduced. Among other things, it was designed to eliminate all traces of Mahdism by giving the Emirs effective executive powers to deal with it whenever and wherever it arose in the Emirates. Having that much power delegated to them, the Emirs became very powerful. From 1925 to 1966, the policy of Indirect Rule became inviolate.¹ Henceforth, the British became content with directing the Emirs and chiefs from the background; in turn, the Emirs and chiefs were expected to rule their subjects in a manner acceptable to the British.² Sir Bryan Sharwood Smith told us that the official instructions to all District Officers was that they should at all times uphold the prestige and the authority of the chiefs and their administration and that should the need arise to lodge a protest or to administer reproof, care must be taken that neither the ruler nor any of his officials should be humiliated in the presence of subordinates or of the public. All the British Political Officers (The Administrative Staff: Residents, D.O.s, etc.) were instructed that on no account they were to issue direct orders. That all orders must always come from the chief or his representatives.³ With that unwillingness to interfere too much in local government matters, the British surrendered to the ancien-regime all powers at the local level.⁴

Consequently, the Emirs came to exercise more power than they had before the British conquest. In the traditional milieu, the Emir was

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1. See Temple, C.L., Native Races and their Rulers (London, 1968), p. 30.
 2. See Perham, M., op. cit., pp. 47-8, and Russell, E., op. cit., p. 48.
 3. Smith, Sir Bryan Sharwood, op. cit., who, as a former governor of Northern Nigeria, was reflecting on his personal experiences.
 4. In analysing the power base of the N.P.C. in 1957, Whitaker, C.S., Jr., op. cit., p. 365, affirms this power of the local administrations.

surrounded by other chiefs without whom he could not exercise his supreme prerogatives. That ruling group constituted the Sarakuna who possessed, among others, two characteristics defining their political superiority: the exclusive control of physical force and the disposal of wealth produced by others. In that perspective the Emir was no longer a unique ruler. He was one among many, even if he was the first in importance and the symbol of their collective power. But the introduction of the Sole N.A. system shattered that interdependence of the Sarakuna class. The Emir no longer derived his authority to rule from the support of the Sarakuna and the will of his people but from the support which he obtained from the governor. He nominated and appointed all his councillors, other title holders and all his District Heads¹ and they all held their offices at his pleasure. Furthermore, Indirect Rule restructured district administrations by obliging each D.H. to live in the capital town of his district; thereby, each household, every hamlet and every village was brought into the proper grip of the Emir through the D.H., by holding someone responsible for each unit.

The household is and was traditionally the basic political unit in Northern Nigeria. The household is comprised of a family (a spouse and their children) or it can be an extended family (spouses, their children and an army of relatives living together in a compound). The compound head (Maigida) is the authoritative leader of the compound and relates the individuals in the household to higher echelons in the political hierarchy. These households or compounds link together to form hamlets, villages, wards, towns and cities. Traditionally, a

1. The lineage of some of the minor nobilities which fell out of favour were replaced by Emirs' favourites. Similarly, members of the reigning Emir's dynasty were placed as the District Heads over previously independent pagan districts.

village head is appointed by the Emir, whereas a hamlet head or ward head (a much smaller unit than a village) is appointed by the D.H.; but this procedure is neither common nor universal. Some times a traditional title peculiar to the area concerned is conferred upon the new village head at the time of his appointment. Politically, the village head is the leading person in his area, directly responsible to the D.H. and, through him, to the higher authorities in the capital city where the Emir lives.

The first loyalty of the Talakawa is directed towards the local leadership of their village or town. Occasionally, there were rebellions in an attempt to improve the local situation, more often there was grudging acceptance of an unchangeable situation. Many village heads do not handle their affairs in a responsible manner. They look upon the commoners as subjects and, as such, legitimate targets for appropriative demands. Many British Touring Officers have attested to the numerous ways villages were drained of their economic surplus by village heads anxious to increase their income. All occupational groups in a village have their respective heads, subordinate to the village head. Hence, they all give deference, support and tribute to the village head. About one-third of all the tribute paid to the village head is kept by him and the remaining two-thirds are passed on to the D.H. The authority of the village head over his community is legitimized by his recognition and the support he enjoyed from the higher authorities from the capital city. This recognition and support was channelled through the D.H.

A group of villages, the number and the population of which vary greatly, make up a district. In each district there is an administrative centre known as the district capital in which the D.H. resides.

The D.H. is an employee of the N.A. and, like most leading officials of the N.A., he is directly nominated and appointed by the Emir. In most cases he is a member of a branch of the royal family and, as such, a potential Emir. His administrative functions include tax collection, school inspection, supervision and repairs of roads, etc. He also settles disputes among his people. He and the male members of his family make up the group of local administrators who run the affairs of the district. In each district capital, the D.H. heads a number of N.A. departments: elementary school teachers and the staff of education department; a number of village and district scribes; an agricultural assistant; a dispensary attendant; a forest clerk; an Alkali and his court scribes, etc. In Muslim areas, each district capital has a Friday mosque with the Imam.

Every district has a number of policemen (say, 2-10, depending on the size and the population of the district) as its official law enforcing agents. In the Emirates, most, if not all, members of the defunct N.A. police were former janissary (Dogarin-Sarki : the personal bodyguards of the Emirs) who were converted into the police force after the British conquest. Since all the janissary were slaves, most of the N.A. policemen were either of slave origin or were known to be loyal to the Emir. Hence, besides the police "discipline" inculcated in them and the regular income they were provided by the N.A., they had a traditional loyalty to the entire system and to the chieftaincy institution in particular.

The D.H. is the eyes and the ears of the Emir in his district. He is charged with carrying out the directives of the Emir to whom he is expected to be very loyal. The fact is that the Emirs are so powerful that any D.H. with an eye to his career followed the wishes of the

Emir. He should see to it that the N.A. is not troubled in any way. So, in the absence of adequate policemen he maintains law and order by means of autocratic relationship with his subjects. He keeps a large harem, a battalion of attendants and all sorts of retainers and clients -- many of whom can only be seen as "enforcers" and "hit men": all this supposedly from his meagre salary of something ranging between about £7 - £20 a month.¹

The salary of a District Head is based mainly on the amount of taxes collected in his district. As the sizes of district areas, their population and the prosperity of the people therein differ, so do the salaries and the wages of the district officials. Therefore, being in a bigger and possibly more prosperous district carries along with it a higher salary as well as a higher less visible material reward. Hence, all district officials compete to be sent to or to be transferred to bigger and more prosperous districts. As the nominations and the appointments of the D.H.s were made by the Emir, their promotions and transfers were also made by him. The criterion for their promotion was apparently based on their respective administrative abilities, but in reality, the amount of Gaisuwa they gave to the Emir influenced the Emir's assessment of their individual abilities. Furthermore, the District Head, like his village heads, kept only one-third of all the tribute paid to him, the remaining two-thirds were passed to the Emir.

1. This very rough estimate is based on the writer's information of an approximate salary of the D.H.s in the 1950's, in Muri Division of the former Adamawa province (now Gongola State). It is certainly many times more ~~than that~~ in Kano Emirate where according to Perham, M., op. cit., p. 118, the Emir drew an annual salary of £6,000 with an allowance called an "Establishment charge" of £2,500 p.a. The rulers of Sokoto and Borno drew a little less, whereas the Emirs of Ilorin, Zaria and Yola earned between £2,000 and £2,500 each. The lowest paid was the Emir of Jama'are with a salary of £400 p.a. Whitaker, C.S., Jr., op. cit., pp. 215-216, explains the poor salary of the D.H. was partly responsible to incidence of corruption; and on p. 219 he enumerated the factors which led to extortion by the D.H.s.

To the critic of the N.A. system, that continual exchange of gifts appeared as a widespread pattern of graft and led many to conclude that the term of office of a District Head was usually only as long as his purse. But to many N.A. officials, gift exchange was not bribery as it is understood in the Western context: it was not an extra-legal or extra-official transaction.¹ Rather, it was an integral part of the system and was considered not only proper but mandatory for all. For example, no one in the Emirates would visit, much less make a request of his superior, without offering a gift. Conversely, no man of status would remain respected for a long time if he did not constantly reward his subordinates for their loyalty and services. In this respect the D.H. must be cunning in the exploitation of his subjects. When he succeeded in the extortion of the peasants without causing public outcry or protests and, thereby undermining the authority of the N.A., then he was a "good" administrator. On the other hand, if he fell foul of his subjects, then he alone would suffer the consequences of his misdeeds. Legally, he was supposed to maintain his large family and to meet all his social commitments and obligations out of his own salary.

The legitimacy of the authority of the D.H. derived from the fact that he was appointed by the Emir and that he was supported by the power of the N.A. So, at the lower level of the N.A. organization, effective political power lay with the D.H. Thus, all the occupational chiefs, all the ward, hamlet and village heads and, indeed all the peoples of the district greet the D.H. with exaggerated reverence: more often out of fear than love or respect. So also do people of an Emirate (or Division) greet their Emir.

1. For a contrary view, see Whitaker, C.S., Jr., op. cit., pp. 215-216.

The Emir was the chief executive of the N.A. and in him lay the authority and the power of the N.A., both of which were backed by the coercive power of the colonial government. Among other things, the political power of the Emir rested on the following:

- (1) His office was as much a life appointment as it was hereditary.¹ Provided he remained loyal to the government and, on the condition that he bled his subjects judiciously, so that his extortions did not undermine his own authority and thus that of the colonial power, he remained on the throne till death.
- (2) Following the official support of the colonial government, of which he had become a servitor, the Emir had all the law enforcing agents and all the institutions of command and control at his disposal.
- (3) His dominance over the N.A. bureaucracy gave him complete monopoly of patronage.
- (4) The "Sole N.A." system gave him the right to veto all the decisions of his council and, even more autocratic, the Emir-in-council could enact any law for the purpose of maintaining "law and order" in his area of jurisdiction.
- (5) All Emirs and chiefs adjudicated legal cases (without any legal training) and some of them (first class Emirs) presided over "Grade A Courts", which were the equivalent of High Courts of Justice. That meant that they could also try cases of murder and treason. Hence, some Emirs were Sarakunan Yanka (singular, Sarkin Yanka) meaning those who could inflict capital punishment. Indeed, they did before the advent

1. There were many depositions and resignations between 1953-1963, see "The Position of Emirs", in Whitaker, op. cit., pp. 272-309. But, apparently, the rare cases of depositions were meant to sort out the sheep from the goats and thus enhance the native chieftaincy institution. See Perham, op. cit., pp. 116-119.

of the British and in the first few years of British rule. After more than fifty years of colonial rule, at least one Emir still vetoed with impunity the verdict of the Nigerian Supreme Court (see below).

In order to understand the real grip which the Emir had on the N.A. bureaucracy it is important to know the colonial policy on education and to see how that policy favoured the Sarakuna. Sir Donald Cameron explained the policy as follows:

If Indirect Rule is to be truly tribal (in Northern Nigeria) we must educate from the top down and, not as in Southern Nigeria, from the bottom upwards. 1

This policy governed the selection of pupils to Western schools from 1903 till about 1956. Mr. Hans Vischer (still remembered as Dan Hausa in Northern Nigeria)², a famous colonial educator in the Northern Region, explained the aims of his school in these words:

The object of this school is to train sons of chiefs with a view to making them physically and mentally fitted to assist the government in the administration of the country, to bring them into closer contact with the government, to acquire for them a better understanding of the policy pursued by the government, to acquire for them elementary knowledge of sanitation and hygiene and above all to open their eyes to the commercial possibilities of the country. 3

Clearly, the intention was to produce a literate ruling class so that the new administration with its rules, regulations and associated routine

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1. Quoted in Whitaker, op. cit., p. 341; but there is more information on colonial policy of education in "Northern Nigeria Reports 1900-1911 and 1935-1956", in NAK, Kaduna. Also see Gbadamosi, G.O., "The establishment of Western education among Muslims in Nigeria", Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, IV (No. 1, 1967), pp. 89-115.
 2. See Imam, Dr. Alhaji Abubakar, "Dr. East is dead: a tribute", in New Nigerian, Monday, 30 June 1975. There is more account of Mr. Hans Vischer in Sonia, F.O., Government and Mission Education in Northern Nigeria, 1900-1919 (Ibadan, 1966).
 3. Quoted in Whitaker, op. cit., pp. 341-342. But for an official view on these objectives see Williams, D.H., Short Survey of Education in Northern Nigeria (Government Printer, Kaduna, 1959); for critical comments see Fafunwa, A.B., History of Education in Nigeria (London, 1974).

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could be carried out. Many years later the Sultan of Sokoto confirmed that, by attributing the educational backwardness of his Emirate mainly to colonialism. He said that the British were more interested in training youth to collect taxes to maintain the system of Indirect Rule.¹

Following that policy, the early generations of Northerners to receive Western education were sons of Emirs, chiefs, D.H.s and other title holders. They were either members of the aristocracy or their clients (Yayan Sarakuna Ko Bayinsu). Later on many educated Northerners came from the families of high ranking N.A. officials. That was particularly true at the Middle Schools and all the post-primary levels. The future careers and, indeed, the social statuses of those Western educated young men were assured whatever their individual status at birth had been. Since the traditional political system provided for a measure of upward social mobility, even for commoners, that strengthened the spirit of accommodation and drive for integration. The Maaikata class were on the whole easily absorbed in the N.A.s.²

Most Maaikata were members of the aristocracy (in the upper North) and many of them were N.A. employees. Since their economic security

1. See West Africa (No. 2977), 8 July 1974, p. 842.

2. In Northern Nigeria, all the Western schools combined produced very few graduates as compared to Southern Nigeria. Actual figures for graduates are hard to come by but it suffices to say that up to 1950 Northern Nigeria had only two approved secondary schools for boys whereas at the same time there were twenty in the West and eleven in the East, i.e. the total of 31 approved secondary schools in the South as compared to only 2 in the North. See Nduka, O., Western Education and the Nigerian Cultural Background (Ibadan, 1975), pp. 72. But according to Dudley, B.J., Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria (London, 1968), p. 73, table 2, there were 222 boys in secondary schools in the North as compared to 9,307 in the South. In fact that Northern figure includes those in middle schools (effective primary schools). The few Northerners who went to school but who preferred to join the government service or the commercial firms (e.g., U.A.C. of John Holts) instead of joining the N.A. services received accelerated promotions.

and social status were assured by the N.A. system, their loyalty to it became unquestioning. In any case their education was designed to train them for leadership at the local level. So, all they needed to do was to wait for their turn (i.e. when their elders passed away) and, in that period of waiting, prove their loyalty to the British and their obedience to their elders in the N.A. In that way the Emir was always surrounded by Maaikata who were loyal to the system and obedient to him in person. In that strong position the Emir used his power against anyone who threatened his interest or tried to undermine the N.A.

The Emirs' Control over Native Courts¹

The Emirs' grip on the N.A. judiciary was as firm as it was doubly effective against any opposition. The description below of an instance in Kano was very common in the Muslim North. In 1953 a group of NEPU supporters were imprisoned for some political offences by the Emir's Court in Kano. A NEPU lawyer, Mr. Amanke Okofor, appealed to the Federal Supreme Court on behalf of the accused. Their appeal was heard by his Lordship, Justice P.C. Hubbard, who in his judgement quashed the sentence by the Emir's Court and thus set the accused persons free. The following day, a batch of N.A. policemen in two lorries re-arrested all the accused one by one in their respective houses and places of work, on the alleged order of the Emir of Kano. They were sent back to N.A. prison at Kano where they completed the sentences given to them by the Emir's Court.²

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1. All local judges (alkalai) were employees of the N.A.s and, therefore, they were appointed by the Emirs. In addition to that most of them were related to the Emirs by marriage or belonged to the same family. In almost all cases they belonged to the same ethnic group and thus had very strong kinship ties.
 2. This story was reported in detail in the West African Pilot, Friday, 9 October 1953.

What the Emir of Kano did amounted to saying that he would never let those rebellious peasants out of prison because courts did not figure in his book! And that reflected the dilemma of the colonial government in its support for the Emirs. The government was aware that the ordinary people wanted justice, and to see justice done. Some colonial administrators attempted to identify themselves with the people they were serving by making it possible to redress their grievances through the law courts and to a lesser extent by administrative means. Nonetheless, the ability of the Emirs to defy even the central authority and get away with it was derived from the British policy of defending and protecting the chiefs publicly (with occasional private criticism when really necessary) unless their actions posed a serious threat to British interests.¹ That policy continued right into the early years of Nigeria's political independence. Up to the early 1960s the Emirs still had the right to deport Nigerian citizens from their respective areas of jurisdiction. Some of them did use that power to banish members of the opposition parties (NEPU and AG known to me) and such was the fate of many NEPU members in Borno Province and of Njidda Kofa at Yola.

The opposition parties were so helpless in the face of such deliberate acts of victimization of their members that Alhaji Aminu Kano (the NEPU leader) moved a motion in the Federal House of Representatives, Lagos, in which he said:

I rise to move a motion standing in my name which states that no Nigerian should be banished from his home or place of residence until he has been given full opportunity to defend himself in a court of law, and that persons who are so banished at present should be freed on the 1st October 1960 ... In this motion my intention is not to

1. See Perham, op. cit., pp. 43-60.

bring to this house specific instances of banishments, because it is not my intention to embarrass any institution or any Regional Government or any local authority. But I would like this house to accept the principle that it is absolutely unjust, it is absolutely wrong and morally wrong in Nigeria which is achieving independence this year to have people who are banished from their own homes without a chance of defending themselves in a court of law. 1

In fact, Alhaji Aminu Kano was protesting against the autocratic powers of the Emirs and, especially, against their interference in the judicial process of the Emirates. Until early 1967, the Emirs hand-picked and appointed all Alkalai in their respective domains.² Many Alkalai were related to the Emirs by marriage or by blood and, as N.A. employees they were also answerable to the Emirs. Thus, with the native courts in their complete control the Emirs had combined in themselves judicial, executive and legislative powers, all of which were arbitrarily and ruthlessly used in defence of their interests.³

N.A.s and Politics

The sections above attempt to explain why the illiterate peasant had nowhere to go to seek redress of his grievances and how bribery and corruption became part of the mores of the N.A. service. The views of the Talakawa were never sought on any issue, their welfare was always disregarded and their helplessness shockingly abused. All N.A. employees had monetary obligations to their immediate superiors and through them to the Emir and, in return, subordinates were protected by their seniors.

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1. Kano, Alhaji Aminu, Parliamentary Speeches (Kano, 1964), pp. 75-77.
 2. In 1967, all Native courts were taken over from the N.A.s by the Northern Regional Government. For full details and the reasons for the takeover see NAK/File No. MSNC 53/S.1. Circular: LK 1033/T of 13/2/67.
 3. Both Whitaker, op. cit., pp. 219-230, and Sklar, R.L., Nigerian Political Parties (Princeton, 1963), pp. 355-365, contain useful accounts of the Alkali courts and their openness to abuse by the N.A.

Thus, much of the attraction of the N.A. service lay in the opportunities it offered for extortion in one form or another. Impersonal and disinterested service on the part of N.A. employees was unthinkable. Any service rendered by them had to be paid for accordingly by the recipient. Those abuses notwithstanding, successive Nigerian Governments depended on and, therefore, defended the N.A.s. To the colonial rulers, the N.A.s were not only necessary adjuncts to the central administration but also de facto, if not de jure, local versions of colonialism and as such their authority had to be upheld. To the N.P.C. governments (1954-1966) perhaps there was no alternative to the N.A. machinery in the sense that the N.P.C. leaders belonged to the traditional elite and that most N.P.C. members were N.A. employees. As a political party the N.P.C. was entirely dependent on the N.A.s for its organisation and its electoral success at the polls (see below). Thus, the defence of the N.A. system became an accepted doctrine of conservative politics in Northern Nigeria.

The colonial administration allowed the N.A. staff to take part in active politics long before modern political parties were formed. Obviously that was due to the dearth of politically skilled manpower in Northern Nigeria at that time. But N.A. staff were allowed to partake in political controversy only on the condition that:

An employee shall not, without permission from the Native Authority, take any active part in local political controversy, and the public expression of opinions contrary to the policy of the Native Authority may be regarded as an offence against discipline. 1

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1. Quoted in Government Circular No. MLG. 412/9 of 7 June 1955 in NAK/File, Min. for Local Govt: MLG/Con/29, p. 9. In fact, this was an elderly rule which was updated until 1956. See Native Authority Staff Regulation (Government Printer, Kaduna, 1953).

The fact was that the crucial political issue at the local level was the N.A. itself. So to outlaw public expression of opinions on N.A. policies was to restrict N.A. staff from debating their real problems. With the establishment of political parties in the 1950s and the gradual evolution of elected national and regional Assemblies as well as local councils, the government found it imperative that all councils should contain a sufficient body of educated opinion in their membership. Since most educated Northern Nigerians worked in the local governments, it was felt that a total ban on the election of N.A. staff to such councils might leave them with a membership which was not sufficiently enlightened to understand what was required of them.¹ In the light of this the Executive Council made the following recommendation to the N.A.s in the Northern Region:

(1) That N.A. Staff should ... be permitted to take part in local government activities, with the exception of official members of the N.A. councils and heads of N.A. departments.

(2) That this permission should include standing for election to N.A. subordinate councils.

(3) That this permission should be subject to the proviso that N.A. employees so elected would not be free thereby to act or speak in a manner designed to undermine the policy or status of the N.A.

(4) That if the recommendations here made prove impractical in the case of any individual N.A., the relevant rules in the N.A. Electoral Rules might be amended. 2

On recommendation (3) above it was suggested that:

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1. Even in 1977, Mariga and Shashanga local governments in Niger State could not boast of a single Western educated person among its membership who would be appointed a chairman or a portfolio councillor. Thus, nominated members were appointed to the council to make policy for the local government.
 2. This and the quote below are from Government Circular No. MLG. 412/9 of 7 June 1955, in NAK/File MLG/CON/29, pp. 10-11.

the tactful expression of views contrary to those of the N.A., or abstention from voting, in meetings of subordinate councils might be tolerated in order not to lose the assistance of experienced men; but active disloyalty against the N.A. cannot be permitted ...

What constituted "active disloyalty" was not defined, so it remained an open ended question left to the discretion of each individual N.A.

In 1964 a further amendment to N.A. Staff Regulations Nos. 59 and 60, allowed N.A. employees to partake fully in national and local politics on the condition that they obtained the written permission of the N.A.¹ Those regulations gave the Emirs the constitutional right to manipulate political activities at all levels by determining who achieved elected office. Indeed, the regulations were used, as we show below, to ensure that holders of political offices were certified defenders of the N.A. system.

Under the 1946 Richards Constitution, the Northern Regional House of Chiefs (an unelected upper House) had legislative powers, whereas the Northern Regional House of Assembly (an elective lower House) had advisory powers only, unlike other Regions of Nigeria (East and West), where the reverse was the case. Moreover, most, if not all, the members of the Northern House of Assembly were sons, grandsons, relatives or clients of the Emirs; or they were N.A. employees and thus the personal nominees of their respective Emirs.² When the Jam'iyyan Mutanen Arewa -- the Northern Peoples Congress (N.P.C.) -- formerly a cultural organization, was declared a political party in October 1951, all the elected members of the Northern House of Assembly declared their

1. See Government Circular No. 38/1964, Ref. No. MLG/L/CON/29/172 of 27 August 1964 in NAK/File Min for Local Govt./MLG/CON/29, pp. 172-173.

2. See "The Anatomy of Northern Nigerian Parliamentarians", in Whitaker, op. cit., pp. 317-327.

support for the party and thus became the members of the N.P.C. parliamentary party.¹ The N.P.C. became the ruling party in Northern Nigeria, the dominant party in the Federal House of Representatives, and the senior partner in the Federal Coalition Government (1957-1966). The relationship between the N.P.C. and the traditional institutions was such that the party became the de facto political expression of the Northern chieftaincy institution. Since the N.P.C. was heavily dependent on the N.A.s for its organization, each N.A. area of jurisdiction was coterminous with the N.P.C. organization area.² N.A. employees were the party's local organizers and agents. In each electoral constituency, the Emir nominated the N.P.C. election candidates. It was simply unthinkable for the party to adopt an election candidate who was not also the Emir's choice.³

In that way, the N.P.C. control of the Northern Regional Government (1954-1966) and its dominance over the Federal Government of Nigeria, further consolidated the position of the Emirs at the local level. The N.P.C. Government maintained the sanctity of the entire N.A. structure and it held that Emirs and chiefs were the "fathers of their peoples". That implied that, like the European monarchs, they were neutral in politics. The fact was that the idea of a constitutional monarch was wholly foreign in Northern Nigeria, because the Emirs had always been at the centre of politics. They were never above or below politics. The N.P.C. Government also wrongly assumed that all title holders would uphold the dignity of their offices by remaining impartial

1. Interview with Maitama Sulei, Kano, 1978. Also see Dudley, B.J., op. cit., p. 83.

2. See Whitaker, op. cit., p. 365.

3. Also see Sklar, R.L., op. cit., p. 388.

in settling disputes by being as fair as they could be to all parties. Any criticism of the local governments was seen by the N.P.C. government, as a sacrilege and as an affront to the "natural rulers". Critics of the N.A. system were therefore ruthlessly suppressed by the N.P.C. with all the governmental machinery at their disposal. Again the N.A. set up was referred to as "our traditional heritage", which must be defended by all "true Northerners", from disrupters and vagabonds. The fact that the N.A.s were the Northern Nigerian equivalent of the local government and, as such, they were the arms of the government nearest to the people, was simply ignored. The central belief of conservative politics in Northern Nigeria was that the Emirs had the "Divine Right" to rule, whereas their subjects, if they had any right at all, it was the right to suffer their bondage in silence.

Northern Nigerian Emirs had always resisted being reduced to a ceremonial or symbolic role, accordingly, they had always allied themselves with whoever recognized and helped them maintain their powers and privileges and opposed those who did not, with all the means at their command. For example, their fierce resistance against the British occupation of Nigeria notwithstanding, they agreed to become the servitors of British colonialism. Indeed, many of them became "the reliable pillars of the British Empire"¹ with various decorations and honors to their names. Again despite their opposition to the introduction of a parliamentary system of government in the late 1940s and their open hostility to the formation of political parties in the early 1950s, they became ardent supporters of the N.P.C. and some of them accepted cabinet posts and thus were members of the post-colonial government.

1. Cited in Russell, E., op. cit., p. 45.

The Emirs, always an opportunist group, continued as political trimmers right into the military era. To suppose that such rulers would be neutral in politics was merely wishful thinking.

Conclusion

From the foregoing analysis it is reasonable to conclude that to defeat the N.P.C. at elections would amount to the overthrow of the entire chieftaincy (and the N.A.) institutions. Conversely, it could have been very difficult for the N.P.C. to survive as a political party without the support of the chiefs and the traditional institutions. N.P.C. success at the polls was thus, to the party, as to the chiefs and the N.A. system, a matter of life and death. As it were, N.P.C. defeat would have amounted to a revolution in Northern Nigeria.

The reasons for the survival of the N.A. system until the recent local government reforms (1977) was not only because it was supported by successive Nigerian governments but also because certain circumstances compelled the Talakawa to suffer their misfortune largely in silence. Those circumstances included the Talakawa's own depth of ignorance which was so extraordinary that they had a distorted perception of the world around them. The Talakawa were so used to vicissitudes and a hard life that they became accustomed to extreme poverty and habituated to political servitude. Worse still, even if they were enlightened, the constitutional arrangement in Hausaland was such that there was no legal recourse for them. In fact there were many and varied reasons why a revolution was not seriously contemplated (although there were many instances of rebellions). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to enumerate and analyse all those reasons here. It suffices

to mention very briefly some of the reasons especially those whose backgrounds have been treated in Chapter I.

Following the illiteracy and the ignorance of the overwhelming majority of the population there was the lack of political education and thus very low political consciousness. The patron-client system in Northern Nigeria tied the rural elite to the nobility by providing an opportunity to demonstrate mutual trust and reciprocal confidence (Amana) not to mention the promotion of mutual interests. The strong kinship system entrusted economic and political responsibilities of all young persons to their elders, who as clients of the political authorities did not lend their support to any behaviour or action likely to disrupt the existing social order and, conversely, the young men subordinated themselves to the authority of their elders. Political coercion and administrative extortion were, in most cases, systematically directed at minority ethnic groups who were regarded, by the dominant tribal group, as bigots for whom there was no justice. Although the Talakawa lived simply and badly too, they were not in any way desperate. Furthermore, in the pre-NEPU period, the sole perception of an alternative political system which would alleviate their predicament was that provided intermittently and ineffectively by Mahdist movements. Even this was countered by the strong Muslim religious hold imposed upon them. Religion was used by the privileged classes as a diversionary tactic that distracted the attention of the Talakawa away from the injustices of this world and made them concentrate instead on the blissful state of the hereafter. God, at least, was just, even if the social system and its operators were not. In the face of that conservative interpretation of Islam, the Talakawa were inveigled to come to terms with their lot because of the religious promise of better things

to come. Therefore, they became more religious than their rulers as a consolation for their worldly sufferings. In that way the religion of Islam was deliberately misinterpreted to give the Sarakuna greater security and the same religious misinterpretations promoted social cohesion.

Thus what radical politicians faced in Northern Nigeria was a gigantic and complex bureaucratic structure, drawing its legitimacy from both political and religious sources and relying for its stability on a combination of mass ignorance, religious sanction and force. The radicals wanted primarily to democratize local governments (N.A.s) and secondarily to free Nigeria from colonial rule. As is now well known the radicals failed to kill the twin evils of colonialism and native tyranny with one stone. More than anything else, the N.A. institutions were the main factors which prevented the radicals from capturing political power in Northern Nigeria.

CHAPTER IV

THE ORIGINS OF MODERN RADICALISM

GARI YA WAYE TSORO YA YAYE

"New day breaks and banishes fear." N.E.P.U.

Preamble

Both the colonial and the post-colonial governments protected the N.A.s from any form of progressive influence and, thereby, maintained a closed and tyrannical bureaucracy run by an aristocracy as insolent as it was unfeeling. Consequently, the culture of unaccountability was so firmly established that the Sarakuna acted as though they were the special appointees from heaven invested with power. Thus, their minds became bloated with self-importance and encumbered with anachronistic concepts of authority. On the other hand, the Talakawa were treated with arrogance and extreme contempt by their rulers. The combination of ignorance, poverty, disease and political oppression deprived the Talakawa of organizational initiative, hence, they were effectively excluded from institutional activity. Furthermore, due to a long history of dependency and deference, they lacked enough courage to articulate their grievances and demands, and thus never appeared to the Sarakuna to be likely to challenge their rule.

It was the desire to change the above situation for the better which came to be known as "Modern Radicalism" in Northern Nigeria. The Radicals were those who sought to rescue the Talakawa from the hammer of Native Administration. They aimed to cure the abuses of the N.A. system, which was part of colonialism. Hence, Northern

Nigerian Radicalism was also linked to the struggle against colonial domination. In this sense the Radicals were also nationalists whose brand of nationalism was not content with the mere transfer of political power from the British to Nigerians. They wanted to reform and to rebuild a modern state on the basis of pre-existing cultural ties (of religious solidarity and inter-ethnic harmony) by fostering an enhanced consciousness of these ties. They were in favour of economic and social development but their method was the use of the whole ethos of Islamic political thought ingrained in the minds of Muslims in Hausaland from many centuries ago. In that way the Qur'an and the Hadith were their acclaimed and, indeed, accepted reference points. This type of criticism of rulers is traditionally tolerated in Muslim communities in which the Qur'an is supposed to be the constitution and the law book. By using this method, the Radicals attempted to appear to be recalling the masses to the Revealed Truth (Qur'an) and to past values of the society: the "Truth" cannot change but those who forget the truth can be recalled to it. In addition, when appealing to more educated or urbanized groups they attempted to present the whole ruling elite as effete aristocrats and the Radicals as the laboratory of technicians who best understood the general problems of development and the predicament of the Talakawa in particular.

The history of Northern Nigerian radicalism is not easy to trace, particularly in the period before Zamanin Siyasa, the period of politics (i.e. 1946-1966). Not until the 1930's did the Ulama begin to accept the permanence and legitimacy of colonial rule in the North. The bulk were prepared, like their Emirs, to cooperate with the colonial administration, while a minority who adhered to the principles of the Jihad became increasingly critical of the nature and consequence of indirect

rule. At the same period, the number of Western educated people was too negligible to make any impact on the society as a whole. So, even if there were radicals then, they were relatively few and scattered across the Northern Region and their activities and the organizations they might have formed were shortlived, due to administrative hostility and harrassment. Furthermore, not only was Northern Nigerian radicalism presented in religious and historical terms, with particular reference to the nineteenth century Jihad and its leaders, but the individual radical sometimes practiced Taqiyya, the "precautionary dissimulation of his true beliefs".¹ Thus one has to be familiar with the cultural context in which the presentation was made to understand their arguments. Notable among such radicals was Malam Ahmad Mahmud Sa'adu Zungur (discussed below) but almost all the pioneer radicals were (are) skilled in making their presentation with a deliberate cryptic style (for allusion) and innuendo typical of both Habaici and Zambo, the two categories of Hausa satire. Nonetheless, there was at least one outspoken pre-war radical malam: Alhaji Sani Dingyadi.

Alhaji Sani Dingyadi, Makaman Sokoto

Alhaji Sani Dingyadi belonged to the Habe ethnic group and he was of Talaka parentage. His father was known as Sarkin Makera, chief of blacksmiths, a low status occupation in Hausa society. He was born in 1907 and was educated at the famous Katsina College where he later

1. Referring to Sayyid Jamal Al-din Al-Afghani (1838/9-1897), Thomas Hodgkin defined his practice of Taqiyya as "precautionary dissimulation of his true beliefs", see Political Theory and Ideology in African Society (C.A.S., Edinburgh, 1970), p. 124.

became a master. He was the Headmaster of Sokoto Middle and then became Sokoto N.A. Councillor with the title of Makama.¹ He was a member of the legislative council in the late 1940's, an N.P.C. member of the Northern House of Assembly in 1956-1961, and a member of the Nigerian Senate when that House was created in 1962.

Alhaji Sani was the pioneer radical in colonial Northern Nigeria. In 1933 he addressed pupils in the Middle Schools at Sokoto, Kano, Katsina and Zaria. His message was simply this: Mulki Nan Gaba Sai Da Jamiyya (future government must be by organization of a political party). He made it clear that he was thinking of organizing a Saniyya movement (a party called after his name). He called for a critical examination of Northern Nigerian society and he advised his audience not to be afraid either to advocate or to support reforms. He reminded them that Shehu Usman Dan Fodio did not inherit leadership; he achieved it; he had an autonomous identity as a learned man and a great reformer. Implicit in that statement was his resentment of the injustice of the existing hereditary leadership in the Emirates. As J.S. Mill points out, the Qur'an asserts that "A ruler who appoints any man to an office, when there is in his dominion another man better qualified for it, sins against God and against the state."² Contrary to this maxim, the principle of hereditary rule in the Emirates enabled even the stupid and the incompetent to lead and to rule over Muslim communities. It is, therefore, not surprising that such principles become the target of

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1. One of the junior titles confirmed on both slaves and free-men alike. The origin of this traditional title is still uncertain. See Nigerian Administration Research Project, First Interim Report (Institute of Administration, A.B.U., Zaria, 1972), pp. 6-7.
 2. Quoted in John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (ed. by Mary Warnock), pp. 177-8.

attack by radicals. Hence, in a typical Hausa allusive innuendo that was clearly understood by his audience, Alhaji Sani encouraged them not to be afraid to question the basic assumptions of the Hausa society. On colonialism he said: Lalatacciyar Kasa Itace Kasar Musulmi Wanda Ke Karkacin Mulkin Nasara (a hopeless country is one which is predominantly Muslim but which is under the suzerainty of Christians). In the 1940's he formed the "Sokoto Youth Council" and the "Sokoto Debating Society". He remained active in politics until his death in 1969.¹

His "Sokoto Youth Council" and "Sokoto Debating Society" merged into the Jamiyya (discussed below) and thus formed the nucleus of the Northern Peoples Congress (N.P.C.) Sokoto Branch. Aminu Kano was one of the pupils who listened to him at the Kano Middle School in 1933.

Malam Sa'adu Zungur

The most controversial and the most difficult to understand among the radicals was M. Sa'adu Zungur (1915-1958).² He was controversial because his commitment to Islam appeared to be tempered with scepticism. In Northern Nigeria that was something close to Kafirci (apostasy); yet he was a practicing Muslim and a learned Malam. He

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1. I interviewed Alhaji Sani Dingyadi at Kaduna in 1967. But I owe much of this information to Alhaji Aminu Kano when I interviewed him in London in 1974. Alhaji Aminu Kano was a pupil at the Kano Middle School when Alhaji Sani Dingyadi visited the School and addressed the pupils in 1933. Also see Abdulkadir, Dandatti, The Poetry, Life and Opinions of Sa'adu Zungur (NNPC, Zaria, 1974), p. 11. Whitaker, C.S., Jr., The Politics of Tradition, Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria, 1946-1966 (Princeton, 1970), contains a short biography of the Makama.
 2. For the biography of M. Sa'adu Zungur, see Kano, Alhaji Aminu, Rayuwar Ahmad Mahmud Sa'adu Zungur (NNPC, Zaria, 1973). Most of my information on M. Sa'adu Zungur was obtained from this book. Also see Abdulkadir, D., The Poetry, Life and Opinions of Sa'adu Zungur (Zaria, 1974).

was difficult to understand because of his ability in and skill at presenting different views and arguments, on the same issue, to the elites and the masses.¹ He was born in a scholarly family in 1915. He had an Islamic education and acquired competence in the Islamic Sciences (theology, the law and Qur'anic studies). He had a strong sense of history and a clear perception of the beliefs and values of the Muslim culture prevalent in Hausaland. He also received Western education at the famous Katsina College (the Eton College of Northern Nigeria), and he was the first Northern Nigerian to study at Yaba College, Lagos. So he was as fluent in the English language as he was proficient in Arabic. Having studied at Lagos must have brought M. Sa'adu Zungur into contact with the progressive ideas of many of the Southern Nigerian intelligentsia of the time; and he also became aware of the relative backwardness of the North in terms of Western education and technology. On his return to Northern Nigeria, he took up employment at the Zaria School of Hygiene before he returned to his home town; and soon turned Bauchi into the political boiling pot of Nigeria.

M. Sa'adu Zungur's real attempt in political organization started in 1939 when he formed the Zaria "Literary Society", which attracted many educated young men, including Aminu Kano. But it was disbanded in 1940 due to the sensitivity to criticism of, and subsequent harrassment by, the administration. During the war this was the usual fate of debating societies; after 1945 the administration made some attempts both to sponsor and control their formation and proceedings.² In 1941,

1. Hodgkin, op. cit., attributed this to Sayyid Afghani.

2. Interview with Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim, London, 1973.

he founded the "Northern General Improvement Union" but it was very shortlived as all the committee members of the Union were transferred from Zaria to rural stations. Sa'adu himself was sent to Anchau where he became very ill and resigned from the government service. That mass transfer was the sequel to Sa'adu's inauguration address in which he said that the functions performed by the administrations were not really essential to the way of life of the peasantry. He called upon the authorities to justify their existence on either a religious or a functional basis. At every stage of the speech he cited relevant verses from the Qur'an to support his case.¹ As J.S. Mill recognized (in On Liberty) that Islam is primarily a political and social religion, so did Sa'adu and he went further to hold that the fundamentals of Islam should serve as the basis of public administration.² The result of that transfer of its leadership from Zaria was the natural death of the Union.

Having resigned from the government service in 1942, Sa'adu returned to his home town, Bauchi. Although he had not quite recovered from his illness at Anchau, Sa'adu was still too politically committed to remain quiet. He believed that stability might breed stagnation and so he favoured a controlled instability for the purpose of progress.³ This is to say that rebellion is admissible depending on whether it is for purely personal reasons or it is inspired by the desire for a

1. Kano, op. cit., p. 2.

2. This assertion is very much in line with Islamic traditional political thought. For example, it follows the value system of the founders of the Sokoto Caliphate, especially on the basic functions of their administration. See Mahmud Tukur, "Philosophy, Goals and Institutions of the Sokoto Caliphal Administration: A preliminary view", in Nigerian Administration Research Project, First Interim Report (Zaria, 1972), pp. 15-43.

3. Kano, op. cit., p. 4.

different kind of community from that in which the rebel finds himself. In the latter case, the desire can be shared by all except a small minority who profit by the existing system. This type of rebellion is constructive and therefore legitimate. Without this kind of rebellion mankind would stagnate and injustice would be irremediable. The man who refuses to obey authority has, therefore, in certain circumstances, a legitimate function, provided his disobedience has motives which are social rather than personal. But this matter is one which is impossible to lay down rules. In 1943, he formed Taron Tattauna Al'amuran Bauchi (the Bauchi Discussion Circle).¹ At first, the circle was supported by colonial officials and it represented all shades of opinion in Bauchi.² But it was banned after one year, following a debate on "Indirect Rule". That fateful debate was chaired by the Emir of Bauchi, with the Resident of Bauchi Province in attendance. The debate was followed by a discussion during which Sa'adu asked for the criteria which determine the salaries of Emirs. It fell upon the Resident to answer the question and he, at first, gave two reasons: (1) the amount of taxes collected within the Emirate; (2) the duties involved in administering the Emirate, i.e. the grade of the Emir's court and the number of cases tried by the court, etc. As for the first point, Sa'adu reminded the meeting that Bauchi Division was in fact bigger than Adamawa Division³; and as for the second point he cited the Provincial Reports, to prove that the Emir of Bauchi's

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Without Sardauna Province, which was then a mandated territory of the United Nations in the British Trust and administered locally by the Adamawa N.A., Bauchi Division was, indeed, much bigger than Adamawa Division.

court dealt with more of such cases than the Lamido of Adamawa's court. But the Resident explained that the colonial government also took into consideration the order of seniority of the Emirs as established by Shehu Usman Dan Fodio from the time of the Jihad. To this Sa'adu pointed out that the Shehu made Bauchi senior to Adamawa. Thus, in the presence of the Emir of Bauchi and his councillors, Sa'adu implied that the colonial administration both slighted and cheated the Emirs of Bauchi. The Resident understood the implications of both Sa'adu's questions and his subsequent inferences; and, in high temper, the meeting was closed. Consequently, the Bauchi Discussion Circle was officially proscribed from that date.¹

M. Sa'adu Zungur then tried to establish the "Bauchi General Improvement Union" and the "Youth Association", and he also attempted to open an "Islamiyya School". All failed because of the opposition of the authorities. In view of that he devised other means of keeping in touch with the educated people of Bauchi town, one of which included visits to the N.A. and the government's departments where he would meet and talk to the staff. Through these discussions he would explain his ideas and views on current affairs and, of course, he would also get some information from them.² This was to lead, a little indirectly, to a marked change in Sa'adu's views and subsequent struggles.

One day he visited the Public Works Department (P.W.D.) which stood next to the house in which Sa'adu lived. There, some of the staff complained to him about one Mr. Orgle, the officer in charge of the department. Mr. Orgle was notorious for his arrogance and for

1. Kano, op. cit., p. 6.

2. Ibid.

humiliating his subordinates and all black people generally. As a result of those complaints, Sa'adu wrote an article on Mr. Orgle for the West African Pilot, a Lagos-based newspaper. In it he called for the removal of Mr. Orgle from Bauchi.¹

About one week later this article was published and Mr. Orgle read it. The following morning he went into the P.W.D. yard, where by standing on an empty drum, he could see over the wall, right into the house in which Sa'adu lived, and waited for Sa'adu to emerge so that he could shoot him. However, Sa'adu noticed ^dMr. Orgle standing against the wall of his house and before leaving the Zaure (a thatched round-hut used as a resting or entrance hall of a house) of his compound he asked his servant, as a precautionary measure, to find out who was the person standing against the wall. When his servant confirmed to him that it was Mr. Orgle and he (Mr. Orgle) was armed, Sa'adu became suspicious and sent for Aminu Kano immediately. Sa'adu and Aminu had first met in 1935 when Sa'adu visited Kano Middle School where Aminu was a pupil. They met again at Zaria in 1939 when Aminu was on a teaching practice at Zaria Middle School. Apparently, Sa'adu's return to Bauchi was partly responsible for Aminu's decision to go and teach at Bauchi in 1942. At Bauchi their friendship warmed-up and the two became very close indeed.

On seeing Mr. Orgle, Aminu Kano informed the police and he and Sa'adu wrote to the press about it; they also sent an urgent telegram to the Governor at Kaduna. Mr. Orgle was charged with attempted murder, but was only found guilty of possessing a firearm without a licence and was fined £5. The case endeared Sa'adu greatly to the

1. Ibid.

people of Bauchi and it made them realize how discriminating colonial justice was. But more important, it changed the direction of Sa'adu's protests. From then on his attacks were centred on the evils of colonialism.¹

The above incident occurred after World War II when Nigerian soldiers were returning from the war fronts. So, either by coincidence or by design, Sa'adu composed a poem Maraba Da Soja (MS), "Welcome to Soldiers". This poem is very much in the traditional style of Hausa praise-songs, which intended to celebrate the triumphant return of the soldiers, but in the end it turned out to be a succinct warning to the administration on the impending crisis. Sa'adu was quick to see that the return of the soldiers, who fought in various parts of the world in order to defend the Empire would have momentous social and political consequences. Thus, he went on to say,

Freedom is of no value,
Where there is poverty,
Mutual trust stands no chance,
If some are self-seeking at heart,
There is no good leadership,
Save where there is justice.
There is no value in kinship,
Save where there is generosity,
And when there is no gross ingratitude,
No malice, no indifference,
No inhumanity,
None is starved for food
Then only is freedom assured. 2

1. Ibid., p. 10.

2. The full Hausa text of this song will be found in Wakokin M. Sa'adu Zungur (NNPC, Zaria, 1971), pp. 6-10. And Abdulkadir, op. cit., pp. 36-47, contains both the full Hausa text and an English translation. Also see Hiskett, Mervyn, "The Development of Sa'adu Zungur's Political Thought from Maraba Da Soja, through Arewa Jumhuriya Ko Mulukiya to Wakar Yanci", in African Language Studies, XVI (1975), pp. 1-23. The Hausa version runs as follows:

Babu amfani ga'yanci	In akwaihalin talauci,
Babu yin zarafin aminci	In da masu kwafa a zuci,
Babu kyawun shugabanci	Sai idan da akwai adalci,
Babu amfanin zumunci	Sai fa in da akwai karimci,
Kuma babu yawan butulci	Babu keta, basakarci,
Babu ketawar mutunci	Babu mai yunwar abinci,
San nan yanci yake tsayawa.	

In what looked like a reminiscence of Lloyd George's slogan that after World War I British soldiers would return to "A land fit for heroes to live in", Sa'adu warned the authorities that unless a programme of rapid social change was undertaken, the return of the soldiers would bring in its trail a crisis which had every promise of turning into a disaster. This poem (MS) is a protest against the prevailing conditions of the masses as well as a clairvoyant expression of the trend of future political development. It was not long after he composed the above poem (MS) that Sa'adu had the opportunity to address a larger audience through an organized political party.

In 1947, M. Sa'adu Zungur met Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe, the then leader of the "National Council of Nigerian Citizens" (N.C.N.C.)¹ in Bauchi. At that meeting Zik (as he is popularly called) invited Sa'adu to Lagos, but before he left Bauchi to Lagos, an incident occurred in Bauchi which is relevant and therefore worth mentioning.²

In 1948, Sir John Macpherson, the new Governor of Nigeria, planned to tour the whole country, but curiously, Bauchi town was left out of his itinerary. So, Sa'adu and his clique decided to hold a demonstration in order to show that Bauchi people wanted to see the Governor. But Bauchi N.A. intervened, warning that no meeting should be held in the Division without the permission of the police. The obvious reason for the omission of Bauchi town in the Governor's itinerary was the political activity of Sa'adu, Aminu and their group. Perhaps the authorities did not want the Governor to meet the agitators at Bauchi. But whatever the real reason might be, the demonstration was held with the permission of the Emir of Bauchi.

1. It was then called the "National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons".
 2. This incident is fully described in Kano, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

The demonstration started from the house of one M. Waziri to the Bauchi Market. Probably due to the Emir's permission, the turnout was far beyond the expectation of the organizers. At the market, Sa'adu read out his political speech in which he condemned colonialism and called upon all patriots to come forward without fear and make sacrifices in order to free Nigeria from colonial domination. That speech was the text of the letters which Sa'adu sent to the Governor, to the Lieutenant Governor and to the Press. This is one of the first organized anti-colonial political demonstrations in Northern Nigeria.

Sa'adu Zungur was appointed the Federal Secretary of the N.C.N.C. in 1948 and he left Bauchi to resume office in Lagos. In accepting his new appointment in Lagos, he also made his own calculations, for having studied at Yaba College, Lagos, he was aware of the relative backwardness of the North in terms of Western education and technical skills and hoped that the support of a Southern Nigerian political party might help the north to make up the leeway before independence overtook it. But, as we show below, flirtation with Southern Nigerians proved disappointing as Sa'adu became convinced that Southern politicians wished to use the North to advance their own sectional ambitions and that they were indifferent to the real needs of Northern Nigeria. Soon after his arrival at Lagos and before he assumed his duties in the N.C.N.C. Secretariat, he formed a "Northern Peoples Party", Jamiyyan Al'amuran Nijeriya ta Arewa, to organize Northern Nigerian immigrants in the Lagos area and tap their resources¹: its ideas were later to influence the formation of similar organizations

1. Ibid., p. 14.

in the North, through the influence of Sa'adu Zungur or Aminu Kano and the advice which he gave him.

One of the very first things Sa'adu did in the N.C.N.C. was to change the title of his office from the Federal Secretary to the National Secretary of the Party. This shows his commitment to the idea of Nigerian unity. But it did not take him long to become disenchanted with the N.C.N.C. leadership whom he called "foster nationalists" — those who are brought up in the colonial values and therefore look up to the colonialists for inspiration as well as for aspiration. He constantly accused his Southern colleagues of being cowards and unimaginative. According to Sa'adu their sole motive was to inherit the colonial structures with all its drawbacks and abuses. Thus, even after independence, the central government would remain an oppressive "quasi-colonial" government, divorced from the people. His disillusionment with his colleagues led him to form a youth wing of the party, the famous "Zikist National Vanguard".¹ During his tours to various parts of Nigeria, he recruited young men who he reckoned were courageous and talented. His new recruits included: Alhaji Habid Raji Abdallah, Chief Anthony Enahoro, Asita Agwuna, Mokogwu Okoye and Kebby Oged Macauley. He surrounded himself with the above young men in Lagos and with that group behind him he led a fierce opposition against colonialism in 1948/49.

The reason given for Sa'adu's departure from Lagos was due to "ill-health", but surely he could have received better treatment there than at Kaduna. It must be due to his resentment of the "foster

1. For a brief discussion of the early activities of the Zikist National Vanguard, see *ibid.* For a more detailed account of the Zikist movement, see Coleman, J.S., Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, (Berkeley, 1960), especially pp. 288, 296-297; also see Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties (Princeton, 1963), especially pp. 195, 201-21, 403-406, 73-80; and Olusanya, G.O., The Second World War and Politics in Nigeria 1939-1953 (Lagos, 1973), especially pp. 112-17 and 120-3.

nationalists" who were full of words but no action and whose broken promises he could no longer stand. He therefore broke his connection with the N.C.N.C. and returned to the North in the firm belief that the salvation of Northern Nigeria and, indeed, the freedom of the whole of Nigeria, was to be fought in the North. In his poem, Arewa Jumhuriya Ko Mulukiya (AJM), "North Republic or Constitutional Monarchy"¹, he not only accused Southern Nigerian politicians of being insensitive to the problems of reforms in Northern Nigeria, but he also partly pleaded with and partly challenged the Muslim North to make rapid social and political changes or face the inevitable consequences of Southern (Christian) domination of the whole country. He appealed to the common history, common religion and common culture of the Muslim North; he also appealed to the concept of "peaceful co-existence" between Muslims and non-Muslims which had existed in Northern Nigeria since the Jihad. Sa'adu's main aim was to mobilize the whole North, not so much against the South, as to bring about rapid development to the whole region. He said:

Our prayers are to God, the Merciful
That He may protect the North as a whole
Muslims and Christians, altogether,
And also Pagans, the beer goblins. 2

The general tone of the whole poem (AJM) is in the pious Islamic literary convention but Sa'adu's appeal to the Emirs, in particular,

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1. The full Hausa text of this poem is found in Zungur, Sa'adu, op. cit., pp. 13-22; Abdulkadir, D., op. cit., pp. 72-99, contains both the full Hausa text and its English translation; also see Paden, J.N., op. cit., pp. 283-284; and Hiskett, M., op. cit. This poem is not dated by its author but it might have been composed in 1950, i.e. after Sa'adu had left the N.C.N.C.
 2. The Hausa version runs as follows:
Addu'armu ga Allah Rahimi,
Ya kiyayi Arewa gabadaya
Muminai da Masihai jumlatan,
Kumada Arna dodan nin giya.

is in the traditional concept of authority through a favoured line of descent which, in Northern Nigeria, serves to establish the basic principle of legitimacy. He then enumerated the genealogical concatenation which links the Emirs of the Muslim North to Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, the founder of the Sokoto Caliphate. This style appeals strongly to the Muslim's sense of solidarity. But Sa'adu did not limit his appeal to the Northern glorious past, he also warned the Emirs "to sprinkle water on their beards as those of their contemporaries in India were already on fire" (a Hausa proverb which says Idan Kaga Gemun Dan-Uwanka Ya Kama Wuta Shafawa Nakaruwa). This is to warn the Emirs that they must move with the times or be blown by the "wind of change". He said to them:

The lesson is the government of India,
When it became a republic.
Today where are the great chiefs,
of Pakistan or India?
The Nizam, the Maharaja, the Rajah, all,
(They are) only weeping, none laughs.
Formerly the chiefs were more than five hundred,
All are scattered, not one remains,
It is as if they had never existed
You see the evils of a republic. 1

In the first decade of Zamanin Siyasa (1946-1956) the real political forces in Northern Nigeria were mainly the Emirs and chiefs supported by the British, on the one hand, and the Western educated elite on

1. The Hausa version runs as follows:

Wa'azine mulkin Indiya
Data zam daular jumhuriya
Yau ina manya na Sarakunan,
Pakistan ko kuma Indiya?
Da Nizam, Maharaja da Raja duk,
Sai Kuka, ba mai dariya.
Da Sarakai sun fi dari biyar,
Duka sun watse bako daya.
Saika ce fa da dai ba'a yi suba,
Kun ji sharrorin jumhuriya.

the other. Sa'adu wanted to unify the two groups by highlighting what they have in common, i.e. common culture and to some extent common ancestry. Also, in view of the educational backwardness of Northern Nigeria as compared to Southern Nigeria, most educated Northerners were aware of the vulnerability of the Northern Region, to becoming the back-yard of a future independent Nigeria. Thus, what was then contemptuously referred to as the "jungle republicanism" of the Southerners (especially of the Ibos) was pointed out as the main threat to Northern hegemony. He went on:

(You) understand the nature of a constitutional monarchy
 And the dangers of a republic.
 King and Houses of Representatives
 And Shari'ah, that is constitutional monarchy
 Government by representatives only,
 No King, No Queen,
 Save Police, save soldiers
 Issuing orders, that is a republic.
 We hope that the North should be alerted
 To the inclinations of the world.
 All of the false propaganda
 Leave it, seek the truth. 1

Some verses of this poem appear to correspond broadly with Islamic constitutional theory as practiced in Northern Nigeria and thus lead to misinterpreting Sa'adu as one who is advocating for Muslim exclusiveness against non-Muslims or Northern identity against Nigerian unity. But salient features of the poem represent Sa'adu's Taqiyya, in

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1. The Hausa version runs as follows:
 Ku fahinci shiri na Mulukiya
 Da yawan hadarin jumhuriya.
 Sarki da gidajen shawara,
 Da shari'a, kunji Mulukiya.
 Mulki na Wakilai gurguzu,
 Ba sarki babu sarauniya.
 Sai yan sanda, sai soja sai,
 Oda, itace jumhuriya.
 Fatarmu Arewa ta farga duk
 Don ta gane lamarin duniya.
 Farfagandar makirci duka,
 Sai a bar ta a bincika gaskiya.

dissimulating his real beliefs in order to win the support of the whole North. For the poem at once suggests to the Sarakuna how to preserve the status-quo; exploits the fears of the Ma Aikata; and appeals to the religious and cultural sentiments of the Talakawa. The last verses of the poem contain Sa'adu's indictment of Northern Nigerian society as unorganized, conservative and undisciplined. He also criticized Northerners for being ignorant, indolent and uncompetitive. Indeed, Sa'adu was a keen observer and his poetry remains a social commentary, endorsed by all educated opinions. This poem, in particular, created as much stir as it provoked criticism due to misinterpretation and misrepresentation. For instance, his flattery of the Emirs was misunderstood as a capitulation by him on previous opposition to the N.A. system. Hence, M. Mudi Spikin, a Kano poet, reacted by composing a piece entitled Arewa Jumhuriya Kawai (AJK), "North Republic, Pure and Simple".¹ Mudi does not refute the Islamic notion of legitimacy implied in Sa'adu's poem (AJM) but he argues that descendants of the Jihadists are less distinguished than their ancestors because they have flouted the ideals of the Jihad. As a result of their deviation from the path of Truth, "a Governor was imposed upon them from England: he is a certain man with a horrible moustache, his name was Lugard". The implication here is that the Emirs in the North are unjust and, since according to Shehu Usman Dan Fodio's maxim that "a Kingdom can endure with unbelief but it cannot endure with injustice", God transferred the trust of his creatures in the North, from those who are

1. Quoted in Hiskett, M., op. cit., p. 10. There are two verses of the Hausa text in Hassan, Usman, The Sources and Development of Northern Nigerian Politics from 1804-1960 with Special Reference to Political Verse (essay presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of M.A. degree of London University, May 1974), pp. 11 and 13. Mudi's reply to Sa'adu was dated 1951.

unjust to those who are just, even though they are unbelievers. Thus Mudi refutes the inviolability of traditional legitimate authority of the Muslim rule implied in Sa'adu's argument. He goes on to say:

My brothers, I have come to tell you,
 My opinion, in order that you may understand the truth
 About the song that Sa'adu Zungur composed
 In verse about a republic,
 Namely (the song about) the North, what he said about
 A republic and a constitutional Oligarchy
 And in the song he even said,
 That it is not possible to overthrow a constitutional oligarchy;
 He said much,
 That was good to hear and true,
 He took a firm stand, he laid emphasis on
 Government by constitutional oligarchy
 According to the way upon which he relies,
 The flags of the Shehu, worthy to be followed.

Then M. Mudi Spikin concluded his piece with these scathing remarks¹:

If N.A. Government as a whole
 Were good, without any oppression,
 Then what would have led to the sudden
 Abolition of the princes in India?
 Their rule had reached the point of complete collapse,
 So that the country became a republic.
 So it will happen in this country
 In a very similar way, there is no doubt about it
 In my opinion it will be the day after tomorrow,
 Or even tomorrow, first thing in the morning. 2

M. Mudi Spikin makes two points here. Firstly, he asserts that every political institution (or system) is established to serve certain socio-economic purposes. So whenever a socio-economic system changes, so does the political set-up that serves it. Since Northern Nigeria of today is different from Northern Nigeria of yesterday and, better still, of tomorrow, the N.A. system has out-lived its usefulness. Thus, the administrative structure that makes the scaffold N.A.s should

1. Quoted in Hiskett, op. cit., p. 10.

2. Ibid.

be dismantled. Secondly, Mudi rejects the doctrine that Emirs are answerable to God only. He demands that they should also be answerable to the electorate. Thus he is emphasizing the actual practicing of the Qur'anic concept of dual accountability of Caliphs. Obviously, he means that when N.E.P.U., the party to which both Mudi and Sa'adu belonged, was voted into power by the electorate, the N.E.P.U. government would abolish the edifice of constitutional monarchy in Northern Nigeria.

The disputation between M. Mudi Spikin (AJK) and M. Sa'adu Zungur (AJM) is useful academically but, as I explained above, it derives from the misinterpretation of Sa'adu's real beliefs: for one thing the concluding verses of Zungur's poem reveals his displeasure or disillusion (or both) with Northern Nigerian society as a whole; for another his apparent (but not real) commendations of Northern political culture did not prevent him from attacking the Sarakuna for their autocracy. For example, at the time when his poem (AJM) was being chanted and, indeed, acclaimed by all sections of public opinion in Northern Nigeria, Sa'adu was also writing a series of articles in Gaskiya Tafi Kwabo ["Truth is worth more than a penny"]¹, a government owned Hausa language newspaper, published at Zaria, attacking the un-Islamic practices in the region. In one article on prostration and genuflection (a traditional way of greeting elders and especially those in authority in Nigeria), Sa'adu called on Muslim scholars to identify and separate pre-Islamic practices from Islam. He argued that it was

1. The first issue was published in 1939, edited by Abubakar Imam (see below) with the assistance of L.C. Giles of the Literature Bureau also based at Zaria.

not tenable to accept old methods used by leaders either for correcting wrongs or for committing same. He asked:

Why should we pray to God by bowing five times a day and at the same time bow thirty times to other big fools in the same number of hours? 1

M. Sa'adu Zungur concluded his article by citing the Hadith in which it was said the Holy Prophet Muhammad indicated his displeasure when a follower prostrated to greet him. The Holy Prophet told that person that bowing down and prostrating should be performed to God alone. Then Sa'adu asked for the source of the Hausa greetings -- "Is it Islamic or pre-Islamic?"

Sa'adu's crusade gained its first success few months later when the Emir of Abuja, Alhaji Suleimanu Barau, the first Katsina College graduate to become an Emir, told his people that he would no longer allow people to prostrate before him in salutation as if he were God; they should instead greet him standing when they met him in that posture, or sitting when he was sitting down. However that action had no bandwagon effect as no other Emir emulated it.²

Between 1949/50, Sa'adu worked in the N.P.C. (see below) office at Kaduna, but failing to convert the N.P.C. from a cultural organization to a political party, he left them. He then joined forces with other radicals in the N.E.P.U. (see next chapter). M. Sa'adu Zungur was the Legal Advisor, the Bauchi Provincial leader and a member of the National Executive Committee (N.E.C.) of the N.E.P.U. from 1951 until his death in 1958.³ It is now more than twenty years

1. Quoted in Adamu, Haroun, in New Nigerian Supplementary on GTK 40th Anniversary, Tuesday, 16 January 1979, p. 1. A copy of this paper is in the possession of the writer.

2. Ibid.

3. See Abdulkadir, D., op. cit., pp. 9-15.

since he died but he is still admirably remembered as a pioneer radical, a "Forgotten Nationalist"¹ and a literary genius. As a controversial figure of many sides, Sa'adu Zungur and his works still remain subjects of academic interpretations and evaluations. The way he is interpreted depends on from which perspective one examines him. The evaluations of his works are as varied as the academic disciplines of the students working on him.

Alhaji Dr. Abubakar Imam

Another figure who came into prominence from the 1940's was Alhaji Abubakar Imam whose influence on the thinking of the young generation of the North in the years that followed is yet to be adequately acknowledged.² This is because he wrote almost entirely in Hausa for which reason his writings attracted little interest in Lagos and the U.K. This was probably a deliberate action in his part because he was addressing himself to the Northern audience. He is also the author of the first novels in Hausa and many Hausa text books.³ He became the editor of the Hausa newspaper, Gaskiya Tafi Kwabo. As the editor, he gave some space in his paper to controversial articles dealing with sensitive issues of religion and politics. One of the

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1. This means that his nationalist activities are yet to be fully documented. But this is not a deliberate neglect on the part of the students of the Nigerian political scene as Sa'adu's senior brother, the late Chief Imam of Bauchi, burnt most of his papers because he found out that Sa'adu was working on the translation of the Qur'an from Arabic to Hausa language. Evidently his brother disapproved of his efforts. That happened a few months before he died in 1958.
 2. See Coleman, J.S., Nigeria (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1960), pp. 360-2.
 3. One of his most influential books is Tafiya Mabudin Ilmi (Travel the key to education).

most important articles, that analysed Northern Nigerian problems and had a tremendous influence on the Western educated elements, was written by the editor himself. The series of articles were entitled: Ci Uku Wadanda Sukaci Nijeriya-Jahilci, Zalunci Da Lalaci, "Three evils that plagued Nigeria-Ignorance, 'Graft' and laziness".¹

He regretted that due to ignorance there was a dearth of manpower in the Northern Region and explained that laziness was the foundation of the two other evils. It bred clumsiness, dirt and disease. On corruption he pointed out that,

The worst of all types of corrupt practices is the payment of something of value in order to be appointed to an office or to obtain a job.

He quoted a District Head, who said: "I am here on contract; I bought my post, I have to break even, or make profit."² Those series of articles had tremendous impact on "educated Northern" Nigerians because when they formed a Pan-Northern cultural organisation, the Jam'iyya Mutanen Arewa, its main objectives were to fight the three evils: ignorance, laziness and corruption. Furthermore, it was on its insistence that the government appointed a committee to investigate the traditional forms of corruption (Gaisuwa) in the Northern Region. Consequently, the Northern Region Customary Exchange Law of 1955 which regulated the offering and the receiving of traditional gifts to Emir and chiefs was promulgated. The attacks on the N.A. were persistent as they were vehement, urging that:

If the N.A. are to play their full part in the constitutional framework, they must be prepared continually to adapt themselves to modern conditions ...³

1. Adamu, Haroun, op. cit., p. 2.

2. Quoted in Ibid.

3. Alhaji Abubakar Imam, cited by Adamu, Haroun, ibid., p. 2.

Again, in a series of editorials, in the Gaskiya, Alhaji (Dr.) Abubakar Imam sounded warnings, sometimes even threats on the educational backwardness of the North and therefore, employment opportunities for "Northerners". He gradually made the administrations realize that "Northernization" was the only answer and when that was adopted as a government policy (in 1956-1966) he was one of those to implement the policy: first as a permanent member of the Northernⁿ Regional Public Service Commission and later as its chairman.¹

In 1943, Abubakar Imam visited the U.K. as a member of West African Press delegation and while in England he met Lord Lugard. Their meeting started a correspondence between them. These letters, more than anything else, reveal Imam's discontent and opposition to the N.A. system. So incisive was his criticism against Indirect Rule (and addressed to the very architect of the policy -- Lord Lugard), that it could not be published then because even the British administrators were afraid as to what would happen to Imam in those days if the contents of the letters was known. In those letters he analysed the political problems of Northern Nigeria and explained the extent to which Indirect Rule influenced the situation for worse, and then he concluded:

But there is one thing which people, especially the educated elements trouble me about and that is the way the system is being carried out. They say that the world is changing but Indirect Rule in Northern Nigeria is not changing. 2

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1. Ibid., p. 6.
 2. Quoted in New Nigerian, special supplement, Wednesday, 17 January, 1979, p. 1. The original copies of this correspondence were read by the writer in the National Archives, Kaduna, where they were being kept under restriction up to September 1978. All the subsequent quotes are from the same paper, pp. 3-4. A copy of the New Nigerian under reference is in the possession of the writer.

He argued that the so-called N.A. council was a mere facade and that the Emir was the effective autocratic ruler. That was because:

... members of the council are chosen, as far as the public knows, by the Emir himself. They represent nobody but the Emir himself. When the council is sitting the Emir is always there. It is no wonder that if a councillor wants to escape with his bread he believes that he must shut his eyes and his ears and open his mouth only to say, "that is so", to whatever the Emir says is right.

In view of that the N.A. Council was really a confidence trick. On the face of it, it gave the impression of being comprised of independent councillors, bound by the concept of collective responsibility, running the affairs of the N.A. but, in reality, it was a congregation of loyal and faithful courtiers who were privileged to be the first to hear what his Highness, the Emir, wanted to do in his domain. In that way, the councillors were doing more harm than good, both to the system they represented and, to the country as a whole. The N.A. Council was a council of yes-men, pure and simple. Imam attributed that unhappy situation to the religious adherence of the British officials to their official policy. They were so protective of the chiefs that the most constructive comment on the N.A. was seen as subversive. He said of the colonial officers:

If you talk this over to the average administrative officer in Northern Nigeria they may think of you as another Ghandi, a trouble-maker. Many of them say the only thing we want is education. Education is not the only thing we want. The first thing we want is justice, next freedom, and number three, education which will help us to enjoy our freedom. The people are now dividing into three classes -- the Sarakuna (rulers), the unhappy Maaikata (the salaried officials) and the helpless Talakawa (peasantry).

But the British officials were indifferent to what was happening around them. Worse still, they segregated themselves and thus lived in a world of their own. For that reason misunderstanding was increasing between them and the people they governed.

How can we understand each other? Normally when a European comes to see you or you go to see him it is so that he can give you a command or reprimand you for your faults. There is no other reason for you to meet ... Frank discussion is the best method of clearing misunderstanding and solving problems.

Alhaji Imam added that the demand of the Maaikata class was not an impossible one because they were only asking for a responsible government as laid out by Shehu Abdullahi, the brother of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, i.e. a constitutional system, with the Emir ruling by the advice and consent of his people. But very startling, British officials who came from a country with a constitutional monarchy were not prepared to see one in Northern Nigeria. When pressed on that they replied: "This is how we found you. We do not want to change you." And Imam said,

That is a statement that we never understand. How can Europeans say that they do not want to change us while they give us education? There is no other change in the world which is greater than education. Once you give people education you have changed them entirely. So, we want Europeans to forget the idea of saying that they do not want to change us. They have already changed us and they are changing us now. So, what we want is for them to change us for the better, and not to wait until we change ourselves for the worse. So, I repeat, let the Europeans make us their friends soon, before we are made to become their enemies ...

But enmity between the colonial government and Nigerians had already begun to surface, as even the rank and file who a few years previously joined the British army and fought against their native rulers (or at best stood neutral), began to doubt the sincerity of British administrators. People were generally confused and bitter after forty years of the British rule in Northern Nigeria; the British idea of justice still remained an ideal and, even worse, the colonialists pretended that they did not know and did not want to know of the injustice inherent in the N.A. system. Thus, Imam represented the common man's feelings when he said,

Europeans always repeat that they occupied this country because they wanted to see justice administered. They rule for justice. They are showing us ways of justice. They are fighting for justice. But when the people look around at their own rulers, and see what a lot of injustice there is, they blame the Europeans. Because every act of oppression or extortion on the part of district head or village head is known by the people in the area, and so they think that the Emir must know it too. As they see no action taken, and there is no way of telling them why no action has been taken, they say either that the Europeans do not know what is going on, or that they do not mean what they say when they talk about justice.

The main points in Alhaji Imam's long letter to Lord Lugard can be summarised as follows:

- 1) That the British officials should give Nigerians more moral training by mixing with them socially.
- 2) That N.A. Councils should be made to be more representative of and responsible to the people.
- 3) That appointment into the N.A. Councils should be based on merit and that it should include the younger generation of Western educated Nigerians.
- 4) That N.A. Councils should have specialised committees to deal with the many and varied problems in their respective areas of jurisdiction.
- 5) That N.A. workers should be made aware that they were neither working for their respective Emirs nor for the British but for their country, i.e. for themselves.

Some of the above recommendations were implemented as it later became the colonial government policy to encourage the N.A.s to co-opt Western educated young men into the N.A. Councils. However, in another letter to Lord Lugard (dated 9/12/1944), many of Imam's observations on Nigerian society still remained true:

Our primary need in the Northern Provinces is to see that the standard of living of the masses is raised. At present it is almost as low as it was before your occupation. The masses, especially in the rural areas, are heavily diseased, ill-fed and under-fed, ignorant and poverty stricken.

Alhaji Abubakar Imam did not involve himself openly in politics, but he remained a member of the N.P.C. inner circle until 1966 when all political parties were banned by the then Military Administration.

The Impact of the 1946 Richards Constitution in Northern Nigeria

The years 1944-50 were really the years of modern radical awakening in Northern Nigeria. It was in those years that Northern radicalism started gathering momentum and Northern radicals featured in Pan-Nigeria politics. M. Sa'adu Zungur emerged as the most outspoken critic of the Northern political system and he was appointed the National Secretary of the N.C.N.C. Alhaji Habid Raji Abdallah, one of the founders of the N.E.P.A. (see below), became the President of the Zikist National Vanguard. Alhaji Zannah Bukar Dipcharima joined the N.C.N.C. and he became the Personal Secretary to its President, Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe. Not only in the urban areas, but throughout the North, the ferment was beginning to rise. Contentment with ancient ways was beginning to break down under the impact of new ideas and experiences. For the first time the North took part in the Legislative Council of Nigeria (under the Richards Constitution of 1946) and both chiefs and educated classes welcomed the proposals.

The Richards Constitution had far reaching effects in Northern Nigeria. It provoked political thinking and led to the formation of debating societies in all the Northern Provinces to discuss constitutional

issues.¹ It brought leaders from various parts of Nigeria together in the Legislative Councils and thus ignited North versus South confrontations which seemed to be a necessary prerequisite for understanding and for national unity in Nigeria.² This confrontation further created the fear of Southern domination in the minds of some sections of Northern leadership. Paradoxically, the fear was genuine but unfounded. Genuine, because as a result of the educational backwardness of the North as compared to the South, Southerners dominated all the public services and the commercial activities of the Northern Region.³ They were also very conspicuous in the N.A. technical services. The attitudes of those Southern employees towards their Northern brothers had left much to be desired. This situation gave the impression that in the future independent Nigeria, the Northern Region would be the "back-yard" of Nigeria. This factor along with the unguarded utterances of some Southern politicians led to the fear of Southern domination in some quarters in Northern Nigeria.

However, this fear was unfounded because at that time the political tempo was not for independence. To all intents and purposes the objectives of the Richards Constitution was not to grant Nigeria political independence but to give the Western educated elite a degree of political participation and to prepare the whole country for

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1. Interview with Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim, London, 1973.
 2. A publication by the Current Issues Society, P.O. Box 502, Kaduna, Nigeria, The Nigerian Situation, Facts and Background (Zaria, 1966), pp. 11-15 contains a zestful discussion on this topic.
 3. Ibid., pp. 16-25, contains statistical evidence of this assertion. For a detailed study of the educational gap between Northern and Southern Nigeria (Western and Eastern Regions combined), see Nduka, O., Western Education and the Cultural Background (Ibadan, 1975).

eventual self-rule. The objective was simply to create a forum in which the "educated natives" would air their views on the affairs of the country, in a purely advisory capacity, to the Governor. So, in the 1940's, talk of Nigerian independence was more a discussion topic than part of practical politics.

But almost all Northerners who came in contact with Southerners warned their Northern kinsmen to watch the over-ambitious Southerners. Even Sa'adu Zungur in his poem (AJM) had this to say:

If they become careless, Southerners
Will get control of the Nigerian government.
Then, indeed, who will ask questions,
Everyone knows he will suffer. 1

These verses of warning from Sa'adu urged for a change of attitudes in the whole North. He was particularly flabbergasted by the intransigence of the Emirs who ran their Emirates like medieval autocrats. So, in the typically covert fashion of Hausa political poetry, Sa'adu's poem was a call to the Emirs to take account of the new political trends and to reform their ways; otherwise the whole of the Northern Region would regret it.

Furthermore, the Richards Constitution prompted the formation of regional political parties² and thereby began to change people's attitudes towards the authorities. Radicals had a different conception of Northern problems and their preoccupation was to organize political

1. The Hausa verses run as follows:

In sunka sake jama'ar kudu,
Suka hau mulkin Nigeria.
Dada ba sauran mai tambaya,
Kowa ya san zai sha wuya.

2. Among many other references see Ezera, K., Constitutional Development in Nigeria (Cambridge, 1960), especially pp. 64-104; Ballard, J.A., "Administrative Origins of Nigerian Federalism," in African Affairs, LXX (No. 281, October 1971), pp. 333-348.

parties as platforms for the expression of their radical views and vehicles for the transformation of Northern Nigerian society. With these views in mind, Alhaji Habid Raji Abdallah formed the Northern Elements Progressive Association (N.E.P.A.) at Kano (in 1946).¹ The N.E.P.A. was the first attempt to organize a political party in Northern Nigeria. As J.S. Coleman said, "It comprised a small group of highly articulate Northern radicals who felt that the real enemy of the North was not the illusory threat of Southern domination but the existing autocratic political order in Northern Nigeria."² Whereas the first group of Northern Representatives in the Legislative Council were essentially defensive against Southern Pan-Nigerian nationalism (in which they saw the attempt of the Southerners to dominate Nigeria) and took refuge in regional separation, N.E.P.A. demanded a radical reform in the North and it favoured the full participation of the Northern region in a united Nigerian movement as the "best way" to achieve such reforms.³ This is to say that all Nigeria organized pressure brought to bear on the administration would precipitate a change of attitudes for the better on the part of the Northern Nigerian Establishment (i.e. colonial supported N.A.s). However, N.E.P.A. suffered from its identification with Azikiwe and the N.C.N.C. and, especially, from the support it received from Southerners resident in the North.⁴

1. There is some disagreement over the date of N.E.P.A.'s foundation: Coleman gives 1945 (p. 358), Sklar gives 1946 (p. 93) and Whitaker gives 1947 (p. 357); Post (p. 73) who gives December 1946, is the only author to cite an authority, in this case, the N.E.P.A.'s founder, Alhaji Abdallah.

2. Cited in J.S. Coleman, *op. cit.*, p. 359.

3. *Ibid.*,; Sklar, R.L., *op. cit.*, pp. 89-90, contains the list of the founder members of the N.E.P.A.

4. See Dudley, B.J., Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria (London, 1968), pp. 175-6. N.E.P.A. did not seem to enjoy substantial, if any, rank and file support. Some of its officials regrouped in N.E.P.U., discussed in the next chapter.

In 1948, Dr. A.R.B. Dikko, M. Yaya Gusau and Aminu Kano began to plan a pan-Northern Nigeria cultural organization. This idea was hatched following a suggestion made by Abubakar Imam that something should be done to unite all Northern Nigerians.¹ As a result of the subsequent discussions, which included more leaders of the Northern Nigerian Teachers' Welfare Association (N.N.T.W.A.)², the Jim'iyar Mutanen Arewa was formed in Kano in 1949.³ The leaders of the Congress

1. According to Alhaji Aminu Kano (interviewed in London on 12/11/1979), after a meeting of the Northern Nigerian Teachers' Welfare Association held at Zaria in March 1948, Alhaji Abubakar Imam approached them and suggested efforts should be made to organize not only teachers but all educated Northerners with the view to unite the whole region. Then a meeting was arranged between some leaders of the N.N.T.W.A. and other educated Northerners at Zaria which included Dr. Dikko, M.A. Imam and a few employees of the Gaskiya Corporation, Zaria: see footnote below.
2. In 1947, when he was a student at the London University, Institute of Education, Aminu Kano made the following entry in his diary: "On 3/5/1947 discussed the formation of Teachers' Union with Shettima; after having discussed the general problems of Education in the Northern Region." While still in the U.K. he made the following entry in his diary on 27/9/1947: "Northern Nigeria Teachers' Welfare Association suggested. To see Yaya and write other interested persons. 5/- (five shillings) to be the initial entrance fee". Alhaji Aminu Kano confirmed that the N.N.T.W.A. was formed in London and that he was assigned to transplant it into Northern Nigeria. The founder members were: Shettima Ajiram, Salahu Ilorin, Yaya Ilorin, Yahya Gusau, Aminu Kano (interviewed in London on 12/11/1979).
3. A group of Western educated Northern Nigerians formed independent associations in various parts of the Northern Region in the 1940's. Perhaps that was a follow up to the idea hatched by Mr. E.L. Mort, the Principal of Kaduna College, that the College graduates should form "Kaduna College Old Boys Union". The Union was formed and it met annually for three years, then it collapsed due to the hostility of Emirs who suspected the organization and thus prevented their respective N.A. employees from attending its meeting. Consequently, each group formed their own little association wherever they were enough in number to warrant one. Thus, in Zaria, employees of the Gaskiya Corporation, who included M. Abdulkadir Makama and M. Abdulmalik Mani, formed the "Zaria Union of Friends". That group was later joined by a medical doctor, Dr. A.R.B. Dikko, who then became its leader. The "Union of Friends" was later on named the "Northern Nigerian Congress" by M.A. Makama. In Kaduna, among others, M. Yaya Gusau, M. Aliyu Mai Borno and M. M.D.A. Rafi formed Jam'iyyar Mutanen Arewa A Yau, "Northern Peoples Congress/

declared that "the North must and could be saved by Northerners"; that the organization was not subversive. The

Jam'iyya does not intend to usurp the authority of our natural rulers. On the contrary, it is our ardent desire to enhance such authority whenever and wherever possible. We want to help our natural rulers in the proper discharge of their duties. We want to help them to enlighten the Talakawa. 1

Nevertheless, the Emirs and chiefs were suspicious of the Jam'iyya, while the colonial officials adopted a cautious attitude towards it. Perhaps that was due to the fact that initially the Jam'iyya had among its officials some radicals like M. Sa'adu Zungur, M. Aminu Kano, as well as some progressive civil servants like Dr. A.R.B. Dikko and M. Isa Wali, whose preoccupation was the reform of the autocratic Emirate political system. Although the Jam'iyya was then a cultural organization, the radicals had attempted to use it as a platform to advocate political reforms in the North and they were also pressing that the Jam'iyya should convert itself into a political party. In 1950, it became obvious to all shades of opinion that a Northern political party was necessary to operate the constitutional machinery then emerging from the process of the constitutional reviews. But the N.P.C. could not be immediately declared a political party because the Emirs and some colonial officials regarded it as a dangerous radical group. One year later (1951) the N.P.C. was declared a political party with the following objectives²:

Congress of Today". Among many others, those were the groups which along with the Northern Teachers' Welfare Association, came together and formed the N.P.C. NAK, File Nos. 45, ZAR.PROF. and 467 Yola PROF. contain information on such associations. Also see Alhaji Isa Kaita, "In the '40's, '50's, '60's and '70's", and Uthman Mairiga, "Born to Wage War against Three Evils", and Haroun Adamu, "Northern Solidarity", all in New Nigerian, Tuesday, 16 January 1979, pp. 111, viii, and vi.

1. Daily Comet, December 29, 1949, cited in Coleman, *op. cit.*, p. 358.
2. Antiye papers, Potiskum. Photocopies of N.P.C. manifesto are in the possession of the writer. M. Antiye Na Riga was one of the first full-time officials of the N.P.C. in Jos. He was later transferred to Potiskum by the party. He still lives and works with Maina Waziri at Potiskum. The following objectives of the N.P.C. are paraphrased and edited by the writer.

- 1) One North, one people, irrespective of religion, tribe or rank.
- 2) Regional autonomy within a united Nigeria.
- 3) Drive throughout the whole North for Education while retaining and increasing cultural influence.
- 4) Eliminate bribery and corruption in every sphere of Northern life.
- 5) The voice of the people to be heard in all councils of the North.
- 6) Local government reform within progressive Emirate system.
- 7) Retain the traditional system of appointing Emirs with a wider representation on the Electoral Committee.
- 8) Eventual self-government for Nigeria with Dominion status within the British Commonwealth.

Both the Sardauna of Sokoto and Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa joined the N.P.C. on Monday, 1 October 1951.¹ In December 1953, the N.P.C. held its first annual conference at Jos, and there the radical elements were forced out of the party: M. Sa'adu Zungur, M. Aminu Kano and M. Abubakar Zukoki were removed from the Executive Committee. Subsequently, a decision was taken by the N.E.P.U. members that they ceased to be in the N.P.C.² Also the entire Kano delegation, led by Alhaji Inuwa Wada, withdrew from the conference.³

In addition to the N.P.C. and the N.E.P.U., there were several associations with more limited bases, none of which survived the repressive reactions of the N.A.s and the colonial authorities; their leaders and supporters were mainly absorbed into the N.E.P.U. or the N.P.C. For example, at about the time when M. Sa'adu Zungur and M.

1. Ibid. Also, interview with Antiye Nariga, Potiskum, 1974.

2. Interview with Alhaji Maitama Sulei, Kano, 30/3/77.

3. See Dudley, B.J., op. cit.; Sklar, R.L., Nigerian Political Parties (Princeton, 1963), pp. 95-6.

Aminu Kano were active at Bauchi, M. Sani Darma was organizing Jam'iyyar Ci Gaban Arewa (Northern Progressive Party) at Kano.¹ But the party was immediately suppressed because its Secretary, M. Yusufu Maitama Sulei, called for a review of the Nigerian Constitution and in particular for all Emirships to be elective. That was a bold bid to democratise the N.A. and more especially to make the Emirs accountable. The party was crushed and Maitama Sulei was sacked by the Kano N.A. In 1948 he was once again politically active, helping Alhaji Abba Maikwaru found, first a kingship organization, Taron Masuzumunta, and later a political version of this body, Jam'iyyar Neman Sawaba (the Freedom Party).² But this party died a natural death due to lack of organization. Again Maitama Sulei tried to organize the Kano Citizens Association, Jam'iyyar Samarin Kano, with Alhaji Abdulkadir Dan Jaji (who later became treasurer of the N.E.P.U.) as its President. Once again, that attempt failed due to lack of public support.³ Finally, the remnants of all these elements regrouped themselves in the N.E.P.U. in 1951.

In 1949-50, Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim launched a one man crusade against the abuses of Borno N.A., but he was immediately transferred from Maiduguri to Jos by his employer, the United Africa Company (U.A.C.). Before he left for his new station, he also helped organize N.E.P.U. at Maiduguri.⁴ In 1950, Alhaji Maina Waziri formed the North East Convention Peoples Party (N.E.C.P.P.) with the sole aim of

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1. Interview with both Maitama Sulei and Sani Darma, in Kano on 30/3/77.
 2. Dudley, B.J., *op. cit.*, pp. 78-9, mentions Taron Masuzumunta (but spells it incorrectly). My information is from Sani Darma. M. Sani Darma was one of the founder members of N.E.P.U. See Chapter V.
 3. Interview with Alhaji Maitama Sulei, Kano, 30/3/77.
 4. Interview with Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim, London, 1974.

securing the creation of a North-East state from the former Northern Region of Nigeria. Maina Waziri thought that the former Northern Region of Nigeria was too large and unwieldy and as such difficult to develop. He wanted to see four provinces (Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno and Plateau) of the North Eastern part of Nigeria formed into one autonomous state. He believed that the creation of the new state would bring government nearer to the people and that that would accelerate economic development. The N.E.C.P.P. had a red flag with three black stars on it. Thus, the colonial officials suspected the party of communist connections and it was hammered out of existence: the party leader was expelled from the Fika N.A. service.¹

Alhaji Aminu Kano

We noted above how M. Sa'adu Zungur and M. Aminu Kano worked together at Bauchi. That brought Aminu Kano to the attention of the colonial officials. But the attitude of the colonial officials towards Aminu Kano was ambivalent: as an intelligent young man they liked him but they disliked his political activities and because he wanted their elimination from the Nigerian scene they opposed him. A colonial Intelligence Report, once described Aminu Kano as an "able demagogue".² So, the first thing the Colonial Administration did was to separate Aminu Kano from Sa'adu Zungur. He was sent to the Institute of Education

1. Months later Maina Waziri was made a co-opted member of the N.A. Council on the condition that he abandoned independent, radical activity. He compromised by resuscitating the N.E.C.P.P. as an independent party, but in alliance with the N.P.C. It is this N.E.C.P.P. that is mentioned by Sklar, op. cit., p. 387; and Dudley, op. cit., p. 89; interview with Maina Waziri, Potiskum, 1974.

2. Rhodes House, Oxford, File No. MSS. Afr. S. 1210, p. 11.

of the London University. His stay in England further surprised the colonial officials in Nigeria: he made friends with influential persons in the Colonial Office, in the Fabian Society, left wing Labour M.P.'s, Trade Unionists, etc. His diaries also reveal that he attended the meetings of the British Communist Party in London but he was obviously not impressed by the Communists because on Friday, 29 August 1947, he made the following entry in his diary:

I feel myself like a newborn man -- more determined and more courageous to face facts and swallow the bitter pills. There must be sacrifice if we want to do something for Northern Nigeria.

6:14 p.m. on the same day: "I confess the Qur'an to be my only guidance."¹ His one year's stay in Britain was both a period of study and of meditation. By the time he returned to Nigeria he was already thinking that "the North needs a new faith", as he noted in his diary on Monday, 10 May 1948. Nor did he relent his opposition to bad chiefs and to the N.A. system. On Thursday, 9 September 1948, he entered in his diary: "Emir (of Bauchi) requested to stop forced labour. No hope for North until N.A. disappears." But when he returned to Nigeria from the U.K., he was at Bauchi only for a short time then he was transferred from Bauchi to the Teachers' Training College (T.T.C.) at Maru, in Sokoto Province. It was at Maru that Aminu began to act fully independent of Sa'adu Zungur. He expelled the Sultan's Yan Labari (informers) from the premises of the Teachers' Training College (T.T.C.)², he supported the Sardauna of Sokoto (Sir Ahmadu Bello) in his appeal against a

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1. Aminu Kano's Diaries from 1947 to 1977 are in the possession of the writer.
 2. See Feinstein, Alan, African Revolutionary: The Life and Times of Nigeria's Aminu Kano (New York, 1973), p. 119.

previous conviction by the Sultan's Court¹; his (Aminu's) refusal to attend Maru Mosque on Fridays because the Imam was not good enough was followed by Muslim students in the T.T.C., and all these infuriated the Sultan. But more was to come between Aminu Kano and the authorities in Northern Nigeria, and he foresaw the events, as the front page of notes of his 1950 diary shows:

The closing side of 1949 was stormy in my life, officialdom has now applied its hammer on me. There is no doubt that next year at this time may see my exit from this filthy affair.
A very turbulent year 1949. Nigeria at crossroads ...
Almost all chiefs against me. Enugu shooting!!

But there might have been some officials sympathetic with Aminu's predicament. He noted his meeting with what he described as "a very political D.C.", who suggested that the Shehu (i.e. Shehu Usman Dan Fodio) would have been angry with Northern leaders if he were to come back. Aminu further noted, "How true." But subsequent notes in Aminu Kano's diary showed that his discussions with the "political D.C." was more wide ranging because of what he noted in his diary on the same day, which runs as follows: "Partition of Africa into states!! Looking for a day when all Africa should be a Socialist Republic of Soviets." Then two days later (Saturday 28 January 1950) he made these revealing

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1. Sardauna is a traditional military title, the equivalent of Commander in Chief, conferred on Princes in Sokoto (see Nigerian Administration Research Project, First Interim Report [Institute of Administration, A.B.U., Zaria, 1972], p. 7). The then holder of the post was Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, the N.P.C. leader, 1953-1966; and Premier of Northern Region of Nigeria, 1954-1966. He competed for the throne of Sokoto with the present Sultan (Alhaji Sir Abubakar). When the Sardauna was sent to jail by the Sultan's Court for alleged embezzlement of public funds, Aminu Kano saw that as an act of victimization. He helped raise funds for the Sardauna's appeal. His action set him against the Sultan. See Feinstein, op. cit., p. 124; for the Sardauna's own views on his trial and subsequent imprisonment see Bello, Sir Ahmadu, the Sardauna of Sokoto, My Life (Cambridge, 1962), pp. 49-59.

notes: "Written to General Secretary I.L.P. (Independent Labour Party) asking for help to organize a Socialist Party of Northern Nigeria."

As the administrations became increasingly concerned with Aminu Kano's defiant attitude, the Resident of Sokoto Province decided to see him in person and "tell him off". The Resident visited Maru T.T.C. on Tuesday, 4 April 1950 and Aminu noted in his diary on the same day the following: "Resident saw me at 5:15 p.m. and uttered his wrath, 'You are proud to everyone, I am disappointed in you.' We parted in cold mood." That parting in a cold mood also showed that things were coming to a head because on Friday, 28 April 1950, Aminu Kano received a letter from the Deputy Director of Education (D.D.E.) of the Northern Region, Kaduna, warning him that any further contravention of the General Orders (regulations on the conditions of service of all civil servants, which also prohibited the government employees from taking part in politics) would result in the termination of Aminu's secondment of service from the Bauchi N.A. to the government and that the N.A. would not re-employ him. But Aminu Kano's reaction was that the government should do as it liked while he remained determined to resign from the service by the following year. But, in order to test the D.D.E.'s letter, Aminu Kano wrote to Bauchi N.A. protesting that he was the N.A.'s employee and not the government's employee. But the N.A. replied and disowned him. The ^{Provincial} Provincial Education Officer (P.E.O.) for Bauchi Province also wrote quoting the N.A.'s letter and said that he knew nothing about Aminu Kano.

Aminu Kano then discovered that what caused all that fuss was that the Sultan of Sokoto had heard that he (Aminu) would leave government service. So the Sultan had written to the Emir of Bauchi, advising him that when Aminu left government service, the Bauchi N.A. should

not re-employ him. That made Aminu Kano even more determined to resign from the services and become more involved in politics as an independent person. On 28th April 1950 he made the following entry in his diary:

I am not sure whether 4th January 1951 will ever find me in this department. But if even it does the next year term will not. This is my irrevocable determination and may God give me the strength to bear this will.

Perhaps Aminu Kano's colleagues in the Department of Education were sorry to see him go, for many suddenly became nice to him whereas the most senior ones continued to warn him that there would be no job for him elsewhere. When the D.D.E. visited Maru T.T.C. on Tuesday, 18 July 1950, he made it very clear to Aminu Kano that if he lost his job at Maru no one would employ him. But the fact was that, at the same time, offers for employment were made to Aminu Kano in many institutions, which included one for teaching Hausa language at Oxford and another to be the Librarian at University College, Ibadan.¹ But Aminu Kano had already made up his mind to be in the turmoil of public life. In fact, he was already dreaming about the struggle to follow. On Friday, 15 September 1950, he noted in his diary: "Dreamt of taking poison to die due to too difficult problems of North. Is this a sign that what I intend to do should be carried out? Oh! God help me!" M. Aminu Kano had been thinking of devoting his life to nationalist politics, in order to free Nigeria from the colonial yoke, for a long time back. But in 1948, he actually considered resigning from the government service because he noted that "government people (civil servants) were stupid!" Aminu Kano's fondness for standing against authority derived from his hatred of any government which "sat" on the people. Then Aminu found

1. See Feinstein, op. cit., p. 119, and Aminu Kano's diary of 1950.

himself in Sokoto, a place which was (is) wholly stifled with clouds of religious and traditional conservatism. Thus, Aminu's radical ideas were incompatible with that of traditional Sokoto. On Tuesday, 3 October 1950, he prepared his letter of resignation but did not hand it in immediately. On Monday, 16 October 1950 he submitted his resignation letter from government service, to the Education Officer in charge, Maru T.T.C. and, on Saturday 4 November 1950, he left Maru for Kano. This event prompted the Gaskiya Tafi Kwabo, in a leader article, to warn the whole region to watch "this dangerous man carefully".¹ On 11 November 1950 the Daily Comet, a Kano based daily newspaper, published M. Aminu Kano's article entitled "Why I resigned".

I resigned because I refused to believe that this country is by necessity a prisoner of Anglo/Fulani aristocracy. I resigned because I fanatically share the views that the native authorities are woefully hopeless in solving our urgent educational, social, economic, political or even religious problems. My stay in England has hardened my soul in elevating truth, freedom and above all human rights for which the world fought off fascism.

I had twice been threatened with the merciless fangs (of General Order No. 40B) while all around are piled corruption, misrule, political bluff, slavery under garb, naked nepotism, tyranny, poverty, unnecessary, retention of hereditary parasites, naked and shameless economic exploitation.

I cannot tolerate these things because of their awful smell. I am prepared to be called any name. Call me a dreamer or call me a revolutionary, call me a crusader or anything that Imperialist government wills. I have seen a light on the far horizon and I intend to march into its full circle either alone or with anyone who cares to go with me. To these same oppressors of our people I say this: Look out!

Africa is a sleeping giant no more! She is just about to shake off the stupor. 2

1. Feinstein, op. cit., p. 129.

2. Also cited in Ibid., pp. 129-30.

M. Aminu Kano's resignation from the government service might have been dangerous to the establishment but to the Talakawa it provided a strong voice which was to articulate their grievances. Having freed himself from the Civil Service Regulations, Aminu Kano concentrated his energies on political organisations which included the following:

- 1) "Northern Central Congress" (N.C.C.), whose aim was to coordinate all progressive societies formed by Western educated men in urban towns and its main characteristic was opposition to the N.A. system.¹
- 2) "Northern Muslim Congress" (N.M.C.), which affiliated to "Muslim Congress of Nigeria" (M.C.N.), a Yoruba organization with offices at Ijebu-Ode and at Lagos. It advocated the unity of Nigerian Muslims; welcomed and encouraged contact with all Muslims the world over; endeavoured to secure Muslim missionary from the ancient university of Al-Azhar in Cairo.²

But Aminu Kano's boldest attempt in political organization was on the "Northern Askianist Movement" (N.A.M.), alias "United Nationalist Movement" (U.N.M.).³ The aims and objectives of the movement were initially as follows:

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1. Rhodes House, Oxford, File No. MSS., Afr. S. 1210, p. 12.
 2. Ibid.; also see Feinstein, op. cit., p. 142.
 3. NAK, File no. 45, ZAR, Prof, Political bodies in Nigeria, pp. 79-84. The original committee members in 1951 were:

President	Spikin, Mudi
Secretary	Danbatta, Mustafa
Treasurer	Kaula, Musa
Publicity Secretary	Danbatta, Magaji

Central Committee Members were:

President	Spikin, Mudi
Vice President	Dangyara, Alhaji
Secretary	Bakinzuwo, Sabo
Treasurer	Chomodo, Ahmadu <u>alias</u> Bida
Publicity Secretary	Dodo, Muhammadu
Information Officer	Alkasim, Uba Na
Field Secretary	Na Abba, Bala
Auditors	Yakasai, Tanko
	Saleh, Yelwaji
Patron	Kano, Aminu

- 1) To try and free every black man wherever he may be in the world, whether in America ~~of~~ South Africa, from the mouth of the English hyenas and the rest of the oppressors, even if blood will be shed.
- 2) To try and draw the attention of every black man to his rights to live in the world, so that extortioners may not harm him.
- 3) To check oppression, and even dig out from the graves the bones of the notorious extortioners who have died and burn those bones, or take legal action against their descendants in a court of law.
- 4) To try and stop the Colonial Office from sending unsuitable Europeans, who spoil the country, to Africa.
- 5) To build a large school where it will teach the black men (Nigerians?) about politics, trade and social welfare, before the end of 1951.
- 6) Not before long it will send two delegates to Russia, France, America and the Headquarters of the Kisrawa (i.e. England), so that it may make clear what it intends doing.
- 7) To pray to God that He may bring low that Evildoer, Dr. Malan, and those who follow his views.¹

The "Askianist Movement" was effective in both Kano and Jos², but its attempts to mobilize support were only partially successful in other urban centres. It produced a duplicated newsheet, Aminiyya (after Aminu Kano) at irregular intervals for its members only. When in August 1951, the N.E.P.U. was launched as a political party, the "Northern Askianist Movement" automatically became one the of N.E.P.U.'s ancilliary organisations.

1. See Daily Comet, 22/3/1951, p. 2.

2. The branch officers at Jos were:

President	Bagobiri, Garba
Secretary	Mahmud, Baffa
Asst. Secretary	Abbas, Sharif

CHAPTER V

NORTHERN ELEMENTS PROGRESSIVE UNION¹

... I for one have no faith in the remedial qualities of a government carried on by neglected democracy who, for three centuries, have received no education. What prospect does it offer us of those high principles of conduct with which we have fed our imagination and strengthened our will? I perceive none of the elements of government that should secure the happiness of a people and the greatness of a realm.

But in my opinion if democracy be combated only by conservatism, democracy must triumph, and at no distant date.

From Disraeli's Coningsby,
cited by Thomas Hodgkin 2

Preface

N.E.P.U. was the main opposition party in Northern Nigeria from 1951 to 1966 when all political parties were banned by the new Military Government in Nigeria. Unlike the Conservative and the "establishment" nature of the Government Party, the Northern Peoples Congress (N.P.C.), N.E.P.U. was considered to be radical and the party of the Talakawa, "commoners" or "the respectable poor". The party initials later became institutionalised in the Hausa language as NEFU and is virtually synonymous with Tawaye, rebellion or opposition to authority. This is because, as we have shown in Chapters II and III, Hausa society today

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1. Renamed "Nigerian Elements Progressive Union" in 1964 in order to give the party a national outlook.
 2. This quote from Disraeli appropriately fits the attitude of the British colonial administration in Northern Nigeria. Cited by Hodgkin, T.L., "Disraeli on Northern Nigeria", in West Africa (No. 79229, Saturday, 9 May 1953), pp. 413-414.

(as with Hausa states in the past) contains within it a process of constant questioning of authority, but not one of revolution. It is not the structures of the society (or the states) that are in question, but only the nature of holders of power and authority. Rebellion as the Hausa understand it, can lead to secession, to changes in the holders of offices, or it can be institutionalized as a factor in the strengthening of the political organization within the framework of the traditional structures.¹

N.E.P.U.'s other names in Hausa are Jam'iyyan Nemansawaba or Jam'iyyan Ci Gaban Arewa. The latter literally means "Northern Progressive Party" and the former is akin to the "Emancipation League". The party's slogan is simply Sawaba², "Freedom". The name "Northern Elements Progressive Union" was suggested by Alhaji Maitama Sulei (a founder member of the party) for three reasons: it signified the unity of Northern Nigerian Progressives; it honoured N.E.P.A. (its

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1. Hausa Muslims see their social institutions as "Islamic" or, at least, as apparently supported by the religious faith, hence political conflicts are about holders not about systems of authority. In Hausa society political combat is either a battle for power or a battle between powers. For example, see the issues involved in the nineteenth century civil war in Kano in Hogben, J.S., and Kirk-Greene, A.M.H., The Emirates of Northern Nigeria (Oxford, 1966), pp. 202-4; for the dynastic conflict in Zazzau see Smith, M.G., Government in Zazzau (Oxford, 1960), pp. 100-109; Skinner, N. (trans. and ed.), Alhaji Muhmudu Koki: Kano Malam (A.B.U., Zaria, 1977), pp. 11-13, gave his childhood reminiscences of the Kano Civil War; and for the general African idea of rebellion, see Balandier, G., Political Anthropology (trans. by A.M. Sheridan Smith, Penguin, 1970), p. 148.
 2. According to Fuglestad, F., the word Sawaba means quietness or tranquillity, see Journal of African History, XIV (4, 1973), pp. 313-330. It also means peace or, at times, cheapness. It is originally an Arabic word which emphasized religious righteousness, i.e. something that is religiously correct. Since submission to God brings peace to Muslims, anything that is religiously correct makes a Muslim free.

predecessor as a radical party in Northern Nigeria); and its initials could be pronounced as a single word.¹

This chapter begins with a very condensed history of N.E.P.U. by sketching its origin and enumerating its trials and tribulations during its formative years. Our subsequent examination of the structure, organization and sociology of N.E.P.U. attempts to show how it was run and by whom as well as to reveal the social background of its leaders and members. Finally, the analysis of N.E.P.U. ideas and strategy suggests that it was more concerned to eradicate twentieth century "feudalism" in Northern Nigeria and to create, in its place, a new community based on democratic ideals, than with power, patronage and winning elections. We conclude by examining the assertion that N.E.P.U. was a continuation of the nineteenth century Muslim reform movement in Northern Nigeria.²

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1. Interview with Alhaji Maitama Sulei, Kano, 30/3/77. Alhaji Maitama Sulei was a founder member of N.E.P.U. After he defected to N.P.C. he was elected one of Kano's members in the House of Representatives, Lagos, from 1956-1966, and was a Federal Minister of Mines and Power in 1959-1966. He was Civil Commissioner in the Kano State Government of Nigeria in 1967-1975, and was then appointed the Federal Chief Complaint Commissioner 1975-1978. He is now a leading member of the Nigerian National Party (N.P.N.). Also see Sklar, R.L., Nigerian Political Parties (Princeton, 1963), pp. 94-5; Whitaker, C.S., The Politics of Tradition, Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria 1946-1966 (Princeton, 1970), pp. 358-9.
 2. Feinstein, A., African Revolutionary: The Life and Times of Nigeria's Aminu Kano (New York, 1973), p. 35, argues that Aminu Kano's Genewa clan persistently upheld the principles of the Jihad discussed in Chapter II; and in pp. 90, 271, he points out that Aminu's call for social reforms are in line with the tradition of the Holy Prophet and the teachings of Usman Dan Fodio.

The Emergence of a Radical Party

On 8 August 1950, N.E.P.U. was declared a political party in Kano by a group of Northern Nigerian radical youth.¹ The first President of the N.E.P.U. was Alhaji Abba Mai Kwaru, the leader of Taron Masu Zumunta, a "Friendly Society" based in Fagge quarters, Kano.² The founder members of the N.E.P.U. included both traders and Maaikata.³ Alhaji Aminu Kano's name did not appear in the list of the founder members of the N.E.P.U. because, at the time the N.E.P.U. was

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1. Malam Uba Taura's membership card (which is in the possession of the writer) has on it: 8/8/1950 as the actual date on which N.E.P.U. was declared a political party. M. Uba comes from Taura village in Kano Emirate and he was the full-time N.E.P.U. organizing secretary in Potiskum, Borno Province, in 1958-1961. Also see Sklar, op. cit., p. 94; and Whitaker, op. cit., p. 358.
 2. See Sklar, op. cit.; Whitaker, op. cit., p. 359, and Dudley, J.B., Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria (London, 1968), p. 80, all contain brief discussions of the composition, aims and objectives of this "friendly society".
 3. According to Maitama Sulei, the following are among the founder members of the N.E.P.U.:
 1. Abba Maikwaru (Hausa), trader.
 2. Babba Dan Agundi (Fulani), trader — Sarakuna.
 3. Abdulkadir Dan Jaji (Hausa), trader.
 4. Baballiya Manaja (?), ?.
 5. Bello Ijumu (Yoruba), ?.
 6. Maitama Sulei (Hausa), teacher.
 7. Mudi Sipikin (Hausa), trader.
 8. Sabo Bakin Zuwo (Hausa), trader.
 9. Sani Darma (Hausa), clerk.

Sklar's list in op. cit., p. 94, contains eight names with the Maaikata predominating. He lists Abba Kashiya (Hausa), clerk, Magaji Danbatta (Hausa), journalist and Ahmadu Bida (possibly N.U.P.E.), ?, who are not in the above list; but he also left out my Nos. 3, 4, 7 and 8. The difference may be due to lapses of memory on the part of our respective informants. On Alhaji Aminu Kano's secret membership of the N.E.P.U., even when he was still a government employee, see Anon, "The Leader Left Out", in West Africa (No. 2070, December 15, 1956), pp. 1013-1014.

launched, he was still a civil servant and General Order 40(B) forbade government servants to take part in active politics.¹ Nevertheless, it was an open secret that he was not only a member, but also the brain behind the organization. His resignation from the government service soon after the N.E.P.U. was formed, confirmed that.² One of the main impetuses for the formation of N.E.P.U. in Kano was the Bakin Kasuwa Da Fada conflict, i.e. the mutual animosity between "the market and the palace". This hatred also expressed itself in ethnic terms, i.e. the mutual contempt between Hayin Fulani and Hayin Habe, literally, "The Fulani mound versus the Habe mound". This antagonism stems from the growing awareness of the exploitation of traders who lived around the market by administrators who lived in and around the palace. The ethnic connotation is descriptive of the location of the Fulani rulers as distinct and separate from the location of Habe subjects. This unfolding tribal consciousness was later analysed

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1. Interview with Alhaji Aminu Kano, London, 12/11/1979.
 2. As noted above (footnote 1, previous page), N.E.P.U. was officially declared a political party in August 1950 and Aminu Kano resigned from the civil service in October 1950. See Feinstein, op. cit., pp. 123-130 for the full account of his resignation. Alhaji Aminu Kano said very little about the formation of N.E.P.U. in his diaries. Perhaps because he was very security conscious. However, when he was still a student in London, he mentioned having "interesting talks with Dipcharima [Zannah Bukar Dipcharima, who was then the Private Secretary to Dr. Azikwe] on North/South relations" on 7 July 1947. He also met Zik (Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe) and an N.C.N.C. delegation at Waterloo Station, London, on 10 July 1947. He recorded in his diary that one M. Isa brought him papers about N.E.P.A. Then he said, "I strongly support this organization no matter what they say." This entry was made in his diary on September 6, 1947. But, according to Maitama Sulei, N.E.P.A. was disbanded in 1947. He gave neither reasons nor an exact date. So our uncertainty regarding the date of formation and disbanding of N.E.P.A. remains to be cleared.

and presented as "class" conflict by the N.E.P.U., thus defusing a potentially explosive tribal tension in Kano, or even in the Northern Region.¹

Many of the founder members of the N.E.P.U. were, however, simultaneously members of the Jam'iyyan Mutanen Arewa (JMA) and at first, it seemed N.E.P.U. wanted to operate as a political vanguard within the broader but cultural and more conservative J.M.A. N.E.P.U. leaders like Alhaji Aminu Kano, M. Abubakar Zukoki and Maitama Sulei remained members of the Executive Committee of the J.M.A.² But that

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1. In the 1950's and 1960's it was fashionable in Nigeria to interpret socio-economic problems in tribal terms by attributing bad public policies or even natural tragedies to the dominance of a particular ethnic group over others, especially if the victims happened to be largely subject people. The case under reference was a good example because it reflected the grievances of Hausa subjects against their Fulani rulers. By its "class" analysis N.E.P.U. began to educate the people on the difference between the Sarakuna and members of the Fulani tribe. For a brief discussion on tribal politics in Nigeria, especially Northern Nigeria, see Jalingo, A.U., "Nigerian Politics: The causes and the effects of the Civil War" (seminar paper for the Dept. of Sociology, Leeds University, May 1972). Also see Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., "The Peoples of Nigeria: The Cultural Background to the Crisis", African Affairs, LXVI (No. 262, January 1967), pp. 3-11.
 2. J.S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley, 1960), p. 359, holds that N.E.P.U. was formed in Kano by a group of "dissidents" who broke away from the Jam'iyyan Mutanen Arewa (J.M.A.). This is not altogether correct as amongst those originally involved in the J.M.A., only Aminu Kano and Maitama Sulei featured in the N.E.P.U. More than anything else N.E.P.U. developed from Taron Masu Zumunta. However, there was a desire for unity in both groups, but the conservative stance of the J.M.A. prevented this. But according to Maitama Sulei (interview in Kano on 30/3/1977), the meeting of the Steering Committee of the J.M.A. held in Greene's Hotel, Kaduna, 1948, he remembered that the following delegates were in attendance:
 1. Maitama Sulei -- Secretary, N.N.T.W.A.
 2. Shehu Shagari -- representing N.N.T.W.A. Sokoto branch as well as the Sokoto Discussion Circle (Sokoto Youth Council and Sokoto Debating Society merged in this new name, see Chapter IV, p.175).
 3. Yahya Gusau -- N.N.T.W.A. member also representing Mutanen Arewa A Yau, which was based in Kaduna.
 4. Aminu Kano -- from Bauchi.
 5. Abubakar Imam -- from Zaria.
 6. Dr. A.R.B. Dikko -- from Zaria.

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dual membership of J.M.A. and N.E.P.U. ended when at the Jos convention in December 1950, the radicals ceased to be members of J.M.A.¹ This

The Steering Committee appointed the following pro tem officers:

1. Umaru Agaie -- Secreatry.
2. Abubakar Imam -- Treasurer.
3. Abdulkadir Makama -- Publicity Secretary.

Maitama Sulei explained that the Kaduna meeting was very open and that letters of invitation were sent to persons both of Northern and of Southern origin. Sklar, op. cit., pp. 87-96, contains a longer list of the officials involved in the saga which led to the formation of the J.M.A. and subsequently the Northern Peoples Congress (N.P.C.).

In 1949, the inaugural meeting of the J.M.A. was held in the El-Duniya cinema house (now a tomb in memory of those who were killed in it following a fire tragedy), Kano. The meeting elected the following officers:

1. Dr. A.R.B. Dikko -- President General.
2. Alhaji Sanda -- Deputy President General.
3. Maitama Sulei -- First Vice President General.
4. Rafi Tiyye -- Second Vice President General.
5. Umaru Agaie -- First Secretary General.
6. Isa Wali -- Second Secretary General.
7. Abubakar Imam -- Treasurer.
8. Yahya Gusau -- Auditor.
9. Aminu Kano -- Joint Auditor.
10. M. Julde -- Joint Auditor.
11. Abdulkadir Makama -- Publicity Secretary.

M. Sa'adu Zungur attended this inaugural meeting from Lagos. Both the Sultan of Sokoto and the Emir of Kano sent their goodwill messages to the meeting. But before the meeting finally closed, it was announced that the Sultan of Sokoto withdrew his blessing from the meeting!

Maitama Sulei thinks that the significance of the Kano meeting of J.M.A. was that for the first time some Kano N.A. employees openly criticised Kano N.A. (and other N.A.s as well) and, a decision was taken to appeal to the Regional Government in Kaduna against certain actions of the Emir of Kano. However, Kano delegates to the conference were already split by the Fulani versus Habe controversy (see footnote 1, previous page). It was also in that meeting that the J.M.A. began to weed out some radical youth. Hence, Maitama Sulei and Bello Ijumu began to meet secretly with the view to forming a new political party. Thus, meetings in the Kano branch of the J.M.A. became irregular until the convention of the Jam'iyya in December 1950 at Jos.

1. The general impression is that the radicals were expelled from the J.M.A. at Jos in 1950: see Sklar, op. cit., pp. 95-96; Whitaker, op. cit., p. 59; and Dudley, op. cit., p. 80. But Maitama Sulei maintained that it was their own decision to leave the J.M.A. He explained that the preparations for the Jos convention led to a closing of ranks in the Kano branch of the J.M.A. and that Aminu Kano suggested to them in Kano certain resolutions to be moved by their branch at Jos. When all the resolutions tabled by the Kano branch/

set in train events which led to both intense and bitter political rivalry as well as to the partly tribal and partly religious politics of the separatist movements in Northern Nigeria.¹ On the one hand, three years after the withdrawal of the radicals from J.M.A. (and two years after it was declared a political party) its leadership became almost entirely drawn from members of the Sarakuna², and thus the party became a convenient instrument in the hands of the establishment; furthermore, most of the J.M.A. (N.P.C.) provincial leaders were employed

branch were rejected, the delegation withdrew to one Alhaji Akawu Namata's house, along Sarki Street, Jos. There a decision was taken that they should cease to be members of J.M.A. Bello Ijumu then suggested that they should join the N.C.N.C., but Aminu Kano and Maitama Sulei opposed the suggestion. Finally, a decision was taken to align with the N.C.N.C. in the absence of Aminu Kano but when Aminu Kano returned to the meeting he accepted the decision but laid conditions of alliance with N.C.N.C. as follows:

1. That the N.C.N.C. should give the control of its Comet Press, which came to Kano in 1948/49, to N.E.P.U.
2. That the N.C.N.C. should finance all N.E.P.U.'s election expenses.
3. That the N.C.N.C. should bear the running costs of the N.E.P.U.'s Secretariat and provide transport for the party's National Officers.

When interviewed in London on 12/11/79, Alhaji Aminu Kano explained that he was not in favour of alliance with N.C.N.C. but a decision to that effect was taken by the majority. However, he then felt certain that the above conditions would be unacceptable to the N.C.N.C.; hence he was startled when the conditions were accepted. So he abided with the majority decision.

1. The "exclusive conservatism" of some leaders of J.M.A. characterised by their servile deference to Emirs and their disregard to Talakawa; worse more, they continued to regard the peoples of the Middle Belt as the traditional fodder of the Muslim North. These are some of the factors which led to the formation of the United Middle Belt Congress (U.M.B.C.). See "Demand for a Middle Region", in Political Bodies in Nigeria, NAK File No. 45, ZAR PROF, pp. 118-122.
2. Just to mention a few of J.M.A. (N.P.C.) leaders: Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto (President); Alhaji Muhammadu Ribadu, formerly Ardo Balala, a district chief in Adamawa Emirate and N.A. Treasurer (Treasurer); Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, formerly Bauchi N.A. Education Officer (Vice President). The first two were members of the Fulani ruling dynasties at Sokoto and Yola respectively, and the last named was the son of a leading client of the Ajiya of Bauchi. See account of Northern Nigerian political leaders, 1946-1966, in Whitaker, op. cit., pp. 471-497; and the occupational background of the members of N.P.C. National Executive Committee, 1958, in Sklar, op. cit., pp. 513-517.

by, and therefore dependent upon, the very administration which was the main political issue in Northern Nigeria at that time; on the other hand, the unprogressive stance of the J.M.A. (N.P.C.) generated the anti-Muslim reaction of the Christian converts which led to the formation of the Middle Belt Zone League (M.B.Z.L.) which later became the United Middle Belt Congress (U.M.B.C.) with the objective of demanding the creation of a Middle Belt State.¹

The religious animosity and tribal jingoism which underlined the separatist demand of U.M.B.C. was rejected outright by N.E.P.U., hence the two parties could not cooperate initially. N.E.P.U. conceived religious bigotry and tribalism as part of the colonial tactic of "divide and rule". According to N.E.P.U., the domination of the colonized "barbarian" by their "civilizing colonizers" was rationalized

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1. According to official reports, the United Middle Belt Congress (U.M.B.C.) came into existence as a result of the merger of three associations:
 1. Birom Progressive Union (B.P.U.) which was mainly opposed to tin-mining activities which had taken good farming land from the Birom tribesmen on the Jos Plateau. It was also against Muslim domination of the Jos township area. See Rhodes House, Oxford, File No. MSS. Afr. S. 1210, p. 12.
 2. The Tiv Progressive Union (T.P.U.), started in November 1944, with non-political objectives but later became a satellite of the N.C.N.C.
 3. The United Tiv Movement (U.T.M.), first started in Zaria in September 1952, as a non-political body devoted to undermining the position of the T.P.U.

All the above associations came together and formed the Middle Zone League (or the Middle Belt Zone League) mainly representing non-Muslims. Their main aim was to demand the creation of a Middle Belt Region out of the then Muslim dominated Northern Region of Nigeria. In the 1950's it came to be known as the United Middle Belt Congress (U.M.B.C.) under the leadership of Mr. J.S. Tarka. For more details on 2 and 3 above, see "Political Party Summaries" in NAK, File, op. cit., pp. 70-78, and 117-122. And for a general account of U.M.B.C., see Dent, M., "A minority party — the United Middle Belt Congress", in Mackintosh, J.P., Nigerian Government and Politics (London, 1966), pp. 461-507.

by dehumanizing the "natives", by describing and regarding them as "bigots", for whom there is no justice.¹ N.E.P.U. held that colonial exploitation and political repression are the root causes of all Nigerian problems. In view of this perception of colonialism and because of its radical leadership², it was clear from the outset that N.E.P.U. was destined to clash with the J.M.A. (N.P.C.) and to have a showdown with the Administrations.

No sooner was N.E.P.U. launched than it made its stand on current issues in Nigeria known. It disliked the abnormally autocratic powers and the unpopular rule of the "chiefs"; it was opposed to the Richards Constitution, on the grounds that it would "pakistanize" Nigeria and break the country up into tribal "chiefdoms". N.E.P.U. saw the new constitution as a deliberate legal device by the British to keep Nigeria divided and thus hold the country in bondage: it detested the electoral college system, introduced in Northern Nigeria by that constitution, and in its place wanted a system of direct election based on universal adult suffrage. It stood for separate executive and legislature in Nigeria as a whole and it wanted to separate the judiciary

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1. Interview with Alhaji Abubakar Zukogi, Bida, 1977. Alhaji Abubakar Zukogi was the General Secretary of N.E.P.U. He was a Civil Commissioner in the North Western State Government of Nigeria in 1967-1972. Also see part of M. Gambo Hawaja's poem A Yau Ba Maki Nepu Sai Wawa, "Today, no one rejects NEPU but a fool", reproduced below. For a more illuminating analysis of colonialism see Stauder, J., "The 'Relevance' of Anthropology to Colonialism and Imperialism", in Race and Class, XVI (No. 1, July 1974), pp. 29-51; May, R., and Cohen, R., "The Interaction between Race and Colonialism: A case study of the Liverpool Race Riots of 1919", in Race and Class, XVI (No. 2, October 1974), pp. 111-126; and Hodgkin, T.L., "The Vietnamese Revolution and Some Lessons", in Race and Class, XVI (No. 3, January 1975), pp. 233-249.
 2. For an analysis of the difference in styles of leadership between N.E.P.U. and N.P.C., see Whitaker, C.S., "Three Perspectives on Hierarchy", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, 3-4 (1965), pp. 1-19.

from the executive in Northern Nigeria. N.E.P.U. was very critical of the colonial government for not providing education on a wide and popular basis in Northern Nigeria as was the case in Southern Nigeria.¹ The anti-establishment stand of N.E.P.U. was made even more clear by its dedication to the emancipation of the Talakawa through the reforms of the autocratic N.A. system. N.E.P.U. believed that the root cause of the social and economic degradation of the Talakawa was "the vicious system of administration by the family compact rulers which was established by the British Imperialist Government."² Thus, N.E.P.U.'s primary objective was to fight the twin evils of colonialism and native autocracy. This is one of the points with which the party fought its first electoral battle in Northern Nigeria.

The First Parliamentary Election

Under the Richards Constitution which came into effect towards the end of 1946, Northern Nigeria was represented in the Nigerian Legislative Council for the first time. Northern Nigerian representatives in the legislative council were the personal nominees of the Emirs chosen by the Native Authority Councils of each province.³ Most provinces had one member each except for Sokoto Province, which had two and Kano with three.⁴ Obviously, the method employed in choosing those

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1. Interview with Alhaji Aminu Kano in London on 12/11/79. For N.E.P.U.'s criticism of the colonial education policy in Northern Nigeria, refer to official N.E.P.U. documents in Rhodes House, Oxford, File No. MSS. Afr. S. 1210, p. 11.
 2. N.E.P.U., "Declaration of Principles", a copy of which is in the possession of the writer.
 3. The details of how members of the legislative council were chosen is contained in "The Constitution of Nigeria" published in the Nigeria Gazette of 1946 as Public Notices Nos. 139-147.
 4. Bello, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu, My Life (Cambridge, 1962), pp. 60-72, gave an account of his recollections on some of the members and on how they were "chosen".

representatives and the representatives chosen were inadequate in proportion to the population of their respective provinces. So a new system of election (or selection) based on the electoral principle was introduced in the whole of Nigeria as follows:

- A. Eastern Region: universal adult suffrage.
- B. Western Region: suffrage limited to tax payers.
- C. Northern Region: electoral college system.¹

Thus, there was a curious situation in which Nigerian representatives went to the legislative council via different routes. That was both odd and undemocratic though, in the Northern Region, it was an advance on the previous system of nomination by the N.A. councils. The general form of the electoral college system was as follows, each level forming the college for the one above²:

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|---------------------------------|------------------|
| 1. Primary elections | Hamlet level |
| 2. Sub-Intermediate elections | "Village" level |
| 3. Intermediate elections | District level |
| 4. Final Intermediate elections | Emirate level |
| 5. Final elections | Provincial level |

Even with these arrangements made for holding the elections in Northern Nigeria, it was still feared by the authorities that the system might produce a crop of quite "inexperienced, possibly illiterate

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- 1. The qualification for voting was restricted to males over 25 years. Up to five layers of electoral colleges were then used to select the final representatives. See Review of the Constitution, Recommendations of the Northern Regional Conference, 5th to 12th September, 1949 (printed by Government Printer, Kaduna, 1949), pp. 7-8. For a fuller study of the subsequent pertinent Orders in Council, Letters Patent and Royal Instructions, etc., for all Nigeria, see Nigeria Gazette of 1949, Public Notices Nos. 158-160 and Public Notice No. 13, see "The Nigerian Constitution -- III, The System of Voting", in Venture (October 1951), p. 6.
 - 2. See "Report on Elections, Katsina Province", in NAK, File No., KANO PROF: - PRE/42, p. 1. For a detailed discussion on electoral trends in the whole of Nigeria, see Mackintosh, J.P., op. cit., pp. 508-544.

and, even worse, possibly unsuitable representatives from whom it might well prove to be almost impossible to build up a ministerial system of government."¹ It was thought essential by officials that the North should not fail her first step towards democracy for lack of the right people at the top. The solution was that at every stage of the electoral college one-tenth of the number of members were to be chosen by the N.A.s from the senior members of their staff or councillors. That came to be known as the "10% N.A. Injection", and it meant that the political parties' activities were limited to the lowest level of all the five stages. It was obviously very difficult, if not impossible, for a party man through the sheer support of his party, to fight his way at each of the colleges into the House of Assembly. The difficulty lay in the fact that it was not possible to predict who would be elected (and with what number of supporters) from one lower college to a higher. The rationale behind that awkward arrangement might be that, since Hausa society (if not the whole of Northern Nigerian society) was unfamiliar with elections, it was a temporary expedient, a sort of practice run, to assist those who had no experience in democratic political organization and who had never taken part in an election on the principle of the ballot box or indeed in any kind. In the 1950's the Western concept of election by secret ballot and of popularly elected representatives was a novelty in Northern Nigeria.²

N.E.P.U.'s opponent (J.M.A./N.P.C.) did not grumble on the electoral colleges, perhaps because at that time J.M.A./N.P.C. was more an alliance

1. See Bello, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu, op. cit., p. 70.

2. Ibid., pp. 70-71; also see Hiskett, M., "The Development of Sa'adu Zungur's Political Thought", African Language Studies, XVI (1975), pp. 8-9.

of men who happened to have arrived in the Northern House of Assembly than a political party. As for the N.E.P.U., the electoral college system was a travesty of democracy;

if democracy means a form of government in which the ruling power of the state is legally vested, not in any particular class or classes, but in the members of the community as a whole, then it is essential to simplify registration, to make the franchise direct, equal and universal and to make the ballot secret. 1

Opposition notwithstanding, the constitution² had to be upheld and elections carried on under the existing rules. So one of the first changes in the N.E.P.U. hierarchy in preparation for the election was the elevation of M. Aminu Kano to the post of the Vice President of the party and in that capacity he directed the 1951 election for the party.

The electoral regulations under the 1951 constitution stipulated Zaben Hawan Hawa (indirect election by electoral college system).³ The elected members of the Regional House of Assembly in turn were to

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1. Interview with Alhaji Tanko Yakasai (N.E.P.U. Publicity Secretary) at Kano, 1977. Alhaji Tanko was obviously reading from one of his former party's pamphlets at the time of the interview. Alhaji Tanko Yakasai was a Civil Commissioner in Kano State government of Nigeria, 1967-1975. He is now a businessman and a member of N.P.N.
 2. The "Macpherson Constitution" (named after the then Governor of Nigeria, Sir John Macpherson) came into effect in 1951. For a critical analysis of this constitution see Ezera, K., op. cit., pp. 105-175; and "Nigerian Constitutional Road to Independence" in Political Quarterly, XXX (No. 2, 1959), pp. 131-140. Also see Mackintosh, J.P., op. cit., pp. 26-28.
 3. See "Arrangements made for holding the Elections" in NAK, File No. KANO PROF: - PRE/42, p. 1. Later on the number of electoral ladders differed from one province to another. In some provinces, it was reduced to a three tier indirect election, i.e.:
 1. Primary election District level (with all hamlets and villages)
 2. Intermediate election Emirate level
 3. Final election Provincial level
 Also see Whitaker, C.S., op. cit., pp. 359-60; Dudley, B.J., op. cit., pp. 80-81.

select members of the House of Representatives (the central legislature) from among themselves. But far more disastrous for N.E.P.U. was the right given to Emirs and chiefs (or the N.A.s) to inject a further 10% to the members elected at every stage of the system's five stages. That eventually produced representatives favoured by Emirs. The primary election itself was conducted by the electors standing in the open space (in most cases in front of the Emirs' palaces) behind the man whose candidature they supported. The counting agents and the returning officers were all N.A. employees. At the Emirate and Provincial levels, a District Officer and a Senior District Officer respectively acted as the returning officers.¹ That the electoral college arrangement was susceptible to manipulation by the N.A. is too obvious to need elaboration here. Unfair to N.E.P.U. as that method of election was, it was a step forward towards democracy in Northern Nigeria where succession to an official title or nomination to a public office by the Emirs had been the only known way of acceding to political office and thus to political participation.

In view of the foregoing obstacles, it is unsurprising that N.E.P.U. contested the 1951 regional elections unsuccessfully.² The party's election programme promised that it was dedicated to improving

the welfare of the people of Northern Nigeria and to establish sound social, economic and political justice, to insure domestic tranquillity and to secure liberty of thought and expression, equality of status and opportunity for all the peoples of Northern Nigeria

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1. For example, see "List of Electoral Officers, Katsina Province", in NAK, File No. KANO Prof: - PRE/42, p. 10.
 2. All the 90 seats in the Regional House of Assembly, Kaduna, were won by J.M.A./N.P.C. See Sklar, R.L. and Whitaker, C.S., "Nigeria", in Coleman, J.S., and Rosberg, C.G., Jr. (eds.), Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley, 1964), p. 652.

and to promote among them all real fraternity, to safeguard the individual as well as the unity of the people. 1

N.E.P.U.'s 1951 election programme can be summarized as follows²:

- 1) Mechanization of agriculture and improving animal husbandry to increase food production, in order to raise the standard of living of the people and thus stabilize our internal economy.
- 2) Progressive reforms of our system of education so as to provide appropriate intellectual, technical and moral training.
- 3) A scheme to dam river Niger to provide water for drinking and irrigation as well as for improved water transport and the production of electricity.
- 4) Introduction of a local government system to be based on popular democratic elections and thus do away with the autocratic Native Administrations (N.A.s); and sound town and country planning.
- 5) Reforms in the laws relating to transport and the provision of better trunk and feeder roads.
- 6) Introduction of a uniform judicial system throughout Northern Region for the purpose of establishing the rule of law.
- 7) Development of local (primary) and secondary industries in order to provide employment and thus reduce the present high percentage of unemployment.

Despite the administrative haughtiness and the legal obstacles of the electoral college system, N.E.P.U. recorded unexpected success at the primary and intermediate levels of the elections in Kano city,

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1. Quoted from the appendix of N.E.P.U.'s memo submitted to the Colonial Secretary, London, 1952. A copy of this memo is in my possession.
 2. N.E.P.U.: Party Programme 1951.

Jos township, Kaduna, Maiduguri, Kabba, etc.¹ To the consternation of the authorities it appeared as if N.E.P.U. might capture the control of Northern Regional House of Assembly. But at the final level of the elections all those previously defeated by N.E.P.U. candidates were declared elected members of the Regional House of Assembly. Notable among those who were at first defeated by N.E.P.U. candidates but finally emerged as the "elected" members, due to the 10% injection device were Inuwa Wada (Kano), Bello Dandago (Kano) and Isa Kaita (Katsina). Some of them became government ministers at Kaduna and Lagos.² Following N.E.P.U.'s initial success at the primary and intermediate elections, an editorial comment in the Nigerian Citizen (a government owned newspaper then published at Zaria) warned that the election results showed "the red-light" for "the stringent heart searching particularly at the top" and with the N.E.P.U.'s objectives already known, the question was whether the N.A.s and the Regional Government would heed the warning before "it is too late".³

N.E.P.U. itself was not unaffected by the election result, which boosted the morale of the party's members and raised the hopes and the expectations of the leaders. Both the leaders and the led felt

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1. Although the final result of the 1951 election is known (see footnote 2, p. 228), the details of the winners' of the elections at primary and intermediate levels are not (to our knowledge) recorded anywhere. However, the elections were discussed by Sklar, R.L., op. cit., pp. 28-37; Paden, J.N., Religion and Political Culture in Kano (Berkeley, 1973), p. 308; also see Supplement to Nigeria Gazette, 38, No. 37, 19 July 1951.
 2. Inuwa Wada became a federal minister at Lagos whereas Isa Kaita became a regional minister at Kaduna. See Whiteaker, C.S., op. cit., pp. 360-1.
 3. Nigerian Citizen, October 25, 1951, p. 6. Both Whitaker, op. cit., and Dudley, op. cit., pp. 80-81, reproduced and analysed the implications of this editorial comment.

that in a free and fair election based on secret ballot system, N.E.P.U. would sweep the polls and thus seize the government of the region. On the one hand, the party intensified its recruitment drive and it opened branches all over the Northern Region, especially in all the provincial towns and the urban centres; on the other hand, the focus of the party's profuse petitions became centred on the desire for electoral reforms in Northern Nigeria. Accordingly, a new slogan was coined to reflect the party's immediate desire: Zabe Daya, Falle Daya, Rana Daya, Cikin Asiri, Kan Balaga, "One man, one vote, on the same day, by secret ballot, based on universal adult suffrage."

Pressing further its demands for general, i.e. electoral, administrative, educational and other reforms in Northern Nigeria, N.E.P.U. sent a delegation to London in 1952 to present its case before the Colonial Secretary. In a memorandum¹ they explained all the injustices of the electoral college system and then pointed out that most of the members of the Northern Regional House of Assembly were N.A. employees in whom the electorate had no confidence but who, through the 10% N.A. injection became the officially "elected" members. Table 1:5 on the next page, culled out from the memorandum, elucidates their point in Kano province.

In Kano District² alone, seven N.A. employees contested the elections against their N.E.P.U. opponents and of those four were actually defeated by N.E.P.U. candidates. But in the end all the four

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1. The original copy of this memorandum which includes Table I reproduced on the next page is in my possession. For the Colonial Secretary's reply to N.E.P.U., see Venture IV (No. 8, October 1952), p. 2.
 2. In 1951, Kano electoral district included the city, Fagge, Sabon Gari, Tudun Wada, Gwagwarwa and Tarauni with an estimated population figure of about 150,000 people.

TABLE 1:5

KANO MEMBERS IN THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY AFTER 1951 ELECTIONS

Name	Profession	Nominated by	Remark
1. Muh. Sanusi	Emir's eldest son District Head and Heir Apparent	Chief and D.O.	Did not stand for election
2. Bashari	N.A. Adviser on Muslim Law	Chief and D.O.	Did not stand for election
3. Alhaji Ahmadu	District Head	Chief and D.O.	Did not stand for election
4. Usman	N.A. Staff Supervisor	Inuwa Wada	Did not stand for election
5. Bello	Ed. Offr. (N.A.)	Chief and D.O.	Did not stand for election
6. Galadiman Hadejia	District Head	Chief and D.O.	Did not stand for election
7. Ma'ajin Gemel	N.A. Treasurer	Chief and D.O.	Did not stand for election
8. Ibrahim	Trader	Bello	Did not stand for election
9. Alhaji Nabegu	Trader	Bello	Did not stand for election
10. Ma'ajin Hadejia	N.A. Treasurer	Sambo	Did not stand for election
11. Madakin Hadejia	District Head	Chief and D.O.	Defeated in primary election
12. Sambo	District Head	Chief and D.O.	Defeated in primary election
13. Muhammadu	District Head	Chief and D.O.	Defeated in primary election
14. Alhaji Abubakar	District Head	Chief and D.O.	Defeated in primary election
15. Munir	N.A. Supervisor of Works	Chief and D.O.	Defeated in primary election
16. Muhammadu	District Head and Emir's brother	Chief and D.O.	Defeated in primary election
17. Dandago	District Head	Chief and D.O.	Defeated in primary election
18. Inuwa Wada	N.A. Chief Clerk	Chief and D.O.	Defeated in primary election
19. Maje	N.A. Dev. Sec. Emir's son	Chief and D.O.	Defeated in primary election
20. Jibir	Emir's Private Sec.	Chief and D.O.	Defeated in primary election

defeated members of the N.A. Staff reached the House of Assembly. Five out of the remaining sixteen members from Kano province were rejected by the electors at the initial stages of the election but nevertheless eventually entered the House of Assembly through the "back door". As the above table shows altogether ten members contested the elections at the final level only, i.e. they contested neither primary nor intermediate election, yet they represented Kano people in the House of Assembly at Kaduna. What happened in Kano was the rule rather than the exception and, if anything, may have even been fairer because the electors in Kano were more enlightened and relatively more prosperous and thus less coercible; also in the 1950's Kano people were more assertive of their rights than any other province in Northern Region. Table 1:5 also clearly shows that N.E.P.U. was beaten by the existing electoral system which appeared to be specifically designed to favour the N.A.s.

In the same memorandum N.E.P.U. recommended to the Colonial Secretary that the Northern Region should be divided into single member constituencies, in which one member would represent a population of 100,000 people in the House of Assembly. That, the party argued, would make the members more representative. Based on the 1947 Head-Tax Count, which estimated the population of Northern Nigeria at about 13 million, that recommendation, if accepted would have increased the membership of the Regional House of Assembly from ninety to one hundred.

During their stay in London, the N.E.P.U. delegation must have lobbied, among others, Members of Parliament to support their case before the Colonial Secretary, for no sooner had they returned to Nigeria, than Colonel George Wigg, M.P., launched an attack on the Colonial Secretary on the 10th N.A. injection in Northern Nigerian

elections. He explained that the N.A. Police assaulted N.E.P.U. supporters and described in detail the political conditions in Kano which he likened to that in a "Fascist state".¹ Soon after that criticism, it was announced that the 10% N.A. injection was abolished, although the electoral college system remained; but the damage had been done.

Trapped in Opposition

At home, N.E.P.U. was both reorganizing itself and intensifying its political campaigns. In 1953 came changes in the party's leadership. In those changes Aminu Kano replaced Abba Maikwaru as the party's President. Between 1951 and 1956 N.E.P.U.'s popularity soared up among the masses and, conversely, the Administrations reacted with merciless ruthlessness.² N.E.P.U. members, in the far North, claimed that they bore administrative repression and victimizations with fortitude, believing that in 1956 when the secret ballot system was to be tried in some parts of Northern Nigeria, the party would win.

In 1954, there were elections into the Federal House of Representatives, which N.E.P.U. contested. Once again, N.E.P.U. was badly beaten, not winning a single seat.³ The main problem of N.E.P.U. was that the

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1. "One-Party Parliament", in West Africa (No. 1919), 5 December 1953, p. 1131; and "Instability in Kano", in West Africa (No. 1921), 19 December 1953, p. 1178.
 2. For example, see NAK, File No. 45, ZAR PROF, on many administrative, judicial and police reports on the actions taken against N.E.P.U. in Zaria province, between 1952 and 1955. Also see "Political File", D.O.'s Office Potiskum, for similar reports in Fika Emirate between 1953 and 1959. See further, "The Administration of Bida", in West Africa (No. 1913), 24 October 1953, p. 996; and Olu Akinfosile, "The Bida Situation", in West Africa (No. 1918), 28 November 1953, p. 1114.
 3. The results of 1954 Federal elections are in Sklar, op. cit., p. 35; and Whitaker and Sklar, op. cit., p. 652. Paden, op. cit., pp. 308-9, discussed the significance of this election in Kano.

electoral college system was still enforced in the North. In addition, electoral officers especially in rural areas were N.A. employees (District Heads, Alaklis, Chief scribes) and, worse still, many more were active members (or officials) of the N.P.C. Many electoral officers openly demonstrated their antagonism towards N.E.P.U. members.¹ On the whole, N.E.P.U.'s preparations for the elections were less elaborate than its preparations for the previous Region elections in 1951. This suggests that the party was more concerned with the problems of Northern Nigeria and the use of governmental institutions to make reforms in the region than in winning Federal elections. After all, Federal Government was then so remote that it made little direct impact on the rank and file Nigerian.

With the electoral college system and the use of N.A. staff who were also N.P.C. supporters (or active members) as electoral officers, it was a foregone conclusion that N.E.P.U. would lose the elections, as it did. Far more important was, judging from the experience in the 1951 elections, the authorities became more apprehensive that N.E.P.U. might ~~as~~ well win and that it must be stopped. Indeed the authorities became more determined to win because of the risks in the N.P.C. not controlling the Federal authority. As by the time of the election the first batch of N.P.C. ministers were already elected, the combination of patronage and coercion were used to ensure the success of their party. But the party's agitation for reforms continued unabated and, at the same time, it made preparations for the forthcoming

1. For the electoral procedure in the North, see Government Circular TS. 53521/S.7/Vol. 111/24 of 24/8/1954 and "Revised Constitution — Electoral Regulations for new House of Representatives", both in NAK, File No. C. 6/1954, ZAR PROF, pp. 15-16 and 17-19. Also see, Aminu Kano, "Northern Nigeria's Electoral Officers", in West Africa (No. 1969), 20 November 1954, p. 1091.

1956 elections to the Regional House of Assembly. In a bid to enlighten the masses, newspaper articles on political issues were written by N.E.P.U. leaders. After one of these articles, entitled Biyayavya Ga Sareuta Haramun (literally, "obedience to hereditary titled traditional official is unlawful")¹ by Aminu Kano published in Daily Comet, Kano, the author was prosecuted for sedition and subsequently fined fifty pounds. In that article Aminu Kano said that Nigerians disliked Europeans (British) and wanted them to leave Nigeria.²

N.E.P.U.'s objective of effective electoral changes in Northern Nigeria was not achieved before 1956. Although the membership of the Northern House of Assembly was increased, very much in line with N.E.P.U. recommendations (see above), the introduction of direct elections on the secret ballot system were limited to nineteen urban constituencies. Elections in the rural districts were to be through the electoral colleges: in most cases there were to be two stages but in some cases up to three. Electors were to be adult male tax-payers only. In the urban centres suffrage was limited to men over 21 who had lived and paid tax in an area for three years immediately before the elections or were born there and had paid tax for one year. In the rural areas there were primary, intermediate and final levels of electoral colleges, and voters had to produce tax receipts.³ Another electoral hurdle for

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1. Haram, "forbidden", i.e. anything that is unlawful under Islamic law. As for the objection of Islam to hereditary leadership and the condemnation of traditional titles in Northern Nigeria by Usman Dan Fodio, see Chapter II.
 2. According to Alhaji Aminu Kano (interviewed in London on 12/11/1979), his offence carried the minimum of four years and the maximum of ten years in prison. But the judge, Capt. Symes, believed that to imprison Aminu Kano was to deny him his political objectives, hence he fined him £50. For the interest shown in Aminu Kano's prosecution in the House of Commons, London, "Matchet's Diary", in West Africa (No. 1966), 30 October 1954, p. 1015.
 3. See Northern Region of Nigeria Gazette Extraordinary (No. 40, V), 30 August 1956, Supplement Part B, pp. B531-B533.

N.E.P.U. was the transfer of the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order at election times, from the government to N.A.s, thus handing back N.E.P.U. members to their enemies at the time when they most needed protection from the abuses of the N.A.s by the government.¹

N.E.P.U. fought the 1956 election on European style "Class" basis. In its election manifesto, N.E.P.U. said that the N.P.C. was a party of "property and privilege" fighting a "rear-guard action against equality": to vote for the N.P.C. meant "to believe in a ruling class". Tactfully, the manifesto promised the Emirs a "glorified status" under N.E.P.U. government, and it warned that intransigence to change would bring "extreme leftist revolution" that might result from poverty and hunger.² The party's message throughout the manifesto was clearly directed at the underprivileged. N.E.P.U. did not promise detailed reforms in the field of government, but it emphasized that if elected to power there would be constitutional changes in the Region as well as in the whole Federation. In the economic field it promised to establish a "National indigenous Bank for the Northern Region" and higher prices for farm produce from the Marketing Board.²

The economic resources of the Region will be improved. We shall see to it that all the economic potentialities of the Region are tapped and the economy of the Region diversified. Farmers would be guaranteed fair and stable prices for their produce and thus keeping the margin between the prices offered to those farmers at present and the profits made by the Marketing Board Agencies within a reasonable bound as well as by giving

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1. See "Native Authority Law, No. 4, of 1954: The Native Authority (Delegation of Powers) Notice", in NAK, File No. MSWC 7, especially annex B. Also see Governor General's Reply to Aminu Kano in West Africa (No. 2057), 15 September 1956, p. 711.
 2. This and the following quotations are cited in Nigerian Citizen, 12 September 1956. Also see NAK File: AGNN/1095, for more election manifestoes.

the farmers representation on the various Marketing Boards which deal with their interests. We shall establish more industrial centres and generally undertake to develop the Region to become a very strong agricultural country. We shall encourage foreign investments in various development enterprises, but we shall always see that the Government and private indigenous shareholding are greater in such enterprises.

With regard to small scale cottage industries, N.E.P.U. would give the necessary financial aid or loans to farmers, craftsmen, traders and cooperative societies.

N.E.P.U. promised universal, compulsory and free education to all children between the ages of 6 and 14 (but no time-table was mentioned) and would establish Marriage Bureaux to deal with the causes of high divorce rates.

Women and girls' education will be intensified throughout the Region and more and more girls' schools will be built in every province. Greater facilities will be accorded to our girls for secondary and higher education irrespective of tribe, creed or status. Domestic Science centres and women's institutes will receive full encouragement.

N.E.P.U. believed that the ability to work depended on good health hence it regarded good health as a matter of great importance in its drive to have a virile population in a new society. The main items in their health services can be summarized as follows:

- 1) To improve the health of the next generation by looking after children and expectant mothers.
- 2) To bring the means of healing within the reach of those who are ill without regard to status.
- 3) To provide both practical and theoretical knowledge and preventive measures in order to diminish the incidence of illness.

If elected to power, N.E.P.U. government would reform the legal system and local governments; and it would convert the "N.P.C. ministers'

palaces into maternity clinics, nursery schools and other social and medical institutions."¹

N.E.P.U.'s election manifesto in 1956 was one of the most radical in West Africa, because its real concern was with internal class relations in Northern Nigeria, not with political relations with Britain. N.E.P.U. disliked not the individual Emirs but the N.A. system which was oppressive; it opposed not the British but colonialism which created internal divisions and exploitative strata within Northern Nigerian Society.

The result of the 1956 elections (see Table 2:5 below) confirmed N.E.P.U.'s complaint that the electoral college system was unfair to the party and it also confirmed N.E.P.U.'s accusation that N.P.C. was a "party of property and privilege". For example, M. Abba Habid, the Waziri of Dikwa², won election to the House of Assembly in Dikwa North constituency where he bypassed the primary and intermediate levels and contested only the final level of the electoral college. According to results declared in the first week of the election (November, 1956), N.P.C. won 53 seats: 30 of these were District Heads; one was an uncle of the Northern Premier, one his cousin and yet another was his nephew (i.e. they were all members of the Sokoto ruling dynasty). A son of the Emir of Kano was elected as were sons of the Emirs of Gombe and Fika. 35 of the 53 elected N.P.C. members were returned unopposed, and many N.E.P.U. candidates (and supporters) were arrested to permit this.³

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1. For a critical comment on the 1956 election manifestoes, see "The Sardauna's Prospects" in West Africa (No. 2063), 27 October 1956, p. 843.
 2. Dikwa is also commonly called Bama. For a portrait of Abba Habib, M.H.R., see "The member for Dikwa" in West Africa (No. 1921), 19 December 1953, p. 1181.
 3. See "Sardauna's Return to Power", in West Africa (No. 2064), 3 November 1956, p. 866.

TABLE 2:5¹

NIGERIA: NORTHERN REGION ELECTIONS 1956

FINAL STATE OF THE PARTIES

<u>Party</u>	<u>Seats</u>
Northern Peoples Congress	100
Northern Elements Progressive Union -- N.C.N.C. (Opposition)	6
Ilorin Talaka Parapo -- A.G. (Opposition)	3
Egbe Igbomina Parapo A.G. (Opposition)	1
United Middle Belt Congress -- Lot's Wing (Allied to N.P.C.)	5
United Middle Belt Congress -- Rwang's Wing (Opposition)	6
Igbirra Tribal Union (Allied to N.P.C.)	2
Bornu Youth Movement -- N.E.P.U. (Opposition)	2
Undeclared (Political Stand)	1
Independents	5
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Total	131

SUMMARY

N.P.C. and allies	107
Opposition Parties	18
Independents	5
Undeclared	1
	<hr/>
Total	131

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1. The figures in Table 2:5 are culled from "Election Results", File No. AGNN/1095A in NAK. Also see Sklar, op. cit., p. 36; and Whitaker and Sklar, op. cit., p. 563. For a critical appraisal of the election results, see "Northern Nigeria" in Venture, VIII (No. 7, December 1956), p. 2.

The aristocratic background of the N.P.C. members¹ showed that the party and the N.A.s were siamese twins. In addition to N.A. employees being the electoral officers, the N.A.s themselves were given the legal rights, at election times, to decide when and where public order was liable to be endangered and to take appropriate action to restore law and order. In that way the electoral system provided sufficient built-in safeguards for the ruling party. It was not surprising that the electoral fortunes of N.E.P.U. fell below expectations in 1956. As Table 2:5 above shows, N.E.P.U. won only 6 seats (4 in the urban constituencies by direct elections and 2 in the rural constituencies through the electoral colleges), whereas its ally the Bornu Youth Movement (B.Y.M.) won 2 seats.² Naturally, the result of the election was shocking to the party, however, their failure was attributed to poll rigging, harrassment of the party's candidates and supporters, etc.³

Despite its defeat at the polls, N.E.P.U.'s non-electoral campaigns and activities heightened political awareness and thus increased public protests against maladministration and that, in turn, led to many changes, especially at the local level. For instance, the Emir of Zaria (M. Ja'afar) complained that the damage done by N.E.P.U. was to let the

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1. Whitaker, op. cit., pp. 476-489, contains "biographical directory" of N.P.C. members of the House of Assembly, 1956-1961, as well as that of the members of the opposition in the same House at the same period. Sklar, op. cit., p. 325, has the occupational background of some N.P.C. and, p. 365-70, discusses the social origins of some N.P.C. leaders.
 2. The opposition parties and one Independent candidate won more than half of the 19 urban constituencies in which direct election by secret ballot took place. For an analysis of the first direct election in Northern Nigeria see "The Sardauna's Century" in West Africa (No. 2068), 1 December 1956, p. 961.
 3. See "NEPU's failure" in Ibid.; and "Electoral systems and the Franchise", in Venture, VIII (No. 3, July 1956), pp. 2 and 4.

commoners know that they could say "no" to their rulers.¹ Following N.E.P.U.'s protests, communal labour for non-communal purposes ceased; so did unpaid forced labour on farms belonging to the Emirs and the District Heads; forced labour to rebuild or to repair public places and to construct roads, all stopped.² The use of Jekadu or Yaran Sarki (Emirs' Representatives) on oppressive missions in the rural areas was waived. Underpayments of peasant farmers for their produce at cotton and groundnuts markets was reduced. All the foregoing changes came as a result of N.E.P.U.'s criticism of N.A.s and its protests on behalf of the villagers.³

In urban centres N.E.P.U. activities centered on the reduction of taxes and rates, with particular success in Zaria and Kano. These successes precipitated the enforcement by the Colonial administration of the salient aspects of the Native Authority Law 1954 which was designed to prevent the introduction of a fully-fledged participatory local government and thus restrict the role of the chiefs to a purely symbolic one. This reduced the N.E.P.U. controlled Town Councils to an advisory capacity and thus ended their power to enact any rule or regulation without the approval of the N.A. Council. What had, at first, brought N.E.P.U. success in some local elections was the fact that, under British supervision, political competition became tolerated

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1. Feinstein, A., op. cit., p. 132. In a letter Ref. 11/1946/35 of 20/10/52 to the Civil Secretary, Northern Region, Kaduna, the Resident of Zaria Province explained how disturbed the Emir was with N.E.P.U. activities and he suggested the things to be discontinued in order to blunt N.E.P.U.'s appeal; see NAK, File No. 45, ZAR PROF.
 2. See Government Circular headed "Intervention in local affairs by political bodies", in NAK, File ibid.
 3. A detailed analysis of this aspect of N.E.P.U. activity in Zaria Emirate is made by Smith, M.G., "Historical and Cultural Conditions of Political Corruption among the Hausa", in Comparative Studies in Society and History, VI (1963-4), pp. 164-194.

and direct elections, by secret ballot, were held in most urban centres. In several cases parties opposed to the Government and the Native Authorities controlled the Town Councils. For instance, N.E.P.U. controlled Funtua, Kano, Mubi, Potiskum and Zaria Town Councils. In Jos, N.E.P.U.'s victory was so overwhelming that the party's Provincial Treasurer, Alhaji Usman Na Garba, was appointed the Magajin Gari (Lord Mayor) of Jos, which also assumed full control over N.A. bureaucracy.¹

African Solidarity

Whereas N.E.P.U. local branches were gaining control of some urban councils in 1956-57, the national leadership of the party was making clear its commitment to the idea of "Pan-Africanism". To the N.E.P.U. the ideal of Pan-Africanism was based on two components. Firstly, N.E.P.U. believed that there was an "African personality" which revealed itself in the attitudes and the institutions of all peoples of African descent. Secondly, that African peoples (and their New World descendants) ought to and would have a common destiny — a notion signifying the political unity of an independent Africa.² With the slogan of "one god, one aim, and one destiny", the idea of Pan-Africanism was disseminated among N.E.P.U. supporters in Northern

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1. That was because, following the recommendation of a commission of inquiry, Jos N.A. Council was dissolved in 1955. For the details of town council election in Jos, see NAK, File KANO PROF: - PRE/42, pp. 27-29. For a report on franchise in Northern Nigeria and N.E.P.U. victory at the local elections see Venture, VIII (No. 3, July 1956), p. 9.
 2. Interview with Alhaji Aminu Kano, at Kano and with Alhaji Ali Batan Yerima Balla at Gombi, 1977. Alhaji Ali Batan Yerima Balla was the Deputy President of N.E.P.U. He was one of the members from Adamawa to the Federal House of Representatives, Lagos, 1959-1964. He became a civil commissioner in the North-Eastern State Government of Nigeria, 1967-1975.

Nigeria. Their conception of the Pan African Movement transcended the established nation-state's boundaries: it was built upon much wider cultural and geographical affiliations. In the Muslim North, Pan-Africanism was often presented in religious terms, i.e. Pan-Islamism (or Arabism). This method followed the Hausa idea of Jama'a which conceived a community united by religion and in which language, ethnicity or territorial differences were insignificant. In fact the literal meaning of the word Jama'a is much nearer to "Commonwealth" than to that of a "nation". In physical or geographical terms, N.E.P.U. appealed to the continental unity of the "black people" (coloured inclusive) wherever they happened to be. That was also in keeping with the idea of Jama'a which, in fact, derived from the Islamic ideal of community. Thus, the idea of Pan-Africanism differed from that of a national movement in scale and in degree, though both the national movement and Pan-Africanism were political innovations which aimed at satisfying one thing: nationalism, i.e. independence, decolonization and development.¹

It was, therefore, with a firm belief in Pan-Africanism that Aminu Kano represented N.E.P.U. at the Accra Conference in 1953 to consider the possibility of forming a "West African Federation".² Following this the party's relationship with other African nationalists began to warm up. N.E.P.U. was particularly close to Djibo Bakary's Sawaba party, the Partie de Federation Africain (P.F.A.) section in

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1. Interview with Alhaji Aminu Kano, ibid. This whole idea was presented in a simplified form in a song by a leading N.E.P.U. singer in Kano city, Alhaji Lawan Maiturane, Africa Kasa Maison 'Yanci (Africa: A continent in search of freedom), Kano, 8 August 1961. The original copy of this song is in my possession.
 2. See a report on this conference in West Africa (No. 1921), 19 December 1953, pp. 1177-8.

Niger Republic.¹ In 1965, there were many exiled members of the Niger's Sawaba Party, in Kano, Jos and Kaduna (N.E.P.U.'s stronghold). N.E.P.U. was also friendly with Dr. Kwame Nkrumah's Convention Peoples Party (C.P.P.) in Ghana.² At the African Peoples Conference in Accra in December 1958, the N.E.P.U. delegation's address ended in these words:

This conference must condemn "apartheid", and all African Nations in close collaboration with their Asiatic brethren must take stand about South Africa; the restoration of the dignity of the "Black Man" is an avowed duty for us all. 3

The Beginning of the End

The foregoing shows that N.E.P.U. was not only concerned with the abuses of power in Northern Nigeria but also with the wider problems of the African continent. But the party's main arena was the Emirates and its emphasis was to check the malpractices of the N.A. system, especially in the rural areas. The successes scored in the 1956-57 urban elections raised the hopes of the party. All N.E.P.U. officials were optimistic that the 1959 general elections, when the secret ballot system would, for the first time, operate all over Nigeria, might give them their first taste of victory over the conservative forces in Northern Nigeria.⁴ That optimism was based on the theory that given the

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1. See Fuglestad, F., "Djibo Bakary, the French and the Referendum of 1958 in Niger", in Journal of African History, XIV (No. 2, 1973), pp. 313-330. Also see Alhaji Lawan Maiturane, op. cit., p. 2.
 2. In a recent interview in London (on 12/11/79), Alhaji Aminu Kano informed the writer that he thought of naming the N.E.P.U. as the C.P.P. but the idea was dropped because it would be too obvious that they were copying Dr. Nkrumah in Ghana and that the relationship between the two parties in Ghana and Nigeria remained "cordial".
 3. Quoted in Sklar, op. cit., p. 374.
 4. See a song by Alhaji Lawan Maiturane which aimed to raise the hopes of N.E.P.U. supporters and to urge the electorate to vote for N.E.P.U. in 1959 Federal elections: Zabe Yazo Rana Guda Dan Sawaba Zaka Ga Gaskiya (meaning, roughly, election by secret ballot has arrived. N.E.P.U. members will obtain justice). A copy of this song which is undated is in my possession.

opportunity to vote secretly, the Talakawa would use their votes to further their own interests by voting the party which represented that interest (N.E.P.U.) and reject the party of property and privilege (N.P.C.) which was against their interests. In 1958, N.E.P.U.'s strength appeared to be so formidable that many N.A. officials and Attajirai (rich merchants) were secretly enrolling in the party.¹ Many people then held dual membership cards of both N.E.P.U. and N.P.C. That action was a reflection of the uneasiness of those people about the approaching Federal Elections in 1959.

The result of the 1959 General Elections was a shattering disappointment for N.E.P.U. because its political activities did not lead to parliamentary power. The party obtained more than half a million votes but won only eight seats in Northern Nigeria.² All the election did was to give N.E.P.U. a voice in the Federal House of Representatives but at the same time it created confusion within the party. Since none of the parties won sufficient seats to form a government alone, N.P.C. formed a coalition government with N.C.N.C. (N.E.P.U.'s ally). Subsequently, Alhaji Aminu Kano (the N.E.P.U. leader) was appointed a government whip. This appointment was opposed by all N.E.P.U. branches in Northern Nigeria, who were already against any idea of cooperation with N.P.C. government. But due to strong discipline (see below) in the party, a semblance of unity was maintained pending the forthcoming 1961 Northern Regional Elections. It was hoped

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1. For example, in Potiskum and Azare towns, the writer acted as an intermediary who sold N.E.P.U. membership cards and collected funds for the party from many U.A.C. customers. Similarly, I put many N.A. staff in touch with party officials in many areas, including Jos.
 2. See Post, K.W.J., Nigerian Federal Election, 1959 (Oxford, 1963), pp. 367-75.

TABLE 3:5. COMPARISON OF VOTES AND SEATS BY PARTY AND REGION¹

Region	Action Group			National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon/ Northern Elements Progressive Union						Northern Peoples Congress				Small Parties and Independents			TOTAL	
	Votes		Seats	Votes		Seats	Votes		Seats	Votes		Seats	Votes		Seats			
	Votes	%	Seats	%	Votes	%	Seats	%	Votes	%	Seats	%	Votes	%	Seats			
Northern Region	559,878	17.2	25	14.4	525,575	16.1	8	4.6	1,994,045	61.2	134	77	179,022	5.5	7	4.6	3,258,520	174
Eastern Region	445,144	23.1	14	19.2	1,246,984	64.6	58	79.5	-	-	-	-	237,626	12.3	1	1.3	1,929,754	73
Western Region	933,680	49.5	33	53.2	758,462	40.2	21	33.8	32,960	1.7	-	-	162,107	8.6	8	13.0	1,887,209	62
Federal Territory	48,137	43.8	1	33.3	61,608	55.9	26	6.7	189	.2	-	-	138	.1	-	-	110,072	3
TOTAL	1,986,839	27.6	73		2,592,629	36.1	89		2,027,194	28.2	134		578,893	81.0	16		7,185,555	312

NOTES

1. In interpreting the above figures it has to be borne in mind that only males may vote in the Northern Region, so that one vote is roughly equivalent to two elsewhere.
2. The principle which has been adopted is to show the candidates as they stood for election (i.e. as Independents or as members of a party).
3. Of the 16 successful candidates under the heading "Small Parties" and "Independents" the one in the Eastern Region represented the Niger Delta Congress, and one in the North represented the Igbirra Tribal Union. The rest stood as Independents. The Niger Delta Congress had, before the election, declared itself to be in alliance with the N.P.C.
4. Apart from the Niger Delta Congress candidate, 13 of the remaining 15 have subsequently declared support for the N.P.C. and 2 for the Action Group, so that the effective strength of the parties and their supporters after the elections was: N.P.C., 148; N.C.N.C./N.E.P.U., 89; Action Group, 75.
5. It may appear inconsistent with Note 2 above to show the N.C.N.C./N.E.P.U. as one party. The reason for this is that before the election the two parties signed a joint declaration saying that they would contest the election as one party, and not as two parties in alliance.

1. This is reproduced from Government's Report on the Nigeria Federal Elections, December 1959 (Government Printer, Lagos, p. 24, in NAK, Elections Rile Ref: RG7/1. This pamphlet contains an official description of the arrangements as well as the administration of the elections.

that if N.E.P.U. could win the Region Elections, then it would break its alliance with the N.C.N.C. (thus ceasing to be a member of the Federal Coalition Government) and go it alone.

But that hope was also destined not to be realized because many changes took place in Nigeria and, especially, in Northern Nigeria, which made it impossible for an opposition party to win an election in any region. For example, in contrast to N.E.P.U., which was never in power and could only speak vaguely of political reforms and socio-economic improvements, the N.P.C. had been in power for nearly ten years and could therefore rely on its record in office. Even more important to the Northern Nigerian electorate, the N.P.C. promised to "Northernize" the civil service in the shortest possible time. In March 1959, Northern Nigeria became self-governing and since the 1959 Federal elections installed the N.P.C. in the centre, by the same token, the N.P.C.-controlled government in Northern Nigeria was further consolidated. Thus, the N.P.C. increased and intensified its "Northernization policy". This policy preferred a Nigerian of Northern origin for employment and, in the absence of a suitable Northern Nigerian, an expatriate on a contract basis, to a Nigerian from the Southern Regions.¹

As a result of the Northernization policy, the Administrative Service of Northern Nigeria was filled by the members of the ruling elites who were the first (or even most preferred) to go to Western schools in Northern Nigeria.² In view of their social origins or

1. See NAK, File No. MSWC/402/S.1, pp. 1-10.

2. An analysis of the British colonial policy on education in Northern Nigeria is made in Sonia, G.F., Government and Mission Education in Northern Nigeria 1900-1919 (Ibadan, 1966). But the primary source still remains in "Northern Nigeria Reports" in NAK, Kaduna. Reports for the years 1935-1953 are most relevant for the period we cover. Also see Crampton, E.P.T., Christianity in Northern Nigeria (London, 1979); Ubah, C.N., "Problems of Christian Missionaries in Muslim Emirates of Nigeria, 1900-1928", Journal of African Studies, III (No. 3, 1976), pp. 351-371; Gbadamosi, G.O., "The Establishment of Western Education among Muslims in Nigeria", Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, IV (No. 1, December 1967), pp. 89-115.

socialization processes or both, most of the new administrative officers were sympathetic to the N.P.C.¹ Those indigenous officers replaced British officers from the Provincial and Divisional Administrations and thus made way for the increased and more effective harassment of N.E.P.U. members by a series of indiscriminate arrests either for "illegal meeting" or "misbehaviour" under the newly enacted section 37 of the N.A. Law, for the control of "unlawful" assembly.² Similarly, N.E.P.U.'s attempt to obtain redress for aggrieved commoners were rendered ineffective by the enforcement of a new administrative rule that complaints of official misconduct were to be entertained only if made personally by the complainant.³ Consequently, the N.E.P.U. branch leadership was sentenced to silence by those events and the party's organization became tattered. Many N.E.P.U. supporters were forced or induced to defect to the N.P.C. As N.A. officials became aware that government administrators did not permit the N.E.P.U. organization to

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1. See "Administrative service in Africa", West Africa (No. 3062-6) 8 March - 5 April, 1976. See also A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, "The New African Administrator", in Journal of Modern African Studies, X (No. 1, 1972), pp. 93-107; and "Bureaucratic Cadres in a Traditional Milieu", in Coleman, J.S. (ed.), Education and Political Development (Princeton, 1968), pp. 372-407; also see his perceptive analysis on "The merit principle in an African Bureaucracy: Northern Nigeria", in Rivkin, A., Nations by Design (1968), pp. 257-285.
 2. NAK, File No. MIN. FOR LOCAL GOVT: MLG/CON/29, contains copies of the N.A. Laws and other Government ordinances; and File No. Premier's Office: ASL/919 contains copies of Government Circulars which stipulated the role of public officials in dealing with political parties and, especially, at election times. See M.G. Smith, op. cit., p. 191.
 3. NAK, File No. 45, ZAR PROF, contains a Government circular, No. 287/1948 of 25/11/1948 which explained how government officials should deal with the problem of "Intervention in local affairs by political bodies", but in 1952 a more stern instruction, specifically headed, "Northern Elements Progressive Union", was issued in a Secret Circular No. Sec. 100 of 13/6/1952. This circular warned that redressing decisions/actions taken by local officials, on the intervention of N.E.P.U. agents was "improving the strength and prestige of the party". The circular urged that "N.E.P.U. should be treated with customary courtesy" but the imagined complaints of these "discredited riff-raff" must be made to pass through recognized channels. Also see Whitaker, op. cit., p. 381.

sponsor private complaints, hell was let loose upon innocent people and thus it amounted to reckless courage to identify oneself as an N.E.P.U. supporter.¹ In fact in 1961 what remained of the N.E.P.U. was only its vocal national leadership. Therefore, it was not surprising that despite the votes it polled (see Table 4:5 below) in the 1961 Regional Election, N.E.P.U. won only one seat in Jos.² Indeed, without an effective opposition in the Northern House of Assembly, the N.P.C. majority became an elected despotism.

The following years became a period of declining morale in the N.E.P.U. Many N.E.P.U. leaders at all levels had either declared for the N.P.C. or had quietly taken gainful employment. In fact, the only N.E.P.U. members remaining were the N.E.P.U. Kaceni, "the N.E.P.U. diehards". On the other hand, the N.P.C. local agents were engaged in a witch hunt of N.E.P.U. members. Except in the urban centres like Jos, Kaduna, Kano and Zaria, it was very risky to be known as an N.E.P.U. member, so much that in several areas most known activists of the party were in exile until 1966 when the Armed Forces took over the Governments of Nigeria. In 1962, N.E.P.U.'s main problem was how to maintain its name even in the press and on the radio. In the same year the U.M.B.C.

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1. Many N.E.P.U. supporters were killed in various parts of the Muslim North. For example, Dr. D.J.M. Muffett has told us that a N.E.P.U. official was beaten to death and thrown into a disused well at Birnin Kudu in Kano Emirate. See Muffet, D.J.M., "Legitimacy and deference in a tradition oriented society: observations arising from an examination of some aspects of a case study associated with the abdication of the Emir of Kano in 1963", in African Studies Review, XVIII (No. 2, September 1975), pp. 101-115.
 2. For detailed results of the 1961 Regional Election, see Dudley, op. cit., pp. 166-168; Sklar, op. cit., p. 33; Whitaker and Sklar, op. cit., p. 654. An analysis of the election process and its prophetic consequence is made by O'Connell, J., "Northern Regional Election, 1961: An Analysis", in The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, IV (No. 1, 1962), pp. 181-187.

TABLE 4:5

NORTHERN HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY ELECTION IN 1961

VOTES OBTAINED BY PARTIES¹

<u>Party</u>	<u>Votes</u>
N.P.C.	1,506,934
A.G.	332,586
N.E.P.U./N.C.N.C. alliance	319,377
Independent candidates	40,747
Igala Union/N.P.C. alliance	26,530
Igala Divisional Union/N.P.C. alliance	22,564
Igbirra Tribal Union/N.P.C. alliance	9,773
Kabba Federal Union/Kabba Divisional Union	3,739
Middle Belt State Party/N.P.C. alliance	320
Borgu Talaka Parapo /Action Group alliance	320

The state of the parties in the House of Assembly were:

N.P.C.	160 seats
A.G.	9 seats
N.E.P.U.	1 seat

Altogether 158 candidates lost their deposits: a total amount of £11,850, distributed among the parties as follows:

A.G. (92)	£ 6,900
N.E.P.U. (48)	3,600
Others (13)	975
N.P.C. (5)	375

1. The details in this table are culled from the Government Newsheet, Northern Nigeria Daily Press Service (No. 1240), Kaduna, 10/5/61; also see NAK, File No. Kano PROF: PRE/4, p. 126.

broke away its alliance with its main financier, the A.G., because the latter was in crisis¹ and thus fell in serious financial difficulty. So, while the N.E.P.U. was on the verge of organizational collapse, the U.M.B.C. was faced with its possible extinction as an opposition political party in the Middle Belt area of the Northern Region. Hence, the two parties were impelled to pool their resources, as a united opposition group, if they were to survive as political parties.

The Northern Progressives Front²

The N.P.F. came into existence in October 1963 as a united front of Northern Nigerian opposition parties, held together by their common opposition to the N.P.C. and for electoral purposes, otherwise each party retained its separate identity. Alhaji Aminu Kano, the N.E.P.U. leader, was elected the President, whereas Mr. J.S. Tarka, the U.M.B.C. leader, became the General Secretary. Together, they unsuccessfully campaigned for a majority in the 1964 General elections in Northern Nigeria.

At the same time, a crisis of legitimacy³ arose in Kano following the deposition of the all powerful Emir, Alhaji Sir Muhammadu Sanusi, by the Northern Regional Government. Consequently, the supporters of Emir

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1. Martin Dent's article in Mackintosh, J.P., op. cit., pp. 461-507, discusses in detail the A.G. crisis and how it affected the U.M.B.C.
 2. Dudley, op. cit., p. 185, analyses the circumstances which brought about the formation of the N.P.F. and in pp. 324-327 he reproduces the Instrument Establishing the N.P.F.
 3. This point was ably dealt with by D.J.M. Muffet, op. cit. (see footnote 1, p. 250). Mr. Muffet was the Senior Administrative Officer in Northern Nigeria who, as the Government appointed Sole Commissioner, enquired into the finances of Kano N.A. The Emir of Kano, Muhammadu Sanusi, was deposed as a result of his report. Also see, Skinner, N. (trans. and ed.), Alhaji Mahmudu Koki, Kano Malam (Zaria, 1977), pp. 141-2.

Sanusi formed the Kano Peoples Party (K.P.P.)¹ in April 1963. The main objective of the K.P.P. was to secure the return of the ex-Emir Sanusi to his throne or the succession of his eldest son, Ado Sanusi. The executive officers of the K.P.P. were jailed for abusing the Sardauna, almost immediately after the party was formed. Hence, the K.P.P. became heavily reliant on N.E.P.U. and in January 1964, the two parties were formally allied. Apparently, N.E.P.U. leaders felt that Emir Sanusi was deposed, not for his crimes against the people of Kano Emirate, but because of a rivalry for power and authority between the ex-Emir and the Premier of the Northern Region, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto. Thus, N.E.P.U. believed that Alhaji Sir Muhammadu Sanusi was unfairly treated by the Regional Government², hence its sympathy with the ex-Emir and its subsequent alliance with the K.P.P. But no sooner was the alliance agreement reached between the parties than N.E.P.U. transformed the K.P.P. to Kano State Movement (K.S.M.) and thus the political demands of K.P.P. supporters was widened and their energies channeled into the new party which agitated for the creation of a separate Kano State from the existing Northern Region of Nigeria.³

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1. Paden, op. cit., pp. 266-272 analysed the circumstances which led to the emergence of K.P.P. and subsequently K.S.M.; and K.W.J. Post and M. Vickers, Structure and Conflict in Nigeria, 1960-1966 (London, 1973), p. 102, described the popularity of K.P.P. in Kano.
 2. Interview with Alhaji Ibrahim Biu at Maiduguri in 1972. Alhaji Ibrahim Biu was Minister of Information in Northern Regional Government in 1961-1966 and, at the same period, he was also a member of the National Executive Committee of the N.P.C. In 1967-1975 he was a Civil Commissioner in the North East State Government of Nigeria.
 3. This was the result of N.E.P.U.'s influence which was clearly using the K.S.M. to do the groundwork with its full support. In 1965 N.E.P.U. leaders became convinced that it was very difficult, if not impossible, for the party to win elections and to introduce reforms in Northern Nigeria, hence the demand for the creation of Kano State. This represented a marked change of policy on the part of N.E.P.U., which was previously opposed to the creation of states in the North. But even then N.E.P.U. demanded an "effective" Federal Government. Interview with Alhaji Tanko Yakasai in Kano, 1972. However, Paden, op. cit., p. 271, argued that the K.S.M. was a resurgence of "Kano nationalism", i.e. he was drawing a parallel with the crisis which led to the nineteenth century civil war in Kano.

K.S.M. worked closely with N.E.P.U. (they shared the N.E.P.U. Secretariat in Kano). Obviously, K.S.M. and N.E.P.U. were one and the same thing, but it seemed that separate names were maintained to keep the momentum for the demand for the creation of a Kano state and thus deploy local activities to that goal while national leaders of N.E.P.U. tried to grapple with national problems. Also the alliance saved N.E.P.U. from having to explain (or even defend itself) publicly, why it changed position from its previously known preference for the establishment of Provincial Administration with an effective centre (see below) to its demand for a Kano state within the Nigerian Federation.

In 1964, the N.P.F. along with the N.C.N.C. and the remnants of the A.G. formed the United Progressives Grand Alliance (U.P.G.A.). Under the umbrella of the U.P.G.A. all the parties campaigned for the 1964 Federal elections. But sensing defeat due to the irregularities of the campaigns as well as the election arrangements, the U.P.G.A. partially boycotted the General Elections in protest¹, and thus they set in motion the events which led to the military take-over of the Government in 1966.

Party Structure and Organization²

N.E.P.U.'s organization was simply structured and highly centralized, based on direct individual membership. Significantly, the important

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1. The perceptive analysis of this crisis is made in detail by K.W.J. Post and M. Vickers, op. cit., pp. 161-189.
 2. Dudley, op. cit., p. 171, denied the existence of any N.E.P.U. organization except in ad hoc form: a conclusion probably derived from the lack of records in N.E.P.U. Headquarters in Kano on the party's branches. He asserted that N.E.P.U. has no constitution (p. 172). The fact is that N.E.P.U. has a constitution published in Hausa: Jam'iyyar Neman Sawaba: Manufa, Sharudda da Ka'idodi (printed in Great Britain by Lowe and Brydone Ltd., London, n.d.). A copy of this constitution is in possession of the writer. Sklar, op.

N.E.P.U. units did not necessarily coincide with the Administrative Divisions. For instance, some of the party's branches in Misau Division of Bauchi Province came under Potiskum in Fika Division of Borno Province. However, rural, town or district branches were often coterminous with administrative units. The lowest level organization was the ward branch, where the party's agent responsible for the ward kept a record of members and collected membership fees either weekly or monthly. He also knew all party supporters in his ward. His duties included keeping members and supporters informed of party activities and politics as well as canvassing for new members. He represented his ward in town or district branch meetings.¹ Each party agent was elected by members in his ward and he was recognized by the town or the rural branch. All town and district officers were elected annually. Each town or district branch had a president, secretary and treasurer, and in turn, one or two of the branch officers (depending on the membership of the branch concerned) represented their branch on the relevant higher body. There was a direct chain of command linking local branches to one another and on to the Provincial body.

In the early 1950's N.E.P.U. organization was very skeletal. Party branches existed in the urban centres (especially in Kano, Jos, Kaduna and Zaria). But by the mid 1950's, the party's structure began to take

op. cit., p. 418, admitted that N.E.P.U. organization existed but was more effective at two levels, i.e. "the branch, at the urban and rural district level, and the provincial executive." But Post, op. cit., pp. 133 and 147-9 only made a detailed analysis of N.E.P.U.'s activities at the National and Provincial levels, at election times. In addition to interviews, I draw very heavily from my personal experience as a member of N.E.P.U. branch committees in Potiskum, Yola and Jos. I also worked in the N.E.P.U. Headquarters in Kano during the 1964 Federal Elections.

1. That was the detailed functions of a party agent at Potiskum, Fika Division, Borno Province, where the writer acquired personal experience and so was the case in many other branches in Borno, Adamawa, Bauchi and Plateau provinces.

shape. In 1956 provincial organizers were appointed and the National Secretariat was properly organized into departments. The Provincial Organizers were the party's overseers in the provinces. They ensured that the existing branches were functioning properly and they helped to organize new ones. They organized and helped to run adult literacy and political classes to train party cadres and educated members by explaining to them their rights under the law. They also helped to organize Islamiyya schools (see below). Provincial organizers submitted reports on their activities to the National Organizing Secretary and were the effective links between their respective provinces and the National Headquarters. Whereas all other provincial officers of the party were elected by the annual provincial conferences, the organizers were appointed by the National Secretariat at Kano. They were not necessarily sent to their provinces of origin. For example, in the early 1960's, Lamin Sanusi, from Potiskum in Borno province, was the Provincial Organizer of Bauchi province. Lawan Dambazau, from Kano, was sent to Sokoto; and M. Garba Kano, from Kano, went to Borno province. They were employees of the National Secretariat and they were paid £360 p.a.¹ (in the 1960's) by the N.E.P.U. Headquarters.

Another important component of N.E.P.U. organization was the Election Committee. From 1951 to 1956 each province had an election committee which accepted recommendations on prospective candidates from branches and made the final selection for all the constituencies in the province.

1. This was very attractive salary at the time, considering that a teacher grade II (i.e. a primary school head teacher) earned between £18 and £25 a month (depending on his length of service). The salary scale was equivalent to that of N.A. councillors, assistant executive officers in the civil service, and senior staff in the private sector. Unfortunately, this relatively good salary did not stop some officials (e.g. Lamin Sanusi and Adamu Abubakar Jajire) breaking away from N.E.P.U. to join N.P.C. or the civil service.

But in 1960 that was changed so that each constituency had its own election committee. Whereas in 1956-1959 the party's headquarters paid all election expenses, in 1961-1964, each constituency paid most election expenses, except deposits, which were first paid by the constituency committees but later on refunded by the National Headquarters. Presumably, this change reflected the partial collapse of N.E.P.U., underlined by organizational disarray due to lack of finance. After the 1961 Regional Election it became obvious that N.E.P.U. had little, if any electoral prospects, hence most of the better educated members defected to the N.P.C. Denuded of talents, N.E.P.U. organization suffered irreparable damage.

Each provincial branch held an annual conference of the party to elect its officers for the following year as well as to elect branch and provincial delegates to the party's General Annual Conference. After 1961, some provinces like Adamawa, Benue, Kabbia, etc., were unable to hold provincial conferences, due to many and varied reasons (see above) but others like Kano, Plateau, Zaria, etc., continued to do so until 1965.

The Annual Conferences of N.E.P.U., which was held regularly from 1951 to 1965, was vested with supreme authority. The conferences were attended by delegates from all branches who could afford the expenses and by representatives of the youth and women's wings of the party. The conferences elected most members of the National Executive Committee (N.E.C.), whose number fluctuated, on provincial basis. The President also nominated between four and seven members of the N.E.C. for the approval of the conference. The Western and Eastern regions of Nigeria had two representatives each on the N.E.C.; so did Kaduna Capital territory, youth wing, women's wing, and ex-servicemen union. Kano

Waje Area and Labour Unions were represented by one member each on the N.E.C.¹ The N.E.C. was expected to meet three times in a year to implement conference decisions and to decide on policies between conferences. It also disciplined any erring national officers of the party.

The Central Working Committee (C.W.C.) was responsible for the day to day running of the party, especially of the National Secretariat. The exact number of its membership was undefined but it comprised members both elected and nominated as well as all the departmental heads in the National Secretariat. Half of whatever happened to be the number of C.W.C. members every year were to be elected by the Annual Conference of the party; the President nominated a further four members, whose names were first to be submitted to and approved by the Annual Conference of the party.

Prior to 1960, the President General of N.E.P.U., like all party officials, was elected annually at the party's annual conferences. But, in January 1960, at Jos, the annual conference confirmed Alhaji Aminu Kano as N.E.P.U.'s President General for life. The President General, in consultation with the elected members of the N.E.C. selected four ex-officio members of N.E.C., subject to ratification by the annual conference. A great deal of N.E.P.U. business was conducted by sub-committees whose members were either elected or selected by the

1. This and the following paragraph are based on my interview with Malam Adamu Abubakar Jajire at Potiskum, 1976. M. Adamu was a N.E.P.U. Secretary at Potiskum and he rose up the ladder to become Assistant General Secretary in 1959-61. After the 1961 Regional Elections he defected to the N.P.C. but returned to join the N.E.P.U. again in 1964. Sklar, *op. cit.*, pp. 418-419 discusses the N.E.C. very briefly, but in pp. 524-527 he makes a list of N.E.P.U.'s national officers, principal advisers and parliamentarians. Dudley, *op. cit.*, pp. 172-173 discusses both N.E.P.U.'s N.E.C. and C.W.C.

annual conference of the party. The most important of those committees were the Finance and the Election Committees.

Party branches were instructed to adhere to policies made by the N.E.C. through the full-time Provincial Organizers. In that way the conference decisions provided the general guidelines within which the party operated for a period of one year. The conference elected the members of the committees which made policies and looked after the day to day business of the party. Ultimately, all national officers were answerable to the membership through the Annual Conferences.¹

Auxiliary Bodies: Communities, Youths and Women in N.E.P.U.

N.E.P.U.'s auxiliary organizations included a small number of communalist bodies, such as the Kilba Tribal Union and the Kare-Kare and Ngizimawa Tribal Union, which represented small communities particularly disadvantaged by the N.A. system. In the 1950's many tribal unions, such as the Southern Zaria Freedom Movement and the Middle Belt Peoples Party and the Zamfara Peoples Party, etc., were affiliated to the N.E.P.U., but most of such affiliates of N.E.P.U. from the lower North disaffiliated from the party and went alone because their leadership had ambitions for the creation of new regions from the Northern Region, which were not in keeping with N.E.P.U. policy. Those who accepted N.E.P.U. policy on tribal unions and remained with the party were soon to be absorbed by N.E.P.U. branch organizations. N.E.P.U. policy on tribal unions was briefly as follows:

- 1) They must carry N.E.P.U. cards and not that of their tribal union.

1. For a brief but useful discussion on decision making in the N.E.P.U., see Dudley, op. cit., p. 173.

- 2) The union as a body was automatically given a seat in the N.E.C.
- 3) Their problems were regarded as part of the wider problem of "class" relations arising from economic exploitation, political oppression and social repression as analysed by N.E.P.U. which were collectively tackled by the party at the national level.
- 4) Following the above, tribal unions affiliated to N.E.P.U. became means of recruitment for the party at the local levels.¹

This policy aimed to negate tribal consciousness and ethnic competition and thereby eliminate, or at least, to minimise tribal hatred and mistrust which bedevilled Nigerian politics.² The ultimate objective of the policy was to subsume the false "ideology of tribalism"³ to the wider struggle of the peasants against their rulers. The policy worked in the Muslim North where the society is relatively homogeneous and in which the great power was concentrated in the hands of the Northern Emirs. Thus in the far North, tribal discrimination was seen as another aspect of the subjugation of the Talakawa and the N.A. system

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1. Interview with both Alhaji Aminu Kano and Alhaji Ali Batan Yerima Balla, at Gombi, on 7/4/1977. Yerima Balla was the president of the Kilba Tribal Union.
 2. The subject of "tribalism" in Nigerian politics captured the attention of scholars, especially during the period just before and, indeed, on the outbreak of the civil war. For example, see Akintunde, J.O., "The Demise of Democracy in the First Republic of Nigeria: A casual analysis", in Odu, IV (No. 2, 1967), pp. 3-28; Oyediran, O., "The role of Ethnicity and Partisanship in the Politics of Nigerian Students", in Odu, IV (No. 2, 1968), pp. 3-29; Nnoli, O., "The Dynamics of Ethnic politics in Nigeria", in Odu, New Series, No. 14 (1976), pp. 3-25; Sofola, J.A., "Some Aspects of Pre-crisis Inter-ethnic Relations in Nigeria: The Yoruba Repatriates' Social Relations in the Former Eastern Region", in The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, XII (No. 1, 1970), pp. 115-132. Also see Anon., "Reflections on the Nigerian Revolution", in South Atlantic Quarterly, Autumn 1966, and Onwubu, C., "Ethnic identity, Political Integration and National Development: The Igbo Diaspora in Nigeria", Journal of Modern African Studies, XIII (No. 3, September 1975), pp. 399-413.
 3. This phrase is coined and ably analysed by Mafeje, A., "The Ideology of Tribalism", Journal of Modern African Studies, IX (No. 2, August 1971), pp. 253-261.

as the enemy of all tribal groups, Muslims and non-Muslims alike. But in the Middle Belt areas, the whole purpose of political organization was, first and foremost, to resist Muslim domination of their region. Historically, these areas were Gwari (pagan) areas and as such the legitimate targets for slave raiders. Their plight was changed by colonization and, especially, by the introduction of Christianity and Mission Schools. Their first political awareness¹ came about in the 1950's and it manifested itself in their attempt to assert their tribal identity by their control of their local political institutions. Subsequently, they realized that they were in a hopeless numerical minority in the Northern Region and that the Muslim majority would continue to rule the North for a long time to come. Their solution was to demand a separate Middle Belt Region to be carved out of the then Northern Region in which Hausa/Fulani Muslims were dominant. Hence, their politics was primarily anti-Muslim and anti-Hausa/Fulani; indeed against everything the "North" stood for. Thus N.E.P.U. which was based in the Muslim North and which seemed to articulate the grievances of the Hausa/Fulani Talakawa against their Muslim rulers, was ultimately rejected in the Middle Belt Areas.

The most important wings of the N.E.P.U. were the youth and women's wings of the party. The first of these originated in the "Askianist Movement" (see Chapter IV, pp. 212-213) which in 1952 temporarily changed

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1. M. Dent's article in Mackintosh, op. cit., analysed Tiv political awareness in detail. In addition, see Dorward, D.C., "The Development of the British Colonial Administration among the Tiv, 1900-1949", in African Affairs, LXVIII (No. 273, October 1969), pp. 316-333; and "Ethnography and Administration: A study of Anglo-Tiv misunderstanding", in Journal of African History, XV (No. 3, 1974), pp. 457-477. These two articles provide useful background on political development and awakening in Tiv Division.

its name to "Northern Aminiyya Movement", and from time to time called itself "The Northern Askianist (Aminiyya) Movement". It was devoted to disseminating among the youth N.E.P.U.'s class analysis of Northern Nigeria and especially to inflame the traditional animosity between the Habe stock and the members of the Fulani ruling classes. In April 1952, it restated its aims and objectives as follows¹:

- 1) This society is properly established , therefore, there is no objection to its interference in the matter of constitutions whether just or unjust.
- 2) It agrees with the existence of Emirs but in future it wants the people to have control of the conduct of affairs.
- 3) It has the firm aim of ending the oppression of old persons without family support who die of hunger in the market for lack of attention.
- 4) If there is an opportunity it will establish a school with a wide curriculum of subjects so that people may understand their condition and demand justice, which is their due from those in authority over them.
- 5) The society will cooperate with any society which has the good of this country at heart although it may differ in opinion from it.
- 6) It will help anyone be he rich or poor who is oppressed, especially he who has truth on his side, and every effort will be made to see that he gets his just demands.
- 7) It will demand economic development so that business may prosper and traders enjoy prosperity in a spirit of friendship.
- 8) Every effort will be made to see that Europeans take their hands out of the affairs of the country, especially affairs of finance.
- 9) It will advise educated and intelligent persons on certain subjects which may cause peaceful and prosperous progress.

Obviously, in colonial Nigeria some of the above objectives were clearly seditious but legal action could not be taken either due to its obscure language or a deliberate policy to ignore N.E.P.U. and its auxiliaries or both.²

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1. Points 1-9 are quoted from N.A.M.'s aims and objectives, a copy of which is with M. Uba Taura (see footnote 1, p. 217). See NAK, File No. 45, ZAR PROF, pp. 79-84, for an official report on the activities of the N.A.M.
 2. Official concern on the N.A.M. clearly showed in the NAK File, ibid., especially in pp. 38-39. However, there was a standing instruction (see footnote 3, p. 249) in confidential circular No. Sec. 100 of 13th June 1952 which explained that the Government policy towards N.E.P.U. was "As far as is practicable, to ignore it until or unless its members indulge in activities which are contrary to law or threaten a breach of the peace." NAK, File ibid., p. 19.

A second youth organization which came into existence in 1953 but was very quickly dissolved in 1954 when its actions proved embarrassing to N.E.P.U. was the Positive Action Wing. The P.A.W. was especially formed to protect N.E.P.U. members against N.P.C.'s Jam'iyar Mahaukata¹, literally "Madmen's Party", which was a group of political "enforcers" founded in 1953 and known to have existed in Kano only. This group was purposely organized by the N.P.C. to disrupt a political tour of Northern Nigeria by A.G. politicians led by the late Chief S.L. Akintola. But after the Kano riot of 1953² they began to attack N.E.P.U. members, hence N.E.P.U. reacted by organising P.A.W. supposedly in self defence; but the P.A.W. turned out to be even more violent, hence its dissolution in 1954.³

In 1954, the Askianist Movement was succeeded by Rundunan Samarin Sawaba (R.S.S.)⁴ literally "The Freedom Youth Wing". This was a youth

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1. Dudley, op. cit., pp. 24-25, implies that Inuwa had a hand in its formation to retaliate on the A.G. delegation the humiliation suffered by Northern politicians at Lagos in 1953. Whitaker, op. cit., p. 386 says Yan Mahaukata existed in Bida, Lafiya and Chafe, but he mentioned no source or even date (year). Perhaps similar positive action groups existed in other areas. (see footnote 3, below), but according to the writer's knowledge as Dan Sawaba, there is no evidence of its existence anywhere outside Kano.
 2. A copy of the official report on Kano riot, Report on the Kano Disturbances in May 1953, is available in NAK. Although in Appendix B, p. 46, of this report, Inuwa Wada was said to be involved in organizing the J.M., no evidence was produced against him. Bello, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu, op. cit., pp. 110-134, discusses the background to Kano disturbances.
 3. As both the J.M. and P.A.W. were underground organizations, information about them is scanty; what information exists is as horrific as it is legendary. However, it is a well known fact that whenever and wherever law and order broke down, political bodies did organize their own security guards and that varied from area to area. For instance N.E.P.U. had mysterious associations known as Aljanun Dare (Midnight Fairies) at Jos, and Aljanun Tsakar Rana (Dare Devils) at Potiskum. But still no one speaks about these bodies and, as far as we know, their records are not available.
 4. The President of the R.S.S., Alhaji Tijjani Gago, informed the writer that he lost all his papers in police raids at Jos. While the Secretary General, Alhaji Jibril Zololo, explained that what remained of their official files were removed by the police in 1966 when the new military regime banned all political parties.

brigade which was to N.E.P.U. what the "Zikist Movement"¹ was to N.C.N.C., and the "Young Pioneers"² to Nkrumah's C.P.P. in Ghana. R.S.S. was the most successful and, indeed, the most influential of N.E.P.U.'s youth wings. It had a special representative in both N.E.C. and the C.W.C. But constant wrangling for leadership within the R.S.S. greatly weakened it in late 1962. Furthermore, it adopted a policy of confrontation toward N.P.C. after the 1961 elections and it advocated "positive action" against government and N.A. officials, all of whom they thought were the accomplices of N.P.C. in defeating N.E.P.U. in the 1961 Regional Elections. This position was seen by the N.E.P.U. leadership as dangerous and fruitless, and as a result of these incessant disagreements between the R.S.S. and its parent body the former ceased to exist in 1963.

In 1955, a religiously inspired body, Zahral Haq, literally "The Truth is Revealed", was formed: the revelation being N.E.P.U.'s interpretation that "Islam is the religion of fighters for freedom who pursue justice and righteousness; the religion of those who crave for freedom and independence; the school of resisters of exploitation."³ According to N.E.P.U.'s interpretation of the Qur'an, "Islam is as much opposed to political authoritarianism as it is to economic exploitation and injustice hence a religious person is simultaneously a fighter against oppression and cruelty."⁴ Two other youth wings of N.E.P.U. existed at about the same time with R.S.S. Those were Tabi'unah Haq,

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1. See Olusanya, G.O., The Second World War and Politics in Nigeria, 1933-1953 (Lagos, 1973), especially pp. 112-117 and 120-123.
 2. See Austin, D., Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960 (Oxford, 1964).
 3. Interview with Sadi Gabari, the President of Zahral Haq, in Kano, 1976.
 4. For this quote and the subsequent information I am indebted to Alhaji Aminu Kano, interviewed in London on 12/11/1979.

literally "Those who follow the path of Truth"¹, and Nujumun Zaman², literally, "The start of new era". The latter was a young pioneer group whose aims were to recruit youth in their teens into the N.E.P.U. whereas the former was mainly concerned with the organization of the political education of Qur'anic Malams.

As their name showed, the Zaman was an aspect of N.E.P.U.'s strategy to create a new society in Northern Nigeria. The aim was to replace in the minds of the young, the Hausa concept of Biyayya, "obedience", with Mutunci, "human dignity". The difference is that whereas Biyayya is often manifested by slavish attitudes towards superior, Mutunci is characterized by psychological humanism, i.e. the ability to respect the dignity of every man. In this way Mutunci is an inner spirit which is demonstrated by one's ability to respect the human dignity residing in the individual. In order to achieve that goal members of the Zaman were taught some Islamic fundamental tenets which could be the basis of a democratic society and government, notably:

- 1) The supremacy of God, which means the rejection of all idolatry including personality cult and Emir worship. In that way N.E.P.U. asserted that there was no place for monarchy and, worse still, hereditary rulership in Islam.
- 2) Justice and equality under the law which is a negation of class distinction based on any criterion.

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1. Its President General was M. Habu Makwalla. It very quickly spread in the Northern provinces and was particularly strong in Katsina, Jos and Zaria. The writer knows and recently had an interview (August 1978) with its former Secretary, M. Shitu Tela, at Potiskum.
 2. Because this body was mainly concerned with youth in their teens its leadership is not well remembered. Also in 1958 it was outlawed by the Northern Regional Government, hence documents concerning Zaman were destroyed in panic.

- 3) The principle of accountability and responsibility; the participation of people in running their own affairs.
- 4) That it is offensive to human dignity to take off one's shoes for anyone and kneel down in greeting anybody in authority, etc.

Members of the Zaman greeted each other by raising one finger up and saying Allah Daya, literally "God is Alone", meaning we ought to obey God rather than man.

To N.E.P.U. those teachings were "categorical imperatives" if the hearts of the youth were to be changed with the view to changing the "decadent" Hausa society in the future. The government was quick to see the writing on the wall and so the young pioneer groups were quickly proscribed under the Northern Region of Nigeria Children and Young Persons Law of 1958. The law made it illegal for children under the age of 16 to engage in politics or to join any political school.¹

N.E.P.U. women's wing under the leadership of Hajiya Gambo Sawaba² had great significance in Northern Nigeria in the sense that it made real efforts to involve women in politics. Unfortunately, most of its members were unmarried women³ as many married women in the Emirates remained in purdah. Nevertheless, it made its impact felt when it

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1. NAK has a copy of Northern Region Law No. 28 of 1958, especially pp. 33-35. Dudley, op. cit., pp. 174-175 superficially describes N.E.P.U. youth wings; and Sklar, op. cit., pp. 419-20, mentions them briefly but contains useful footnotes.
 2. Sklar, op. cit., p. 419 footnotes 99 and 100, discusses the training and the leadership of the women's wing. Hajiya Gambo herself emphasized the influence of Mrs. Ransome Kuti, the N.C.N.C. women's leader from Abeokuta, Western Nigeria, upon her. See Trust (Nigeria), July 1978, pp. 5-6.
 3. Hajiya Gambo Sawaba, the women's leader, was then married to a policeman in Zaria whereas the Secretary, Malama Ladi Shehu, was then a housewife. In addition she was a teacher in a girls' secondary school at Kakuri-Kaduna South. The fact still remained that not many married women in the Muslim North had the opportunity to participate in public affairs.

campaigned vigorously for women's suffrage in the North. N.E.P.U.'s liberal teachings and unrelenting activities on the liberation of women (see below) provoked zestful discussions and heated debates in the Muslim North. The net result of this was that other parties, especially N.P.C, imitated N.E.P.U. by attempting to organize women, although for different purposes. Whereas N.E.P.U.'s primary objective was to emancipate women and thereby to involve them in all public affairs, N.P.C. was determined to contain women and thus to maintain the status quo which kept women as subordinates of their male counterparts. N.E.P.U.'s limited success in organizing women was that it trained women who on their own kept the agitation for their emancipation alive and thus put a big question mark on the role of women in the traditional North where they had been subservient and very much relegated to the background in almost everything.

N.E.P.U. believed that "there is no justification in Islam for purdah or for the ^{Say}subordination of women."¹ The party explained that Islamic political theory and practice "are the first to emancipate women by giving them equal rights with men in their civic responsibilities as well as guaranteeing them comparable place with men on the platform of fundamental human rights."² On the equality of all human beings references were made to the Qur'an and the Hadith to confirm the equality of all sexes in Islam. For example, the Qur'an teaches that all people are created equal and classified into tribes and nations so as to "know" themselves and that in the eyes of God the best among them are the most

1. This and the subsequent quotation are from my interview with Hajiya Gambo Sawaba at Zaria in 1976.

2. This point was supported and, indeed, elaborated upon by my colleague Dr. M.T. Liman of the Dept. of Arabic, Bayero University, Kano.

pious.¹ The implication of this Qur'anic teaching is that the quality of piety does not discriminate between the sexes. Piety manifests itself in a man or a woman in his or her behaviour, morality, honesty, dedication to duty and positive contribution to society.

In order to encourage women to make their own positive contribution to society, women participated in all N.E.P.U. schools and many of them, notably Amina Karamba, became teachers in such schools. The party believed that the only thing which debarred women from participating in public affairs was ignorance:

They are ignorant about health and child care. Their heads are full of superstitions, legends and apathy. Incapable of devising any new thing, they submit to fate and to the work of medicine men, witches or to the power of prayer. 2

In order to overcome that ignorance N.E.P.U. did not stop in attempting to educate its women members, it also urged all its supporters to send their daughters — the future mothers— to school. The party explained that:

The girls of today are the true educators of citizens in the society of tomorrow. It would be useless to teach in schools principles that are contradicted in homes governed by ignorant mothers ... If this assertion is accepted, the logical conclusion is that education of girls is more important than that of boys.

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1. This is paraphrased from an unpublished paper by Dr. M.T.A. Liman, "Women's Franchise in Islam", p. 4. I suppose the argument here is that since Qur'anic teaching does not specify that the male is superior to the female the imagined superiority of men over women is man-made and thus ought to be changed to ensure the equality of both sexes.
 2. This and the following quotations were made by Alhaji Aminu Kano, the N.E.P.U. leader, cited by Adamu, Al Rashid Haround, The North and Nigerian Unity: Some Reflections on the political, social and educational problems of Northern Nigeria (Zaria, 1973), p. 35. The writer remembers very clearly many touring N.E.P.U. officials using the same arguments and subsequently urging all N.E.P.U. women members to attend adult literacy classes and thereby get rid of their illiteracy and ignorance.

N.E.P.U.'s firm stand on the emancipation of women was based more on the balance of rights than on the equality of rights with men. The party referred to the works of leading Muslims¹, including Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, to support its stand. N.E.P.U. supporters also wrote profusely on the "True position of women in Islam".² N.E.P.U.'s policy on women's education and the numerous hand-outs produced by the party on the subject were all largely adaptations from Aminu Kano's 1947 dissertation on girls' education for the Institute of Education, London University.³

N.E.P.U. and Trade Unions

Although some N.E.P.U. leaders had personal contacts with central labour unions no trade union was officially affiliated to the party.

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1. For example, some of the works of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio are available, among others, in Hodgkin, T.L., Nigerian Perspectives (Oxford, 1975), pp. 254-255; Ogunbiyi, I.A., "The Position of Muslim Women as Stated by Uthmān b. Fudī", in Odu, New Series, No. 1-2 (1969), pp. 43-60. Also see Brown, N. G. and Hiskett, M. (eds.), Conflict and Harmony in Education in Tropical Africa (London, 1974), especially Chapter II, pp. 134-168, and 247-270. On the same theme in North Africa and the Middle East, see Beck, L., and Keddie, N. (eds.), Women in the Muslim World (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), especially Part One, pp. 35-226. Afza, N., and Ahmed, K., The position of Woman in Islam (Karachi, 1969), is an interesting comparison of the position of woman in Islam and Christianity. For a useful contribution towards understanding the position of woman in Muslim parts of Northern Nigeria, see Adamu, Al-Rashid Haroun, Matsayin Arewa A Tarayyar Nijeriya (Zaria, 1973).
 2. The most controversial of these were the articles written by Alhaji Isa Wali, "The True Position of Women in Islam", in Nigerian Citizen, Zaria; the copies of this paper and the articles for the month of July and August 1956 are in NAK. Alhaji Isa Wali was one of the founder members of J.M.A. (see footnote 2, p.220, No. 6). He was the Nigerian High Commissioner in Ghana from 1964 until his untimely death in 1967. For a general study on the position of women in Islam, see V.R. and L. Bevan Jones, Woman in Islam (Lucknow, 1941).
 3. See Aminu Kano, The Problems of Girls' Education in a Muslim Emirate: Kano, Northern Nigeria (Presented to the Institute of Education, London University, in partial fulfilment of the requirement for Diploma certificate in Education, 1947).

However, N.E.P.U. identified itself with workers' interests and some individual trade unionists were known to be the party's supporters. For instance, the late Gogo Chu Nzeribe considered N.E.P.U. to be "The most conscious radical political organization in the country."¹ Mr. G.C. Nzeribe was a strong supporter of N.E.P.U. Another left wing trade unionist, Mr. Eskor Toyo² taught off and on at N.E.P.U. political school in 1959-1964. Alhaji Ibrahim Nock³ was also associated with N.E.P.U. and N.P.F., especially in 1963-1964, i.e. just before he identified himself with N.P.C. N.E.P.U.'s inability to win direct support of the trade unions was due to the fact that Nigerian workers' unions were then essentially "house unions" organized around a single employer, not "trade unions" based on trade or professional groups, as is the case in the industrialized countries of Western Europe.⁴ Consequently, most individual unions in the North were at the mercy of their employers and of the Government and, therefore, dared not openly oppose the Government party; worse still, support a radical political party: that was in contrast to the role of the trade unions in the South in the 1940's, especially in their relationship with N.C.N.C., Zikist wing. However, Nigerian politics, even after independence, remained largely determined by ethnic cleavages and that obscured the

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1. Quoted in West Africa (No. 2502), 15 May 1965, p. 533. Gogo was the General Secretary of Post and Telecommunications Workers' Union in Nigeria. The circumstances of his murder at Lagos in 1967 are yet to be known.
 2. Esko, as he is fondly remembered by his N.E.P.U. comrades, is now Dr. Esko Toyo, a Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Calabar.
 3. Ibrahim Nock was the General Secretary of Northern Federation of Labour, the only trade union to be officially affiliated to a political party (N.P.C.). See Ananaba, W., Trade Union Movement in Nigeria (London, 1969), p. 127. For his brief honeymoon with N.P.F., see Dudley, op. cit., p. 324.
 4. For a comprehensive study of trade unions and politics in Nigeria (heavily biased on Southern Nigeria), see Cohen, R., Labour and Politics in Nigeria, 1945-1971 (London, 1974).

true interests of working men. Hence the politically unenlightened workers (especially in the North) remained politically divided by their ethnic differences because they understood little (if any) about real economic and political issues. Thus, if any union tried to identify itself with any political party it would certainly lose those of its members who were tribally opposed to the party.

Another reason why N.E.P.U. did not win direct and open trade union support was partly because there were neither strong unions nor conscientious trade unionists in the North, and partly because in post-colonial Nigeria (1960-1966) trade unionists were competing for political patronage from the governments of the Federation and so it was not materially rewarding to identify themselves with an opposition party.¹ A sizable proportion of Northern workers were not organized in trade unions and those who were organized did not pay their union fees regularly, even after the introduction of "check-off system"² in

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1. Dudley, op. cit., pp. 239-41, discussed the political role of trade unions on the tin mines in Jos. But the political involvement of trade unions in politics even on the mines was more apparent than real. For example, trade unionists like S.U. Bassey (N.T.U.C.) was a sponsored member of the N.C.N.C. in the House of Representatives, Lagos; M.A. Inuwa (U.L.C.) was a special member of N.P.C. in the House of Assembly, Kaduna; both of them were in their respective parties as individuals not because their respective unions were officially affiliated either to N.P.C. or N.C.N.C. The Northern Federation of Labour was officially affiliated to N.P.C. because, as Ananaba, W., op. cit., p. 127, explained, the N.F.L. was wholly sponsored by N.P.C. to "stage war against Southerners" in the North. N.F.L. had virtually no fee paying trade union affiliated to it and thus it was a labour off-shoot of N.P.C.
 2. A system in which the union dues were directly deducted from a worker's wages by the employer on behalf of the unions. But even at that the law made it the discretion of the employers to introduce the system. Some did, but on the condition that whenever the workers went on strike it was withdrawn and thus its continuity had to be renegotiated between the unions and the management after every strike action. Indeed, that condition was a disincentive hence a great limitation on unions which were already financially weak to attempt a strike action. A further handicap was that many workers took the option not to be union members and, as non-union members, they did not contribute to the union's purse although they always reaped the benefits of the unions' negotiations with the employers on behalf of all the workers.

in 1965. Therefore they were financially so weak that they had no career structure and thus did not attract intelligent officials, subsequently trade union officials were largely "careerists", who were prepared to compromise or even to betray the interests of their members in return for some material reward.¹ The only thing that was certain about many of them was their support for the government of the day no matter how detrimental its policies were to the working men. The foregoing notwithstanding, N.E.P.U. always sought redress for the grievances of the workers as part of the exploited class and both the trade unions and their members featured prominently in the party's election manifestoes.

Party Discipline and Central Authority

There was very strong discipline in N.E.P.U. For example, Abba Maikwari was expelled from the party for conducting unauthorized negotiations for alliance with A.G. in 1954.² The only conflict between the party and a Parliamentarian resulted in the expulsion of the Parliamentarian from the party. In 1957, M. Isiyaku Gwamna, N.E.P.U. member for Jos central constituency, in the Northern House of Assembly, was expelled from the party for proposing in the House that members be given loans by the government for the purchase of private cars.³ In

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1. The effect of trade unionists' opportunism on the Nigerian working man is variously analysed by different authors. For example, see Cohen, R., op. cit., pp. 70-144 and 145-179; Ananaba, W., op. cit., pp. 86-97 and 141-154; and Waterman, P., "Communist Theory in the Nigerian Trade Union Movement", Politics and Society, III (No. 3, Spring 1973), pp. 283-312. See also Post, K.W.J., "Nationalism and Politics in Nigeria: A Marxist approach", The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, VI (No. 2, 1964), pp. 167-175; and Dudley, B.J., "Marxism and political change in Nigeria", in ibid., pp. 155-165, both of which lament the careerist tendency in the labour movement.
 2. Interview with Alhaji Aminu Kano in London on 12/11/1979.
 3. For his speech see Northern Regional House of Assembly Debates, Official Report, March 6, 1957, p. 605; and for a brief discussion on party discipline in N.E.P.U., see Sklar, op. cit., pp. 420-421.

principle, N.E.P.U. opposed the bestowal of unnecessary monetary rewards upon parliamentarians which widened the gap between them and the people they represented and consequently elevated them into the privileged classes. N.E.P.U. believed that the personal style of life of all the members of government ought to be exemplary, and it called for moral restraint, economic frugality and a generally simple way of living by all leaders national and local. The party hoped that such personal examples by public figures would give the government the moral authority to enforce austerity measures in all public life.

Another important member of N.E.P.U. (then he was the first National Vice President), Alhaji Ibrahim Imam¹, was expelled from the party in June 1958, when he entered negotiations with the A.G. for alliance without the consent or consultation with the party. As Alhaji Ibrahim Imam was also the leader of Borno Youth Movement (B.Y.M.), the alliance between N.E.P.U. and B.Y.M. automatically dissolved and B.Y.M. then entered into a new alliance with A.G. It is relevant to note that B.Y.M. was a political extension of "Borno Youth Improvement Association" (B.Y.I.A.)² founded by Alhaji Ibrahim in 1949, for the purposes of reforming social habits and building up a healthy Kanuri patriotism. The association wanted a changed status for women as well as the ending of the Kanuri habit of wearing knives and carrying amulets and other evidence of superstition among the peoples of Borno. It also favoured the development of a written Kanuri language. The Association

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1. For portraits of Alhaji Ibrahim Imam, see "The Member from Bornu", in West Africa (No. 1885), 11 April 1953, p. 315; and "Leader of Opposition", in West Africa (No. 2068) 8 December 1956, p. 989. Also Dudley, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-89.
 2. Because it was a cultural association the B.Y.I.A. made no political impact in Borno until 1955-56. See "Unrule and Undivide", in West Africa (No. 1958), September 1954, p. 821.

also encouraged the simplification of dress for their fellow countrymen because it believed that the current voluminous robes of the Kanuris slowed down action. The B.Y.I.A. remained essentially a cultural association like the J.M.A. until Ibrahim Imam resigned from the N.P.C. in 1954.¹

On his resignation as the General Secretary of the N.P.C. and from the party as a whole, Ibrahim Imam became like a fish out of water. In order to build an independent political base for himself, Imam returned to Maiduguri where he secretly converted the B.Y.I.A. from a cultural body to a political one in 1955.² No sooner was B.Y.M. declared a political party than it established a working understanding with N.E.P.U. Having accused N.P.C. leadership of "being reactionary Imperialist agents who fear radical changes in the North"³, Imam saw himself as a radical and thus found a natural ally in N.E.P.U.

The B.Y.M. was a federalist party which believed in "one Nigeria". It did not advocate the separation of Borno province from the Northern Region hence its alliance with the N.E.P.U. However, the B.Y.M./N.E.P.U. alliance was more than anything else an electoral strategy. The reformist ideas of B.Y.M. were very popular in Borno's capital, Maiduguri, resulting in the party winning the two Maiduguri urban seats in the 1956 Regional Elections. Thus, rather than contest elections separately and split the votes (and possibly make way for the victory of their common opponent, N.P.C.), N.E.P.U. and B.Y.M. allied against and defeated

1. See Dudley, *op. cit.*, p. 110, footnote 60.

2. Interview with Malam Ben Waffy at Maiduguri in 1978. M. Waffy was a founder member of B.Y.M.; and later he became a leading member of N.E.P.U. at Jos. He was a U.A.C. (N) Ltd. manager at Yola, Lau and Jos before he retired from the company. He now lives in Maiduguri.

3. Alhaji Ibrahim Imam, cited in *West Africa* (No. 1941), 8 May 1954, p. 410.

the ruling party. That agreement (or understanding) between N.E.P.U. and B.Y.M. ended in 1958 when Alhaji Ibrahim Imam led B.Y.M. into alliance with A.G.¹

As we explained earlier, after the 1961 Regional Elections, N.E.P.U. was greatly weakened mainly because of its continuing alliance with N.C.N.C. In addition there was increased decline in morale due to internal dissension and strife. Also due to lack of finance, some full-time officers became jealous of the party's parliamentarians. As a result, some N.E.P.U. leaders (mainly based in Zaria) broke away from the party and formed the "Northern Elements Freedom Organization" (N.E.F.O.) led by Alhaji Aliyu Mahmud. All the leaders concerned were expelled from N.E.P.U.²

Election Procedures

N.E.P.U. parliamentary candidates were first selected by the party's election committee (1956). But later (1959, 1961 and 1964) all

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1. Sklar, op. cit., pp. 338-344, discusses the impact of communalism and populism in Borno.
 2. Interview with Alhaji Aliyu Mahmud in Kano, March 1978. In addition to being a leading member of N.E.P.U. Aliyu Mahmud was a hotel proprietor at Zaria and later at Maiduguri. He is now a successful businessman based in Kano, and a N.P.N. member of the House of Representatives, Lagos. According to Aliyu Mahmud, his main reason for leading the N.E.F.O. in 1961 was because N.E.P.U. was not benefitting by its alliance with N.C.N.C. In fact, he felt that N.E.P.U. made no electoral head-way in the North because of its association with the Ibos. It should be remembered that when Abba Maikwaru was expelled from N.E.P.U. in 1954 he also formed a body called N.E.F.O. which died a natural death because most of the leaders who went along with Abba Maikwaru, later took gainful employment either in the Northern Nigerian civil service (like Magaji Danbatta) or in the private sector (like Abba Kashiya). Dudley, op. cit., p. 87 (see also his footnote 47, p. 109), refers to the U.N.M. as one of the splinter groups in 1954. But the U.N.M. was the predecessor to R.S.S. (see Chapter IV, p. 212). It was voluntarily dissolved in favour of R.S.S. in 1954 (see pp.

candidates were selected by their respective constituency election committees subject to the approval of the provincial Selection Boards and their ratification of the N.E.C.¹ The various election committees were largely responsible for electoral financing. A manifestation of the degree of centralization in N.E.P.U. was when in 1959 some of the party's candidates contested election in constituencies² where they were neither natives nor residents: a risk rarely taken by any other Nigerian political party.³ That was done because the party members were made to believe that a capable Nigerian should contest election anywhere in the country: a belief which was in keeping with the party's concept of "one Nigeria".

Finance

N.E.P.U.'s known sources of finance were its membership fees of one shilling (1/-) and then the monthly contribution of sixpence (6d) per member; the lecture fee of three pence (3d); special levies and money collected from dances organized by party branches; income derived from the sales of party literature, emblems, badges, flags, etc. The party also received generous donations from its financially better-off members and supporters.⁴ Under the terms of their agreement for an

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1. That practice was a mere formality to ensure that the local election committee made a "good" choice in the first place. Both the provincial selection board and the N.E.C. never rejected selections made by the constituency election committee.
 2. For constituency delimitation, and nomination system in N.E.P.U. in contrast with other parties, see Whitaker, op. cit., pp. 369-370; Sklar, op. cit., p. 421; and Post, K.W.J., Nigerian Federal Elections 1959 (Oxford, 1963), pp. 244-245.
 3. In fact, the only exception was when in 1961, Alhaji Ibrahim Imam, a Kanuri from Borno, won election in Jamgbar constituency in Tiv Division, Benue province, on A.G. platform and with the help of U.M.B.C.
 4. Interview with Alhaji Aminu Kano in London on 12/11/1979. Alhaji Aminu Kano recalled a contribution of £12 made by one Alhaji Ance at Sharanshi in 1951, i.e. soon after N.E.P.U. was formed. The writer collected secret donations for the party from prosperous businessmen at Potiskum in 1959-1961. Also see Whitaker, op. cit., p. 335, footnote 13.

alliance N.C.N.C. bore the running cost of N.E.P.U. National Secretariat and paid the salaries of all the national officers of the party (see footnote 1, pp.220-221); also the N.C.N.C. paid most of N.E.P.U.'s election expenses.¹ In 1959, N.E.P.U. received a contribution of twelve cars and some substantial amount of money from Dr. Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana but there is no evidence this help continued.² The party's annual budget was about £4,000 which was for the personal emoluments and the general upkeep of the National Secretariat; all branches were supposed to be financially self-sufficient.

Party Sociology

In general, while N.E.P.U.'s active cadres were farmers who also followed a second occupation such as petty trading, blacksmithing, butchery, etc.³, the party leadership was drawn far more from full-time petty traders, craftsmen, shopkeepers and labourers, especially at provincial or branch level. Few of them had aristocratic origins. Many salaried clerks and technical workers employed by N.A.s and other educated individuals covertly supported N.E.P.U. but were inhibited from assuming leadership roles by their career considerations. Among the N.E.P.U. national leadership, the presence of certain "well born" individuals was significant in the early 1950's. Aminu Kano is a member of an eminent Fulani family of Muslim jurists and the members of his extended family still dominate the religious and judicial institutions

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1. There is more speculative discussion on N.E.P.U. finances in Dudley, op. cit., pp. 179-81; Post, op. cit. (1963), p. 153.
 2. Interview with Alhaji Adamu Abubakar Jajire, Potiskum, 1976.
 3. Interview with Alhaji Yusuf Maitama Sulei, in Kano on 30/3/1977. In Skinner, N., op. cit., pp. 65-76, Alhaji Mahmudu Koki discussed various taxes, their organization and collection in Kano Emirate, the base of N.E.P.U.

in Kano. One of the patrons of N.E.P.U., Malam Abubakar Tambuwal, is a descendant of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, a member of the Atikawa¹ royal family in Sokoto and, as such, a distant cousin of both the Sardauna and the Sultan of Sokoto. The late Alhaji Abubakar Zukogi, the General Secretary of N.E.P.U., was a member of the Masaba² ruling dynasty in Bida. Alhaji Ali Batan Yerima Balla, is a title holder in Kilba District of Adamawa Division. There were many others who either by conviction or through frustration have abandoned their ascribed status in favour of an achieved one through the N.E.P.U.³

But as from 1955 there occurred marked changes in the composition of N.E.P.U. leadership; changes in their social background, education and occupation, as Tables V and VI below show. Those changes were due to an increase in political awareness among the rank and file of the

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1. The members of the Sokoto royal house are now drawn from two lineages: the Bellawa, i.e. the descendants of Muhammadu Bello (Mai-Wurno), the first among the sons of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio to become the Sultan in 1817-1837; the Atikawa are the descendants of Abubakar Atiku (Mai-Katuru), the second son of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio and the full brother of Muhammadu Bello, who became the Sultan of Sokoto in 1837-1842. See Hogben, S.J. and Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., The Emirates of Northern Nigeria (London, 1966), p. 414; and Abdullahi, B., "Story behind Sokoto Dynasty", in World Peace, II (No. 6, June 1978), p. 9. Bello, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu, op. cit., p. x.
 2. See his obituary by Candido, the man behind the mask, "Late Zukogi -- a fearless patriot", in New Nigerian, Wednesday, 7 June 1978. Alhaji Zukogi was also the Ciroma of Bida. The traditional title of Ciroma is given to the heir apparent in Hausaland and it probably has the same status in Nupeland (Bida). Masaba was the second son of Malam Dendo (Manko), the founder of the Fulani Etsuzhi Nupe. Masaba ruled 1841-1847. His son Abubakar was the Etsu Nupe 1895-1901 and he fought against the British until his death. Abubakar Zukogi was the grandson of Etsu Abubakar. See Hogben and Kirk-Greene, op. cit., p. 282.
 3. Further see Whitaker, op. cit., pp. 329-31 and 441-46. There was a relatively high proportion of patricians in the N.E.P.U. leadership both at the provincial and branch levels, especially in 1951-56. A good number of them were attracted by N.E.P.U.'s call for a return to Islamic puritanism. A comprehensive analysis of N.E.P.U.'s elite leadership, and why they initially supported the party, must wait further study.

TABLE 5:5¹

EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATION OF MEMBERS OF THE N.E.C. of N.E.P.U.

	1954		1958		1962	
	No.		No.		No.	
University Trained	1	5.5	3(c)	5	3(c)	4.5
Secondary School	2	11	1	2	1	1.5
Middle IV (a)	7	39 55.5	5	8	15	2 3 9
Primary School	4	22	12	19	9	14
Illiterates (b)	4	22	43	65	51	77
TOTAL	18	99.5	64	99.0	66	100

NOTES

- (a) Roughly equivalent to two years past primary education.
 (b) I.e., not literate in English. Some of these, a small number, certainly not more than 5, are literate in Arabic.
 (c) This is of course Aminu Kano alone in 1954 and two lawyers in 1958 and 1962 who had university training.

TABLE 6:5²

OCCUPATIONS OF N.E.P.U. MEMBERS OF N.E.C. 1954-1962

	1954		1958		1962	
	No.		No.		No.	
Civil servants (a)	3	16.6	4	6	1	1.5
N.A. employees (b)	3	16.6	3	5	3	5.5
Employees of Commercial firms	2	11 66	6	9	26	- 13
Lawyers (c)	-	-	2	3	2	3
Teachers	4	22	2	3	2	3
Businessmen (d)	3	16.6	11	17	2	3
Petty Traders	2	11	23	36	36	54
Artisans (e)	-	-	6	9	10	15
Farmers	1	5.5	2	3	5	7.5
Others	-	-	5	8	5	7.5
TOTAL	18	99.3	64	99.0	66	100.0

NOTES

- (a) Junior Civil Servants, i.e. clerks and messengers.
 (b) Composed as for (a).
 (c) The two N.C.N.C. lawyers coopted into the N.E.P.U.'s N.E.C.
 (d) Made up largely of small contractors, produce buyers, etc.
 (e) Tailors, washermen, dyers, etc.

1. This table is taken from Dudley, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

2. This table is taken from *ibid.*, p. 177.

party who were disillusioned by the Maaikata¹ leaders of the party and, consequently, asserted themselves in the party so as to run it in their own way and according to their own interests.

N.E.P.U. was started largely by the Maaikata, but between 1955 and 1958 the formerly Ammawa (the politically enlightened, or the most political conscious, illiterates) became dominant in the party's N.E.C. This replacement of the Western educated elites by the merely enlightened illiterates is also reflected in the change of occupations of the members of N.E.C. Table VI above shows this change very clearly, while Table VII provides supplementary data from a wider sample, compiled by R.L. Sklar, for the late 1950's.

TABLE 7:5²

OCCUPATIONAL DATA ON THE NATIONAL OFFICERS, PRINCIPAL ADVISERS AND
PARLIAMENTARIANS OF N.E.P.U., 1957-1958

All employees	13 (20)	
Civil servants		4
N.A. employees		3
Employees of Commercial firms		4
Independent Agents		2
Lawyers	2 (3)	
Teachers	2 (3)	
Businessmen	11 (17)	
Petty Traders	23 (36)	
Artisans	6 (9)	
Farmers	2 (3)	
Others	5 (8)	

1. A good number of N.E.P.U. leaders who belonged to the Maaikata class (e.g. Maitama Sulei, Lamin Sanusi, etc.) later declared for N.P.C. Some of them won elections as N.E.P.U. candidates (like Ibrahim Mahmud, M.H.A., ex-N.A. Supervisor; Misau and M. Abdulmumini, M.H.A., ex-District Head, Katsina, etc.) but crossed over to government (N.P.C.) benches in the House of Assembly. Thus, N.E.P.U. members believed that the Maaikata were using the party as a platform to secure employment in the government. Hence they increasingly elevated their own Talakawa fellows to the party leadership and to parliamentary candidature.
2. This table is taken from Sklar, op. cit., p. 337. This table is weakened in that it probably took account only of those advisers whose names appear in N.E.P.U. files. The fact was that there were more workers (or employees) who were N.E.P.U. advisers, but whose names did not appear anywhere (see p.246). Similarly, there were many government (or N.A. subsidized) businessmen who were among the principal N.E.P.U. advisers. I am still inclined to withhold such names in writing although I am quite willing to discuss instances with interested researchers/scholars.

Both in the 1959 General Elections and in the 1961 Regional Elections an increased number of disaffected N.A. employees and deposed Emirs contested elections on N.E.P.U. platform. For instance, M. Ahmadu, the deposed Lamido of Adamawa, contested election in 1961 as a N.E.P.U. candidate at Jada in Sardauna province. There were many other formerly prominent figures who attempted to return to public life through N.E.P.U. But even then such person were adopted as party candidates only when there was no active member available to contest in that constituency. In 1959 the position of non-Maaikata person in the N.E.P.U. leadership was so strong that they injected more rank and file members than any other category as N.E.P.U. candidates in the election of that year. N.E.P.U. contested 117 out of 161 seats in the Northern Region, during the 1959 General Election: out of that number 46 candidates were petty traders; 19 were peasant farmers; 16 were professional drivers; 9 were mechanis; and only about 20 candidates belonged to the Maaikata class.¹

The distrust of the Maaikata by the rank and file members became still more pronounced when after Northern Nigeria attained internal self-government in 1959, the Maaikata were attracted to the sharply increased opportunities for gainful employment in the public and the private sectors of the economy. Thus Talakawa became dominant in N.E.P.U. leadership and what remained of the party in 1965 depended heavily upon them until 1966 when all political parties were banned in Nigeria.

N.E.P.U. was conceived as essentially a mass movement and a reformist party and the most active of its supporters were those least

1. There is a more detailed analysis of the candidates of all the parties in that election in Post, op. cit. (1963), pp. 277-283 and especially Table X, p. 279.

in thrall to hierarchical relationship, especially those of clientage.¹ Most N.E.P.U. members were free of the complex relations between those who use their influence, social position or some other attribute to assist and protect others and those whom they so help and protect. Thus they were mainly petty traders, craftsmen, artisans, skilled workers and young men about the town. They were less dependent for their livelihood on the good will of eminent personages than were either peasant farmers of the Attajirai (merchants). Moreover, they had common grievances in connection with taxation, levies and other forms of administrative extortions (see Chapter III). Other urban youth like Gardawa (singular, Gardi, meaning mature students in Islamic Studies), who were in towns in order to escape from the inevitable toil, severe discipline and subservience of peasant life, were recruited into N.E.P.U. Those were the group often called Yan Iska, literally, "sons of the wind". This really means hooligans or irresponsible persons and in the Hausa language the term Yan Iska (singular, Dan Iska) is a convenient term of abuse which could apply to anyone whose behaviour or actions are distasteful.²

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1. Both Whitaker, op. cit., pp. 373-375 and Smith, M.G., Government in Zazzara 1800-1950 (Oxford, 1960), pp. 259-261, discussed patron and client relationship from the narrow political or administrative context. The fact is that the subject is much wider and far more complex (and often confusing) than is realized. For example, in most parts of Northern Nigeria there seems to be no clear distinction between a slave and a servant; and what is today being done by civil servants was the function of royal slaves in the traditional Emirates. Clientage exists both overtly and covertly in all aspects of the society in Northern Nigeria. Thus its comprehensive examination is a subject for a doctoral dissertation on its own, or that of post-doctoral work. Here, by clientage I mean simply the exchange of personal labour, loyalty and obedience by a subordinate (client) in return for the security, i.e. economic, political and social protection provided by a superior (patron).
 2. See Smith, Sir Bryan Sharwood, But Always as Friends (London, 1967), who throughout his book insists that N.E.P.U. supporters were "undesirable elements"; and Whitaker, op. cit., p. 380, who tells us that another British official referred to all N.E.P.U. supporters in/

In the rural areas N.E.P.U. mobilized the peasantry by attempting to champion their causes by complaining against maladministration on their behalf, but the party's efforts to obtain redress were not always successful.¹ N.E.P.U.'s avowed intention to ~~demoralize~~^{democratize} the N.A.s, especially in the Emirates, raised the expectations of many people towards the realization of "social justice" and thus the policy won for the party many sympathizers.

N.E.P.U. cadres, agents and the hard core of the party's supporters mostly came from those who were economically independent but of low social status. The party's voters were also drawn from the urban poor and the peasants, often those belonging to a particular religious sect, or ethnic group. The dilemma of the urban poor stemmed from the fact that they moved from their respective villages less by their own will than at the dictate of external compulsions — which they could neither comprehend nor question — and the reactionary stance of their rulers. They were lured from the countryside into the towns by the glitter of social amenities and the promise of regular incomes, higher wages and, at times, by land shortage.² Once in the townships, the poorer among

in the same theme but less crude than that of Sir Bryan Sharwood Smith. In pp. 410-11, Dr. Whitaker explains that even members of Tijjaniyya brotherhood are called Yan Iska. N.E.P.U. members were first of all called Kafirai (singular, Kafiri, the apostates) but that label did not stick as the party was predominantly Muslim led as it originated and was based in the Muslim North. Then the term Yan Iska was applied on some not all N.E.P.U. members.

1. For the official reaction to N.E.P.U.'s unsuccessful effort to assail the emirate system see NAK File No. 45: ZAR PROF, p. 19.
2. Hill's analysis of the causes of rural poverty, sale of farm lands and migration in Batagorawa village is typical of Hausaland. See Polly Hill, Rural Hausa: a village and a setting (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 84-159. She takes up the theme again in her recent study of Dorayi village near Kano and examines the economic relationship between city and countryside; the consequences of persistent population pressure; and the evidence of economic inequality. Once again with slight and insignificant local variation this analysis can apply to almost every village in the far North. See Population, Prosperity and Poverty: Rural Kano 1900-1970 (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 1-20 and 95-123. Also see Alhaji Umaru, "Wakar Talauci Da Wadata: 'The song of Poverty and Wealth': A poem on social problems", in Africana Bulletin, No. 21 (1974), pp. 67-116.

them became separated from their families which led to the break-up of their households and the disruption of all those ties which linked man's heart to the better portion of his nature: his instincts and social affections. In most cases, it was impossible to go back to the rural areas, even if they wanted, because as more and more able-bodied men and women left the countryside for the urban centres, the old village economy tends to crumble at their backs and thus there is nothing to go back to. Their state of alienation created serious problems for them and for the authority. N.E.P.U. provided the platform upon which they could vent their feelings against the authority so they supported the party en masse.¹

As for the peasants, their predicament has always been that they were, to the ruling classes, mainly the producers of revenue; hence, the more the peasant grew, the more he had to turn over to the tax collector. Furthermore, the emirate system of occupation^{al}/taxes, in addition to head tax, contained a built-in temptation to squeeze the peasant heavily. The peasants responded to an oppressive ruler simply by absconding, because flight was the traditional answer to famine or to man's oppression in Northern Nigeria (see Chapter II, pp.128-129). Again N.E.P.U. provided a means whereby they could stay in their respective villages and complain, until the administration decided that "attempts by N.E.P.U. to set itself up as an independent organization, entitled to investigate grievances and to arrogate unto itself the duties of the local administration should

1. See Police and Administrative Officers' reports on N.E.P.U.'s increasing popularity and large scale recruitment in 1952-1956 in "Provincial Reports and Complaints", File Nos. AS1/134, AS1/305 and AS1/432 in NAK. The administrative reaction to stop that "mass enrollment" in N.E.P.U. can be seen in the official minutes and recommendations attached in these files. Also see "Political File, Fika Division", Potiskum, with John Lavers, Dept. of History, Bayero University, Kano.

not to be tolerated." Accordingly, the government officials were instructed, "On no account should Administrative officers permit N.E.P.U. organization to sponsor ... complaints."¹

N.E.P.U. articulated the grievances of all the poor in cultural terms as much as in an economic formation to explain their predicament. In that way N.E.P.U. made its appeal and sought support by evoking the special solidarity of the Talakawa versus the aristocracy. In that respect the party was careful in emphasizing the authentic ideals of the Jihad with the imputation that those ideals had been betrayed by those who succeeded the founding fathers of the Fulani Empire. That method was meant to stir the inner feelings of the people by inculcating an acute awareness of the inequalities of the authoritarian administration and by instilling the conviction that people would have independence, justice and equality under a N.E.P.U. government. N.E.P.U. believed (as shown below) and made it clear to the Talakawa that social hierarchy inevitably embodied conflict of divergent interests. Such a class appeal showed that N.E.P.U. was not a sectarian party, hence it did not win support in the Middle Belt where the grievances of the people were more communal in nature (see p. 222). Furthermore, as it had been British colonialism which checked the Emirate authorities and slave raiders from overrunning the region, the peoples of the Middle Belt were initially on the side of the British against a nationalist from the far North.

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1. Quoted from a Government Circular in NAK, File No. 45, ZAR PROF, "Political Bodies in Nigeria", p. 19. Although this circular was dated 13/6/1952, M.B. Yunusa (N.E.P.U. organizer for Niger province) observed that it was not until 1955/56 that it became really enforced. This is about the time when the Northernization policy was adopted by the Regional government and indigenous officers were appointed into the Administrative Service of the Northern Region. Interview with M.B. Yunusa, at Minna, in 1976.

Their early political awareness was conditioned by their historic opposition to Islam and to subjection by Muslims. Therefore, in the Middle Belt, N.E.P.U. suffered for having emerged from the group to which the party was opposed. N.E.P.U.'s primary strength was in the Emirates which were predominantly Muslim and, especially among the Habe commoners and members of the Tijjaniyya brotherhood.¹

The Tijjaniyya arose in Algeria early in the nineteenth century. After the death of its founder, Ahmad Tijjani of Fez, born at the end of the eighteenth century, the brotherhood split, with one group in Algeria and the other in Morocco. The order still flourishes in the former French and British territories in North and West Africa.² From Morocco it entered Nigeria in the first decade of the nineteenth century. It is a puritan brotherhood which believes in militant Islamic activism; hence it is opposed to Western materialism and material culture. It came into confrontation with and was crushed by French in West Africa

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1. My information on the Tijjaniyya "confraternity" is derived from my interview with my friend Alhaji Abdulkadir Mansur, who is a member of the order in Kano, 1977/78; with Alhaji Salihu Na Kande, the Tijjaniyya leader at Jos, and also the N.E.P.U. member of the House of Assembly, Kaduna, 1961-1966 (see Sklar, op. cit., p. 524, No. 6), at Jos, in 1976/77; and M. Liman, a devout Tijjani, at Potiskum in 1976/78. For the relationship between the Tijjaniyya Tariqa (Yan Wazifa, as they are called in Hausa) and N.E.P.U., see Paden, op. cit., pp. 197-198 and 312; Whitaker, op. cit., pp. 254-256, 413-414, 396-397; and Dudley, op. cit., p. 190. Since his visit to Kaulaha (Kaolack) in Senegal as the guest of Shehu Ibrahim Na Kaulaha (Shaikh Ibrahim Niass of Kaolack) in September 1964, Alhaji Aminu Kano has been the Deputy Khalifa of the Tijjaniyya in Northern Nigeria (the Khalifa being the deposed Emir of Kano, Alhaji Sir Muhammadu Sanusi). On Aminu Kano's visit to Senegal, see Daily Comet, 1 September 1964, p. 1.
 2. For a study of Islamic radicalism in French West Africa, see Lansine Kaba, The Wahhabi Movement and its Contribution to Political Development in Africa 1945-1958 (Ph.D. Thesis, Northwestern University, 1972); and Alexandre, P., "Hamallism in French West Africa", in Rotberg, R.I. and Mazrui, A.A. (eds.), Protest and Power in Black Africa (New York, 1970), pp. 497-512. Paden (see footnote 156) discusses Tijjaniyya politics in Nigera, especially in Kano in contradistinction to Sokoto.

during the 1914-1918 war. Many of its adherents settled in Kano and spread the rite in Northern Nigeria. The French further expelled more in 1949 and some of them entered Nigeria and settled in Sokoto province. In contrast to Kadiriyya (see below) the Tijjaniyya is the "Protestant" Islam and, as such, it upholds the revolution precipitated by the Holy Prophet Muhammad and thus it is the repository of the revolutionary tradition of Islam. The Tijjaniyya teaches that not to retaliate against the oppressor is tantamount to collaborating with him. As a result of its teachings against colonialism and against the authoritarian emirate system it became the natural ally of N.E.P.U.¹

The Kadiriyya² brotherhood was founded by Abdulkadir Al-Jilani of Baghdad about A.D. 1150. It made its first converts in Borno in the late twelfth century and remains the predominant brotherhood there, though not until after the Jihad did it become widespread throughout the North. It is a very ascetic Sufi system but like a dead volcano it causes no trouble. It emphasizes obedience to authority and respect to elders. Its political tenet is the Umma: the singleness or the unity of Muslim community. It teaches that Muslims are one people, one brotherhood and, in theory, it follows that they can only have a single leader in one country. This is to say that, fundamentally, Islam is opposed to nationalism and separatism in all its forms. Its adherents were mostly the palace Malams and, therefore, it was opposed to N.E.P.U.³

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1. See "Political Situation in Northern Provinces of Nigeria", in File No. MSS. Afr. S. 1210, in Rhodes House, Oxford, pp. 5-7.
 2. Muslim religious sect and followers of Shaikh Abdulkadir Al-Jilani. For Kadiriyya politics and its activities in Nigeria, in particular, see references in footnotes 1 and 2, previous page.
 3. In addition to footnote 1 above (p. 4 of the reference), see Introductory Notes on Muhammadanism (compiled in the Secretariat, Northern Provinces, Nigeria, Government Printer, Lagos), p. 4, in File No. M.P.K.5669/3 Northern Provinces, in NAK.

Strategy and Ideology

N.E.P.U.'s concept of "class" stemmed from what the party understood as the common experiences (both inherited and shared) felt by the Talakawa as well as their identity of interests against the interests of their rulers. To N.E.P.U., class experience was determined by the productive relations into which people were born or entered involuntarily. The party attempted to awaken class consciousness by explaining the experiences of the common men in cultural terms: embodied in traditions, value systems, ideas and institutional forms of an ideal Muslim society. In that way "class" was defined by the way people lived currently and by the way they lived in their social history.

Conflict between the Sarakuna and the Talakawa was N.E.P.U.'s main point everywhere. The party's presentation of that point was however made in such a way as to argue that the Sarakuna were the revisionists of the principles of Islam in the sense that the maintenance of their privileges and power took priority over and above the application of Islam and the protection of the interests of their people. In that way N.E.P.U. sought to justify its objectives by simultaneous reference to the absolute norms of Islam (which are otherworldly) and to material Western values (which are this worldly). They appealed to tradition, in the sense of emphasizing the need to restore the reformist ethic of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio and, at the same time, they criticised the Sarakuna for neglecting the welfare of the people.

N.E.P.U. ideas were presented in different fashions to the elites, the Malamai and the masses. For instance, to the Western educated elite, N.E.P.U. argued in favour of rapid economic development and "democracy" through the reform of the existing political system in order to give an opportunity to the deserving educated youth. In this case democracy

reflected the party's fundamental belief in "justice"¹ and its position that equality of opportunity was essential to a just society.

But to the Malamai, N.E.P.U. referred to Hadith to remind them that they should lead the fight against foreign domination by guiding their students and the peasantry in the struggle. The Malamai could not keep themselves out of the people's struggle on the specious basis that religion and politics should not be mixed. Did Ali (the son-in-law of the Holy Prophet) keep out of politics? Did Hassan and Hussein (the twin sons of Ali and the grandsons of the Holy Prophet) fatalistically accept the tyranny of their era? Were the Malams holier than Ali and his twin sons?² It was thus clear to all who could think, N.E.P.U. argued, that the duty of the Malams was to sacrifice all their possessions and even their lives, if necessary, in the struggle against oppression and exploitation. Since N.E.P.U. believed in the rule of law and that a N.E.P.U. government would carry out social reforms in line with Islamic ideals, the Malamai would be given the opportunity to play a fitting role in it as the custodians of public morals in their respective communities and as advisers on Muslim affairs to the administration.³

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1. N.E.P.U.'s concept of justice remained vague and often conflicting. The most religiously minded among them turned to the notion of justice in Islamic thought which is equated with the equality of all before God and before Shari'ah and the practice of mutual aid; and that the rulers should set an example of frugality and simplicity in their way of life. But the Maaikata equated justice with the strict observance of the order of meritocracy, equality of all before the law and the rule of law. In addition, some of them vaguely mention "socialism" which was closer to material aid than to scientific socialism.
 2. The writer was at a public lecture which ran on those lines by Malam Uba Taura, at Potiskum, in 1959. Immediately after the lecture M. Uba was arrested by N.A. police for inciting public disorder. This and the subsequent arguments were the general patterns of N.E.P.U.'s appeal to Qur'anic Malams before Nigerian independence.
 3. It is relevant to note here that N.E.P.U.'s N.E.C. and all branch executive committees always had an adviser on Muslim law/Muslim affairs.

N.E.P.U.'s own Muslim scholars bridged the gap between the party and the Malamai in their ability to articulate the inner Islamic feelings of the people. Some N.E.P.U. leaders made Tafsir (Qur'anic exegesis) in which they cited relevant Qur'anic verses to stress the centrality of injustice in Islam (interpreting justice to mean equality before the law; equality of status through equitable distribution of wealth; and equality of opportunity for all citizens) and the importance of education.¹

But to the illiterate Talakawa, N.E.P.U. concentrated more in articulating their local grievances and on simple political education, i.e. the rights and the duties of a citizen, as well as the methods of making legal appeals and administrative petitions, to higher authority. N.E.P.U. never relented in pointing out to the people the unIslamic excesses and the extravagance of the rulers. In a just society as advocated by Islam, N.E.P.U. explained, "there is no trace of great palaces and other ostentations of her^editary kingship."² The party's Muslim scholars would quickly refer to the exemplary leadership of Caliph Umar who, even when his dominions expanded beyond Arabia, continued to live so unpretentiously that strangers to Mecca would mistake a servant for the Commander of the Faithful himself; who kept

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1. I have personally attended such Tafsir sessions by Alhaji Ibrahim Imam, at Maiduguri (1958); and by Alhaji Aminu Kano, at Potiskum (1959). During our interview in London (12/11/1979) Alhaji Aminu Kano confirmed that they began to make Tafsir in reply to N.P.C. accusations that N.E.P.U. were Kafirai (apostates) but the practice was lessened in the middle 1960's. Perhaps this is after when N.P.C. formed a coalition government with N.C.N.C. (in 1960) Muslims realized that the former's accusations of N.E.P.U. as Kafirai was mere political propaganda. Paden, op. cit., pp. 274-291, 294-297, reproduces and analyses the Tafsir session given by Alhaji Aminu Kano which he (Dr. Paden) attended in Kano.
 2. When I first heard this from M. Lawan Dambazau I cross-checked with Muslims scholars, and with an Imam, M. Abubakar Liman of Potiskum. He confirmed that M. Lawan Dambazau was right by making references to Muqaddimah and other works on Islam.

his treasury empty through help to the poor; and who, when his all powerful army brought him large quantities of booty, broke down and wept, lamenting the day when "the riches which the Lord bestoweth on us will be a spring of worldliness and envy and in the end a calamity to my people."¹ Still more relevant to Northern Nigerian Muslims was Caliph Umar's rebuke to Sa'id, one of his most brilliant commanders; he said:

It has been reported to me that you have built yourself a palace; and people call it the castle of Sa'id. Moreover, you have erected a gateway between you and your people. It is not your castle, rather it is the castle of perdition. What is needful for the treasury that you may guard and lock, but the gateway which you shut out the people from you, that you must break down.

Citing the above, N.E.P.U. leaders reminded their Muslim followers that the history of Islam can be seen as a struggle against tyranny and against hereditary monarchy (which is one of the causes of tyranny); because hereditary monarchy hinders the political, economic and cultural growth of the people. To establish a just society, the party argued that people must first eliminate all forms of political tyranny and restore the freedom, the dignity and the liberty of the individual.

N.E.P.U. stated that Northern Nigerian masses were shackled by fetters and chains imposed upon them by regimes which appeared to be Islamic when in fact they were un-Islamic. As an alternative to what existed, the party would create a society in which talents would be

1. This and the quote following were taken from M. Lawan Dambazau's text of a public lecture at Sokoto in 1958. See Lawan Dambazau's political papers, Kano. It is important to note that M. Lawan Dambazau succeeded M. Sa'adu Zungur as N.E.P.U. Legal Adviser (Muslim Law) in 1958. In 1957-58 he was N.E.P.U. provincial organizer for Sokoto Province (see Sklar, *op. cit.*, pp. 524 and 525). The political undertone of that sermon was very significant when we remember that Sokoto, where it was given, is the home town of Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauno of Sokoto and the Premier of the Northern Region of Nigeria.

trained and permitted to develop. The laws of the new society would not contradict Islam. All affairs of that society should be in the hands of the people and would be implemented through just laws.

The Role of Songs

One of the most effective ways by which N.E.P.U. conveyed its ideas and popularised its policies to the pre-literate masses was by the use of party songs. This is because, traditionally, singers were one of the few groups of people in the society who enjoyed freedom of speech. By convention, popular songs never make direct references and no real names are mentioned. Nevertheless, they are full of insinuations, oblique gibes and double entendres. They are also characterized by extreme subtlety and presented in satirical form using innuendo. The purpose of the singers is to extract presents in return for abandoning the satire. Praise singers are tolerated because public reaction to their songs, like a public display of emotion, is regarded as uncouth by the cultured group. Furthermore, by publicly reacting to the singers one reveals not only the hidden nuances of the songs, but one also exposes oneself as the real person referred to by the singers. Popular songs are rapidly learnt especially by women and children: thus one fears both the immediate impact of the satire and that if it goes on too long, one is likely to suffer veiled references to one's miserliness or one's amorous adventures, chanted by women and children as they go about their daily chores. But if one is generous to the singers one can enjoy hearing one's good qualities celebrated in the same way. Thus singers constitute a powerful factor in Hausa society.¹

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1. Academics are now becoming increasingly interested in the social functions and meaning of Hausa popular songs. See Ames, D.W., Gregersen, E.A., and Neugebauer, T., "Taaken Samaarii: A Drum Language of Hausa Youth", in Africa, XLI (1971), pp. 12-30; Smith, M.G., "The Social Function and Meaning of Hausa Praise-Singing", in Africa, XXVII (1975), pp. 26-43; also see Clayton, A., Communications for New Loyalties (Athens, Ohio, 1978); Hiskett, M., A History of Hausa Islamic Verse (London, 1975), especially pp. 2-11, thereof.

Just as Hausa praise singers composed songs to extol the virtues of their patrons or to insult those who refuse to patronize them, so N.E.P.U. adopted the same method to sell its ideas as well as to ridicule its opponents to the masses. The party's political broadsheets served both to entertain and to educate the masses on political issues.¹ Although N.E.P.U. political songs were on secular subjects, the underlining sentiments were Islamic both in content and in purpose: Islamic mores and attitudes colour most of the political songs. For example, in his song Wakar Yan Sawaba (W.Y.S.), literally "The song of Sawaba members"², M. Gambo Hawaja of Jos ridiculed the N.P.C. leader by making veiled references to Islam and to other pious rubrics inseparable from Muslim literature. He said:

Ancestor, Father, will not save the soul of their son,
 If the son does not follow the path of Truth.
 And here is the example which the Lord revealed to us,
 The lesson of how Kana'an was destroyed.
 You! who flatter yourself with the glory of your ancestors stop,
 Remember that Hassan and Hussein upheld the Truth.
 Don't be proud of your ancestor I see no salvation for you,
 Your Ancestor did not shake hands with a white woman.
 And he did not say that Kolanuts should be taxed,
 He neither made friends with Christians nor drank alcohol.
 The son of this and the descendant of that is not sufficient
 for you,
 God said that only good works count.
 Your beard and your sidewhiskers induces no respect for you,
 Unless your works are righteous.
 The man in a loin-cloth ~~is~~ he is righteous,
 Is superior to the man with a turban who is this worldly.
 If nobility of birth were the criterion for leadership,
 Awolowo would not have been a Premier.

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1. N.P.C. also composed songs in praise of the party's leaders. But N.P.C. songs are largely political invective and not really designed to educate the masses. See some of N.P.C. songs in Dudley, op. cit., pp. 328-334; Hiskett, M., op. cit. (1975), pp. 105-107.
 2. The full Hausa text of this song is in my possession. The Hausa version of the text translated below is reproduced as Appendix V, Wakar Yan Sawaba by Gambo Hawaja, Section A. In my interview with Alhaji Ibrahim Bui at Maiduguri in 1972, he recalled that Ahmadu Bello said that Aminu was no problem, Amma. Kaga Zabiyan Nasu!, literally, "But you see that minstrel of theirs!" That, of course, referred to Alhaji Gambo Hawaja, because when his song was published in 1954, it spread in the Muslim North like wildfire.

The bogey of "beware the bull"¹ no longer frightens me,
 I will not run until I see the forehead of a cow.
 They despised the ways of the Shehu they renounced him,
 They are not interested in heaven save in wealth.
 They would rather ride in a Buick and lodge at Hill-Station,
 Friday is the day they make feast on alcohol.
 Had he the faith to emulate the past heroes,
 Who ruled the entire world.
 They held no evil intention (in order to harm anyone),
 Their plans aimed to help everyone.
 All the Prophets, the Apostles, who preceded,
 They worshipped God and upheld the Truth.
 The descendants of the Holy Prophet for whom this world,
 And the next world were created, also upheld the Truth.
 You Gaskami (2) who goes to market once, stop!
 Remember God, you better be less bumptious,
 If you refuse you will make a false start like Bubukuwa (3)
 The community will be saved by the Shehu while you suffer.

Whoever knew Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, the N.P.C. leader, would recognize the subject of the above verses. The "Ancestor" and the "Shehu" referred to are the same person: Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, the leader of the Muslim Jihad in Northern Nigeria, from whom Sir Ahmadu Bello was descended. Hassan and Hussein were the two sons of Ali ibn Abi Talib and the grandsons of the Holy Prophet Muhammad. Other descriptions in the song refer to actual events or to real personalities of the time. As a whole the verses challenged the apparent legitimacy of hereditary leadership as they question qualifications of the N.P.C. leader. N.E.P.U.'s official view was that it would be fatal to any society to give anyone the right to leadership and to power merely because his parents had it. In this song M. Gambo Hawaja attempted to popularise his party's official

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1. The Hausa expression Gafara Sa! is roughly equivalent to "crying wolf" in English. My translation, "beware the bull", is the literal meaning of the Hausa version in the original text.
 2. Gaskami (Hausa), blocks of locust bean pulp (epithet, Gaskami Kasuwarka Daya, literally, "Gaskami, you have one market", i.e. it is taken to the market once because it soon goes bad). Metaphorically, it is roughly equivalent to the English expression, "flash in the pan" or "nine days' wonder."
 3. Bubukuwa (Hausa), the earliest grass after the dry season (others which spring up later grow taller). Epithet: Kada Kayi Sammakon Bubukuwa, literally, "Do not make a good early start and then tail off".

view. The song also mocked the Talakawa who supported N.P.C. in these words:

I am not in N.P.C. nor do I want to join,
 Their leaders do not help Nigeria.
 I disdain their party they are boastful,
 I stand under the banner of N.E.P.U. the flag of Truth.
 The flag which does not attract the ignorant nor the tyrant,
 (It) Is black with red, with green and a white star.
 If not an ignorant fool who does not know,
 Who will support a party of con men!
 To God I will tell you my brothers,
 The Talaka who supports N.P.C. has no heart.
 Only pimps and servants can join (it),
 And he who can betray his father because of greed.
 And any rich man who supports them, be sure,
 He scorns what he has and strives for the unlawful.
 You are the sons of Talaka so is your father and your mother,
 Nevertheless, you support the party of the Princes!
 Your money has confused you, you did a shameful thing,
 Because you reject your lineage for the drunkards.
 Either the rich or the learned who lost his head,
 May God save him -- let us pray for him.
 To-day no one opposes N.E.P.U. except the tyrant,
 And the ignorant Talaka who is doomed.
 Or those who are born fools,
 And those destined to lose their souls because of wealth.
 Save the merchants who want loans at all costs,
 Hence, they are enticed with loans and they became restless.
 They forgot the gift that God bestowed upon them,
 They intend to obtain loans that will not be repaid.
 This money they will only hear of but never will see,
 For God's sake let them stop fidgeting.
 The Talaka who supports N.P.C. ought to know that
 (He is like) the pail-bucket used in digging a well;
 When water is obtained, it is not to be used,
 In no time you will see it in the gutter.
 You are the son of Talaka who lend support to the tyrant,
 So that he can cheat your father while you laugh.
 We do not care two hoots for those who like the tyrant,
 Nor give a tinker's curse for the stupid tyrant himself.
 Any Talaka who supports N.P.C. here is your name,
 You are a traitor: the betrayer of your class.
 Your father is a farmer who lives by sweat of his brows,
 Yet you do not want him to prosper. 1

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1. The Hausa version of this song is reproduced in Appendix V, (W.Y.S.) Section B.

M. Gambo Hawaja wants, simultaneously, to inculcate class consciousness as well as to evoke class solidarity. He also makes consistent attempts to portray the Sarakuna as ticks who live on the blood of the Talakawa. When ministerial offices were first introduced in Northern Nigeria and the first ministers were appointed in 1954, M. Gambo Hawaja decried the composition of that first crop of ministers as a victory for conservatism. He lamented the fact that the exploitation of the Talakawa would be increased and intensified. He said:

The habit of squatting continues though the dog is sold,
 A monkey is bought with the proceeds, the former is better.
 Among the ten ministers now gathered,
 Who is Talaka among them, I ask you?
 They are either nobles or the sons of nobles,
 You know, the composition is not right at all.
 Oh! what people to select as our rulers,
 As if one is to make gruel with the recipe of a soup.
 Or to leave one's goat in the trust of a hyena,
 Oh! people, how can a monkey watch over peanuts? 1

At times the songs are presented in similes and in metaphors. For example, Gambo Hawaja said:

N.P.C., like the stinking shrew-mouse, is myopic,
 For an owl does not like to see a dove.
 The shade of a palm-tree can be pretty useless,
 To those near the trunk as only those who are far away enjoy it.²
 The Witch can forget (his misdeeds) after some time,
 But the victim's mother remembers till she dies.
 The repentance of a wild-cat is useless,
 Someone is forbidden to dance but he sways. 3

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1. The Hausa version of this text is reproduced in Appendix V, Section C.
 2. The palm tree which normally has no branches can be taller than twenty feet and its leaves hang from the tip of the trunk, hence what little shade (if any) it has, is always far away from the main trunk. Anyone sitting by the tree is bound to suffer the heat of the tropical sun. This metaphor explains that under N.P.C. government, the wealth of the country is enjoyed by foreigners, not by Nigerians. It decries foreign control of the national economy and, especially, the close association of N.P.C. ministers with Lebanese and Syrian traders at the expense of indigenous businessmen. Interview with Alhaji Gambo Hawaja at Jos in 1972.
 3. The Hausa version of this text is reproduced in Appendix V, (W.Y.S.), Section D.

N.E.P.U.'s songs carried to the masses the cross-fire of political debates normally confined within the literate group. They also set out the party's aims and objectives in simple and popular language for the understanding of the rank and file. For example, Alhaji Aminu Kano, in his Wakar Yancin Nepu Sawaba (W.Y.N.S.), literally, "N.E.P.U.'s song of freedom"¹, said:

Oh! God, the most merciful;
Here we are inspired;
Help is with you the Lord of the Universe;
We beseech freedom and social justice;
The Lord most High: he is Nigeria.

We appeared (and) we are not afraid of trouble;
Give way anyone who is a weakling;
The time is ours (and) we can't be diverted from (it);
We shall sacrifice everything and endure suffering;
The Lord most High: he is Nigeria.

We shall stake wealth and even life;
We are of to-day, sons of to-day, fit for the task;
We set ourselves on a rightful course;
Woe to all oppressors of Talaka;
The Lord most High: he is Nigeria.

Time has changed so have the old ways;
We have already taken the flag of nationhood;
In order to liberate mother Nigeria;
Hence we shall make name in this world;
The Lord most High: here is Nigeria.

In the 1956 Regional Election, N.E.P.U.'s manifesto ended with this short poem:

Oh you common people look!
Strengthen your determination and overthrow your curse,

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1. The full Hausa text of this poem is in the possession of the writer. The poem carries no name of the author but it is believed to be authored by Alhaji Aminu Kano, who confirmed the same to me. But the poem also carries a brief Hausa explanation of its objectives in Hausa which is reproduced at the bottom of the original text in Appendix V, Wakar Yancin Nepu Sawaba. Paden, *op. cit.*, p. 295, has a slightly different translation of this poem from mine.

The rule of oppression and the government of tribulation,
Vote for the candidates of N.E.P.U. Sawaba,
Assure victory to those on the side of Truth. 1

The strategy of using songs to appeal to the masses worked especially among the young. Youths all over the Emirates chanted N.E.P.U. songs and poems, even if they did not know what they meant. It also inspired many poets and singers in the Northern Region to practice their skill even more with the result that Northern Nigeria is very much richer in such literature. We hope that as time goes on native scholars will translate these poems and songs into languages of wider communication.

Reaction to the N.A. System

As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, N.E.P.U.'s primary objective was the democratization of the local governments, and thus its immediate target of attack was the N.A. system. In its "Declaration of Principles" (1950)², N.E.P.U. outlined Northern Nigeria's socio-economic and political problems as follows:

1. The shocking state of social order as at present existing in Northern Nigeria is due to nothing but the family compact rule of the so-called Native Administration in their present autocratic form.

1. This poem was composed by M. Sa'adu Zungur. It was cited in Paden, op. cit., p. 295. Once again Dr. Paden's translation of some words differs slightly from mine. The Hausa version of the poem runs as follows:

Ina Jama'ar Talakawa Ku Duba!
Ku Kar Fafa Himma Ku Toshe Masifa,
Ta Mulkin Zalama Da Daular Azaba,
Kuzabi Wakilai Na Nepu - Sawaba,
Ku Tabbatadda Nasara Ga Mai Gaskiya.

2. The original copy of N.E.P.U. "Declaration of Principles" is in my possession. It is undated but all the N.E.P.U. officials I interviewed agreed that the date should be 1950. Sklar, op. cit., p. 557, agrees with this date but Dudley, op. cit., p. 191, dated 1952, quoting no one as his source. One of my sources is Alhaji Aminu Kano, the N.E.P.U. leader.

2. That owing to this unscrupulous and vicious system of Administration by the family compact rulers, there is today in our society an antagonism of interests, manifesting itself as a class struggle, between the members of that vicious circle of the Native Administrations on the one hand and the ordinary 'Talakawa' on the other.
3. That this antagonism can be abolished only by the emancipation of the 'Talakawa' from the domination of the conduits, by the reform of the present autocratic political institutions into Democratic Institutions and placing their democratic control in the hands of the 'Talakawa' for whom alone they exist.
4. That this emancipation must be the work of the 'Talakawa' themselves.
5. That as at present the machinery of Government, including the armed forces of the nation, exists only to conserve the privilege of this selfish group, the 'Talakawa' must organize consciously and politically for the conquest of the powers of Government — both national and local, in order that this machinery of Government, including these forces, may be converted from an instrument of oppression into the agent of emancipation and the overthrow of Bureaucratic and autocratic privilege.
6. That all political parties are but the expression of class interests, and as the interest of the 'Talakawa' is diametrically opposed to the interest of all sections of the master class, the party seeking the emancipation of the 'Talakawa' must naturally be hostile to the party of oppressors.
7. The Northern Elements Progressive Party of Northern Nigeria, therefore, being the only Political Party of the 'Talakawa' enters the field of political action determined to reduce to nonentity any party of hypocrites and traitors to our mother country, and calls upon all the sons and daughters of Northern Nigeria to muster under its banner to the end that a speedy termination may be wrought to this vicious system of administration which deprives them of the fruits of their labour and that Poverty may give place to Comfort, Privilege to Equality, and political, social and economic Slavery to Freedom.

N.E.P.U.'s "Declaration of Principles" is one of the few documents produced by the party in English, hence numerous poems and songs were composed which supplemented as they analysed the society for the benefit of the illiterate N.E.P.U. members. One such social criticism

was by M. Sa'adu Zungur, who in his Wakar Yanci (W.Y.), literally, "The Song of Freedom"¹, said:

Everything in the North is different
 From what is found in a hundred [other] communities.
 Their trading is different, their occupations are different,
 Their knowledge is different, for it is not well organized.
 Their trading is like their trousers,
 Their wide loose trousers that have no value.
 Their occupations are like their turbans,
 A useless tangled bundle, not carefully planned.
 Their knowledge is like their gown,
 Voluminous but making no useful contribution.

N.E.P.U.'s aim was to recruit all who agreed with its principles on the condition that those who wanted to join the party in order to reform the above conditions should be active cadres in accordance with the "Sawaba Creed" (1950?)²:

1. I joined the Sawaba Crusade because I have a mind; a mind I have trained to accept or to reject, to ponder and to weigh -- a mind which knows the flowing stream of thought, not the stagnant swamp of blind obedience; a mind trained to think for itself, to be curious, sceptical, to analyse, to formulate and to express its opinions because if a mind does not think, it is the brain of a slave.
2. I join the Sawaba Crusade because my knees kneel only to God.

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1. The full Hausa text of this poem and its English translation are in Hiskett, M., "The Development of Sa'adu Zungur's Political Thought from Maraba Da Soja, through Arewa Jumhuriya Ko Mulukiya, to Wakar Yanci", in African Language Studies, XVI (1975), pp. 1-23. However, parts of the poem quoted here are reproduced in Appendix V, Wakar Yanci, Sections A, B, C and D.
 2. A typed written copy of the "Sawaba Creed" is in my possession. It is undated though it bore the address of N.E.P.U. in Kano. It was given to me by Mr. T.L. Hodgkin, at Oxford, in 1971. Some of the documents given to me bore the signature of Malam Ben Waffy, who informed me (interviewed at Maiduguri in 1972) that he got his copy in Kano, 1953, but he thought it was written about two years earlier (1951). But Lawan Dambazan thinks (interviewed at Kano, 1977) that it was actually typed in 1950, with very limited circulation. I relied on M. Lawan's information because he was in the N.E.P.U. from its inception in 1950; he was a full-time officer of the party till 1966. Furthermore, that neither Whitaker and Dudley nor Sklar, op. cit., made any reference to the Sawaba Creed shows that it had a very limited circulation indeed.

3. I join the Sawaba Crusade because I believe in progress not in reaction; because despite our shortcomings I trust that all African government for Nigeria could offer better opportunities and security and freedom to read, to write, listen, think and talk and enjoy life to its fullest.
4. I join the Sawaba Crusade because I want my children to be born into a free Nigeria.
5. I join the Sawaba Crusade because I want to be free: free to establish a govt. of the people, for the people and by the people in this great country, Nigeria.
6. I join the Sawaba Crusade because it is better not to live at all than to live on one's knees.
7. I join the Sawaba Crusade because my feet should go where they please, because they should need no passport to walk among any of the 24 provinces of Nigeria; because I do not believe in the establishment of custom houses between any of the three Regions of Nigeria; because I want to go about in my country without having to bribe anyone; because when my feet walk only the way they are forced to walk they hobble.
8. I join the Sawaba Crusade because my mouth does not fear to utter my opinions; because, though I am only one, my voice helps to forge my destiny; because when my mouth speaks and can say only what everyone is forced to say, it is gagged.
9. I join the Sawaba Crusade because my ears can listen to both sides of a question; because they are a channel for information not a route for repetition; because if I hear and do not think I become deaf.
10. I join the Sawaba crusade because my eyes are unafraid to look into another's eyes; because they have been suffering and because they want to see happiness and want to be free.
11. I will fight, if need be, for Sawaba because it is my obligation, because oppressed and exploited people must struggle to be free.
12. I will fight, if need be, for Sawaba because colonial brand of fascism is menacing us as we have never before been menaced, because only craven will not struggle against the establishment of a fascist government in Northern Nigeria.

The Sawaba Creed shows very clearly that N.E.P.U. regarded its political campaign against the emirates authorities as a twentieth century Jihad reminiscent of the mediaeval Christian war to recover the Holy Land: it was at the same time a campaign against the evils of colonialism and a concerted action against the "un-Islamic feudalism" of the emirate structure. There was no distinction between the colonial power and the local authorities because the latter derived both its power and "legitimacy" from the support of the former, hence Dokan Sarki

(the order of the Emir) was synonymous with Dokan Bature (the colonialist's order).¹ In his poem cited above, M. Sa'adu Zungur explained to the masses how indirect system of colonial rule worked in Northern Nigeria, in these words:

They say that authority over everything rests with the Emir,
 Because we are told the town is in his hands.
 But the Resident, the District Officer and others,
 Are (mere) Advisers without the full responsibility of
 carrying it out.
 A useless lie, an empty lie,
They have the thread, they lay out the warp.
They have the knife, they do the flaying --
 Rule over the people to their discomfort.
 The chiefs are mere imitations,
 Of the traditional authorities in the town.
 Resident, District Officer, Assistant District Officer,
 They have the key to the matter.
 What they plan, the District Officer
 Must sign it and he must scrutinize it.
 Even if it be a religious matter,
 If it touches the authority of the chiefs.
 Or if it be a matter of custom,
 Let alone a matter of the politics of the oppressors. 2

Having explained how indirect rule worked, that the chiefs were mere window-dressing, whereas real power lay with the colonialists, N.E.P.U. urged its supporters first to unmask the enemies within, to expose them and then to fight them along with their imperialist backers. Again M. Sa'adu Zungur said:

As from today we have taken up our weapons,
 For killing the oppression of the chiefs.
 For the tongue is a sword,
 And the pen a spear.

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1. Dokan Bature, literally means the order of the European. In fact, the Hausa word Bature refers to all white men though it originally referred to the brown-skinned North Africans.
 2. The Hausa version of this text is reproduced in Appendix V, (W.Y.), Section B.

It is the Truth that we will come forth and declare,
 Even if we are tied up in bonds — to the very tip of our
 penis!
 Truth has but one colour,
 Even in the palace of Pharoah, the oppressor.
 We are wise to the web of the Europeans, let alone
 Their servants the ministers, the oppressors.
 Oh Lord! release the North,
 From its tight and dangerous bonds.
 Those pilfering butchers' mates — they and their Europeans,
 Have made friends with the chiefs.
 They have hatched up a friendship, inseparable,
 Until the day when the spider inherits the town. 1

And M. Gambo Hawaja (in W.Y.S.) added:

We are the people who are set out to achieve,
 Freedom, in order to cleanse Nigeria.
 This party, the N.E.P.U., is determined,
 To see the end of this tyrant, the drunkard.
 She took weapons more deadly than any gun or bomb,
 You know them or let me tell you they are the Truth.
 When it comes to the crux, artillery and bombs are useless,
 For no one has the power to blunt the Truth. 2

Both the Sawaba Creed and the subsequent verses above spelt out not only the political and the religious conservatism which N.E.P.U. had to deal with, but also what the party called "colonial fascism" and the native despotism which combined to keep the commoners in bondage and thereby forced the Talakawa to remain at subsistence level. But to many common men the Sawaba Creed was an open call to rebellion because Hausa believe that Addinin Mu Addinin Biyaywane, "Our religion is the religion of obedience". Indeed in the rural North it is impossible to be respectful without being slavish. So to call thus upon the Talakawa was mistakenly believed to be a violation of Islam. In fact, this mistaken belief follows a Hausa adage: Bin Nagaba Bin Allah, "To obey a superior is to obey God." It is mistaken because the Islamic injunction upon Muslims to obey their leaders (superiors) depends on the conditions:

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1. See Appendix V, (W.Y.), Section C, for the Hausa version of this text.
 2. Part of Wakar Yanci Sawaba by M. Gambo Hawaja, Jos. The Hausa version is in Appendix V, Section E.

- 1) that the leaders must come from amongst the led, i.e. the elected representatives of their people.
- 2) that the leaders have neither rights nor privileges over and above their people.
- 3) that the leadership must be collective, i.e. by consultation.¹

Nevertheless, to the Sarakuna, the Sawaba Creed was an indirect challenge to political legitimacy which would make the ground beneath their feet cease to be solid. Some colonial officials became openly harsh towards N.E.P.U. because they regarded the Sawaba Creed as a clandestine call to revolution. Conversely, N.E.P.U. reacted to administrative repression with increased political militancy which included protest poems against the administration. One such poem was entitled A Yau Ba Maki Nepu Sai Wawa (S.W.W.), "Today no one opposes N.E.P.U. except a fool" (1955)², by M. Gambo Hawaja. It attacked the N.P.C. for being the stalking-horse of the colonialists. Again, the appeal to Islamic values is the central theme of this poem. M. Gambo Hawaja said:

1. The Lord, Most High, help us to help ourselves,
Raise us over our opponents,
Bring freedom and dignity to our country,
Make the peasants vote for us,
Free us like everybody else.
2. Think of the greatness of our country,
Our ancestors had [Islamic] learning,
Their judiciary was unequalled,
Today our chiefs have no self-respect,
The N.P.C. fellows gave it to the Europeans.

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1. Interview with Dr. M.T.A. Liman, a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies, Bayero University, Kano, 1978.
 2. The full Hausa text of this poem runs to 65 parts of five lines each and covers 7 pages. I have a copy in my possession. Hiskett, op. cit. (1975), pp. 111-112, contains the English translation of some parts of the poem. The Hausa version of the parts translated here are reproduced in Appendix V, A Yau Ba Maki Nepu Sai Wawa, Sections A and B.

3. With their aid our chiefs have been demoted,
Whereas they [themselves] became our representatives,
Today they do not apply our [Islamic] knowledge,
Our judicial system is flung aside,
Europeans [are now] both chiefs and judges.
4. As for the Christians, what they desire is gain,
They cast aside our learned men,
They caused them to stop applying the Shari'ah,
Which God sent to our Prophet,
You know there is nothing more hateful than the European!
5. Both our chiefs and our merchants,
And judges and the leaders of our country,
The Christians treat us [all] as if we "have eyes and see not",
When they [Christians] push our leaders they [our leaders]
push us around,
N.P.C. fellows are their stupid guides.
6. The Christians picked our enemies,
And placed them in charge of our affairs,
That they would open our eyes[lead to progress],
It is a confidence trick against us,
So that we shall be led into wilderness.
7. They cheat us because we are unwise to their tricks,
They rub shit in our calabash,
Then flies will cover all over our food,
Yet they prevent us from improving our situation,
It is greed that deceives you, you idiots.
8. We must regain our self-respect,
By teaching the [Islamic] knowledge of our forefathers,
That traditional one "because it will save us",
Let us also purify our religion,
And worship the Lord of all creatures.
9. Our predicament is most worrying,
Let us pray to our Lord and Master,
To save us from the conspiracy of our enemies,
N.E.P.U. [members] ought to be our representatives,
[If we are] to regain our honour even to Europeans.
10. Look at a blessed country like ours,
Yet we have no control over our affairs,
Men and children and our women,
There are chains of slavery on our waists,
Today we are the slaves of these fools. 1

1. For the Hausa version of this text see appendix V, Section A,
whereas parts of the poem below are reproduced in Section B.

He also capitalizes on a number of government regulations, e.g. game laws, which were the sources of grievances of the peasants, especially in the rural areas of Northern Nigeria. He said:

1. And the river and the forest and our farms,
Houses and children and our women,
Horses and cattle and our sheep,
Our hunters can testify that
Today we have no power to kill an elephant.
2. As for the hippopotamus in our lake,
As the giraffe in our forest,
It is lawful for every son of our soil [to hunt them],
[Yet] Today no hunter among us,
Can kill them save Europeans.
3. Our people and/or our chiefs,
Who will dare shoot at our elephants,
And distribute the meat among our relations,
And take the tusks to our markets,
It is unlawful for us [to do so], but lawful for Europeans.
4. Brothers a great misfortune befell upon us,
It enslaved our children and our country,
When we cut down a tree we shall be arrested,
They will imprison us along with our families,
How can anyone feel at ease in his mind?
5. If not for the stupidity of N.P.C.
At Jos there is grass in our forest,
We can't cut it with our sickles,
Unless we have permits in our hands,
And the grass tax goes to Europeans.
6. They fence off part of our forest,
They say it is the property of the Governor,
When a leaf is found in our hands,
We are arrested and we are surely fined,
Our trees are also given to Europeans.

The above poems are means of political propaganda which played on the short term grievances of the peasants to arouse their consciousness and rally them behind N.E.P.U. On the other hand, the administration persisted in its view that N.E.P.U.'s real intention was to destroy the emirate system; whereas the party's main goal was to mobilize enough support among the masses in order to press for the reform of the N.A. system. Democracy, i.e. political participation of the Talakawa so

that they could have a say on how they were governed and economic development geared to raise the standard of living of the masses, were the objectives which N.E.P.U. meant to achieve. Furthermore, N.E.P.U. believed that development (economic, social and political) would enable "Northerners" to compete, on an equal basis, with other Nigerians in a united independent Nigeria. While that policy did not seem to be destructive to the emirate system, it was undoubtedly too radical for Northern Nigeria at that time: because the idea of the North competing on an equal basis with the South was then a day-dream which bordered on irresponsibility. A further evidence of N.E.P.U.'s reformist, rather than destructive intention was the fact that one of its leaders and, indeed, the leading critic of the Northern Nigerian political arrangement went as far as advocating "regionalism" in order to preserve the emirates' governments (see Chapter IV, p. 187).

M. Sa'adu Zungur's plea for the preservation of an ideal emirate system was in accordance with N.E.P.U.'s call for the reformation and the democratization of the actual N.A. system, to bring it in line with the modern idea of an elective local government. N.E.P.U. leaders thought that when given the vote, the Talakawa would use it to emancipate themselves. Thus N.E.P.U. was pro-Talakawa and, indeed, the party for all the subordinate strata. Hence N.E.P.U. intellectuals composed poems and songs to educate the masses on how they were being exploited, to instil self-confidence in them and to explain the extent to which the Sarakuna were dependent on the surplus they expropriated from the Talakawa as well as to call upon those who were contemptuous of the peasantry to refrain from their "most objectionable" attitudes and behaviour. M. Sa'adu Zungur (W.Y.) said:

Those who chant the proud refrain,
 That the common man is the plaything of the rulers.
 Money payments are imposed upon him perforce,
 He must find it to avoid the fetters.
 Chains, shackles and fetters,
 All are weapons of oppression.
 We pay taxes and we pay for transport,
 We pay for tickets [to enter] motor parks in towns.
 We pay for licences and pay court fees,
 Before the judges of the rulers.
 And the market-stall fees to sell [even] spindles,
 And all merchandise including braiding.
 If you appeal against these, you will lose all,
 Your money in the pool of the oppressors. 1

And M. Gambo Hawaja (W.Y.S.) added:

You immodest honey-sucker stop,
 You extremely greedy ant.
 You do not at all farm or trade,
 And you have no occupation, yet [you are] outrageously
 boastful.
 I am sure no N.E.P.U. member would like you,
 No more than [he would like] the bluebottle that dropped
 into the soup.
 We N.E.P.U. are the water-lettuce in ponds,
 The idiot who steps on us will be drowned.
 Here is N.E.P.U., the stone which cannot be suddenly assailed,
 If assailed the attacker will catch hell.
 We are in dish of fine sand to the oppressor,
 Before they eat us, I swear, they must suffer.
 You, who are puffed-up with self-importance,
 Your huge tummy demonstrates your corruption. 2

Thus, by the use of poetry and very many songs, N.E.P.U. sought mass support by trying to evoke the special solidarity of the Talakawa against the Sarakuna. In this respect the party was very careful in emphasizing the authentic ideals of the Jihad with the insinuation that those ideals had been betrayed by those who succeeded the founding fathers of the Fulani Empire. These methods of appeal explained the party's substantial peasant following. N.E.P.U. believed that social hierarchy inevitably embodied a conflict of divergent class interests. To N.E.P.U., democracy

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1. The Hausa version of this text is reproduced in Appendix V, (W.Y.), Section D.
 2. The Hausa version of this text is reproduced in Appendix V, (W.Y.S.), Section F.

was the antithesis of that hierarchy, a levelling process which provided the channel for the ultimate resolution of conflicts. Hence its persistent call for the democratization of the N.A. system. The party had great distaste for the lordly comportment of the chiefs. It hated both servility and arrogance in all their forms. It fought against deference and called upon its members and supporters to abandon the traditional habits of removing their shoes and prostrating themselves before the Sarakuna. In general the party's attitudes towards authority was something akin to rebellion by the standards of Northern Nigerian political culture. Non-violent civil disobedience was an important but unpublished tenet of N.E.P.U.'s political creed. Constant references to Islamic religious injunctions and precedents to justify its teachings notwithstanding, N.E.P.U. members were referred to as Yan Tawaye, "the rebels", by the traditionalists. Conversely, N.E.P.U. made it clear to the authorities that the traditionally deferential habits were offensive to human dignity. The authorities took repressive measures against the party's supporters whose behaviour was found to be contrary to the traditionally accepted social norms.¹ N.E.P.U. reacted by advocating legal limitations on the customary powers of government and constitutional guarantees of civil liberties and the due process of law. In keeping with that principle the party was identified with the successful pressure to write the provisions of "Fundamental Human Rights", based on the United Nations Declaration, into the Nigerian Constitution.

1. This point is discussed at length, with examples from various parts of the Muslim North, by Sklar, op. cit., pp. 355-365.

Education and the Emancipation of Women

As the problems of the lower strata of the society were the focus of its attention, one of N.E.P.U.'s primary objectives was the emancipation of women. The effective way to achieve this objective was through education, hence both married and unmarried women were enrolled in the party's adult literacy classes throughout Northern Nigeria. The number of mature students in those classes varied from 20 to 30. Where the number of interested students was more than 30 a double stream was introduced. The teachers were mostly party cadres at the local level though many Maaikata members of N.E.P.U. volunteered as teachers. For instance, the writer along with other employees¹ taught at the N.E.P.U. school in Potiskum. For political lessons and those on elementary hygiene, the classes were often mixed (both men and women) but when the lessons were on child care and home economics the students were mostly women except for interested men or observers. The curriculum was varied and, dependent on the availability of volunteer teachers. As far as I know, political lessons were taken by full-time party officers. In addition to reading and writing, religious (Islamic) and general knowledge were taught. The English language was also taught to

1. In fact I found that already M. Danbala Illiasu was running an evening school for N.E.P.U. at Potiskum (1958). M. Danbala was then an employee of the U.A.C. (Nigeria) Ltd. Others were M. Baba Gadau and M. Mahmuda Gwarzo, both employees of Barclays Bank (Nigeria) Ltd. Except for M. Danbala who was transferred from Potiskum to Zaria (1959), the rest of us taught in the school till 1962, when the writer was also transferred to Yola. I helped to open a N.E.P.U. school at Yola (Jimeta) in 1962 and I taught at Jos in 1963-64. Similar schools existed in Maiduguri, Kano, Zaria, etc.

some advanced students.¹ All the lessons were carefully designed to assail superstitious beliefs and slavish deference, and to inculcate political awareness.

N.E.P.U.'s eventual achievements in the field of women's education were minimal, because in the traditional North women's education was seen as a waste of both money and time, for girls marry in their teens. The whole idea of a working woman or a working wife was abhorrent since many people thought (and still think) that it is un-Islamic for women to mingle with men other than their husbands. In many cases unmarried women and, especially the working women, are regarded as Karuwai, "harlots". Underlining this opposition to women's education is the fear that female material independence will lead to their emancipation and hence to the end of the traditional family set up in which women are the subordinates.

In view of the foregoing and many other reasons, many people in Northern Nigeria were, at best, skeptical and at worst abhorrent of N.E.P.U.'s call for the emancipation of women. Furthermore, their opposition was reinforced by the fact that in Islam, it is one of woman's religious duties to marry. Therefore, it is not surprising that the strongest opposition to N.E.P.U. policy came from the Malamai, especially those upon whom the pull of tradition is particularly strong. The religion of Islam prescribes certain functions and obligations for

1. When I returned to Nigeria in 1976, I found that most of our former students were making real progress. For instance, M. Babayo Hamman took employment with the Northern States Marketing Board in late 1969; Alhaji Babayo Audu, now a successful contractor and property owner, supervises all his business ventures personally; and M. Uba Taura completed his legal studies, from the School for Arabic Studies, Kano (1977). All of them were in my English class in 1959-1962. It is relevant to explain that it was Alhaji Babayo Audu (then Babayo Dan Soja, as we called him) who first took me to a N.E.P.U. meeting at Potiskum in November 1958.

women as much as it does for men in accordance with the "natural" characteristics of each sex; because Islam recognizes that the male and the female play different but complementary roles in society. Although the Holy Qur'an is differently interpreted on the role of women in Islam, it is impossible for anyone to justify the subordination of women on the basis of Islamic law, nor is it possible for anyone to dare reduce, cancel or distort the clear cut legal rights of women in Islamic law. The history of Islam is rich with women of great achievements in all walks of life from as early as the seventh century. In any case what Muslims do to their women in Northern Nigeria is no different from the way their pagan neighbours treat their women folk. The latter do not attempt to justify their traditional practices from the teachings of Islam nor do they pretend that they are imitating their Muslim cousins. Thus one cannot but conclude that the established practices in regard to polygamy, concubinage, divorce and the non-participation of women in public affairs are matters of custom merely, and they have nothing to do with the basic principles of Islam.¹

Education and Schooling

N.E.P.U. appealed to the Malamai as well as to the Muslim Congress of Nigeria to help modernize Islam in the North and, more especially,

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1. The stand of most Muslims on women is more customary than it is Islamic. For the debate on the position of women in Northern Nigeria, see Isa Wali, "The True Position of Women in Islam", in Nigerian Citizen, 4 August, 1956, p. 5; Dr. M.T.A. Liman, "Women Franchise in Islam", unpublished paper in my possession. Also see Greenberg, J.H., "Islam and Clan Organization among the Hausa", in South West Journal of Anthropology, III (1947), pp. 193-211; Barkow, J.H., "Hausa Women and Islam", in Canadian Journal of African Studies, VI (No. 2, 1972), pp. 317-328; The African Studies Review, XVIII (No. 3, 1975), pp. 1-120, A Special Issue: Women in Africa; Ogunbiyi, I.A., "The position of Women as stated by Uthman b. Fudi", in Odu, New Series, No. 1-2 (1969), pp. 43-60; Ahmad, K., op. cit., pp. 131-144; Hiskett, M., and Brown, G.N., op. cit., especially pp. 247-270.

to develop Qur'anic schools to qualify ^{for} government grants which Christian mission schools already enjoy. This meant that Qur'anic education was to be developed along more modern Western lines and the curriculum expanded to include secular subjects. N.E.P.U.'s position was at least listened to by some of the Malamai who saw Aminu Kano, the N.E.P.U. leader, as one of them, both because of his family background and because of his very wide knowledge of Islam and the Islamic law. Indeed, Aminu Kano is a convinced Muslim and his intellectual commitment to Islam is serious. This is why he is seen by his supporters as a religious as well as a political reformer. Nevertheless, his desire to reform Islam met with many setbacks.

N.E.P.U. made bold attempts to reform Islam by the introduction of Islamiyya¹ schools in Jos, Zaria and Kano, 1951-1952. These schools are very much like the Western schools and, thus, contrary to the tradition of Qur'anic schools in Northern Nigeria; pupils sit on chairs and use tables and/or benches to write on. There are blackboards, chalk and exercise books, etc., and the students are divided into classes according to the year of entry. The school organization as well as the syllabi are more appropriate to the Muslim North because they aim to integrate traditional and modern methods of education. The Islamiyya schools are by far in advance of the traditional Qur'anic schools in the sense

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1. These are essentially Muslim schools in which both religious and secular subjects are taught. They are organized exactly as Western schools except for their Islamic religious bias. The introduction of Islamiyya schools in the North was M. Sa'adu Zungur's idea. It was first unsuccessfully tried at Bauchi in 1944: see Kano, A., Rayuwar Ahmad Mahmud Sa'adu Zungur (Zaria, 1973), p. 13. It failed because Sa'adu's request to open an Islamiyya school was referred to Alkalin Bauchi Umaru by the Emir of Bauchi Yakubu and when the idea was explained to the Alkali, he said in Arabic: "Kutilal Karrasuna", roughly, "God accursed those who want to create what does not already exist." That ended the matter. Interview with Alhaji Aminu Kano in London on 12/11/1979.

that the Qur'an is being interpreted in Hausa for the benefit of the pupils. They are also taught how to perform ablutions and how to practice praying and many other relevant religious subjects. This is in contrast to the method of teaching in the traditional Qur'anic schools in the Northern Region where the pupils, like parrots, recited verses of the Qur'an in Arabic without knowing -- or ever coming to know -- the meaning of what they learnt by rote. N.E.P.U. made efforts to open more Islamiyya schools in the North in 1953-1954, but in the face of strong opposition from the authorities some of the schools were abandoned.¹

But on the whole the few Islamiyya schools which survived are now a great success: the old style N.A. controlled elementary schools adopted the Islamiyya techniques of teaching; their style of uniforms are adopted by all government schools in the Northern States. Those who started their schooling in the Islamiyya schools in the 1950's can be found among high-ranking civil servants, university lecturers, local government councillors and businessmen. My colleague, Shehu Abdullahi Umar, a senior lecturer in Islamic Studies, Bayero University,

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1. During our interview, ibid., Alhaji Aminu Kano recalled that he was slapped by one Baban Adamawa as he and N.A. representatives were inspecting a plot of land to be given to N.E.P.U. for the purpose of building an Islamiyya school. Subsequently, N.E.P.U. was refused the promised plot of land on the grounds that its members were already fighting and that if the party was given the plot it would cause more trouble in the building. Following that, Aminu reported Baba in an Alkali court but all the N.A. employees who were there denied having seen Baba slap Aminu, hence the case was dismissed. Nevertheless, N.E.P.U. was not given the plot of land. M. Sani Bunu donated his guest house in which the first Islamiyya school was opened in Kano. The teachers were Hassan Dan Waziri and Musa Dan Waziri; both are sons of M. Gidado, the Waziri of Kano. At Azare the first teacher was M. Adamu Badamagare with M. Hassan Na Abba as the school's secretary. The Azare school, which was opened in 1953, is now a secondary school.

Kano, is one good example of those who started schooling in the Islamiyya schools. Finally, the Islamiyya school at Azare in Bauchi State, celebrated the silver jubilee of its foundation in 1978 which many of its now famous former pupils attended from all parts of Nigeria.

Education and Democracy

N.E.P.U.'s two principal political strategies were, firstly, the political awakening of the masses through education and by using both the modern means of formal education as well as the traditional informal education such as Tafsir (Qur'anic exegesis) and Wa'azu (sermon) in which the exemplary life of prominent Muslim religious leaders and, particularly, that of Northern Nigerian Jihadists, were cited and their achievements extolled. Their greatness was always attributed to their education, thereby emphasizing the importance of education in the teachings of Islam. The modern means of motivating the masses included appealing to their self-interest in material advancement through education and citing the achievement of Western societies in the field of technology, commercial products and, subsequently, high standards of living, as the examples. But more important, N.E.P.U. tried to eliminate the official interpretations of the Qur'an which reinforced the selfish interests of the traditional elite.

N.E.P.U.'s second strategy was to agitate for public participation in governments through democratization of the N.A. and, subsequently, the Regional and the Federal Governments. The party hoped that a greater degree of local democracy would lead to direct confrontation between the rulers and the ruled. N.E.P.U.'s concept of democracy was summed up by Aminu Kano when he said:

We interpret democracy in its more traditional radical sense, and that is the true rule of the common people, the poor, the illiterate ... 1

But the Northern Nigerian peasant in particular has yet to acquire the material and the intellectual prerequisites for such a democratic society. N.E.P.U. itself knew that its ideal of democracy as the rule by the Talakawa had its attendant problems in that illiteracy, handicapped the party in winning the support of the populace which was the first step in establishing any type of democracy in the Northern Region. The party was fully aware that, rightly or wrongly, many people especially in the rural areas felt that the party's ideal of democracy was inconsistent with what was thought to be the religious justification of the status of the chiefs. On the other hand, N.E.P.U. saw its own concept of democracy as the only effective cure for the political plague of Nigeria because the party's ideal of democracy aimed 1) to check arbitrary rulers, 2) to replace arbitrary rulers with just and rational ones and 3) to obtain a share for the underlying population in the making of rules.²

National Unity

From its formation as a political party in 1950, N.E.P.U. became the leading proponent of "One Nigeria" in the Northern Region. N.E.P.U.'s early idea of unity was first Northern, then Nigerian unity. The type of government the party envisaged for the Northern Region was one that would unite the Emirs and chiefs with their subjects; that would make

1. Quoted in Sklar, op. cit., p. 372.

2. Alhaji Aminu Kano still thinks that this idea of democracy is the only way out of political bondage for Nigeria; and many former N.E.P.U. leaders still share his views. Field interviews in 1976, 1977 and 1978.

everyone realize that the progress of the country did not lie in those who were holding official positions only, but in everybody be he an official or not. Unless the people could feel that the elected representatives were their own representatives, having the interests of the masses at heart and not merely the "yes-men" of their respective Emirs and chiefs, the common people would not feel that they had means of making their contribution to the common effort.

At first, this conception of Nigeria unity made N.E.P.U. ~~hesitant~~ to enter into an alliance with any Southern based political party despite the overtures of both N.C.N.C. and A.G. Furthermore, N.E.P.U. was hesitant because of the regionalist stand of the Southern parties; and because they lacked shared democratic ideals. These hesitations led to the initial opposition, by certain N.E.P.U. leaders, especially M. Sa'adu Zungur, to any dealings with Southern politicians and, more especially, with Sa'adu Zungur's former colleagues in the N.C.N.C.¹ But in 1954, Sa'adu Zungur changed his views, not because he thought that Southern politicians were any better but because he was flabbergasted by the intransigence of the Northern Emirs; he lost any hope that they would ever agree peacefully to reform their despotic ways. For example, just before the elections in 1956, Sa'adu Zungur wrote in one of his memos to the N.E.P.U. Headquarters in Kano:

The next three decades will surely see the Northern Region cut off completely from the rest of Nigeria, under the aegis of a theocratic, one party fascist government built on the remains of the present feudal autocracies. 2

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1. On the causes of M. Sa'adu Zungur's disagreements with N.C.N.C., see Chapter IV, pp. 184-185.
 2. Quoted in Paden, op.cit., p. 284.

This realization not only shifted Sa'adu Zungur's emphasis from the reform of the emirate system to a more forcible destruction of the whole set-up, but it also made him see alliance with a Southern party as a lesser evil than the increasing isolation and subsequent possible "Pakistanization" of the Northern Region from the rest of Nigeria. He insisted that Nigeria must be preserved as a united entity by any means possible. Its central concern with the preservation of Nigerian unity made N.E.P.U. suspicious of the separatist dreams of U.M.B.C. and the protective regionalism of N.P.C. Despite articulate pleas for caution in dealing with Southern politicians, the N.E.P.U. annual conference at Lafiya decided in favour of alliance with N.C.N.C. in 1954.¹

In spite of this alliance, N.E.P.U. scrupulously preserved its separate identity which was a necessary condition for its effective operation in Northern Nigeria. Another reason why N.E.P.U. maintained its separate identity lay in the disparity between the nature of the leadership of the two parties. Whereas N.E.P.U. had minimal and, indeed, indirect connections with the Attajirai, the N.C.N.C. was both led and heavily dependent financially on middle class businessmen, with the result that it was preoccupied with entrepreneurial interests.² Generally speaking, N.E.P.U. had very little in common socially with the leadership of the N.C.N.C. and it was reluctant for egalitarian ideological reasons (see below) to abandon its separate political identity.

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1. The conference decided with 64 votes in favour of alliance with N.C.N.C. and 13 for the A.G. and the rest abstained. Altogether about 100 delegates attended the conference. But M. Sa'adu Zungur remained cold towards southern politicians till early 1956. This information is based on my interview with Alhaji Aminu Kano in London on 12/11/1979.
 2. The business connections of some N.C.N.C. leaders is discussed in detail by Post, op. cit. (1963), pp. 57-60; Sklar, op. cit., pp. 62-185, discusses the report of the Foster-Sutton Tribunal of Inquiry which reveals the business connection of N.C.N.C. leaders in Eastern Region.

Perhaps the most plausible reason for the N.E.P.U./N.C.N.C. alliance was the fact that N.E.P.U. regarded the attainment of independence for Nigeria as one of the first objectives of progressive politics. In view of that it was consistent for N.E.P.U. to seek a de-emphasis of interparty conflict in order to enhance the stability of independent Nigeria. This was one of the reasons for the party's participation in the 1959-1964 Federal Coalition government in which Aminu Kano served as a government whip. Although N.E.P.U. was a fierce opponent of the N.P.C. in the North, it cooperated with the N.P.C. controlled central government and it was prepared to cooperate with other nationalist parties in order to achieve independence and to ensure the stability of the nation. On the other hand, N.E.P.U. never regarded its participation in the Federal government (1959-1964) and its cooperation with any other party as an obligation to abate its militant opposition in the North. Hence its separate identity was convenient both to the party and to its ally, the N.C.N.C.

N.E.P.U.'s stand on Nigerian unity was consistent but its approach to constitutional reforms was gradualist. Before Nigerian independence N.E.P.U. wanted a federal system ^{with} an effective centre, but after independence it advocated gradual transfer of residual powers from the regions to the centre and an ultimate unitary system. N.E.P.U.'s vision of a unitary government was one comprising provincial rather than regional sub-units. Although the party supported the creation of states as a step in the right direction, in principle it was opposed to regional legislatures and to the Houses of Chiefs in particular. N.E.P.U.'s unitary philosophy was based on its confidence in the long term unity of the peoples of Nigeria and the party's perception of social change that would render current tribal divisions obsolete. At the party's

annual conference in 1957, the Presidential Address summed up the party's policy on Nigerian unity as follows:

Nigeria has the good fortune of having large Muslim communities in the North and in the West as there are pagans in the North and in the South and Christians in almost every corner of the country. It is our belief that the overriding factors for unity within a given territory are community of interests, economic problems and the existence of external factors which withhold or threaten full independence of the people of an area. The desire of the people of Nigeria for progress, comfort and freedom is the same all over [the country]. The complementary nature of the resources of the different parts of the country emphasize the need for a single direction of economic development to benefit all the people alike.

It is in the light of this belief that we stand for the unity and the ultimate independence of Nigeria. We in Nigeria, today, as you all know, have come to believe that whatever political system may have to be in the future, the one thing certain is that it will be considerably unlike the system under which most of us have been living. For better or for worse, we are for comprehensive changes in the fundamental structure of our society and it will depend on us and on other men much like ourselves what is made of the objective conditions upon which the future state of Nigeria would have to be built. 1

In view of this conviction and confidence in a united Nigeria, N.E.P.U. believed that only inter-regional party alliances would save Nigeria from complete disintegration and help the emergence of a Pan-Nigeria political party in the future. It may as well be argued that N.E.P.U.'s idea of a united Nigeria led to the party's support for a West African Federal Union and to its involvement in Pan-Africanism (discussed above).

The main reason why N.E.P.U. tolerated autonomous regions within federal Nigeria was for the purpose of separate development, especially in the field of education. This is because N.E.P.U. wanted Northern Nigeria to be treated as a "special" case, so that more federal money could be pumped into the North to enable it to catch up with other

1. Quoted in Sklar, op. cit., p. 373.

regions in education, the acquisition of technical skills, etc. But even with this policy of separate development N.E.P.U. preferred provincial administrative units to regional governments so as to bring government nearer to the people. Because, rightly or wrongly, N.E.P.U. believed that smaller provincial sub-units would both accelerate economic development and thus facilitate mass participation in government.

The gradual devolution of the existing regional administration to a provincial administrative unit, and the transfer of residual powers from the regional to the federal government would, N.E.P.U. believed, cater for minority interests. Thus, the party was reluctant, at least initially, to be involved in separatist politics. However, N.E.P.U. did appeal to some tribal unions mainly by sympathizing with their demands for greater local autonomy. What little support the party had in the Middle Belt was due to its ideal of a united Nigeria and the fact that it regarded the creation of states (or rather provincial assemblies) as a step in the right direction. This also explains why most of N.E.P.U. supporters came from the Muslim North , a few from the Maaikata class and a section of the Northern ex-Servicemen Associations: the problem of the ex-Servicemen's Union (Northern Nigeria) was that their leaders were political mavericks aligning themselves with either N.E.P.U. or N.P.C. as and when it suited them to do so. But the oscillation of the union notwithstanding, most of its individual members remained loyal to the N.E.P.U. There were also N.E.P.U. branches among the Northern traders resident in the urban centres of the South, and since the dominant theme of N.E.P.U.'s programme has been the ideal of One Nigeria, in contrast to N.P.C.'s policy of regional autonomy, many Southerners resident in the North supported the party.

Economic Policy

N.E.P.U.'s economic policy reflected the prevailing enthusiasm among contemporary African leaders for economic development and its objectives were an optimum point between the ~~pursuit~~^{Pursuit} of material growth and a more equal distribution of goods. N.E.P.U. was prepared to accept a sacrifice of a measure of the former goal for the attainment of the latter. But in order to understand N.E.P.U.'s economic policies we need to grasp the party's analysis of the Nigerian socio-economic predicament under colonial domination. This analysis is based, and to some extent is an elaboration on, Aminu Kano's Yan Tande (the colonialist exploiters).¹ It was first written in 1943, but could not be published then because the publishers (Gaskiya Corporation, Zaria) thought that it was seditious. Alhaji Aminu Kano's analysis can be very briefly summarised as follows:

- 1) That colonial domination had arrested and self-contained the internal dynamics of Nigerian development and thus diverted the country's progress onto a path of underdevelopment.
- 2) That development of the metropolitan country (U.K.) and the underdevelopment of its colonies were the two opposites of the same process each being largely the cause and the effect of the other.
- 3) That colonial domination reduced Nigeria, in particular, to structural dependency which formal political independence alone was not likely to correct.

1. Literally, Yan Tande means "the lickens", as in licking something sweet with the tongue. But metaphorically its nearest equivalent in English is a parasite, or a social drone. This unpublished Hausa manuscript is still with Alhaji Aminu Kano.

- 4) Thus, after independence the socio-economic structure of Nigeria would need a complete reorganization which would include the overthrow of the existing exploitative colonial structure which in itself characterized underdevelopment.

The paper argued that since the majority of the population were peasant producers living in the countryside, the first step towards economic self-sufficiency was the mechanization of agriculture and the improving of animal husbandry to increase food production in order to raise the standard of living of the people and thus stabilize Nigerian internal economy.

N.E.P.U.'s economic policy was based on the strategy of self-reliance and the use of intermediate technology. The party was opposed to prestige projects and capital intensive development projects which excluded Nigerians in their construction and thereby deprived them of the opportunities for learning new skills.¹ Therefore, N.E.P.U. believed in labour intensive development programmes. The party favoured heavy industries like steel, whose social benefits included a means of training Nigerians -- in metallurgy and heavy engineering. In view of the dearth of skilled manpower and capital in the country, N.E.P.U. favoured government participation in the private sector of the economy. To the embarrassment of its ally, the N.C.N.C., N.E.P.U. spearheaded the

1. This economic policy derived from the foregoing analysis kept on recurring in different forms in N.E.P.U. manifestoes and the public speeches of the party leaders. For example see, "N.E.P.U. Manifesto", in The Nigerian Citizen, 12 September 1956: NAK File AGNN/1095; S. Darma, Nepu Sawaba: Zaben 1959 Kira Na Farko (Kano, 1959); and Kano, A., African Economic Development (Kano, 1961).

opposition to foreign domination of the Nigerian economy.¹ It successfully called for the establishment of a "Retail Trade Commission" which gradually stopped foreign firms (U.A.C., G.B.O., John Holts, etc.) from retail trading and from buying agricultural produce in Northern Nigeria. N.E.P.U. also favoured nationalization "with full compensation" and it believed that the only effective strategy for economic development was by "mobilizing and involving the teeming millions of Nigerians and campaigning against all the existing evils that weaken the super-structure of our society."²

The Nature of Decolonization and a Socialist Nigeria

Despite what appeared to be the African leaders' belief in the "divine right" of the Western educated elite to lead their people, N.E.P.U. pointed out that the attractions of new leadership opportunities frequently led the new educated elite to compromise their political principles and thus the forfeiture of their claim to democratic leadership. A N.E.P.U. poem by Alhaji Abba Maikwaru, on the Western educated elite, entitled "We have recognized those who have wronged us", reads as follows:

You through hankering for a salaried job,
Your attitude had made a volte-face,
So that you continually take a way of corruption,
On the day of Resurrection the day of Judgement,
You will be cast into the hell-fire. 3

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1. N.C.N.C. was worried that the result of N.E.P.U.'s campaign against foreign firms would seriously affect its financiers who were agents and customers of big companies like the U.A.C. Hence N.C.N.C. made unsuccessful efforts to restrain N.E.P.U. on that campaign. Interview with Bala Keffi, M.H.A., N.E.P.U. member for Kaduna in the Northern House of Assembly (1956-1961) at Kano in 1978. M. Bala also served on the "Retail Trade Commission", 1958/59.
 2. Quoted from Alhaji Aminu Kano, Parliamentary Speeches (Kano, 1964), p.10.
 3. Part of N.E.P.U. political song recited by the writer. There is a slightly different translation of this part of the same song by Whitaker, C.S., Jr., "Three Perspectives on Hierarchy", in Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, III (1965), pp. 1-19, especially p. 19, footnote 39.

N.E.P.U. leaders were disheartened both by the corruption and by the contempt with which the Maaikata held the rural population. N.E.P.U. feared as Sa'adu Zungur did, after his experience with N.C.N.C., that on the attainment of independence, the Western educated elite would (as they did) degenerate into the mere inheritors of the power and the privileges previously enjoyed by a few whites; and that as the post-colonial rulers took a grip on power it would be impossible to effect a peaceful change in the society which would benefit the rank and file. Thus, N.E.P.U. preached to the masses that life was an unending contest and that the overthrow of the colonialists was only the first of the many battles to be fought. The party urged its supporters to be ready to fight Azzalumai Farare Da Bakake (the oppressors white and black). N.E.P.U. lumped together both the Maaikata and the Sarakuna as "parasites": lacking any skills and dependent on their exploitation of the peasants.¹ The Maaikata in particular were referred to as Yancin Amana (traitors): "who betrayed the trust and confidence" of the masses; because they were educated by the tax-payers' money, yet they failed to use the knowledge they acquired to emancipate those who paid for their education. So, except for those whose loyalty to the party had been tried and tested, N.E.P.U. members were cool towards all Maaikata. Hence, official N.E.P.U. policy condemned the Maaikata for accepting the presuppositions of Western Imperialism and for identifying themselves with the imperial power against the Talakawa.

Whereas N.E.P.U. denounced the colonial apparatus of government, the party was much less clear on the nature of the regime it would

1. I attended a N.E.P.U. lecture in the New Era cinema house, at Jos in 1963, when successive speakers enumerated the crimes of chiefs and the educated elite against the people and the country. Each speaker reminded the audience that the road to freedom was long and thorny and that people must be prepared to fight as the struggle continued.

establish if voted to power: only saying that it would be Mulkin Gurguzu, "an egalitarian/socialist government". The party's officials were vague on what that meant. M. Tanko Yakasai, N.E.P.U. publicity secretary, said: "Ours is that we firmly believe in Socialism, but as to what it should look like, it is left to the people of this country to determine when the time comes."¹ So, in order to identify N.E.P.U.'s brand of socialism, it is important to understand the party's analysis of post colonial Nigeria:²

- 1) The party believed that Nigeria is a client state in that the successors to the colonial power did not rid the country of any of the social evils of colonialism and, particularly, the exploitative characteristics which the British colonial administration represented. They perpetuated all those evils and, even worse, Nigerians in power used government machinery for their own self-advancement to the detriment of the majority of the population.
- 2) Thus, the power base of the new Nigerian state and what stability it achieved depended on the congruency of the interests of foreign corporations, which dominated (and still dominate) the national economy, and those of the indigenous ruling group, who were (and still are) the executive arm of the foreign corporations in Nigeria. Hence there existed a bureaucratic form of authoritarian state which served the interests of the international bourgeoisie and their internal allies.

1. Yakasai, S.A. Tanko, Why Every Northern must not vote for the N.P.C. (Kano, 1964), p. 5.
 2. The following points are based on a series of interviews with Alhaji Lawan Dambazau and Alhaji Tanko Yakasai in Kano between 1976 and 1978.

- 3) In view of the above, Nigeria was being run by the adoption of "foreign ideologies" which could not be reconciled with the Nigerian traditional way of life. In fact the Nigerian tradition was jettisoned and substituted by a foreign one which was unacceptable to the generality of the population. N.E.P.U. argued that colonialism had already subordinated the indigenous culture but after independence the colonial legacy caused our indigenous culture to begin rotting.
- 4) N.E.P.U.'s answer to what the party called the "increasing decadence of Nigerian society" was a return to the common culture of Communalism: in which people were bound together not only economically and politically but also religiously and socially by a system of collective activity and mutual help which extended from the family to the ethnic group. That traditional reciprocal policy created both sense of belonging and of brotherhood which served as the cornerstone of the extended family system. The system taught social obligations and, in it, the whole purpose of education was to prepare a child for participation in the life of the community, the ideal of which was to inculcate correct relations with, and behaviour towards, others.¹

Alhaji Aminu Kano has explained that N.E.P.U. believed in socialism; in that the party's objectives and its implementation were socialist; but the pronouncements were welfarist because the Hausa phrase meaning socialism scared away supporters in the sense that it also implies denial of private ownership of basic needs.² So the apparent obscurity

1. This concept of "communalism" was first mentioned to me by Alhaji Aminu Kano, in London, 1973. I have since discussed it with many other former N.E.P.U. officials, in addition to those named in footnote

2. Interview with Alhaji Aminu Kano at Little Gombi on 7 April 1977.

of N.E.P.U. literature on its ideology was the result of practical politics not lack of clear cut ideology as it appeared to be. To N.E.P.U., socialism means the setting up of a society on the basis of self-sufficiency and justice, work and equal opportunity for all, and production and service to people. Seen in that light both democracy and socialism appeared as one and the same extension of the act of the emancipation of the Talakawa. Democracy was the political freedom and socialism was the economic freedom. They were, so to speak, its twin wings without which it could not soar to the horizons of the desired justice in society. The freedom of the masses was to be consolidated with all their abilities.

If voted to power, N.E.P.U. had no intention of adopting the colonial structure of government as it was committed to restructure the whole Nigerian economy and society. N.E.P.U. maintained that the colonial bureaucratic set-up was as alien as it was oppressive, hence, it was undesirable for a "truly free society". It was designed to preserve the privileges of the "master classes" and, therefore, socially divisive. The party held that civil servants, or any other group of employees, had no right to be more secure than the peasant tax-payers with whose money they were educated and who they were supposed to serve. Accordingly, salaries and wages would be revised to bring them into line with the general standard of living in the country.

Conclusion/Summary

From the foregoing, it can be seen that N.E.P.U. entered the Nigerian political scene determined to reduce and subsequently to eliminate the privileges of the Sarakuna. It was dedicated to the

struggle to emancipate the Talakawa and to win real independence for Nigeria. In order to achieve those aims, it called upon the peoples of Northern Nigeria to end the ancient system of rule which deprived them of the fruits of their labour, so that poverty might give way to comfort, privilege to equality, and political, social and economic slavery to freedom. Whether or not N.E.P.U.'s underlying concepts of society and its proposed solutions to social problems were Marxist was and still is debatable, but the party's language clearly owed much to Marxiam, although no member of the party travelled beyond the "Iron Curtain" or was familiar (except Aminu Kano) with communist literature before Nigerian independence. Similarly, Marxism cannot claim to be the sole quarry from which N.E.P.U. ideas and terms were extracted because, if anything, our evidence shows that the party was more "utilitarian" than "Marxist". Even more important, our research shows that N.E.P.U.'s modes of thought and language derived from Islamic sources and thus, at that time, it was the only substantial representative of the Islamic radical tradition brought to Northern Nigeria by the Jihad of Usman Dan Fodio.

CHAPTER VI

ISLAMIC RADICALISM IN NORTHERN NIGERIA: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

N.E.P.U. KUKAN JARIRINE, SHI DAI BA ZAI YIKOME BA SAI DANU

N.E.P.U. is [like] the cry of a baby, it does nothing but disturbs."

Alhaji Alhassan Dantata, Kano¹

Introduction

Islamic "radicalism" (or radical ideas) refers to those aspects of the teachings of Islam which oblige believers in the Islamic faith to resist tyranny by "exertion", "struggle", or "effort" (Jihad), especially if the tyrant (or tyranny) is anti-Islamic or un-Islamic. In practice all tyranny is interpreted as irreligion in Islam. Those teachings also uphold definite political rights which are bestowed upon Muslims. Among other things, the teachings emphasize the rights of the ruled over and against those of the rulers. The teachings are underlined by demands for the widest possible diffusion of knowledge and education and stresses on the idea of Umma (the international Muslim community). On the other hand, Islamic thought justifies the use of revolutionary means to achieve Islamic objectives. Depending on the nature of government and its laws, it upholds that violence is permissible.

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1. My informant is Alhaji Ahmadu Tireda, Kano. Alhaji Ahmadu was for many years the national treasurer of N.E.P.U. Alhaji Alhassan Dantata was, in his time, the richest man in Kano, and his family became the principal financiers of the Northern Peoples Congress (N.P.C.) in the city.

In this concluding chapter I intend to show that as N.E.P.U.'s political philosophy stemmed from its belief in personal liberty, national independence and opposition to foreign domination, the party was part of the above radical tradition. I shall argue that as N.E.P.U. was a national movement in a predominantly Muslim area (the Emirates), the party's language and modes of thought derived from both Islamic and from Western sources; and that N.E.P.U.'s Islamic mode of thought was in fact a continuation of the religious "activism" set in motion by the nineteenth century Jihad in Northern Nigeria. Thus, Alhaji Aminu Kano, the N.E.P.U. leader is the twentieth century counterpart of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, the leader of the Jihad movement.

The flare point in the Muslim North is no different from the legacy of the rest of the Muslim world where religion is the natural vehicle for the expression of dissent and the mosque is its focus. But what Northern Nigeria has in common with other Muslims is not just religion but exposure to the tensions of abrupt and often unprepared change. In either case a part of the political stage, and often a dominant part, is occupied by supporters of reform and modernization. The rest is held by forces, traditional, conservative and often deeply religious, who reject the philosophy of reform and progress almost in its entirety. Consequently, the clash is ultimately about values and each community has to resolve its crisis in its own way. That religion plays such a vital role in Muslim affairs is apparently due to the fact that in Islamic thinking the Western separation between private religion and public affairs does not exist (see below). Islam was the ideology of the Jihad movement as it was equally used to justify N.E.P.U.'s rebellion against the N.A. system in the North and against colonial domination of Nigeria.

Thus, the historical thread which ties together radical ideas and indeed radical movements in Northern Nigeria is Islam. But since Islamic ideas were neither clear to nor accepted by the generality of Muslims until the nineteenth century Jihad, our examination of the radical tradition in Northern Nigeria begins with the Jihadists' ideas and their movement. The ideals of the Jihadists were rooted in Islam and their purpose was to create an Islamic state, taking the form discussed in Chapter II and now summarized below.

A Summary of Some of the Political Teachings of Islam¹

1. The political philosophy of the Qur'an is essentially based on its fundamental concept of the Universe which can be summarised as follows:

- i) That God is the creator of the whole universe, including man and all that man exploits and harnesses into his service.
- ii) That God Himself remains the sole master, ruler, director and administrator of His creation.
- iii) That the sovereignty of this universe does not and cannot vest in anyone except God and no one else shares this sovereignty with Him.
- iv) That all attributes and powers of sovereignty are solely His prerogatives.

2. God is the only rightful authority in human affairs just as in all other affairs of His creation. Thus no human or non-human has any right to give orders or decide matters independently.

1. The following account on the political teachings of Islam is drawn from Sharif, M.M. (ed.), A History of Muslim Philosophy, vol. I (Wiesbaden, 1963); and Gibb, H.A.R., Studies on the Civilization of Islam (London, 1962).

3. The Qur'an says that unadulterated obedience is due to God alone, in that His law should rule supreme, i.e. to obey others or follow one's own wishes against the law of God is not the right way.
4. The Qur'an says that Prophets are the only source of knowing the law of God.
5. According to the Qur'an the commandments of God and the Prophet of Islam constitute the supreme law of God and that Muslims cannot adopt any other attitude other than that of complete submission to it.
6. According to the Qur'an, the right form of government for mankind (i.e. an Islamic state) is one in which the state relinquishes its claim to sovereignty in favour of God and, after recognizing the legal supremacy of God and His Apostles, accepts the position of viceregency (caliphate).
7. The Qur'anic conception of the caliphate can be summarised as follows:
 - i) All the powers that man possesses in this world are not his own but have been endowed to him by God and may be exercised only within the limits prescribed by Him. Thus man is neither the real sovereign nor an independent master but a viceregent.
 - ii) This viceregency cannot be right and lawful unless it is subservient to the commandments of God. Thus any state that claims to be independent of Him is in revolt against the Lord and, therefore, forfeits the obedience of the Faithful.
8. The powers of a true caliphate do not vest in any individual nor in any clan, community or class, but in those who believe in God and do good.
9. The government in a caliphate system cannot claim an absolute or unlimited obedience from the people because the people are bound to

obey it only so far as it exercises its powers in accordance with the divine law.

10. In all affairs of the state the Muslims should make it the rule to take counsel among themselves.

11. The qualifications of those who run the affairs of the state should include the following:

- i) They must have faith in the principles according to which they have to manage the affairs of the Caliphate.
- ii) They must be honest, trustworthy, God-fearing and virtuous.
- iii) They must be intelligent, educated, wise and both physically and intellectually fit to manage the state.
- iv) They must be men of integrity who can be safely entrusted with public responsibilities.

12. The constitution of the caliphate should be based on the following principles:

- A:
- i) That obedience to God and to His Apostle takes priority over obedience to everyone else.
 - ii) That obedience to those in authority is conditional on their obedience to God and His Apostle.
 - iii) That the Caliph must be elected from amongst the believers.
 - iv) That it is permissible for the people to differ (or even to oppose) the government and all their rulers.
 - v) That in the case of dispute the final authority to decide between them is the law of God and His Apostle.
- B: The Qur'an gives no fast and hard rules on the method of election and consultation; it only lays down broad principles within which practical implementation of public problems can be decided in accordance with the exigencies of time and the requirements of society.

- C: On matters about which no clear injunctions are given and no limits proscribed by the Apostle of Islam, the legislature (ijma) has the right to enact by-laws, rules of procedure, in keeping with the spirit and the general principles of Islam, to bring them into practice.
- D: The judiciary must be free, independent and impartial in its authority. Its main duty is to adjudicate cases in strict accordance with God's law and the requirements of justice without being swayed by the passions or prejudices of its own members or of any other group.
13. The Islamic state comes into being for two purposes: firstly, that justice and equality be established in human affairs and, secondly, that the powers and the resources of the state be harnessed in order to promote the welfare of the people.
14. All citizens of the Islamic state, whether Muslims or non-Muslims, must be guaranteed, among other things, the under-mentioned fundamental human rights and it is the duty of the Islamic state to safeguard them against all types of encroachments:¹
- i) Personal security
 - ii) Security of property
 - iii) Protection of honour
 - iv) Right of privacy
 - v) The right to protest against injustice
 - vi) The right to enjoin what is good and to forbid what is evil.

This is the right to criticism.

1. This list is by no means exhaustive. In fact, it is greatly abridged to serve the purpose of this thesis.

- vii) Freedom of association
 - viii) Freedom of faith and of religious practice
 - ix) Protection against bringing one's own religion into disrepute
 - x) Limiting the responsibility of every person to his or her own deeds
 - xi) Protection against action being taken against anyone on false reports
 - xii) The right of the destitute and the needy to be provided with the necessities of life by the Islamic state
 - xiii) Equal treatment of all citizens by the Islamic state without discrimination.
15. The Islamic state has the following rights over its citizens:
- i) That they must submit to the authority of the Islamic state.
 - ii) They must be law-abiding and should not disturb public order and tranquility.
 - iii) They must give support to the Islamic state in its rightful activities.
 - iv) They must be prepared to sacrifice their lives and properties for the defence of the Islamic state.

From the foregoing one can see that Islam incorporates a tradition of political submission as much as it teaches the legitimacy of rebellion. On rebellion, there are numerous Qur'anic injunctions which exercise a powerful hold on the mind of Muslims and which are constantly quoted by radicals to justify revolt. For example, the Qur'an says:

God has given permission to those who have been
cheated (or oppressed) to rise up against injustice,
and indeed, God will help them to be victorious.
(22:40) 1

In fact, another injunction can be seen as making rebellion obligatory when it says: "If they deal with you righteously then do the same thing to them ..." (9:7). The full interpretation of this fairly long injunction very briefly means that loyalty is due only if the leaders are not corrupt, but if they are (corrupt), disobedience to them is obligatory. Also Muslims are taught to persist in their struggle against tyranny because ultimately victory will be theirs:

Do not weaken and do not be aggrieved for you will
be victorious as long as you have strong belief
and commitment. (3:139)

Again Muslims are encouraged by a promise of reward thereafter:

Do not weaken your effort in fighting the enemy because
if you are suffering difficulties they too are suffering
the same difficulties but whereas you will be rewarded
by Allah they have nothing to hope for. (4:105)

These and similar teachings inspired a man like Shehu Usman Dan Fodio and his fellow Jihadists and thus changed the course of history in Northern Nigeria.

The Political Ideals of the Jihad²

In analysing the ideals of the Jihadists it is important to look at the circumstances which favoured the upsurge of the Jihad movement.

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1. I owe this and the subsequent Qur'anic injunction to Alhaji Aminu Kano who drew my attention to them. I am grateful to Dr. M.T.A. Liman who checked my English translation of the injunctions. Students of Islamic history will recall that this first injunction was written on the Abbasid flag when they rebelled against the Umayyad caliphate in 749 A.D.
 2. This section has benefitted greatly from the study of Thomas Hodgkin's work, especially his Nigerian Perspectives (Oxford, 1975), pp. 244-267. It also draws on Mahmud Tukur's "Political Ideals of the Sokoto Caliphate", unpublished paper submitted to International Islamic Seminar on Social Justice (3rd to 8th January, 1978), A.B.U., Zaria.

Bearing in mind the fact that the religion of Islam and thus Muslims existed in Northern Nigeria centuries before Usman Dan Fodio, the period between the middle of the eighteenth century to the early nineteenth century witnessed the growth of the scholarly class, particularly among the Fulani and the Tuareg, with their own distinct family and educational base, sharing a common Islamic culture and community values, operating outside and independent of the existing political structures. This gave the Muslim scholars the freedom to teach their religion and to inculcate alternative political values to their students and fellow Muslims alike. In so doing a firm base was created for the opposition to and the subsequent overthrow of the existing ruling dynasties. There were also a variety of social, economic and political grievances, of the kind listed by Usman Dan Fodio in his Kitab Al Farq, which affected all sections of the population, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. The reforming scholars became increasingly aware of these grievances through their teaching profession and because some of them worked as functionaries of the rulers. Conversely, the masses were awakened to, and indeed, became resentful of, their predicament through the teachings of the scholars. The increasing number of conversions to Islam posed a serious threat to the non-Muslim rulers who reacted by attacking the Muslims, especially the new converts. The Muslims answered aggression with aggression and in the confrontation which ensued the Muslims emerged victorious.

The Jihadists' solution to the problems of government was the installation of a humane and just government which would govern according to the Shari'ah:

The foundation of good government is justice. The Imam should command his people with justice. There can be no development without justice and justice is the basis of all progress. 1

It should be supported by a simple non-exploitative bureaucracy. The appointment of the Caliph would be by consultation not by hereditary right. As a safeguard against oppression on the part of the rulers, the importance of accessibility was stressed: one of the practices most destructive to any reign is "the seclusion of the King from his subjects". Their aversion to injustice and oppression is illustrated by this statement:

The most abhorred and remotest from Allah is the tyrannical ruler. Whoever commits oppression is cursed by God. The oppressive ruler will not get Muhammed's intercession. Authority given to those unfit for it is oppression.

As Thomas Hodgkin perceptively observed that the Jihadists' idea of the state is "essentially elitist, but their conception of an elite is an open scholarly class, admission into which should depend on piety and learning only."² Thus, like Plato in The Republic, the Jihadists insist that the entitlement to power and the credentials for exercising rule over others should be based on individual merit only. The Republic of Plato is clear on its insistence that intellectual merit is the ultimate criterion of the right to rule. On the top of the structure are the "guardians", those who are entrusted with the welfare and the destiny of the society. The guardians should be trained and groomed on the basis of their intellectual capacities and they should be

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1. This and the quotations below were originally from Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, Kitab Al Farq (M. Hiskett, trans.) in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, XXII (No. 3, 1960), p. 570; and Muhammadu Bello, Usul, Fifth Principle, p. 83; all are cited in M. Tukur, op. cit., pp. 6-7.
 2. See Hodgkin, T., "The radical tradition in Muslim West Africa" (see below, footnote 3, p. 340) p. 115.

entrusted with the power to rule on the basis of a strict leadership code. Then comes the class of the "auxiliaries", those bearing the burden of defence and security. Lastly, there is the "economic sector of the society", those bearing the heavy burden of production and the economic well-being of the society.¹ In the same fashion the Jihadists divided men into three categories: firstly, Malamai of high standing; secondly, those that seek knowledge and the way of salvation; and thirdly, the rest of the crowd who follow anyone who calls them.² The elite for the Jihadists, like the guardians for Plato, have the right to rule because of their knowledge and piety. This is the theoretical basis of their republican ideas. They dismissed ethnic origin as worse than irrelevant in becoming a member of the ruling group, with the same theoretical justification:

One of the swiftest ways of destroying a kingdom is to give preference to one particular tribe rather than another or to show favour to one group of people rather than another. 3

This is a reflection of their own belief that when the state power consistently favours one ethnic group against others, the state will not only forfeit the support of the excluded groups but it also undermines the legitimacy of its claim to authority over those ethnic groups. In fact, the reforming scholars were known to have frequently attacked those who mistakenly thought that being a Fulani was a sufficient qualification for being a member of the elite or holding office within

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1. See Plato, The Republic (Lee, H.D.P., trans.) (Penguin Classics, 1972), pp. 156-173.
 2. See Arnett, E.J., The Rise of Sokoto Fulani (Kano, 1922), p. 27; M. Mahdi, AlFarabi, made a similar division of citizens in Strauss, L., and Cropsey, J. (eds.), History of Political Philosophy (New York, 1963), pp. 160-1.
 3. Usman Dan Fodio, in his Bayan Wujub, cited by Thomas Hodgkin, "The Radical Tradition in Muslim West Africa", in Little, D.P. (ed.), Essays on Islamic Civilization (Leiden, 1976), p. 115.

the new Islamic state.¹ Furthermore, after their victory in the confrontation between the Muslim and the Habe rulers, the reforming scholars demonstrated a remarkable tolerance and accommodation of the not so learned Muslims as well as their pagan neighbours:

The caliph has to honour the notables of every tribe and the head of each clan and enjoin them to be kind towards the learned, those who know the law by heart, and the pious and ascetics ... He should not deprive a chief of his chieftaincy -- rather he should make sure that every mighty man retains his position and cause everyone to occupy the place he is entitled to. Only then can he be the chief of chiefs. 2

Indeed, it was on this tolerance and accommodation (which was in contrast with the persecution of Muslims by the Habe rulers), the ease of Muslim conquest and the subsequent stability of their regime in part depended. On the other hand, it partly depended on the accountability of the rulers to the ruled.

Among other things, the Jihadists also stressed the importance of the accountability of all public servants;³ 1) that a leader should be answerable for all his public actions; 2) that holders of public offices should conduct themselves in accordance with the values and the standards of their society; 3) the willingness and the ability of rulers to give information and to submit themselves to examination by the ruled; 4) that caliphs are responsible not only to their own people but ultimately to God. Emphasizing the personal responsibility of a leader to the whole community (umma), Shehu Usman Dan Fodio told his Muslim followers that everyone of them was a shepherd and thus

1. See Last, M., The Sokoto Caliphate (London, 1967), p. 59.

2. Usman Dan Fodio, op. cit., cited in Hodgkin, T., in Little, D.P., op. cit., p. 115.

3. For more detailed discussions on the importance of accountability, see ibid., pp. 103-117.

every one of them was responsible for the flock.¹ And Muhammadu Bello reminded his provincial governors that the happiest ruler was he with whom his people were happy.² The governors were also urged by Abdullahi Ibn Fodio to enforce the law of Tuhdasu, covering those who appear to be "living beyond their incomes".³ Abdullahi Ibn Fodio explained that whoever was found to have wealth above what he earned from his work, the ruler should confiscate and restore it to the treasury. Indeed, the emphasis on the accessibility of the caliph and his deputies to the rank and file members of the community is also a form of accountability because when the oppressor is certain that the oppressed will not have access to him, he becomes even more oppressive. Thus, the accessibility of the ruler and the upholding of justice are means of ensuring the unity of the community, because when people suffer without getting redress from their ruler the people's loyalty will shift to another ruler and thereby cause dissension and division within the community. In order to avoid this, Sokoto still maintains the tradition whereby the Sultan periodically explains his policies and actions to the Ulema, who are the visible embodiment of the Islamic value system. This tradition came into being when Aliyu Babba⁴, the Sultan of Sokoto, encountered a group of Sokoto Ulema who publicly announced that they had withdrawn their allegiance from Aliyu and that it was Halal,

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1. This originates from a well-known Hadith of the Holy Prophet. It was paraphrased by Usman Dan Fodio in Kitab Al-Farq, p. 567.
 2. Muhammadu Bello, in Usul Al Siyasa (B.G. Martin, trans.) in D.G. McCall and N.R. Bennett (eds.), Boston University Papers on Africa, V, (Boston, 1971), p. 83.
 3. Abdullahi Ibn Fodio in Al Hukkum, p. 94, cited by M. Tukur, op. cit., p. 22.
 4. Aliyu Babba (Mai Cinaka), the eldest son of Muhammadu Bello and thus the grandson of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio. He was the third Sultan of Sokoto, 1842-1859.

"permissible", in Islamic law, for other Muslims to do likewise.¹ Accountability to God is fundamental to Islamic political thought, hence the importance of public accountability of Islamic leaders cannot be gainsaid.

In view of the above, widening access to education (and thus entry to the elite) was not only a safeguard against unaccountability but also a means to maximise popular participation in politics. A high standard of education became a necessary precondition of membership of the community as it is necessary to understand the Shari'ah in order to act in accordance with the divine law and to ensure that others do the same. In view of this the reforming scholars put tremendous emphasis on education for the purpose of training more teachers, administrators and jurists. In addition widening the spread of education enabled the reforming scholars to popularise the basic ideas of the reform movement among the masses through poems and songs in Hausa and Fulfulde languages. The right of women to receive education was not neglected and, in fact, it became the responsibility of their menfolk to instruct them.²

To what extent are the ideas of the Jihad movement radical and what are the radical dimensions of the changes introduced by the Jihadists? The central idea of the Jihadists concerned the legitimacy of political authority: the rejection of all the existing dynasties as Haram, "unlawful" according to Islam law and religion; the hostility

1. Interview with Sarkin Rafi, Abdullahi Maikano, at Sokoto, in 1976.

2. See Ogunbiyi, I.A., "The position of Muslim Women as Stated by Uthman b. Fudi", in Odu, N.S. (Nos. 1-2, 1969), pp. 43-60; and Abdullahi Ibn Fodio, Tazvin al-Waraqat (M. Hiskett, trans.) (Ibadan, 1963), pp. 86-87.

towards monarchy because it is an un-Islamic institution; and the condemnation of hereditary kingship as an un-Islamic practice. These were all radical positions for their time and more so in nineteenth century Hausaland. But, far more important were their efforts to give their followers a political education: 1) on the importance of knowledge and its relationship with allegiance to a particular leaders; 2) on the necessity to migrate from the land of oppression and injustice; 3) on the need for the Ulema to disassociate themselves with powerful and wealthy persons; 4) on boycotting the ruling elites and governments who perpetuate injustice and oppression. In fact, the belief that when improperly-educated people were given leadership disaster would ensue, set new rules for the political game in Hausaland. All these ideas and beliefs are rooted in Islam which teaches Muslims not to follow leaders whose policies and practices are not based on the Shari'ah:

Knowledge and authority are the fundamentals of religion and a person who simply follows his whims is not acting according to the Shari'ah. This type of man should not be given leadership. ¹

The Muslims' refusal to humble themselves in front of the Habe rulers at a time when the tradition impelled all commoners to prostrate themselves before the members of the ruling classes, reflected the radical element of the Jihad movement. Similarly, the refusal of the Jihadists to compromise or to negotiate with the Habe rulers posed a serious threat to the existing regimes.

They also addressed themselves to the difficult issues of the economic relations between their new community and the power-elite of Hausaland. They spelt out the correct attitudes which should be adopted

1. Usman Dan Fodio, Masa'il al-Muhimma (O. Isma'il trans.) cited in M. Tukur, op. cit., p. 30.

towards the property of the al-Zalama, "the unjust", and the impermissibility of association with them. The concept of al-Zalama includes all those persons who misused their power, influence or offices to trespass on other people's rights. The economic history of Hausaland in the late eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century suggests an uneven economic boom¹ which enabled many people, traders, rulers and even scholars, to amass wealth; much of which was, of course, obtained by exactions, expropriation or other exploitative means. The relative affluence prevalent drew this stipulation from Shehu Usman Dan Fodio:

Where the Haram part of a person's property is clearly identifiable and the property is still in possession of the person who expropriated it, it is not permissible to sell, buy, eat or wear from it. Nor should any Muslim accept part of it as a present or in settlement of a debt. When most of a person's property is illegally acquired (i.e. through oppressive policies) it is not permissible to trade with him. Any dealing with him is Haram. 2

The Shehu further advised all Muslim scholars not to visit such corrupt persons:

A learned man should have people come to his door and ought not be seen at others' door ... For a scholar should cater for his needs and those of the Muslims by cutting himself off from the men of the world — Abna al-Duniya. 3

That devastating campaign against the existing socio-economic order was unparalleled in the history of Hausaland. The Jihadists put forward a view which is frequently associated with radical movements, that

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1. See "Economic History Papers" (forthcoming by A.B.U., Zaria), submitted at the seminar on Economic History of the Central Savanna of West Africa, 5th to 10th January, 1976, Abdullahi Bayero College, A.B.U., Kano.
 2. Quoted in Usman Dan Fodio, op. cit., cited in M. Tukur, op. cit., p. 37.
 3. Ibid. This is in fact paraphrased from the Qur'an, 2:156.

the identity of their community should be based on the common culture of the Muslims which is rooted in the Islamic belief system rather than on common ethnic or economic interests. Thus, like Marxism¹, the Jihad movement put its claim to the loyalty of its members on the basis of a common belief system. In this way the Islamic values of justice and truth, personal integrity, selflessness, humility and the pre-eminence of the public interest, provided the basis of a viable political community in Hausaland until the advent of the British.

But, as experience has shown all over the world, radical theories are quite different from their practices and, Islamic radicalism is no exception to this general experience. Islam is in its origins revolutionary in that Prophet Muhammad precipitated one of the most remarkable transformations in the history of mankind. But not long after the Holy Prophet, the Muslim world was ruled by despots who used his teachings to sanctify their own authority. The revolutionary tradition of Islam was pitted against the religion of the state which drew its legitimacy from the apparent belief that it stood for justice, equality and freedom on the side of the poor and the oppressed; but in reality the institutions of the state were on one side and the people on the other side. That situation came about when military leaders seized control of the institutions of the state and turned them into the instruments for their own preservation and enrichment.² The religion of Islam degenerated into a dogma which reflected, in a semi-secular

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1. For a comparative study between Islam and Marxism see Hodgkin, T., "The Revolutionary tradition in Islam", in Race and Class, XXI (No. 3, 1980), pp. 221-237.
 2. The same situation developed in the early Muslim state in Arabia. See, among others, Wolf, E.R., "The Social Organization of Mecca and the Origins of Islam", in South Western Journal of Anthropology, VII (No. 4, 1951), pp. 1-19.

form, the socio-political habits conditioned by the authoritarian caliphal system. This crisis arose from the conflict between Islamic values and the values of Arab Bedouin society. All along Islam was unable to free itself completely from ancient Arab beliefs and the search for a balance between the two elements remained a feature of Muslim intellectual life for many years.

Similarly, Islamic values became entangled with local traditions in Northern Nigeria and thus not long after the passing away of the leading Jihadists, Hausaland witnessed the use of Muslim religious dogma to perpetuate un-Islamic traditions. Contrary to the teachings of Islam, the institution of kingship was reestablished and the Emirs, more than anything else, became military commanders who led their people in wars, hence they made laws and controlled the administration of justice. Title to the throne became essentially hereditary while Emirs were regarded as sacred persons if not themselves God, they were, at least, the Lord's annointed. The descendants of the Jihadists and some Ulema who cooperated with them enjoyed all the trappings of high office and much affluence. Subsequently, all members of the ruling dynasties were placed at the top of the social hierarchy. In fact, to many people, the Jihad ceased with the overthrow of the Habe rulers when most non-Muslims came under the protection of the Muslim states and as such they were treated as property (slaves).¹

1. Interview with Jauro Adamu Mapindi who also drew my attention to the large number of pagan communities in the former Adamawa Province (now Gongola State) who were (and still are) referred to as Habe Amana, "Those under Muslim protection". Such pagan areas were preserved as the communities from which slaves were captured as and when they were needed.

That sorry situation led to the rise of Hausa "radicalism", i.e. those who identified themselves with the kind of criticism which Abdullahi Ibn Fodio made on the new political order, especially the predominantly Fulani ruling class:

Whose purpose is the ruling of countries and their people, in order to obtain delights and acquire rank, according to the custom of the unbelievers and the title of their sovereign. 1

That interlude of crisis was immediately linked with the appearance of the Mahdi and thus to increased criticism of the Emirate governments by puritan Malamai. It also led to the migration of other Muslims to Sudan en route to Mecca. Increased social tension and the anxiety of the people did not seem to minimise oppression as rulers warmed up to power and as the descendants of formerly austere Malamai who were accustomed to all the hardships of a meagre existence on the borders of the Sahara desert found themselves masters of some of the richest parts of Hausaland, able to enjoy every luxury and to acquire some of the refinements of ancient Arab civilization. As commerce developed (e.g. in Kano), so did the Emirs' courts become brilliant centres of luxury. "Absolute monarchy" combined with polygamy led, as it did in the Middle East, to dynastic civil wars. There were immense numbers of slaves, largely as a result of the successful military campaigns against non-Muslims. Not only did possession of enormous wealth create demand for costly merchandise, such as silk, etc., from the Mediterranean region by the ruling Emirs, but it also increased ostentatious consumption by all the nobility. In addition, there developed the practice of Murgu,

1. Abdullahi Ibn Fodio, op. cit., pp. 121-122.

"payment by a vassal to his overlord"¹, i.e. the annual tribute of slaves, horses, food stuffs and clothes, to the Sultan of Sokoto by all his vassal states. That practice began when slaves became difficult to obtain in the far North and some Emirs resorted to the practice of Kifa Kwando², i.e. the conscription of Muslim Talakawa as slaves and sent them to Sokoto as tributes. This was widely practiced in Kano, Katsina and Daura before the British conquest of Northern Nigeria.³

The Colonial Impact

It was de Maistre⁴ who observed that in every major social and political transformation the old order had suffered a moral defeat and the erosion of its legitimacy well before the political changes took place. In each case the new morality claimed to express the feelings and the aspirations of a wider segment of the society. This was clearly true of the triumph of Muslims over Habe rulers in the early nineteenth

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1. Murugu: also the payment by a slave in lieu of service to his master. It can also mean payment by a master for the returning of his run-away slave. The practice of paying tributes to Sokoto was established after the death of Muhammadu Bello (1837). In his lifetime, Sultan Bello refused any sort of tribute, commenting that each must be content with what he earned by his own labour. This principle applied to lesser chiefs as well. See Smith, M.G., Government in Zazzan, 1800-1950 (Oxford, 1960), p. 146.
 2. Kwando is the Hausa name for a straw bucket; and Kifa means to turn something upside down. The practice of Kifa Kwando was one by which a straw bucket with some ashes inside was put in front of one's house to signify that the whole family were declared slaves by the Emir and, accordingly, they were taken to Sokoto as part of the tribute to the Sultan. Many such slaves and other poor people who were potential slaves ran away to Lokoja where they joined the British forces which later conquered Hausaland.
 3. Interview with Alhaji Aminu Kano, at Kano, on 9/1/1978. I have verified this with two more informants: one in Katsina and another at Daura who want to remain anonymous.
 4. See The Works of Joseph de Maistre (London, 1965, selected, translated and introduced by Lively, J.).

century. Ironically, it is equally true of the subsequent fall of the "Fulani Empire".¹ For some decades before the British conquest of Northern Nigeria, the legitimacy of the Emirates' governments was being questioned and, indeed, challenged (as evidenced by the civil wars) both in terms of Islam and on a functional basis. The British took advantage of the existing internal divisions and imposed their suzerainty over Northern Nigeria. The imposition of the British colonial rule opened a new chapter in the political development of Northern Nigeria in that colonial conquest meant that Muslim rulers had been shorn of political autonomy and were, instead, subjected to the humiliating control of their Christian overlords. This represented the defeat not merely of a particular ruling class, but also of a religion and a culture. British conquest proved not only the technological superiority of the colonial power, it also exposed the weakness of the Muslims and thus put their culture at risk.

Nevertheless, the British conquerors and their Muslim vassals had some common characteristics which made their cooperation possible, and while the vanquished Muslim rulers acquiesced in a subordinate position to the British in order to maintain their privileges their Christian victors, impelled by administrative necessities, coopted their enemies on the battlefield and ruled through them at the local level. Hence, the policy of indirect rule which made the Emirs efficient agents of colonial administration.²

The administration established by the British might have been different in content but it was similar in form to the old Muslim model.

1. Anon, "The Fall of the Fulani Empire", in The South Atlantic Quarterly, LXVII (No. 4, 1968), pp. 591-602.

2. See Hodgkin, T., Nigerian Perspectives (Oxford, 1975), pp. 70-71.

Under the British, the administrative structure of the Emirates' governments was retained but with slight modification which ensured more effective control of the outlying districts. New fiscal arrangements were made which guaranteed regular incomes to the administrators and the law-enforcing agents. A head-tax was enforced which coopted the natives into a cash economy. In contrast to the personal despotic rule of the chiefs, the colonial civil service was in principle a rational bureaucracy which operated impartially according to rules in implementing government policies. But the British promise not to interfere with Islam proved to be a contradiction in terms since Islam is as much a political system as it is a religion. Furthermore, the British idea of the secular state was fundamentally opposed to the Muslim conception of the Islamic state.

What actually led to a radical challenge to British rule in Northern Nigeria was the British policy of teaching "these semi-civilized natives good behaviour and obedience to government authority."¹ In pursuit of this, Western schools were established to train local functionaries of the Imperial power. These schools produced the graduates who later demanded reforms in Northern Nigeria. Once again there were similarities between the products of the British schools and the products of the Islamic schools in the early nineteenth century. By virtue of their education both had been made distinct in their respective cultural milieu. The British educated Northerners belonged to the modern world of science and technology, as superior to the old ways as Islam was to the pagan ways. They too criticized the British compromise of their

1. Quoted in Anon, "Muslim Areas of Northern Nigeria under British Rule", in Duckworth, E.H. (ed.), Nigeria (No. 22, 1944), p. 38. Also see a long discourse on British policy in Nigeria by Lugard, F.D., "British Policy in Nigeria", in Africa, X (No. 4, 1937), pp. 377-400.

principle of administration with the old traditional methods, as the Islamic reformers criticized religious syncretism 150 years ago. Like the Muslim scholars before them, the young graduates of the Western schools became teachers and administrators in their communities. Again like Shehu Usman Dan Fodio and his contemporaries, the Western-educated elite were not absorbed into the landed magnates of the community but rather remained radicals and idealists. But the modern radicals were critical not only of the old ways but also of the very colonial institutions which produced them. This is one of their distinctive differences with the Islamic reformers of the nineteenth century and, indeed, their main predicament.

Sandwiched between the otherworldly Muslim values and the secular materialism of the West, many of them were concerned that their indigenous culture would be subordinated to the Western European culture. For example, in contrast to Western education, Islam teaches that knowledge is not a goal in itself but, among other instinctive values, it is a path to wisdom; and that it bestows neither privilege nor power but duty and responsibility to one's community. Knowledge provokes the desire to learn as much as to teach: it is the religious duty of the learned to teach those who are not. And that knowledge is used to promote social cohesion and to achieve a higher quality of life for the whole community. It stresses cooperative endeavour rather than individual advancement. It urges respect for the traditional knowledge and wisdom of one's elders. Muslims are taught that the business of the educated is to use their skills to serve the people. Under colonial domination these values were eroding ^{gradually} ~~gradually~~. The radicals feared that the growth

of material culture would compound social divisions and heighten social conflicts.¹

Western education brought along new moral principles. It taught its graduates new scientific methods of analysis. Hence the radicals were simultaneously disillusioned with colonial rule and disenchanted with the N.A. system. The N.A. system preserved pre-colonial social and political institutions with little modification and thus pre-colonial dynasties of the authoritarian type survived under British colonial rule. This gave the chiefs the power to resist any rational attitudes and practices as well as the power to crush national movements because they were seen as "those seeking to disturb the existing political structure". Subsequent to their collaboration with the colonial authorities, the Emirs enjoyed increased power which was used to arrest progressive ideas both from Muslim reformists and from secular radicals.

On the religious front the Emirs belonged to the Kadiriyya ^{order} ~~sect~~², a *distinct* ~~from the~~ component of the Wahhabi³ tendency. This is a fundamentalist Muslim sect which in its political aspect emphasizes total submission to Muslims rulers. The members of this sect were absorbed into the administrative and legal framework of the N.A.s, against the members of the Tijjaniyya sect which were essentially anti-colonialist and anti-traditionalist.

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1. See Last, M., "Continuity in Bureaucracy and Dissent: Northern Nigeria 1800-1967" (unpublished seminar paper, A.B.U., Zaria, 1969), in which an interesting comparison was made between the modern and the traditional bureaucrats in Northern Nigeria. Also see Brown, G.N. and Hiskett, M. (eds.), Conflict and Harmony in Education in Tropical Africa (London, 1974), especially pp. 134-151 and 247-270.
 2. Except for the Emirs of Kano, especially Abdullahi Bayero (1926-1953) and his sons. In fact, Muhammadu Sanusi (1953-1963) is, till today, the leading member of the Tijjaniyya in Northern Nigeria.
 3. A Sunni Muslim fundamentalist tendency established in Arabia in 1747-1812 and named after its founder, Abdul Wahhab.

This deepened division and intensified rivalry between the adherents of the two Muslim sects.

While British colonial rule meant the loss of sovereignty on the part of the traditional rulers, nevertheless the policy of indirect rule preserved a considerable measure of local autonomy for the chiefs. Through indirect rule the British lent support to the ruthlessness and the avarice of the ruling classes. However, the British ideal of a bureaucrat as uncorruptible, just and efficient was greatly admired by the radicals, for these values were identical to the preceding Islamic ideals and, as such, were accepted by the radicals as criteria of good administration. But the British turned a blind eye to the corruptions, injustices and inefficiencies of the N.A. system and, for this reason, the radicals' demands for internal reforms graduated into a generalized nationalist struggle for independence.

The desire to modernize Northern Nigeria was what the Western educated intellectuals had in common, but on the means to achieve that end they were as divided as the European radicals¹ of the nineteenth century. They fell into two categories: the gradual reformers and the "extreme" radicals. The former recognized the need to enlighten the peasantry and to attract them to the cause of reform but the latter believed in peaceful coexistence with the nobility, more especially, they accepted the British strategy of decolonization. Some of them (like the late Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa) advocated mild and gradual reform with sincere attempts to moderate the two extremes of reactionary conservatism of the Emirs and the progressive radicalism

1. See Hobsbawm, E.J., The Age of Revolution, Europe in 1789-1848 (London, 1962), pp. 123-126.

of the intelligentsia. But the latter conceived a radical or even a "revolutionary" struggle against both foreign rulers and domestic exploiters. They doubted the capacity of the nobility and the weak middle class to lead the nation into independence and modernization. Some of them (like the late M. Sa'adu Zungur) directly and sharply challenged the entire society, calling for "power to the people" and for stripping the Emirs of their aristocratic heritage, while, at a meeting of the Jam'iyya at Kaduna in 1949, the late Alhaji Isa Wali proposed that the Northern Nigeria House of Chiefs should be abolished as a legislative chamber and be substituted in its stead by an advisory council of elders, which might include some Emirs.¹ Malam Aminu Kano had a little earlier written in his diary (in August 1948) that "Nigeria is doomed if this pernicious system of bloodthirsty, barbarous, obsolescent Fulani rule is pursued." The gradual reformers dismissed their radical fellows as "irresponsible" elements but the extreme radicals regarded the reformists as "selling-out", for comfortable positions within the old order and, especially, within the colonial administration. The division between the two was so serious that it led to a split and subsequently to the formation of two political parties (N.P.C. and N.E.P.U.) in Northern Nigeria.

The reformers remained in the N.P.C. which first incorporated and was finally taken over by the traditionalists, hence the cooperation between the N.P.C. and the nobility. The N.P.C. leaders took over power from the British when Northern Nigeria attained internal self-government in 1959, and except for minor ameliorations for administrative

1. See Feinstein, A., African Revolutionary, The Life and Times of Nigeria's Aminu Kano (New York, 1973), pp. 111-112.

convenience, ran Northern Nigeria very much on traditional lines. The traditional hierarchies were strengthened and the plight of the Talakawa remained as it was when the British came. The N.P.C. tried to mobilize the traditional Muslim scholars and through them the Muslim community and the party turned particularly to the defence of the traditional North in Muslim terms. They opposed Northern radicals and their Christian allies from Southern Nigeria.

N.E.P.U. Radicalism

The radicals grouped themselves in the N.E.P.U., the opposition party in Northern Nigeria. The peculiarities of the Northern Nigerian political system which prevented N.E.P.U. from securing effective representation in the Northern House of Assembly also obliged the party to concentrate its energies on the demands for electoral and local government reforms and the struggle over civil liberties. Furthermore, the party's concern to preserve Nigerian unity and its development orientation combine to give it a "western orientation", which led Thomas Hodgkin to observe that:

When the delegation from the Islamic congress — a cultural organization sponsored by Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, a kind of Muslim version of the British Council — visited Northern Nigeria at the end of April (1956) it made fairly clear that it was interested in the "Easterners" of N.P.C. rather than in the "Westerners" of N.E.P.U. 1

Indeed, N.E.P.U. was a modern Islamic, radical political party, which could not afford to reject a faith which is deeply rooted among the Northern peoples, hence the party's ideas were derived as much from

1. Quoted in Hodgkin, T., "Radicalism and Revivalism in Northern Nigeria", in West Africa, No. 2062, 20 October 1956, pp. 823-4.

Islam as from Western democratic sources. N.E.P.U. tried to mobilize the Muslim community through the Tijjaniyya or that branch of the order in Northern Nigeria which accepted the leadership of the late Sheikh Ibrahim Nyas of Kaolack.

The Tijjaniyya order disapproves of saint worship and the personality cult; the emphasis is upon blind obedience to a leaders; the economic exploitation of the faith by encouraging or compelling gifts and offerings; the appeal to the credulity of the masses by the use of amulets, miracle-working, etc.¹ Thus, the order's religious grounds of opposition to the establishment reinforces N.E.P.U.'s political objectives. To both N.E.P.U. and Tijjaniyya leaders, the abuses of the traditional authority -- nepotism, corruption, extortion, jobbery, arbitrary power, etc. -- represented the main cause of social chaos in the Northern Region; both held that it was wrong for the Emirs to regard the inhabitants of their respective emirates as subjects rather than as members of the community of the faithful (citizens) because all the peoples were either Muslims or they all recognized the Sarkin Musulmi as their leader.²

In contrast to the N.P.C.'s defence of the traditional system, N.E.P.U. believed that in addition to dispensing justice, to make better his people is one of the foremost tasks of the Emir. This utilitarian moral view argued that morality is not merely man's duty

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1. Tahir, I., Scholars, Sufis and Capitalists in Kano 1904-1974, the Pattern of Bourgeois Revolution in an Islamic Society (dissertation submitted to the University of Cambridge in fulfilment of the Requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, November, 1975) contains an analysis of Tijjaniyya network in Kano in 1930-1949, in Figure 4, pp. 419-421; and its geographical spread among traders and merchants in pp. 423-4.
 2. In addition to Tahir, I., ibid., p. 435, the reader is also referred to Paden, J.N., Religion and Political Culture in Kano (Berkeley, 1973), pp. 106-130, where its structure and authority is discussed.

but it is also good for the maintenance of law and order and, for the political, social and economic well-being of the state and hence helps to keep the ruler in power. M. Lawan Dambazan likened the relation between the Emir and his people to that between "the physician and his patient".¹ This implies a criticism of absolute rule because a Muslim ruler must be guided by the fear of God in administering his people. The secular slant of the N.E.P.U. became manifest when it asserted that although the Emir, like every Muslim, had to perform religious duties, he should neither defend the faith, punish heretics nor wage the Jihad in contemporary Northern Nigeria. N.E.P.U. considered Islamic moral values were valuable not merely because the Shari'ah demands it, but also for political purposes, i.e. for the happiness of citizens and for the perfection of the institutions of the state. N.E.P.U. was the first, in modern politics, to think of the state as an entity in its own right and the first to insist that the Emir should be judged by the performances of his administration in relation to the best interests of his people.

Whereas it was for functional reasons based on the principles of accountability that N.E.P.U. sought to bring the N.A. systems into the full glare of public scrutiny, the party's challenge to the principle of hereditary kingship, as practiced in Northern Nigeria, was based on Islamic grounds.² To N.E.P.U. leaders, the extravagance of the ruling classes represented an arrogant display of insensitive greed. The party argued that the privileges of the Emirs were immoral because they

1. Interview with M. Lawan Dambazan, Kano, 1978.

2. This discourse was recently developed by Hodgkin, T., in "The revolutionary tradition in Islam", in Race and Class, op. cit., p. 226.

negated the Islamic belief in the equal dignity and worth of all human beings, whatever their birth or wealth. N.E.P.U. supporters were urged to desist from "the cult of the individual": explaining that hero worshipping was for school children. The hierarchical society of Northern Nigeria, "which forms a solid foundation for the emergence of a class society, to be based on inherited wealth, privilege and the power that goes with it", was indefensible.¹

The N.E.P.U. leader made very scathing criticisms of the Emirate governments. In his Yan Tande, "The exploiter-colonialists"², Alhaji Aminu Kano challenged the validity of the principle of hereditary rulership in a modern democratic society. He explained that among its many flaws, the monarchy has three outstanding disadvantages: 1) In a monarchical system it is unlikely that the rulers will continue to have sufficient ability, and if there is any uncertainty about succession there will be dynastic civil war; 2) the monarchy is indifferent to the interests of the ruled except when they are identical with the interests of the ruler; 3) kings have the habit of relying upon the nobility to maintain their power and this divides the society into nobles and commoners and thus perpetuates economic exploitation and political repression. Indeed in the 1950's the Northern Nigerian nobility became the bastion of reaction and privilege and, with British support, the N.A.s became the unyielding barrier against which the radical spirit broke itself in vain.

1. See, "N.E.P.U. Election Manifesto 1956", p. 2; a copy of which is in the possession of the writer.

2. Yan Tande, a manuscript written in Hausa language by Alhaji Aminu Kano, Bauchi, 1943.

In a way the failure of radical politicians to win elections in Northern Nigeria was, in fact, a failure of reason. In the name of reason they called upon the people to change their traditional ways, but reason alone does not determine the ends of life, hence their failure. Also they attacked deep rooted prejudices while their arguments were either open to question or too difficult to be followed by the non-literate masses. For example, they wanted democratic reforms because they believed that democratic power was the only means by which they could sweep away the aristocratic privileges and interests that impeded progress in their society whereas their rivals (N.P.C.) skillfully countered the radical demand by, on the one hand, accepting the need for democracy but, on the other hand, insisting that democratic institutions would be introduced when the people were ready to use them. This was tantamount to saying that children must not paddle till they know how to swim. The case for political democracy rests on the fact that the use of democratic institutions is learnt by practice. The counter-argument was absurd but it was backed by the authority of government so it had to stand.

This debate on democracy is one of the distinguishing features in the political values of the N.P.C. and the N.E.P.U. There were two particular qualities which N.E.P.U. regarded as virtues and wanted all citizens to possess, while on the contrary the N.P.C. found it necessary to suppress those qualities. The first was Ijtihad, the insistence on the right to think for oneself and to form one's own opinions; the second was tolerance, i.e. respect for the rights of other people to have and express their own opinions. The radical view was that one of the aims of democracy was to habituate the people to thinking in terms of the good of the whole country rather than of their respective

sectional interests. These objectives were to be achieved in three ways: 1) stimulating general interest in public affairs by 2) setting and striving to achieve a minimum standard of education amounting, at least, to literacy, throughout the population; 3) the free expression of opinions and free discussion. The authorities did not publicly oppose the above objectives but they employed all the institutions of command and control to ensure that the radical politicians were defeated at the polls.

The defeat of radical politicians at elections signified more than a rejection of radical ideas in Northern Nigeria: it involved a rejection of intellectual values and achievement. The Northern Nigerian establishment have always tended to exalt "character" above intelligence, practical experience and, above all, theory. We were instructed in schools all over the region that "Education is of no value without good manners". The North has produced some of the finest intellects in colonial Nigeria, but the intellectual as such has never been greatly prized. Moreover, during the Zamanin Siyasa and even earlier intelligence was discredited in the eyes of the "man of affairs" by its association with the plight of the masses — or the traditional role of the radical intelligentsia. The suspicion of men of intellect is more deeply rooted than most people realized. It arose as far back as the early nineteenth century when Shehu Abdullahi Ibn Fodio led the Muslim populist left against the post-Jihad administration. Abdullahi was punished for his intellectual vigour and physical dynamism by the promotion of Muhammadu Bello who succeeded Shehu Usman Dan Fodio as the leader of the faithful in 1817. Since then the Emirates of Northern Nigeria were led by largely undistinguished men who were thought to be "fair minded, judicious and responsible" by the various N.A. councils of electors. In 1943, Alhaji Aminu Kano observed:

Let us go back to the Emirs. From what we have seen of the Emirs, only a few deserve to be on their thrones at present, if we maintain that our present constitution is fashioned both theoretically and in practice on what was laid down in former days [at the time of the Jihad]. Apart from our government today, where else has there ever been a blind man leading the sighted, a one-eyed man laughing at the two-eyed, and an ignorant man occupying a position reserved for the knowledgeable? 1

In addition, they transplanted mediocre men into high office. These "sovereigns" got rid of all difficult "characters" in their councils while they were establishing their supremacy. Consequently, the emirates were left with no local leadership capable of evaluating the state of affairs and reacting accordingly because the royal dictators had schooled their top officials into taking no initiatives of their own (even if they were able) so that even at the most critical moments they would wait for directives which were slow to arrive. Even more serious was the Emirs' conception of themselves as a group quite apart from the common herd of humanity. This mystical, religious belief in their own separateness was also reinforced by the practical considerations of the whole palace community.

It was his deep-rooted disaffection and frustration with the N.A. system that caused Alhaji Aminu Kano (and others like him) to rebel against both the emirate governments and the colonial might which supported them. In his opposition to the emirate system and to colonial domination, Alhaji Aminu Kano, like Shehu Usman Dan Fodio before him, found intellectual stimulation in the teachings of the Qur'an. The main, if not the only, impetus to Alhaji Aminu Kano's life struggle to emancipate his people lies in his conviction that:

1. Alhaji Aminu Kano, cited in Paden, op. cit., pp. 278-82.

Islam is a religion of rebellion. Every time the Muslim raises his arms in prayer and recites the Kabbara he issues a challenge and a repudiation of all earthly power. He invites emperors, kings, despots and all of the powerful and everything in the universe to bear witness and to deny if they dare that nothing but Allah has power and is to be worshipped and obeyed. The Islamic faith and Islamic prayer are a call to revolution. 1

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1. Alhaji Aminu Kano, in Tafsir at Kano, Ramadan 1973, cited by Tahir, I., op. cit., p. xi.

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My most important source material is myself, as I was a N.E.P.U. supporter and official from 1959-1966. Furthermore, during my career as a trade unionist (1964-1969) I travelled widely throughout Nigeria — especially in the Northern Region — during which I met and interviewed people, too many to be listed here. Being a Muslim has helped me greatly in asking appropriate questions as well as in comprehending answers on theological matters. Dr. M.T.A. Liman (formerly a senior lecturer in Arabic and Islamic Studies at the Bayero University, Kano, but now the Principal Private Secretary to Alhaji Aminu Kano, the national chairman of the Peoples Redemption Party [P.R.P.], which is the successor party to N.E.P.U.) assisted me greatly in explaining Qur'anic injunctions and in my translations from Arabic to English (and Hausa). Alhaji Aminu Kano was always ready to answer all religious and political questions, while Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim explained subtle political issues, especially in Borno, and on his role in both N.E.P.U. and N.P.C. Alhaji Maina Waziri (a Fika prince) and the late Alhaji Abubakar Zukogi, Ciroman Bida (also a Bida prince) dispelled most of the myths of the "ruling class" in Northern Nigeria. My close friend, Alhaji Abdulkadir Mansur (a Tijjaniyya adherent) was my principal informant on the Tijjaniyya religious order.

The primary source materials on N.E.P.U. are abundant, but have been by no means fully or sympathetically exploited. This is because except for such publications as The Declaration of Principles and The Sawaba Crusade, N.E.P.U. literature was almost entirely in Hausa, for which reason it attracted little interest by earlier researchers,

who were non-Hausa speakers. For example, the party's ideas were better expressed in Hausa songs and poems renowned for their innuendo and allusions. Indeed, the works of poets like M. Gambo Hawaja, Jos, and M. Lawan Maiturare, Yelwa, Kano, etc., confirmed that N.E.P.U.'s most effective vehicle of expression was by song (or poem). Behind almost every N.E.P.U. politician was a competent and elegant versifier skilled in the effective use of imagery and piquancy, in conveying the party's ideas to the masses. Yet only a few of these songs and poems are translated into English. Even N.E.P.U.'s constitution, Jamiyyar Neman Sawaba, Manufa, Sharudda da Ka'idodi, was in Hausa, which led J.B. Dudley to conclude wrongly that N.E.P.U. had no written constitution. Similarly, important documents like Aminu Kano's blueprint for radical politics in Northern Nigeria, Yan Tande, is yet to be translated into English; and his critique of the N.A. system, Kano under the Hammer of Native Rule, is yet to be published.

Furthermore, N.E.P.U. documentary sources are widely scattered all over Northern Nigeria (this is not to mention those which were destroyed or confiscated by police) and their utilization presents several problems. In addition to the problem of translation, there are no organized central archives open to scholars. However, some individuals still retain their private collections of useful materials. Alhaji Aminu Kano has a library in his house at Kano which contains a great wealth of source materials on Northern Nigeria. In addition, he keeps all his personal diaries from 1947 to date (except for the one for 1949, which was removed by the police in 1960). Alhaji Ali Batan Yerima Balla has the largest private library in his home at Little Gombi, in Gongola State. He successfully evaded police harassment and escaped with many useful N.E.P.U. files and other documents concerning his area. Both

Alhaji S.A. Tanko Yakasai in Kano and Alhaji M.B. Yunusa at Minna have substantial collections of N.E.P.U. materials. There are also useful N.E.P.U. documentary sources with Alhaji Salihu Nakande at Jos and Alhaji Adamu Abubakar Jajire at Potiskum. Every N.E.P.U. official I know of has something to show or a story to tell about his experience in the party at his or her locality. For example, former field officers of the party like M. Uba Taura (who is now an area court judge at Birnin Kudu) and M. Lawan Dambazau keep important party circulars for Borno and Sokoto provinces respectively. Almost all Hajiya Gambo Sawaba's papers were lost through police raids but she herself remains a mine of information on N.E.P.U. activities.

Arabic and Hausa materials on Islam in Northern Nigeria are substantial, but spread all over the Muslim areas and, unfortunately, only a small proportion have been translated into English. Documents from Sokoto are fairly treated, as shown in the list of books and articles below. But research on other parts of the Muslim North is yet to be made and if they are researched, the results are yet to be published. Some of the enlightened rulers are willing to be interviewed by research students but are reluctant to make available what documents exist in their respective palaces. Even those who agree to be interviewed do not want their names to be mentioned. Perhaps this is because in the traditional North where secrecy is regarded as a virtue, it is considered uncouth to discuss predecessors and departed friends with other people. And since the value of academic research is yet to be fully appreciated, research scholars are seen as intruders who may be talked to but nothing important should be said to them.

The National Archives in Kaduna (NAK) contains many official records and newspapers (especially Nigerian Citizen and Gaskiya Tafi Gwabo) which adequately covered most parts of Northern Nigeria. Police and provincial reports show the variety of opinion and, indeed, of government activities from different parts of the former Northern Region. The Arewa House (formerly the official residence of Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto and the Premier of Northern Nigeria) at Nassarwa, Kaduna, is essentially a research centre which houses the Sardauna's papers, including his correspondence with Alhaji Aminu Kano from 1958 to 1966. It also contains some useful Arabic and Hausa documents from Sokoto possibly collected by Sir Ahmadu Bello himself.

The Colonial Office Library in London contains mainly colonial government reports and publications. Reports for 1945 to 1959 on the political development of Nigeria are particularly revealing, but they are mostly very general and thus said very little on specific issues. The Public Record Office, London, contains informative despatches on colonial government policies but these documents do not adequately analyse the rationale of policies although some of them reveal official attitudes on particular issues. The Library of Rhodes House, Oxford, is by far the most important source materials centre on Nigerian politics, 1945-1960. Its catalogue on Nigeria contains reports by many retired administrative officers who lodged their private papers there. The problem is that access to a good deal of these is restricted and it will take time before the restrictions are lifted. There are the papers of the Fabian Colonial Bureau which show the links of the British Fabian Society and some radical organizations in the former colonies. Some documents of the Fabian Society are to be found in

the library of the Trade Union Congress in London, which also, as to be expected, contains documents on trade unions and politics in Nigeria and other former British colonies.

There are also in the U.K. retired colonial officials who are prepared to assist researchers, although some of them do not want their names to be mentioned. But there are exceptions, for instance, Mr. A.J. Spicer, from whom Aminu Kano took over at the Teachers' College, Maru, in 1949 and who was at Bauchi with Aminu Kano, Sa'adu Zungur, Yaya Gusau and Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, spoke very openly about his experience at Bauchi and Maru between 1944-1950. Mr. W.P. Gaskell was a Scout Commissioner in Northern Nigeria in which capacity he knew most of the Northern political leaders from their days in Kaduna College (1943-1953). Mr. Gaskell is also free in expressing his opinion on those he knows. In addition Lord George Wigg was the N.E.P.U. contact man in the House of Commons, while Marjorie Nicolson of the T.U.C. helped N.E.P.U. delegations to constitutional conferences in London. Mr. Thomas L. Hodgkin knows both Aminu Kano and the late Alhaji Isa Wali fairly well and he has a fair collection of N.E.P.U. papers from which I benefited immensely.

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APPENDIX I A

MEMORANDUM OF THE NORTHERN ELEMENTS PROGRESSIVE UNION SUBMITTED
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (in Parliament),
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MR. OLIVER LYTTELTON IN

LONDON, JULY 1952

The Northern Elements Progressive Union, in keeping with its democratic aims and ideals, believes quite strongly that the time is overdue when something must be done quickly to reform the Northern institutions - Administrative, Educational, Moral, Economic, Social and otherwise. The union believes that this change must be brought about by the combined effort of both the Northern people and the British officials. But this co-operation must be on the basis of equality - not on the basis of masters and servants. The union sincerely shares the view that the British people, however much they may be criticised, abused and even charged with maladministration by the colonials and their (the British) co-nations for absurdities and contradictory colonial and foreign policy, has done and suffered more for the cause of human freedom, humanity and just dealing than any other nation today.

It is in the light of this belief that the NEPU sends this delegation to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in the hope that its demands may be looked into with sympathy and broad understanding - thus avoiding a serious political upheaval.

The Union believes that the British public, peaceful and well meaning as it is, is not aware of what exists in the colonies, and much more especially in the Northern part of Nigeria where feudalism is still practiced under the guise of what the Colonial Office wishes to call "Indirect Rule". The Union is quite aware that many

individual persons in Britain have the welfare of the colonials at heart and are ready to support colonial aspiration.

The success of the delegation (the first of its kind from this oppressed country under Her Majesty) may depend entirely upon what attitude such persons will show and upon the Colonial Office's outlook on the trend of affairs in the colonies.

It is therefore hoped that the Secretary of State for the Colonies will be sympathetic enough to give this union his very best considerations.

(Sgd) Baballiya K. Manaja
General President

(Sgd) Mallam Aminu Kano)
Delegate

(Sgd) Bello Ijumu
Gen.Secretary

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

We condemn, seriously, the Electoral system as it stands today in the Northern Region of Nigeria. For it is deliberately designed (by means of electoral colleges creating a bottle-neck) to keep out the genuine representatives of the people and to favour only those connected with the Native Administrations in whom the members of the public have no confidence. This is proved by the fact that all the present members of the House of Assembly (with the exception of two) are N.A. officials, all of whom were either rejected by the people or did not even stand for election at all. Yet, to everybody's dismay, these people were mysteriously declared elected.

Moreover, the system of ten per cent nominations by the various Native Administrations is a further proof of a preconceived lack of confidence among the N.A. officials in the people and thus creating a back-door entrance to the elected House of Assembly which is said to be representative of the people. This we consider incompatible with any democratic ideal; for the house should either be elective or not.

We therefore impeach the Nominated Committee of Nine, especially the Chairman (who was then the Secretary, Northern Province) responsible for these anomalies in the Electoral System of the Northern Region, for not upholding the enviable British democratic ideals.

2. ELECTION BY CUSTOM

By this is meant sheer acquiescence to sole Native Authority. It is therefore the most glaring anomaly of the electoral procedure

since, obviously, custom is only resorted to in the interest of the sole Native Authorities. Above all, this particular conception of custom is today an anachronism.

3. THE ELECTORAL COLLEGES

At present the Northern Region is divided, for the purpose of election, into twenty thousand primary colleges of no uniform membership but which elect a uniform number of one person each.

4. THE SYSTEM OF NOMINATIONS

Owing to this undemocratic system, not one of the elected representatives was able to reach the House of Assembly. Consequently today the persons who are in the House of Assembly, now being exalted to the sky as representatives of the people in Northern provinces, are all nominated by chiefs under the ten per cent provision, in the first place, or by nominated members, under an additional provision.

Since the number of outsiders, to be nominated to the provincial electoral college by those nominated under the ten per cent provision, is not specifically limited in the electoral system, it follows that any number of persons can rightly come into the provincial electoral college through this additional provision for nomination. One fails therefore to see the use (whatever originally meant to be) of these provincial electoral colleges.

As a result of this impracticable system, the people of Northern Nigeria has no representatives, in the real sense of the word, in the House of Assembly.

To illustrate this point, let us take the example of the Kano District comprising Kano City itself, Sabon Gari, Fage and the

villages of Tudun Wada, Gwagwarwa, Nassarawa and Tarauni with a total population of 150,000 people elected four representatives (N.E.P.U. candidates) to the provincial electoral college where they met 115 people supposed to have been elected from Kano Province and they were all, including the 115 candidates, eclipsed by the nominated members.

5. FURTHER SUBSTANTIAL POINTS INVALIDATING LAST ELECTIONS

UNDUE INFLUENCE: Voters were unduly influenced by the Native Authorities all over the Northern Region through their District Heads, Senior N.A. officials, Chiefs, as well as some of the European Administrative officers. This was done by calling secret meeting of District Heads, for example in Kano, at which the D.O. Kano was present (16th November 1951). The District Heads were told to use their influence to stop the voters in their districts from voting for any N.E.P.U. candidate.

Fortunately, however, a sympathiser among them informed NEPU of what transpired at this meeting. The NEPU, at once wrote to the Senior District Head, Kano asking him to confirm or deny the statement, of which he did neither. Instead he rather called what he perhaps considered a more secret meeting of himself and three others and reported to them of the incident.

The following day, the NEPU received another similar information and at once wrote again to the same Senior District Head, Kano, for confirmation or denial, and for which no reply has been received to date.

The NEPU, therefore, interviewed the Resident, Kano on this matter (30th November 1952) who failed to do anything about it.

This is sufficient evidence of the European Administration's support of the N.A. autocracy.

Yet another startling support has been revealed in the following English translation of an extract from a Hausa circular letter, sent out before the elections from the Northern People's Congress (N.P.C.) Headquarters to the Native Administrations and Government:-

"Every Emir, every District Head, every Resident, every District Officer is aware of this, even by reading in the 'Gaskiya ta fi Kwabo' (The Government Hausa Newspaper), for this reason, therefore, seek their support and advice, and direct co-operation without any fear. They are waiting for you. Their doors are wide open with the intention of co-operating with you. Tell them all your movements".

Obviously, therefore, these Emirs, District Heads, Residents and District officers are members and patrons respectively of this Political Party (N.P.C.) and they might as well, as did the District Heads, have wished to have stood for election.

We see no justification for denying the NEPU Party, with its obvious overwhelming support, equal opportunity and fair play for reaching the House of Assembly.

Further evidence revealing the White Administration's support for the N.P.C. is to be found in a publication in the Nigerian Citizen (a Government Newspaper), referring to the success of NEPU candidates as the red light which calls for its extermination.

In the circumstances, WE the people of Northern Nigeria, do hereby make it known that we have no representatives in the present House of Assembly, and therefore no confidence.

6. OUR CONCRETE PROPOSALS
FOR IMMEDIATE NEW ELECTIONS.

For purposes of election, the Northern Region shall be divided into single member constituencies in the proportion of 100,000 people per member, with each returning its member directly to the House of Assembly. Based upon the 1947 tax count, this amounts to 132 members for a population of 13M. 96,200 as in the following table:-

Table 1

Members of the Northern House of Assembly

Present & Proposed

Province	Population	No. of present Reps. calculated at 145,513 people per member	Proposed number of New Representatives, calculated at 100,000 people per member.
1. Kano	2,871,000	20	29
2. Katsina	1,187,000	8	12
3. Sokoto	2,030,400	14	20
4. Bornu	1,176,000	8	11
5. Ilorin	479,000	3	5
6. Adamawa	796,000	5	8
7. Benue	1,162,200	8	12
8. Niger	579,000	4	6
9. Zaria	554,300	4	6
10. Bauchi	1,048,000	7	10
11. Plateau	662,300	5	7
12. Kabba	551,000	4	6
	13,096,200	90	132

Note:

This Table is based, in round figures, on the 1947 Tax Count. (Lord Hailey's Native Administration in the British African Territories).

We believe most sincerely that the proposals, provided herein, are more satisfactory and democratic, and will enable the members of the public to have confidence in the members of the new House of Assembly - being their own genuine representatives.

This system is, we believe, also easier to implement, since the present Residents could be charged with the responsibility of dividing up their respective provinces into the required number of constituencies.

7. VOTING

Voting shall be by ballot and a sufficient number of polling booths, according to local requirements, shall be provided in each constituency for this purpose. There shall be provided a Register of Voters in each constituency and a further separate Register for each polling station.

The polling day shall be uniform throughout the Region, from 8 a.m. to 12 midnight.

In view of the fact that there are over 60 per cent of the people can read Arabic (Ajami), the names of the candidates standing for election shall be printed on the ballot paper in both English and Arabic, as it was the case in the final election in Kano.

In addition to this, however, colour patches or pictures shall be used to meet the requirements of those few who are not literate in either English or Arabic, as was the case in India and the Gold Coast.

8. RETURNING OFFICERS

A responsible African civil servant, with a staff of three, shall be appointed Returning Officer for each polling station.

9. PARTY SYSTEM

It goes without saying that any democratically responsible Representative Government is practically impossible without a party system. Now that the Northern Elements Progressive Union and the Northern People's Congress are for the first time being the only two recognised political parties all over the Northern Region, sufficient notice shall be given them to put up their respective candidates, by notifying the Chief Electoral Officer.

It shall be the responsibilities of the two parties and any independent candidates to explain to the electorate the procedure of voting by ballot and the colours or pictures representing them.

No party or individual shall use, for purposes of propaganda or otherwise, any Government or N.A. newspaper or property of any description or services of their employees.

Candidates may not necessarily be resident in the particular constituency in which they stand for election.

10. THE NORTHERN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT: FORMATION OF

The Lt. Governor, Northern Region shall call upon the recognised leader of the party returned by the electorate with a simple majority to form a Government for the Northern Region.

11. CONCLUSION

The above summarises our case, and we trust you will use your

good offices to effect, in 1952, an immediate review of the Electoral system in the Northern Region of Nigeria, to be followed by a General election in 1953.

Malam Aminu Kano

The N.E.P.U. Delegate

on behalf of the people of Northern Nigeria

APPENDIX I B

JOINT MEMORANDUM BY THE NORTHERN ELEMENTS
PROGRESSIVE UNION AND THE MIDDLE BELTS PEOPLES PARTY

ON

ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND HUMAN RIGHTS.HISTORICAL.

When sometime last year, the Northern Regional Government took some steps to draw up 'a little bit better system of election' (undoubtedly as the result of much agitation by the NEPU through the press, mass meetings and delegation to the Colonial Office in London), WE of the NEPU and the Middle Belts Peoples Party, as a matter of courtesy and encouragement, praised the Regional Government not because we accepted the new system but because we saw that the Regional Government, at last, had begun to be sensible of the criticisms levied against it by the opposition parties. We deliberately reserved our comments and criticisms because we were of the opinion that the Committee's recommendations would have been made available to the public for consideration and review.

But when the Regional Government, instead of taking such a step, hurried the passage through the two Legislative Houses WE of the same parties find that we must come out to make out and make our stand quite clear.

We are concerned at the present moment with the forthcoming elections into the House of Representatives.

ELECTORAL LAW.

Paragraph 45 Chapter 3 of the Scheme for Ammendments to the Constitution of Nigeria says, amongst other things.....

.....that the Governor General may make regulations for the elections of Representative Members of the House of Representatives and that for this purpose the provisions of section 63 of the Order will apply with the necessary adaptations.

It is with the last four underlined words that we want to express our fears and therefore make our stand as regards the forthcoming elections.

The phrase 'with the necessary adaptations' can mean anything. It may be, in some areas, election by custom; in some, it may mean election through labyrinthine channels of electoral colleges. In some areas it may mean election by whispering or show of hands and so on and so forth. For the vast experience we have gathered during the last general elections is a pointer to us.

We therefore wish to state that what is embodied in the NEPU Memorandum to the Secretary of State for the Colonies is still our stand.

1. Direct elections after getting the country divided into single member constituencies.

2. Elections on party basis. Use of symbols, letters and ballot boxes. For we contend that the Northener is not too backward to participate in such democratic elections. In fact he is in a better position because he can use both Roman and Arabic characters as well as symbols. The elections in India, Kashmir, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and even our sister country, the Gold Coast are a proof and bear testimony to our case.

3. Election Commission. There must election commission to draw up the electoral law and simultaneously supervise the elections

throughout the Country. The practice of employing members of the Native Administrations (who are also an interested party) to help conduct elections must go. European officials must also hands off the elections.

FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS.

Recent events in some parts of this country have shown beyond doubt that the civil liberty of the individual are at stake and can be trampled on without due regard to his inherent dignity and inalienable rights.

We do not wish to give personal and individual examples but it is true to say that in a greater part of this so called protected country the inhabitants are nothing but casualties of modern civilization. The country may answer the name protectorate but when we consider the state of the peasantry internally (especially those who hold opinions other than the opinions of those in authority) we hesitate to believe that the men and women are free and enjoy the five freedoms.

Without freedom of association, assembly, expression, conscience, and access to justice, it is impossible to make any constitutional progress.

We know why many of us find it difficult to consider impartially the meaning and implications of the Universal Declarations of Human Rights.

The British have a deep-seated dislike of high sounding declarations and all written constitutions. They are proud of the fact that they never make Declarations and have practically no written constitutions. But the world as a whole and the British in particular

are alive to Magna Carta, the work of Parliaments, the Petition of Rights, the Habeas Corpus Act, the Reform Act, the Local Government Act, the Factory Acts and scores of other acts which were passed not only after tremendous fight - but also after great sacrifices which involved loss of life and property. The British struggle for the Fundamental Human Rights started from Rennemede right up to the scaffold and later to Dunkirk, Hiroshima, and so on.

We of these two parties therefore very strongly request that the Declaration of Human Rights be incorporated in our Constitution as is the case with the Sudan.

(Sgd.) Aminu Kano
NEPU delegate to Conference.

Federal Secretary,
Middle Belts Peoples Party.

APPENDIX I C

Northern Element Progressive Union Delegation to the U.K.

c/o Forty-Nine Hotel,

49, Norfolk Square, London, W.2.

The Right Honourable A.T. Lennox-Boyd,
Secretary of State for the Colonies,
London.

Sir,

Electoral Reform in the Northern Region of Nigeria

In July 1952, following the first election under the Macpherson Constitution, the N.E.P.U. sent a delegation to the United Kingdom to protest against the 5-stage electoral College system used in Northern Nigeria when TWO stages were used in the Eastern and Western Regions.

That Delegation met the Minister of State to the Colonial Office, the Honourable T. Hopkinson, M.P., on 25th of July, 1952, who counselled that the arrangements then existing should be given a trial.

At the 1953 London Conference following the breakdown of the Macpherson Constitution, the N.E.P.U. again raised the question of electoral reforms in view of the changes which had then been made. The Conference decided that the methods of election should be left to each region to decide. For this reason, the N.E.P.U. has not the advantage of appealing to the Governor-General of Nigeria on its demand for electoral reform on the Northern Region.

Despite the persistent protest of the N.E.P.U. the position now is that the stages in the Region were merely reduced to TWO in some provinces and THREE in others in the 1954 elections to the Federal

Legislature. But both the indirect and nomination systems are retained. They were abolished in both East and West in 1953.

The present Delegation is here to make a third appeal by the N.E.P.U. to the Colonial Office to call on the Northern Regional Government to introduce direct elections and to abolish nomination in all forms in the Region because the N.E.P.U. believes that the introduction of direct elections in the Northern Region is vital not only to the advancement of democratic government in the Region, but also to the unity of Nigeria. The N.E.P.U. believes that the demand ought to come from Northern Nigerians and it brings on this delegation evidence of that demand by the people of that Region.

The Working of the Electoral College System

The stages of election of a member differ in each province. There were at the 1954 elections, for instance, TWO stages in Kano and THREE in Zaria. A constituency ranges from 130,000 to 200,000 adult males who pay tax. Of these, only 500 persons take part in any form of direct elections (e.g. show of hands) and this at the primary stage only.

It is the experience of the N.E.P.U. that their candidates who won at the primary and intermediate stages have to contest at the final stage against their defeated opponents. This happens because the Electoral Law of the Region provides that any person whether or not he had gone through the first two stages may be nominated to stand at the final stage by anyone who has passed through the primary supported by NINE other members of the same Final Electoral College. (See Elections Under the Revised Constitution, page 12, first para.) This also makes it possible for any person who may never have fought

the elections at all to be nominated at the Final Stage as a candidate even in his absence.

Invariably it is the candidates nominated to stand at the Final Stage who have won the seats. This was so at the last election in the case of 16 of the 17 members for Kano for the Federal House of Representatives.

A) The Case for Indirect Elections as put by the Northern Region Government - based on the following:-

(i) Illiteracy That the majority of the people of the Region are illiterate and are therefore incapable of taking part in direct election.

(ii) Expense The Government claims that the Region would be involved in great expense in producing Ballot Boxes.

(iii) Distance That direct elections would necessitate people in rural areas travelling long distances to cast their votes.

B) The Case for Direct Election

(i) There can be no harmony or a true democratic system of government in Nigeria when the country's Legislature is composed of members half of whom are not true representatives of the people.

(ii) The argument in respect of illiteracy as advanced by the Government in (Ai) above is baseless. Elections in India, the Sudan, the Gold Coast and in the other two Regions of Nigeria where the overwhelming majority of the people are illiterates have proved that illiteracy is no longer an obstacle to direct elections. This view is supported by the Report of the Hansard Society on "Problems of Parliamentary Government in the Colonies".

(iii) Distance Same argument as (ii) above

(iv) Expense The Ballot Box is essential to free elections and must be provided no matter the cost.

(v) Direct election reduces to the minimum all chances of corruption which exist under the system of indirect elections. It saves time, when indirect election must be spread over several weeks or even months before results can be obtained.

Criticism of the Present Electoral Laws - Relevant Matters

This party realises that there must be disqualification from elections of persons serving terms of imprisonment of over six months or under the death sentence. But the use which has been made of this principle in the Northern Region exceeds the limits of it in any democratic country and the powers given to the Governor of the Region in this respect are arbitrary and open to abuse.

(See Third Schedule - Northern Elections 1954)

At the 1954 elections to the House of Representatives an instance of excessive use of the principle by the Governor of the Northern Region through the Native Court judges (who are almost wholly members or supporters of Government party) could be given as an example.

Uba na Alkasim, a candidate of the N.E.P.U. was arrested and sent to jail for three months after he had won the Primary election for the offence of giving false information to the police in connection with disturbances by the Government party before the elections. This offence is not an indictable offence and it shows the extent to which opposition candidates are at the mercy of the Government and its supporters. This case of Uba is not an isolated case.

The N.E.P.U. therefore demands that only persons sentenced to death or serving a term of more than six months for all INDICTABLE OFFENCES (not of a political nature) should be disqualified from being voted for as is the practice in other Regions and other countries.

Freedom of Assembly

Regulations in the Northern Region restrict freedom of assembly. Their worst feature is that the authorities administering them not only differ from one province to another but cannot be ascertained with precision from the Regulations. Their requirements are also left to the discretion of the enforcing authority. In some districts it is the Emir or ruler who gives permits for political meetings. In others the function is that of the District Head, and in others still it is any other official not specified in the Regulations. Periods of notice are equally as uncertain. These regulations affect mainly the opposition parties as those administering them are invariably supporters of the Government party.

Restrictions on freedom of Assembly in an area where the tree of democracy is tender, is certain to retard its progress. The N.E.P.U. believes that the normal 12-24 hours notice required before Regionalisation is all that is needed today. The party therefore asks the Secretary of State for the Colonies to take these restrictions into consideration when considering the whole of the Electoral question in the Region.

TWO other practices in connection with the Elections in the Northern Region constitute great injustice to the N.E.P.U. and make a mockery of Northern Region Elections. One is the appoint-

ment of Returning Officers at one or other stage of the elections of men who are either candidates at the same Election themselves or members of the Government party.

The other is the appointment of Native Administration officials who may be candidates at the elections as information officers for the constituencies. At the 1954 Election to the Federal House and By-election to the Northern House of Assembly, the Sarkin Shanu not only acted as information officer for Kano Constituency but was a Northern Peoples Congress candidate. The result was that the N.P.C. supporters were made aware of the rules and regulations of the elections several months before. The N.E.P.U. was only informed only seven days before the By-election. The Sarkin Shanu was elected.

Conclusion

Para 6 of the Notes of the Interview given to the N.E.P.U. Delegation in 1952 by the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs begins;-

"The Minister continued that, while he was not without sympathy for the feelings of the N.E.P.U., he suspected that that party represented only a minority opinion of Northern opinion. He was convinced that the present Electoral System accorded with the wishes of the majority....."

The N.E.P.U. claims that given the normal freedom accorded an opposition party at any free and direct election in the Northern Region today it would be the governing party in that Region. To substantiate this the N.E.P.U. refers to Appendix B showing the strength of the party at three elections without the 3 stages of

the Electoral College. Reference has been made early in this memorandum to the party's evidence of the mandate of the people of Northern Nigeria.

The N.E.P.U. is the main opposition party in the Northern Region. For the Colonial Office to take the party as representing only a minority opinion suggests that the Colonial Office does not wish to encourage an opposition to the Northern Regional Government. This can only be an encouragement of a one party dictatorship and the British Government, if their Minister's view represents its attitude on this question, will have to accept full responsibility for the consequences of despotism in the Northern Region.

This tendency on the part of the British Government to discourage opposition to Governments in countries Britain claims to be bringing to independence along democratic lines, may cost the British people the goodwill of the peoples of the countries affected when these weaker parties become some day the Government of these territories.

The N.E.P.U. believes that the friendship of Britain and Nigeria is essential to both. Whatever its experiences in these past four years under the British rule in Nigeria, the party will continue to value and work for understanding between the two countries. The party and its supporters still have faith in British fairness and professed intention of bringing Nigerians to independence as a democratic people.

The N.E.P.U. therefore asks that before further constitutional changes are made in 1956, the British Government should appoint a neutral Commission to examine the Electoral College System in the

Northern Region of Nigeria and the extent to which it weakens the strength and unity of Nigeria.

Mallam Aminu Kano,

Leader of Delegation,

Barrister C.A.J. Nwajei,

Legal Adviser to the N.E.P.U.
and the Delegation.

19th December, 1955.
London

APPENDIX II A

16th November, 1956

NORTHERN REGION OF NIGERIA.ELECTION RESULTS.

<u>CONSTITUENCY</u>	<u>ELECTED MEMBER</u>
OFFA	J.S. Olawoyin (AG) 2588 votes Defeated: Ezekiel Afolayin (NPC) 1758 votes
KANO EAST	Alahji Ahmadu Dantata (NPC) 2119 votes Defeated Aminu Kano (NEPU) 1776 votes.
SOKOTO EAST	Wazirin Sokoto Junaido (NPC) 2400 votes Defeated Bello Dan Galadima (NEPU) 381 votes
SOKOTO WEST	Aliyu Gumbi Magajin Gari (NPC) 1285 votes Defeated Abubakar Tambawal (NEPU) 732 votes and Maiwurno Tela (Independent) 451 votes.
KANO WEST	Ibrahim Musa Gashash (NPC) 3252 votes Defeated Sani Darma (NEPU) 1229 votes
KANO SOUTH	Ado Bayero (NPC) 2928 votes Defeated Baba Dan Agundi (NEPU) 499 votes and Ali Abullahi (Independent) 74 votes.
JOS TOWN	Isyaku Gwamna (NEPU) 4070 votes Defeated Alhaji Alin Iliya (NPC) 2406 votes, Usman Opai (AG) 616 votes and Patrick Fom (Independent) 51 votes.
KADUNA CAPITAL TERRITORY	Bala Keffi (NEPU) 1845 votes Defeated Haruna Dan Birni (NPC) 1432 votes.
KANO WAJE	Alhaji Haruna Kasim (NPC) 2062 votes Defeated Tanko Yakasi (NEPU) 1773 votes
ZARIA TOWN	Shehu Mahiru (NEPU) 4754 votes Defeated former Minister of Trade Alhaji Aliyu Turaki Zaria (NPC) 3611 votes and Sarkin Fada (Independent) 1607 votes.

APPENDIX II B

19th November, 1956.

NORTHERN REGION OF NIGERIAELECTION RESULTS.

<u>CONSTITUENCY</u>	<u>ELECTED MEMBER</u>
KATSINA TOWN	Alhaji Othman Ladan (NPC) 3467 votes Defeated Alhaji Abubakar Duwan (NPC) 1981 votes and Isa Wole (NEPU) 919 votes.
YERWA TOWN SOUTH	Ibrahim Imam (BYM) 2558 votes Defeated Alhaji Dori (NPC) 1691 votes.
YERWA NORTH	Basharu (BYM) 2416 votes Defeated Shettima Kashim (NPC) 2060 votes
NGURU	Yunusa Mai Hajja (NPC) 2054 votes Defeated NEPU candidate 1234 votes
BIDA	Indagi Faruk (NPC) 1545 votes Defeated Alhaji Abubakar Bale Madakin Bida (Independent) 1088 votes, Halilu Bida 750 votes and Ibrahim Tako Galadiman Bida (Independent) 451 votes.
KAURA NAMODA	Haruna Tela (NEPU) 2901 votes Defeated Sarkin Kiyawa 1378 votes and Dan Galadima (Independent) 1266 votes.
GUSAU TOWN	Baba Dankantoma (NPC) 1281 votes Defeated Mamman Na Lado (NEPU) 1053 votes Garba Gusau (Independent) 704 votes, Rufai Gusau (Independent) 335 votes and Mallam Ali Gusau (Action Group) 208 votes.
ILORIN TOWN	Ibrahim Laaro Ilorin Talaka Parapo (AG Alliance) 3716 votes. Defeated Alhaji Saadu Alanamu (NPC) 3226 votes.
OKENE TOWN	G.U. Ohikere (Igbirra Tribal Union) 1376 votes Defeated Abdallah Raji (NPC) 893 votes, A. Abadaki (Independent) 331 votes and J.A. Amoko (Action Group) 98 votes.

APPENDIX III

NORTHERN ELEMENTS PROGRESSIVE UNION.

Views on

THE NIGERIAN CONSTITUTION CONFERENCE.

1956

The Northern Elements Progressive Union regards the 1956 Conference on the Nigerian Constitution as the last of its kind before Nigerian independence is accomplished. The Party therefore believes that the Conference should lay the foundation upon which a permanent Nigerian Constitution will be established by the Constituent Assembly which will follow the British withdrawal from the country.

It is the belief of the NEPU that any formal conference with the Colonial Office by the political leaders must be preceded by conferences at the divisional, provincial and regional levels as was done in the 1949/50.

The London and Lagos Conferences of 1953/54 did not reflect the views of the people of Nigeria as the Conferences were organised by the Colonial Office to effect changes in the 1950 Constitution without consulting the people of Nigeria. The NEPU does not believe that the changes which altered the whole basis of the 1950 Constitution, without previously consulting the people, can be valid and permanent. The Party wants an opportunity to be given to the people to have their say before those alterations are further entrenched in the political life of Nigeria.

The debate on Federal, Quasi-Federal or Unitary Constitution for Nigeria must be carried into every village and the pros

and cons explained to the people. The NEPU will not support the attempts of the Regional Governments and the Colonial Office to make the division of Nigeria a fait accompli by granting self-government to the Regions before the people of Nigeria know what is actually happening. The NEPU wants self-government and independence for Nigeria but not merely self-government for the Regions designed to hand them over to three major parties with pledges of non-interference with each other's policies and failures.

BASIS FOR NIGERIA'S CONSTITUTION.

It has been said that Nigeria is a British creation; that the Nigerians of today speak many different languages and have different customs and religions and that for these reasons only a constitution which brings them into the minimum contact will suit the country. It is claimed that it is for these reasons also that the Colonial Office began the Regional system which parochial-minded men have seized upon to create three separate states with Prime Ministers while Nigeria, as a nation, is without a Government and Prime Minister. The NEPU regards Nigeria as a good creation although the British motive for bringing it about was to make their domination of the area easy.

The NEPU also believes that differences of Religion, customs and language are not impediments to the unification of the peoples of a single territory as has been shown by the United Kingdom and Belgium examples. Nigeria has the good fortune of having large Muslim Communities in the North and West as there are pagans in the North and South and Christians in almost every

corner of the country. It believes further that the factors of tolerances and community of interests which have welded many distinct ancient Kingdoms into one vigorous and great British nation also exist to weld into a single Nigerian nation our own old and varied communities in this territory the creation of which we owe to the vision of the early British Administrators.

This Party holds, as modern political scholars hold, that the overriding factors for unity within given territory are (a) Community of interests (b) Economic problems and (c) The Existence of external factors which withhold or threaten the full independence of the people in an area. The desire of the people of Nigeria for progress, comfort and freedom is the same all over. The complementary nature of the resources of the different parts of the country emphasises the need for a single direction of economic development to benefit all the people alike.

The NEPU recognises the existence of a strict Federal Structure in the country today. But the Party believes that while the size of the country necessitates the need for a measure of decentralisation in Government, it considers this strict Federal System as entirely unsuitable to the circumstances of Nigeria and opposed to the forms of government in countries such as Canada and India where there are diversities in the population as there are in Nigeria.

The Party's opposition is not to a Federal Constitution as such, but to the nature or type of the Federal Constitution considering the examples of countries mentioned above and the need for the tendency in the world today towards strong central

governments.

The NEPU therefore holds that the basis of a satisfactory constitution for Nigeria is the Quasi-Federal System as practised in Canada until a Constituent Assembly considers a Constitution for the country on attaining independence.

For this purpose, the Party still stands by what it proposed during both the London and Lagos Conferences of 1953/4 respectively and that is...

1. The London Conference must be preceded by a categorical declaration by the leaders of all Nigerian political parties (both invited and otherwise to the London Conference) that fear, suspicion and hatred are not only inimical to Nigeria's interests but that they are agreed upon exploiting ways and means of removing them from the midst of the Peoples of the whole territory.
2. That the great desire of the simple people of Nigeria and their ultimate outlook transcends the North, the West, the East and the Cameroons and that they visualise something greater and that is Great Nigeria.
3. Until Independence, the Police, Judiciary and Higher Education should be Central matters.
4. Reserved Powers be in the Centre not only for political reasons but for psychological ones. Political, because it is easier for the Central Authority to surrender power to the Regions than

the other way. Psychological because feelings of greatness exist in the minds of Nigerians today for such powers vested in the Centre.

5. A Central Ministry for Internal Security and Order throughout the country be created. This is in the light of NEPU experiences since these subjects were Regionalised.
6. Fundamental Rights be incorporated in the Nigerian Constitution. These rights should include the right of appeal to the highest court of the land, the right of bail, the right for free election and that is direct election with single member constituencies, secret ballot and campaign without being molested, discriminated against on the ground of party affiliation or religion.

FEDERAL AND REGIONAL LEGISLATURES.

There is need for increasing the number and structure of membership of the House of Representatives. The NEPU therefore proposes that there should be in addition to the House of Representatives a Senate.

The membership of the House of Representatives should be increased to 240 and the Upper House should be represented by three members per province throughout Nigeria.

The allowances of the members of the House of Representatives should be cut to be commensurate with the economic condition of Nigeria and in order to drive away as many as possible those who participate for personal gains.

The membership of the Regional Houses should be left as

at present so that Regional Constituencies should be larger than the Federal Constituencies.

The post of Regional Prime Ministers should be abolished and the heads of Regional Governments to be known as Leaders of Government Business. The NEPU believes that with the reduction in the functions of Regional Governments with regards to Justice, Security, Higher Education, the country will be relieved of the burdens of paying double ministries both in the Centre and the Regions.

SELF-GOVERNMENT AND INDEPENDENCE.

The NEPU holds that all Nigerian Governments should be self-governing in all matters within their jurisdiction from 1956, The Party believes that the date should be decided this year at which Nigerians will assume full responsibility for their external affairs and other functions of an independent sovereign state. In all matters within the competence of the Regional Legislatures, the Federal House should have power of disallowance and the Powers of both Federal and Regional Legislatures shall be subject to the interpretation by the Courts.

The NEPU believes that the uniformity of Electoral System and Laws throughout Nigeria is essential for the unity and democratic government of the country. The Party holds the view that apart from the larger number of educated Nigerians in the South, the majority of the people in that part are no better in any way in deciding public education than Nigerians in the North. The NEPU therefore believes that with the experience of India, the Sudan, the Gold Coast and the South of Nigeria in recent

years, all the people of Nigeria can take part in a direct uniform election. The Report of the British Parliamentary Hansard Society on "Problems of Parliamentary Government in the Colonies" supports the view that illiteracy is no longer an impediment to the direct election. The vital problem is that of freedom of assembly, freedom to campaign and freedom of opposition. The NEPU strongly proposes that a Neutral Election Commission be set up.

HOW MANY STATES ?

The NEPU has always supported the view that states should be smaller in size than the present Regions. It has supported the idea because it feels that the present Regions are artificial units and therefore it is desirable to create a feeling of harmony, avoid the domination of one region by another and the threat of secession. The position is more difficult with the North than with the South. The NEPU believes that it will be foolish to split one region just for the sake of creating states and it is more foolish to split the Southern Region into Benin Delta State and the Ogoja-Calabar State and leave one Region as an octopus. The vital questions are (1) Is it desirable to have states in the interest of Nigerian Federation? (2) Is it practicable? (3) By what standard should we judge? (4) Are we in the position to assess the cause? At the present time the demand comes from the Benin-Delta Party, the Ogoja-Calabar people, the United Middle Belt Congress, the Bornu Youth Movement, the North East Convention Peoples Party and the Katagum Peoples Union as well as the Kilba State Union. To answer these questions, the NEPU feels, the subject must be on the agenda to

be discussed by the conference with the representatives of the separatist movements to give evidence. But the sole determining factor will be the Constituent Assembly after independence.

CONCLUSIONS.

The NEPU observes the effect of party politics on the transition from dependent to sovereign states. In India, the fact that there was only the Congress Party for many years has given the country a stability which has enabled her to play a leading role in world affairs and to obtain much economic support so soon after independence. In Indonesia on the other hand, the rivalry of many parties has resulted in instability and chaos during nearly a decade of independence. In the Sudan, the closing of ranks by the parties has led to the achievement of independence sooner than would have been the case, had there been political party strife.

In the Gold Coast, on the other hand, what has been hailed as a great West African experiment in self government, is threatened at its very final stage by factions in the nature of opposing political parties and the hope of orderly transition and early stability which will win world confidence, is being dispelled.

The lesson for Nigeria here is twofold. First, that a period of tranquility should be found in the last stage from 1956 before complete independence to build up truly national parties with efficient organisation. Second, that in the period, a Federal Government of all parties, should prepare the country for independence; and that the energies and varying talents of

Nigerians should be collectively devoted to removing any inequalities and causes of suspicion such as the effect of migrant communities on local independence before the heavier burdens of external affairs and defence are added to the task of self government.

This Party believes that given the tolerance and mutual respect and the over-riding desire of her people to build a great nation, Nigeria can attain the status and the degree of independence which even great India enjoys in the world today.

(Signed) Aminu Kano

for NEPU Political Secretariat,
2, Yoruba Road,
P.O. Box 370
Kano.

APPENDIX IV

Case No.1/59 of 14/1/59

Mr. Yusufu Tailor (m) Hausa Moslem of Lokoja

Vs.

Umasasan (m) Kakand Moslem of Lokoja Cantonment.

On account of insulting Sir Alhaji Ahmadu Sardauna
of Sokoto

Proceedings.

Alkali M. Yusufu, What is your complaint?

M. Yusufu I am suing him for insulting Alhaji Ahmadu Sardauna, Premier of the Northern Region. The insulting words used, if not because of a court case, even if in a dream I use such words to my elder. I must pay alms but I am bound to explain the insulting words used to the court, and Umasasan will be responsible for the Sin. Umasasan who is the Organizing Secretary of the Action Group was on a table together with his supporters when he said the Sardauna who you call the Grandson of Shehu that you support - his master Awolowo told him that they were together for seven days at London with the Sardauna without his saying his prayers and he said to his people that the Sardauna was a pagan and his people shouted that Sardauna is a pagan. This was repeated twice. At the third time one N.P.C. supporter took a stick but was prevented by Maman Hadejia from taking it and then the lecture was

dispensed. This happened on Friday about 6:30 p.m. On the following day which was Saturday I took the complaint to the Mixed Court and paid the summons fee and I was given a receipt. Then Mr. Garba sent Alhaji Messenger to inform Umasasan that he has been summonsed and should appear in court on Monday. When Monday came Umasasan did not appear. I asked Mr. Garba - Did you allow him to go on his journey without answering the call of the Court? He answered that he did not permit him to go. Later on I withdrew my case to Kwara 'B' Court. That is the reason of my complaint.

Alkali Umasasan, Do you hear his statement? Was it how the matter went? or How?

Umasasan I heard the statement but that was not what happened. I did not mention anybody's name, because in our order it does not say we should mention anybody's name, and I did not mention anybody's name.

Alkali Umasasan tell the truth. Did you not mention paganism during your lecture?

Umasasan I did not mention anything like that during my lecture.

Alkali M. Yusufu. You hear? Have you anything to say to him?

M. Yusufu I have a reply to give him, because he made the insult in public and I have three witnesses.

Alkali Umasasan. Do you hear? You are denying and
M. Yusufu said that he has witness.

Umasasan I am asking M. Yusufu where did I give my lecture
that you know?

M. Yusufu The place where you gave the lecture, it was
there Lugard Hall and that was the place you made
the insult.

Alkali Umasasan, you hear, he has told you where you gave
the lecture, is it not so?

Umasasan Before we gave our lecture I obtained a permit and
apart from today I do not know anything that has
brought us together but I gave a lecture.

Alkali M. Yusufu you hear he is still denying. Have you
anything more to say?

M. Yusufu Umasasan as you are denying ~~do~~ you agree that you
gave a lecture.

Umasasan M. Yusufu I gave a lecture but I do not know the
reason of the insult I made.

M. Yusufu Umasasan, you know about the insult you made and
for which I have summonsed you.

Alkali Umasasan, when M. Yusufu summonsed you before that
Mixed Court Lokoja did you answer the summons on
Monday? Did you appear?

Umasasan On Monday I did not go to the Court I did wrong.

Alkali Umasasan, how did you give your lecture that it
became so?

Umasasan I gave a lecture in the first instance by telling

the people Action Group policy and in the second place by criticizing N.P.C. I told the gathering that on Thursday the N.P.C. said that A.G. are pagans because they are following a pagan leader. So I told the people that this is not a surprising thing because N.P.C. made an alliance with N.C.N.C. therefore they too are become pagans. Then I said to the people that who calls N.P.C. pagan because there is no connection between politics and religion, because Shehu Usuman who distributed flags did not know anything about political parties. Therefore my people don't you say that Action Group is pagan and that you should resign from it, because it is such a time that has come, moreover the N.P.C. who say that they have money and they are the Government, they say we are slaves. Will, look, I have got up on a table, they will come to arrest me. I am giving a lecture, I also said there are N.P.C. everywhere but the N.P.C. in Lokoja is not good. Also I said that in other places where there is N.P.C. they are bringing benefit with what they do, not so the N.P.C. in Lokoja. The reason for my saying this is that here in Lokoja there are no indigenous people only strangers. Because the leader of the N.P.C. is a stranger, if he gains in Lokoja he will take to his home town. Hence I said N.P.C. have not a good and honest leader

therefore they cannot get any benefit. Again Lokoja N.P.C. and the Government are not in agreement. They are like NEPU and N.P.C. Therefore I said to my people when you hear the N.P.C. are calling the A.G. thieves don't you mind their sayings, even the Awolowo Cards are being insulted by N.P.C. and that Awolowo's are useless cards, thief, do not follow him. I also said to my people that N.P.C. are in the habit of calling me thief, thief as I go along the road. Don't take any notice because they will not do anything because we have already overcome them. Also he will say that we are leaving them alone because our party will not find trouble with them. From then I told the people "Salati Goma goma da Annabi". Then we prayed that God would give us plenty of money. That is the end of my statement.

Alkali

Umasasan you agree that you have explained the lecture that you gave. The N.P.C. witness M. Yusufu said that you insulted Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto, tell us the truth - I insulted him or I did not insult him. You also said that the N.P.C. are insulting A.G. and you reported the matter to Mr. Jibrin, the Inspector who settled the matter between you. Is it not so?

Umasasan

I did mention Sardauna's name but I did not say he is a pagan.

- Alkali M. Yusufu. You hear; have you any question to ask him?
- M. Yusufu I have a question to ask him. When he said he did not mention his name, I have witnesses who heard him mention his name.
- Alkali Umasasan. You hear he has witnesses who heard you mention his name.
- Umasasan I heard, let him bring his witnesses because I did not mention his name.
- Alkali M. Yusufu. You hear, have you any more questions?
- M. Yusufu Umasasan. My question is this - What is 'Ribado' in Arabic?
- Umasasan M. Yusufu, I do not know.
- M. Yusufu Umasasan I want you to distinguish between a stranger and a native of Lokoja because you said we are strangers in Lokoja.
- Umasasan M. Yusufu, I do not know. Do you want me to go into the market and collect them? I am a native and you are strangers.
- Alkali M. Yusufu, where are your witnesses who heard this insult.
- M. Yusufu These are my witnesses:
(1) M. Uman (2) Garba Gagare and (3) Sheriff Manman, they are my witnesses who heard with their ears.
- Alkali M. Uman, what do you know about the time when Umasasan was giving a lecture? Tell us the truth for God's sake.

Uman I will tell the truth for God's sake. I was at the place, Umasasan climbed on to the table and was giving the lecture, then he said that the leader of the N.P.C., Sardauna he heard from his leader Obafemi Awolowo that when they were at London for the Conference with Sardauna he never saw the Sardauna say his prayers and they were together for seven days. That was what he said and he further said that in doing so he showed paganism. That is what I heard. He also said that his people should say Sardauna is a pagan. I heard this with my ears.

Alkali Garba Gagare what did you hear that Umasasan said when he was giving the lecture? Tell me the truth for God's sake.

Garba Gagare I heard from Umasasans mouth that his leader Awolowo said that they were together in London for seven days and Alhaji Bello Sardauna of Sokoto N.P.C. leader did not say his prayers. I heard so from his mouth. He also said that his people should call him a pagan. I heard so from Umasasan's mouth.

Alkali Umasasan do you hear what the witness said? Have you any questions to ask him or not?

Umasasan Garba Gagare, to what party do you belong?

Garba Gagare Umasasan, I am an N.P.C. member

Alkali Sheriff Manman, what did you hear when Umasasan was giving the lecture? Tell the truth for God's sake.

Sheriff
Manman

I heard Umasasan when he was giving the lecture and said that their leader Awolowo told him that when they went to London they stayed for seven days but did not see Ahmadu Bello Sardauna say his prayers. He said to his people that they should say the Sardauna is a pagan. His people also said 'a pagan, a pagan'.

Alkali

Umasasan, have you any question to ask him?

Umasasan

I have a question, to which party does he belong?

Sheriff
Manman

Umasasan, I am in the N.P.C. party.

Alkali

Umasasan, have you any question?

Umasasan

I have no more questions.

Alkali

Have you got witnesses in this matter?

Umasasan

I have a witness - He is Ndace, he is my witness.

Alkali

Ndace, what did you hear when Umasasan was giving a lecture? Tell the truth for God's sake. Remember that when you die you will be buried alone and not with anybody and therefore tell the truth.

Witness
Ndace

I saw Messenger gave a lecture and came down their he Umasasan climbed up and said how should Sardauna make alliance with the N.C.N.C. and not with Yorubas when Yorubas have been going on the Pilgrimage. Those Ibos who are pagans he Sardauna made an alliance with them, he has become the same as the pagans, I heard so from his mouth.

Alkali

M. Yusufu, have you any question to ask him?

M. Yusufu Ndace, from who did you hear that Sardauna was making an alliance with the Ibos, explain to me.

Alkali Ndace, do you hear? Have you anything to say?

Ndace M. Yusufu, I confirm I heard it from Umasasan.

Alkali Umasasan, you hear? Have you anything to say?

Umasasan M. Yusufu, you have a radio in your house, did you not hear?

M. Yusufu Umasasan, I did not hear so on the radio.

Umasasan If he said he did not hear it, that is all.

M. Yusufu Ndace, you did not explain all the words of the insult used by Umasasan because you are the President of the Action Group.

Ndace That was all I heard.

Alkali (1) M. Umah (2) M. Gagare (3) Sheriff Manman all of you can swear on the Koran that the evidence you gave was true?

Answer (1) M. Umah (2) Garba Gagare (3) Sheriff Manman, Yes we can swear on the Koran that, that was what we heard from his mouth.

Alkali Ndace, can you swear on the Koran that that was all you heard? You can swear that or what?

Ndace I will not swear because I spoke the truth.

Alkali Umasasan, did you hear the answer of your witness Ndace. I don't see the truth in his answer. Have you more witnesses?

Umasasan No, I have no more witnesses.

Alkali I do not prevent you calling any member of your party to give evidence in your favour.

Umasasan No more witness.

Judgement.

Alkali Umasasan, since you have confirmed to the Court that you mentioned Alhaji Ahmadu Sardauna's name and four witnesses have confirmed that you did mention his name during the lecture M. Yusufu is right. You yourself are educated in Arabic (almajiri), you also know it is a major offence for a man to get up at a lecture and mention somebody's name and insult him, how much more Sardauna Sokoto the leader such as Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello who is leading about three quarters of the people of this country. Had it not been that the N.P.C. supporters were patient and careful to lay their complaint in the Court it should have resulted in a fight which may lead to loss of life as happened in Bornu and it would not have been pleasant at all.

I will make it clear to the people that courts do not support any political party on such act. Anyone who allows himself to be brought before the Court on such offence he will be severely punished.

Since this is your first offence that you have committed on political activities the court sentence you to six months imprisonment, in

accordance with Moslem Law as contained in the book 'Mudawanati' eighty lashes for Kazaf and for insult sixty. But the Court will not beat you. You will be imprisoned for six months.

14/1/59

(Sgd.) ABUBAKAR
ALKALI KWARA.

14/1/59

APPENDIX V

NEPU POEMS AND SONGS

WAKAR YAN SAWABA JOS; 25/1/54

TSARI DAGA HANNUN MALAM GAMBO HAWAJA

"Allahu taimaki nepu kan azzalumai"

A:

Kaka uba bai fidda dansa ga hallaka,

In dan yace bai kama hanyar gaskiya.

Kumaga misali jalla ya saukar mana,

Aya akan kana'ana inda ya dulmaya.

Kai mai kirarin martabar kaka tsaya,

Katuna Hassan da Husseini sun riki gaskiya.

Bar takamar kakanka banga fitarkaba,

Kakanka baya yin hannu da baturiya.

Kuma bashi cewa goro ai masa jangali,

Kuma bai kawa da nasara baya shan giya.

Danwane jikan wane bata isar maka,

Allahu yace sai kana bin gaskiya.

Gemunka har sajenka bashi da martaba,

Indai yazam aikinka babu na gaskiya.

Mai daura bante in ya bayyana gaskiya,

Ya zarce mai rawanin da keson dulmaya.

Da martabar kaka ka mulkin duniya,

Awolowo waye ya bashi pirimiya.

Kai gafara sa ya isheni ku dakata,

Bana gudu sai naga goshin saniya.

Sun raina hanyar Shehu sun bijire masa,

Basa bukatar lahira sai dukiya.

Su dai su hau buick ko su sauka a hiltasha,

Ran Jumma'a ran nan suke shagalin giya.

Da yayi imani ya dubi mazan gaba,

Da sukai sarautan duniya baki daya.

Basu shuka sharran don cuci waninsu ba,

Su dai shirindasukai ataimaki zuriya.

Duk Annabawa mursalai da sukai gaba

Sunbauta Allah suntsaya bisa gaskiya.

Jikan ma'aiki wanda ankai duniya,

Har lahira dominsu sun riki gaskiya.

Kai gaskami mai kasuwa daya dakata,

Ka tuna da Allah gara ka rage fariya.

In kaki zakai sammakon bubukuwa,

Jama'a mu tsira da shehu kaiko kasha wuya.

B:

Bana cikin N.P.C. banason shiga,

Manyansu basa taimakon Nijeria.

Na raina jam'iyyarsu masu abin fada,

Nina tsaya ~~kan~~ NEPU tutar gaskiya.

Tutar da bata jahili bazalimi,

Da baki da ja kore farar tatsaniya.

In banda wawa jahili da rashin shina,

Wazaibi jam'iyyar da batada gaskiya.

Wallahi Allah zangaya maku yan'uwa,

Talakan dake N.P.C. bashi da zuciya.

Daga dai kawali sai barori ke shiga,

Sai wanda zaiki ubansadonkwadayin miya.

Kuma mai kudinda kaganshi yashiga tabba,

Ya raina nasa yana bidan na haramiya.

Kune talaka uba talaka uwa haka,

Wai harda dan Sarki kukegama jam'iyya.

Kurdinku ya rudeku kunyi abin fada,

Don kunki bin asalinku kunbi masha giya.

Komai kudi ko malaminda ya karkata,

Allahu shawo kansa muyi masa fatiya.

Yau ba maki dan NEPU sai azzalimi,

Sai jahilin talakan dake son dulmaya.

Sai wanda Allah yaishi bashi da hankali,

Sai masu neman hallaka dondukiya.

Sai tajiran nan masu son bashin tsiya,

Wai za'a basu kudi suna ta dawainiya.

Sun manta kyauta wanda allah yai musu,

Su dai nufinsu a basu bashi ba biya.

Wannan kudi kwa jisu baku gane suba,

Don Allah alhaji wane daina dawainiya.

Talakan dake N.P.C. kunyi abin fada,

Gugan dake yasa dashi ayi rijiya.

In anka sami ruwa agun shan bandashi,

Kafin jimawa saiku ganshi ariri.

Kai dan talaka ka daure gindin zalimi,

Domin a cuci ubanka har kayi dariya.

Mu ba ruwan mu da masu son azzalimi,

Balle fa shi azzalimi wawan tsiya.

Talakanda ke N.P.C. ga sunanka nan,

Kaine gurufa kai dage ki zuriya.

Tsohonku na noma guminsa yana diga,

Wai kunfi so kuma kar aganshi da dukiya.

C:

Tsuguna katashi akwai shi anfansar kare,

Ansayi biri da kudinsagara gidanjiya.

A cikin minista goma wanda ka tarkato,

Waye talaka cikinsu nayi muku tambaya?

Daga wane sai dan wane su aka tarkata,

Kunsan abin nan nasu babu na gaskiya.

Ja ma'a hadin nanko kadan bai zaunu ba,

Tanpar adama kunu idan ansa miya.

Ko kuwa abaiwa kura amanar tinkiya,

Jama'a biri yaya zaiyi gadin gujiya.

D:

N.P.C. jaba baku son hangen gaba,

Don mujiya dai bashiso yagakurciya.

Inuwar giginya banga amfaninta ba,

Saidai na nesa ka shanta nata yasha wuya.

Maye yakan manta idan yaga an jima,

Amma uwar ya harta kaura a duniya.

Tubar muzuru banga amfaninsaba,

Wani an hanashi rawa yanayi

Mana rausaya.

E:

Mune nutanen nan da munka fito bidar

Yanci ya samu a tsarkake nijeriya.

Ita jam'iyyan nan NEPU ta dau anniya,

Sai taga bayan zaluminga masha giya.

Ta dau makamai sunfi bom har bindiga,

Kun sansu ko in fadesu sune gaskiya.

Igwa da bom bai magani inta zaka,

Wake da ikon dankofewa gaskiya.

F:

Kai fankashali sha zumami dakata,

Kwaron da bashi danasa sai kwalamar tsiya.

Kai baka noma ba fatauci ko kadan,

Kuma basana'a sai yawan faharin tsiya.

Na tabbata dan NEPU ba zai soka,

Tanfar kudan shadda ya sauka akan miya.

Mu NEPU mune kainuwa bisa kan ruwa,

Wawan da zai takamu shi zai dulmaya.

Ga NEPU dutsi ba'a farmaka nan da nan,

In munka farma zalimi zaishawuya.

Mune tsakin tsakuwa agun azzalumai,

Kafin acimu aradu sai an sha wuya.

Kai turdimi jaki dakikin duniya,

Katon cikin wofi na cinye haramiya.

WAKAR YANCIN NEPU SAWABA

Ya Ta 'ala Jalla Sarkin Rahama;
 Ga mu mun taso da halin azama;
 Taimako na gunka Sarki Mai-sama;
 Don mu 'san yanci da adalcin zama;
 YA TA'ALA JALLA GA NIJERIYA.

Mun nufato bamu tsoron wahala;
 Gafara sa duk mutum mai gafala;
 Lokacin yau namu ne ba shagala;
 Za mu sau komai mu jure wahala;
 YA TA'ALA JALLA GA NIJERIYA;

Za mu ture dukiya har rayuka;
 Mu na yau'yan yau mazajen aiyuka;
 Kan tafarki' mustakimi mun zaka;
 HAGGYALAN duk masu danne talaka;
 YA TA'ALA JALLA GA NIJERIYA.

Zamani ya juye komai na jiya;
 Mun riga mun dauki tutar zuriya;
 Don mu ceto Ummun a Nijeriya;
 Har mu bar suna a wannan duniya;
 YA TA'ALA JALLA GA NIJERIYA.

SAWABA.

BAYANIN WAKA

Kowace kabila a duniya ta na da abinda a ke kira "WAKAR WADANIYYA" wato wakar da a ke yinta don a nuna abinda ke karkashin zuciyar jama'a.

A nan kasar Nijeriya muna da jam'iiyyoyi da dama amma ba mu san watta har yanzu da ta wake duddugin imaninta ba sai NEPU.

Don haka tilas ne kowane dan NEPU ya haddace wannan waka ya kuma san yadda a ke rerata.

Political Secretariat
17 Sudawa Kano City.
16/11/1953.

WAKAR YANCI (Possibly Dated: 1956)

By M. Sa'adu Zungur

A:

Komai na Arewa da bambanci,

Da al'ummomi sunfi dari.

Cinikinsu dabam aikinsu dabam,

Ilminsu dabam don ba nazari.

Cinikinsu kamar wandonsu yake,

Bujensu da bashi da alkadari.

Aikinsu kamar rawaninsu yake,

Daure-dauren banza ba nazari.

Ilminsu kamar rigarsu yake,

Ga yawa ba amfani na-gari.

B:

An ce ikon komai nagun,

Sarki wai don shike da gari.

Amma Razdan, D.O. da wasunsu,

Mashawarta ne ba garari.

Kar yar banza kar yar wofi,

Suke da gari suke wadari.

Suke da wuka suke fita,

Mulkin jama'a kan garari.

Ai Sarakai kan hotan ni ne,

Na Sarautun al'ada a gari.

Razdan, D.O. dasu E'D.O.,

Suke da mabudin al'amari.

Komai suka kulla sai D.O.,

Yasa hannu kuma yai nazari.

Koda sha'anin addini ne,

In ya taba daular masu gari.

Koda sha'anin al'adane,

Balle fa siyasar yan garari.

C:

Daga yau mun dauki makamanmu,

Na kisan zalunci masu gari.

Domin halshe ne kansakali,

Mashi kuwa alkalami na gari.

Gaski yace zamu fito mu fada,

Ko ana dauri har kan zakari.

Gaskiya launinta guda dayane,

Ko a fadan Fir'aunan garari.

Mun gane gizo na nasara bare,

Na baransu minista yan garari.

Ya Rabbi ka fidda Arewa cikin,

Dauri tan-tan-tan mai hadari.

Yan fince dasu da nasaransu,

Sun kulla abutan masu gari.

Sun kulla abuta ba rabuwa,

Sai randa gizami yagaji gari.

D:

Masu rera jawabin alfahari:

Waitalaka talolon masu gari.

Asaka masa kurdi don garari,

Tilas yabida ya kiyayi mari.

Sarka, gigar, ankwa da mari,

Duk makamai ne nakisan garari.

Mu biya gandu mu biya sufuri,

Mu biya tikitin mota agari.

Da kudin lasin da kudin ushuri,

Agaban Alkalin masu gari.

Da kudin tallan rumfar mazari,

Da dukkan hajja har mundawari.

In kayi apil aikayi barin,

Kurdinka a tabkin yan garari.

A YAU BA MAKI NEPU SAI WAWA 1/1/55

By Malam Gambo Hawaja.

A:

1. Ta'alakaban taimakon kanmu,
 Kamaishemu kayin magautanmu,
 Kakawo sawaba kasashenmu,
 Kasatalakawa suzabemu,
 Ka maishemu ya'ya' kamar kowa.
2. Ku dubo mutuncin kasashenmu,
 Da ilmi akwai zuriyartamu,
 SHARI'AH da ke ba kamar tamu,
 A yau babu girman Sarakanmu,
 Su N.P.C. sun kaiwa Turawa.
3. Dasu anka tauye Sarakanmu,
 Ka maishesu, sune wakilanmu,
 A yau sunki aiki da ilminmu,
 SHARI'ARMU saiko aba tamu,
 Da Sarki da Alkali Turawa.
4. Nasara bukatarsa dai samu,
 Yadai yadaku malaman namu,
 Yasa duk subar yin SHARI'AR mu,
 Da Allah ya aikowa Manzonmu,
 Ku san ba abinki ya Turawa.
5. Da Sarki kaza tajiran namu,
 Da Alkali manyan kasashenmu,

Nasara garara ya maishemu,

Ya turo su suma su turomu,

Su N.P.C. jagora ne wawa.

6. Nasara ya jawo magautanmu,

Yace su ka jagora dominmu,

Muje za'a bude idanunmu,

Ashe lamfa ce donsu cucemu,

Mu fada a dajinda ba kowa.

7. Su cuce mu don ba idanunmu,

Suna shafa tutu a kwariyarmu,

Kuda na rufewa a binnemu,

Muce zamu gyara su karemu,

Kwadai ne ya rudeku kun wawa

8. Mu nemo mutenCin mutanenmu,

Mu koyarda ilmin iyayenmu,

Nagargajiya don ya ficcemu,

Mu zam tsarkakewa ibadanmu,

Mu bautawa Allahu maikowa.

9. Abin nan fa ya dami kowanmu,

Mu roka ga Allahu Sarkinmu,

Ya ficcemu sharrin magautanmu,

Gama NEPU saita wakilcemu,

Mu sam martaba koga Turawa.

10. Ku dubo kasace kaman namu,

A ce bamu iko da kayanmu,

Mazaje da ya'ya' da matanmu,

Da igiyoyi nabauta gindinmu,

A yau muka bauta gasu wawa.

B:

1. Dakogi da dajida gonanmu,

Gidaje da ya'ya' da matanmu

Dawaki da shanu tumakinmu,

Kubar lasafaga maharbanmu,

Ayau bamu ikon mukar giwa.

2. Kamar dorina ma a tapkinmu,

Kaza rakuman nan nabajinmu,

Halas ne ga duk dan kasashenmu,

Ayau ba maharbi guda namu,

Dazai karsu in banda Turawa.

3. Mutanenmu ko har Sarakanmu,

Ina wanda zai harbi giwanmu,

A warwashe nama a haulanmu,

Da haure a kai kasuwowinmu,

Haram babu sai dai ga Turawa.

4. Jama'a masifa ta samemu,

Na bautadda ya'y'an kasashenmu,

Da mun sari icce a kamo mu,

Aje duk a dauro iyalanmu,

Ina kwanci yar hankalin kowa.

5. Idan banda N.P.C. wawanmu,

Jos, ga ci yawa a dajinmu,

Ace bamu yanka da laujenmu,

Tutur sai da famet a hannunmu,

Harajin ciyawa ga Turawa.

6. Suna kebe daji a gonanmu,

Suce gonakin Gwamna kayanmu,

Da an tadda ganye a hannunmu,

Akamo mu sai anci taranmu,

Itacenmu anbaiwa Turawa.